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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: RMF who wrote (37416)9/28/2009 9:00:59 AM
From: DuckTapeSunroof  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Op-Ed Columnist: Obama at the Precipice

September 27, 2009
By FRANK RICH
nytimes.com

THE most intriguing, and possibly most fateful, news of last week could not be found in the health care horse-trading in Congress, or in the international zoo at the United Nations, or in the Iran slapdown in Pittsburgh. It was an item tucked into a blog at ABCNews.com. George Stephanopoulos reported that the new “must-read book” for President Obama’s war team is “Lessons in Disaster” by Gordon M. Goldstein, a foreign-policy scholar who had collaborated with McGeorge Bundy, the Kennedy-Johnson national security adviser, on writing a Robert McNamara-style mea culpa about his role as an architect of the Vietnam War.

Bundy left his memoir unfinished at his death in 1996. Goldstein’s book, drawn from Bundy’s ruminations and deep new research, is full of fresh information on how the best and the brightest led America into the fiasco. “Lessons in Disaster” caused only a modest stir when published in November, but The Times Book Review cheered it as “an extraordinary cautionary tale for all Americans.” The reviewer was, of all people, the diplomat Richard Holbrooke, whose career began in Vietnam and who would later be charged with the Afghanistan-Pakistan crisis by the new Obama administration.

Holbrooke’s verdict on “Lessons in Disaster” was not only correct but more prescient than even he could have imagined. This book’s intimate account of White House decision-making is almost literally being replayed in Washington (with Holbrooke himself as a principal actor) as the new president sets a course for the war in Afghanistan. The time for all Americans to catch up with this extraordinary cautionary tale is now.

Analogies between Vietnam and Afghanistan are the rage these days. Some are wrong, inexact or speculative. We don’t know whether Afghanistan would be a quagmire, let alone that it could remotely bulk up to the war in Vietnam, which, at its peak, involved 535,000 American troops. But what happened after L.B.J. Americanized the war in 1965 is Vietnam’s apocalyptic climax. What’s most relevant to our moment is the war’s and Goldstein’s first chapter, set in 1961. That’s where we see the hawkish young President Kennedy wrestling with Vietnam during his first months in office.

The remarkable parallels to 2009 became clear last week, when the Obama administration’s internal conflicts about Afghanistan spilled onto the front page. On Monday The Washington Post published Bob Woodward’s account of a confidential assessment by the top United States and NATO commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, warning that there could be “mission failure” if more troops aren’t added in the next 12 months. In Wednesday’s Times White House officials implicitly pushed back against the leak of McChrystal’s report by saying that the president is “exploring alternatives to a major troop increase in Afghanistan.”

As Goldstein said to me last week, it’s “eerie” how closely even these political maneuvers track those of a half-century ago, when J.F.K. was weighing whether to send combat troops to Vietnam. Military leaders lobbied for their new mission by planting leaks in the press. Kennedy fired back by authorizing his own leaks, which, like Obama’s, indicated his reservations about whether American combat forces could turn a counterinsurgency strategy into a winnable war.

Within Kennedy’s administration, most supported the Joint Chiefs’ repeated call for combat troops, including the secretaries of defense (McNamara) and state (Dean Rusk) and Gen. Maxwell Taylor, the president’s special military adviser. The highest-ranking dissenter was George Ball, the undersecretary of state. Mindful of the French folly in Vietnam, he predicted that “within five years we’ll have 300,000 men in the paddies and jungles and never find them again.” In the current administration’s internal Afghanistan debate, Goldstein observes, Joe Biden uncannily echoes Ball’s dissenting role.

Though Kennedy was outnumbered in his own White House — and though he had once called Vietnam “the cornerstone of the free world in Southeast Asia” — he ultimately refused to authorize combat troops. He instead limited America’s military role to advisory missions. That policy, set in November 1961, would only be reversed, to tragic ends, after his death. As Bundy wrote in a memo that year, the new president had learned the hard way, from the Bay of Pigs disaster in April, that he “must second-guess even military plans.” Or, as Goldstein crystallizes the overall lesson of J.F.K.’s lonely call on Vietnam strategy: “Counselors advise but presidents decide.”

Obama finds himself at that same lonely decision point now. Though he came to the presidency declaring Afghanistan a “war of necessity,” circumstances have since changed. While the Taliban thrives there, Al Qaeda’s ground zero is next-door in nuclear-armed Pakistan. Last month’s blatantly corrupt, and arguably stolen, Afghanistan election ended any pretense that Hamid Karzai is a credible counter to the Taliban or a legitimate partner for America in a counterinsurgency project of enormous risk and cost. Indeed, Karzai, whose brother is a reputed narcotics trafficker, is a double for Ngo Dinh Diem, the corrupt South Vietnamese president whose brother also presided over a vast, government-sanctioned criminal enterprise in the early 1960s. And unlike Kennedy, whose C.I.A. helped take out the Diem brothers, Obama doesn’t have a coup in his toolbox.

Goldstein points out there are other indisputable then-and-now analogies as well. Much as Vietnam could not be secured over the centuries by China, France, Japan or the United States, so Afghanistan has been a notorious graveyard for the ambitions of Alexander the Great, the British and the Soviets. “Some states in world politics are simply not susceptible to intervention by the great powers,” Goldstein told me. He also notes that the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Vietnam share the same geographical advantage. As the porous border of neighboring North Vietnam provided sanctuary and facilitated support to our enemy then, so Pakistan serves our enemy today.

Most worrisome, in Goldstein’s view, is the notion that a recycling of America’s failed “clear and hold” strategy in Vietnam could work in Afghanistan. How can American forces protect the population, let alone help build a functioning nation, in a tribal narco-state consisting of some 40,000 mostly rural villages over an area larger than California and New York combined?

Even if we routed the Taliban in another decade or two, after countless casualties and billions of dollars, how would that stop Al Qaeda from coalescing in Somalia or some other criminal host state? How would a Taliban-free Afghanistan stop a jihadist trained in Pakistan’s Qaeda camps from mounting a terrorist plot in Denver and Queens?

Already hawks are arguing that any deviation from McChrystal’s combat-troop requests is tantamount to surrender and “immediate withdrawal.” But that all-in or all-out argument, a fixture of the Iraq debate, is just as false a choice here. Obama is not contemplating either surrender to terrorists or withdrawal from Afghanistan. One prime alternative is the counterterrorism plan championed by Biden. As The Times reported, it would scale back American forces in Afghanistan to “focus more on rooting out Al Qaeda there and in Pakistan.”

Obama’s decision, whichever it is, will demand all the wisdom and political courage he can muster. If he adds combat troops, he’ll be extending a deteriorating eight-year-long war without a majority of his country or his own party behind him. He’ll have to explain why more American lives should be yoked to the Karzai “government.” He’ll have to be honest in estimating the cost. (The Iraq war, which the Bush administration priced at $50 to $60 billion, is at roughly $1 trillion and counting.) He will have to finally ask recession-battered Americans what his predecessor never did: How much — and what — are you willing to sacrifice in blood and treasure for the mission?

If Obama instead decides to embrace some variation on the Biden option, he’ll have a different challenge. He’ll face even more violent attacks than he did this summer. When George Will wrote a recent column titled “Time to Get Out of Afghanistan,” he was accused of “urging retreat and accepting defeat” (by William Kristol) and of “waving the bloody shirt” (by Fred Kagan, an official adviser to McChrystal who, incredibly enough, freelances as a blogger at National Review). The editorial page at Will’s home paper, The Washington Post, declared that deviating from McChrystal’s demand for more troops “would both dishonor and endanger this country.” If a conservative columnist can provoke neocon invective this hysterical, just imagine what will be hurled at Obama.

But the author of “Lessons in Disaster” does not believe that a change in course in Afghanistan would be a disaster for Obama’s young presidency. “His greatest qualities as president,” Goldstein says, “are his quality of mind and his quality of judgment — his dispassionate ability to analyze a situation. If he was able to do that here, he might more than survive a short-term hit from the military and right-wing pundits. He would establish his credibility as a president who will override his advisers when a strategy doesn’t make sense.”

Either way, it’s up to the president to decide what he thinks is right for the country’s security, the politics be damned. That he has temporarily pressed the pause button to think it through while others, including some of his own generals, try to lock him in is not a sign of indecisiveness but of confidence and strength. It is, perhaps, Obama’s most significant down payment yet on being, in the most patriotic sense, Kennedyesque.

Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company



To: RMF who wrote (37416)9/28/2009 11:20:22 AM
From: Peter Dierks3 Recommendations  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 71588
 
The Last Stand of the West
Mary Katharine Ham
Friday, July 25, 2008

Note: America—and the West as a whole—cannot afford to ignore the battles waged, lessons learned and indignities suffered by the Israelis who share our values and fight to preserve them in the most inhospitable of climates.The following article is from the June issue of Townhall Magazine. To subscribe to twelve issues of Townhall Magazine and receive a free copy of Andrew Learsy's Over a Barrel: Breaking Oil's Grip On Our Future, click here.

In the hilltop neighborhood of Gilo in south-western Jerusalem, the chilly spring wind sweeps up through the town of Beit Jala below, bringing with it the stinging sands of the West Bank.

An eight-foot-high wall takes the brunt of the dusty breeze, as it wings harmlessly up and over the modern barriers of a conflict as ancient as the sand it carries. The wall was built in 2000 to protect Israeli children in their schools from sniper fire from the valley just 100 yards below.

In the days of the second intifada, Gilo was hit 400 times over a two-year period by Palestinian militants, injuring residents and causing major property damage. Palestinian terrorists, moved by Yasser Arafat’s call to arms, had forcibly overtaken the homes and schools of Palestinian Christians in the West Bank town of Beit Jala to send terror into Israel, as indiscriminately as the desert winds that whisper through the quiet valley.

Decorated by Israelis with cartoon animals and idyllic family scenes, the high, concrete sniper wall of Gilo embodies the struggle of a people to protect children while preserving childhood. The wall is a struggle to be both safe and free.

The struggle is the same in Metulla and Qiryat Shemona, where the goal of the Israeli Defense Forces’ Northern Command is to give Israeli citizens near the Lebanon border a “liveable life” within sight of the bright yellow flag of Hezbollah.

The struggle is in the small town of Sderot in southern Israel, where children play soccer on short fields, the better to rush to a bomb shelter. They have only 15 seconds to run when a Code Red alarm warns of another Qassam rocket from the Gaza Strip.

It’s in Tel Aviv, where parents let their children walk out the door, hoping they don’t walk into a club or a bus whose name will live in infamy, such as the Dolphinarium (21 dead, 100 injured in a suicide bombing, 2001) or Bus 5 (22 dead, 50 injured in a suicide attack, 1994).

A Shared Enemy

It is easy in this, the 60th year of Israel’s existence, to believe blithely that the Middle East’s tiny besieged bastion of Western thought will continue to endure simply because it always has. But, what four hijacked American jetliners brought home to the United States in a horrific, towering blaze of national tragedy on Sept. 11, 2001, is that we are engaged in the same struggle.

Radical Islamists had tried to send the message before: when Islamic Jihad bombed the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in 1983, killing 63, and bombed a Marine barracks killing 242; when Hezbollah killed 19 servicemen at Khobar Towers in 1996; when al Qaeda struck two U.S. embassies in East Africa in 1998; and when the same group drove a dinghy into the U.S.S. Cole, killing 16 in 2000.

We neglected to draw the line from Sayiid Qutb’s short educational stint in Greeley, Colo., in 1948 to the holy war waged against us in 2001. We did not see that the cranky Egyptian scholar observed American culture with disdain. It was, after all, the year Israel won its independence by defeating four invading Arab armies—the Arabic word for the war is “The Catastrophe”—that Qutb first developed his distaste for the West.

We did not know that his almost comic dyspepsia would eventually metastasize into a declaration of all modern society as jahiliyya—the unredeemed period of history before the founding of Islam—making it open season for jihad on Jews, Christians, Westerners and even secular Muslims complicit in the maintenance of modernity itself. Qutb’s “scholarship” boasted such famous acolytes as Ayman al Zawahiri and Osama bin Laden, and fueled the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a branch of which now runs the Gaza Strip after wresting it violently from the more moderate Fatah party of the Palestinian Authority in summer 2007. That branch is Hamas, and it now smuggles tons of explosives per month into Gaza and has shot more than 2,700 rockets into the civilian population of southern Israel since disengagement.

Ayatollah Khomeini, the other father of radical Islamist thought and Qutb’s Shia counterpart and contemporary, founded an Islamic state in Iran that now unites the causes of extremist Islamists of all sects by funding the wars of Hamas and Hezbollah against Israel and the terrorism of extremists in Iraq against Iraqi and American forces.

This article is from the June issue of Townhall Magazine. To subscribe to twelve issues of Townhall Magazine and receive a free copy of Andrew Learsy's Over a Barrel: Breaking Oil's Grip On Our Future, click here.

President Bush has always advocated, wisely, taking terrorists at their word, famously using Osama bin Laden’s words in a 2005 speech to stress that among terrorists “there is no debate” about Iraq being central to the War on Terror.

In that spirit, these are the words of Hamas MP and Cleric Yunis Al-Astal preached on Al-Aqsa TV in April: “Very soon, Allah willing, Rome will be conquered. … Today, Rome is the capital of the Catholics … this capital of theirs will be an advanced post for the Islamic conquests, which will spread through Europe in its entirety, and then will turn to the two Americas, and even Eastern Europe.”

Make no mistake, it is the same fight. From the craggy hills of the West Bank to the lush heights of Golan, Israel is a testing ground for their tactics, a proving ground for their martyrs and a potential foothold for their bloody philosophy. The West cannot afford to ignore the battles waged, lessons learned and indignities suffered by those who share our values and fight to preserve them in the most inhospitable of climates.

Close Quarters, High Stakes

As an American, standing in Israel in 2008, it is hard not to simultaneously despair at the conundrum of our ally and admire the determination of its people.

From the desert hills of the West Bank, one can see Jerusalem, the sky-line of Tel Aviv and the Mediterranean Sea, a mere nine miles across the country from an area filled with its mortal enemies.

If one could look overhead and see the missile ranges of Israel’s neighbors painted red against a brilliant blue sky, they would be as inescapable as the sun’s blaze. Hezbollah’s Zelzal-2 reaches 130 miles, deep into Israel’s south where it meets up with the 12– to 24-mile range of Katyushas in Gaza. The entire country and surrounding regions are easily inside Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear aspirations.

“You can literally fight a battle in the morning and pick up your kids from kindergarten in the afternoon,” said a lieutenant colonel in the Israeli Army.

Those are the stakes.

The proximity has advantages and disadvantages. Israeli forces have cultivated human intelligence of varying ethnicities and Arabic dialects for years. Today, U.S. Marines travel to Israel twice a year for desert warfare training with the IDF, and the two countries share both intelligence findings and techniques, but there have been times when the U.S. has not always learned the lessons it should have from its old friends.

Gideon Ezra, former Deputy Head of the General Security Services in Israel and a current member of the Knesset with the centrist party of Kadima, knows well the value of human intelligence and the dangers of operating without it.

“I knew when you went into Iraq, you didn’t have enough Arabic speakers,” he said, shaking his head ruefully. “Without intelligence, you can’t learn. Intelligence is No. 1. We know, personally, everyone there,” he said, referring to Israeli operations in the West Bank and Gaza.

When Israel makes a mistake, either in tactic or negotiation, the consequences are visited immediately upon its civilian population. Israelis don’t have the luxury Americans are sometimes accused of indulging in—“going to the mall while the Marines go to war.” The Jerusalem mall could become the front lines within seconds.

“The departure was three years ago and then our lives changed,” said Sderot resident Chen Abrams of Israel’s disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005. “More than 60 missiles a day. … Life stops and it stops for a long time,” said the mother of one, who has decided to stay despite the barrage, though 10 percent of the town’s population has already left and more than 60 percent say they would if they had the means. Experts are afraid the ever-increasing threat of a nuclear strike from Iran could have the same effect on the entire country, effectively eliminating the state of Israel without having to nuke it.

In 2005, Israel ordered about 8,500 Jewish settlers to evacuate 21 settlements in Gaza, land occupied since the Six-Day War of 1967. The process was gut-wrenching, grown IDF soldiers weeping as they pulled fellow countrymen forcibly from their family homes. The cost was high, but the reward was a chance at peace.

Standing in Sderot today, one can see just two miles away the flat, dirt expanse left by the razing of Jewish settlements is now filled with Hamas training camps.

“Today, to say that Gaza Strip should be demilitarized, it sounds like a bad joke, ” said Brig. Gen. Yossi Kuperwasser of the IDF Reserves, with a bitter laugh.

Kuperwasser, after years of hopes lifted and crushed, has the same assessment of the West that Churchill had of Americans: It “can always be counted on to do the right thing ... after it has exhausted all other possibilities.”

In the north of Israel, civilians watched the same thing happen in Lebanon. When Israel withdrew to the internationally recognized borders from its security zone in southern Lebanon in 2000, it precipitated the arms build-up by Hezbollah that led to the 2006 war.

Though five weeks of fighting dented Hezbollah’s capabilities and sent Hassan Nasrallah to “live like a worm in the ground,” according to a major in the Israeli Army, withdrawal has allowed a build-up of rockets that will not go unfired.

This article is from the June issue of Townhall Magazine. To subscribe to twelve issues of Townhall Magazine and receive a free copy of Andrew Learsy's Over a Barrel: Breaking Oil's Grip On Our Future, click here.

Even so, news broke this spring that Israel, working through Turkey, may be willing to restart peace talks with Syria. The cost to Israel would be the Golan Heights, captured in the ’67 war, a strategic and aesthetic high point of Israel’s holdings. The reward, ostensibly, would be peace with a longtime enemy, though the outlook seems grim.

This is the twisted, exasperating road to peace in the Middle East, lined with potholes, corkscrews and roadside bombs, and Israel walks it because it must. They will not kneel in front of enemies, but they have determined they’ll be ready to sit down with them.

For most citizens, the withdrawal from Gaza illustrated Jewish willingness to endure pain for peace. The Left supported it at the time, the Right opposed it. Today, Left, Right and Center are joined in seeing the aftermath of disengagement as an illustration of Palestinian willingness to endure pain to prevent the very thing they claim to want.

Hamas regularly bombs border crossings where Israel ships humanitarian aid to Gazans. It attacks the fuel depot inside Israel, which supplies 70 percent of the power to Gaza. It threatens the Palestinian Authority’s grasp on the West Bank and renders negotiations meaningless.

“The people we’re dealing with don’t believe in solutions,” Kuperwasser said. “There’s a game going on. Everyone has a role and reads from the script, but everyone knows it’s just a game.”

Winning Like Westerners

And yet, Israel continues to practice restraint with Palestinian communities and other Arab neighbors who seem more and more willing to cast off the two-state solution in favor of a single solution for the Jews.

The security fence between the West Bank and Israel is a counterin-tuitive example of their attempts to coexist. Israel’s critics call it the “apartheid wall” and bemoan the separation it causes between the people of the region. But it was not the wall that caused the rift.

The first suicide attack of the second intifada happened in December 2000. In March 2002, 100 people died at the hands of Palestinian terrorists, the worst an attack on a Passover seder at a hotel in Natanya killing 29 and wounding 140.

They sent the traditional murderers—angry young men, unemployed and marginalized—but they also sent 17-year-old girls to blow up supermarkets, two brothers of 12 and 8 to blow up a Gaza settlement. All of Israel stood agape at this new form of evil.

The assault was particularly shocking given that Prime Minister Ehud Barak had moved further in the direction of Palestinian demands at the recent Camp David talks than any of his predecessors, even putting the division of Jerusalem on the negotiation table. Palestinians refused sweetened deal after sweetened deal without even a pause in the violence. It was a barbaric gambit to bring the West to its knees by bringing death to its door.

By 2004, Israel had decided to block its doorway. Today, a 400-mile barrier prevents 95 percent of Palestinian terror attacks, according to Israeli Defense Force officials.

In the center is an electronic intrusion-detection fence, which warns the IDF of breaches.

When a would-be terrorist trips the fence’s detection system, the IDF is signaled and responds within minutes. In many cases, the tracking is done with the help of Bedouins and Druze, tribal desert denizens who are part of Israeli society and offer their ancient expertise in reading the desert’s clues to the modern task of counter-terrorism. Most recently, the Bedouin Desert Battalion foiled an attack from Gaza on Passover Eve.

A mere 4 percent of the barrier is made of concrete, though that’s the section of it you’ll see most frequently in news reports. The concrete wall is reserved for densely populated areas and along highways where motorists would otherwise be subject to sniper fire.

The struggle is constant to minimize its impact on Palestinians while protecting Israelis. The fence boasts 44 gates to provide Palestinian farmers access to their crops. Israel has replanted thousands of olive trees for Palestinian farmers, to protect them from the route of the fence.

The very route of the fence is open to petitioning by Palestinians. In 2004, the Israeli Supreme Court sided with eight Palestinian communities over the army, ruling that the fence had to be moved to prevent further interference with the lives of Palestinians. There was a legislative attempt to get around the ruling, but then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon declared, “There is a court ruling, and we shall will it out.”

Palestinians have access to the Israeli Supreme Court, to an almost ludicrous degree, in fact. An IDF legal adviser—the equivalent of an American JAG—tells the story of a 2 a.m. bombing of a suspected weapons cache in Gaza interrupted by a last-minute petition to the Supreme Court by the owner of the house to be bombed. IDF troops were on the ground, evacuating the area and wiring the building when a secretary of the Supreme Court called the legal adviser to halt the operations. A Supreme Court judge had to be roused from sleep to hear a telephonic brief about the target in question and decide whether to grant an injunction stopping the operation.

“I think we play really safe,” the legal adviser said. “But even with all these limitations, we win.”

A “Liveable Life”

For Israel, that’s the bottom line: to defend itself while preserving its values, to win while remaining Western. Even the more cynical of Israeli military commanders will tell you as Kupperwassen does, “I believe in the West. I believe we will prevail.”

On the northern border, a major with the Northern Command is determined to provide a “liveable life” to the citizens in his charge. He looks to the hills of Lebanon and says that the second intifada had shown them the worst they could see, and they had survived.

In Jerusalem, a 17-year-old aspiring musician slumps in his chair over Sabbath dinner when he talks about putting his dreams on hold to serve his required stint in the Israeli Army. His mother shrugs her shoulders and explains that he was born into a world of war. When she took him home from the hospital, it was during the First Gulf War. The hospital provided her with a tiny baby gas mask for him.

They are not resigned to this life, but ready to live through it to another, more peaceful time. They are not inconsolable in the face of busted negotiations, but interested in reaching new ones that last. The struggle of Israel and the West in this fight is not about despair, but determination. It may also be about patience, a virtue about which the Jewish people have plenty to teach to other Westerners exhausted by seven years of bloody conflict against radical Islam.

As Yaacov Lozowick, Israeli scholar and archivist at Israel’s Holocaust Museum wrote in his, “Right to Exist:”

“My own opinion is that we have 150 years to go. The Muslim world resisted the Crusaders for 200 years until they finally gave up and left. From their perspecive, we are a second wave of Crusaders, uncalled-for invaders from West. … We have resisted their pressure for 50-plus years, which is more than they expected, but they remember that the first time around it took longer, and they can wait. Perhaps we will need to outlast the Crusaders before they begin to understand that we are another story—that for us, 200 years is as nothing when compared with 2,000. If that’s what it takes, so be it.”

For Americans, 200 years is all we know. In the years to come, when missiles may gain range, grievances may gain ground and enemies may gain new tools of destruction, we will see the lessons of Israel’s long struggle echoed in our tactics. We will see her technology echoed in our tools and her call for restraint echoed in our debates. And, if we are successful, we’ll always see the spirit of that colorful sniper wall in Gilo reflected in our determination to remain safe and free, to walk the frustrating line between security and freedom even when our enemies do not, and to do it well enough to win. Until one day, at long last, all the wind carries from Beit Jala to Gilo, from Gaza to Israel, from the Middle East to America, is sand.
.......................
Editor's note: Mary Katharine Ham's feature, "Last, Long Stand of the West," which appeared in the June issue of Townhall Magazine was written with information and interviews gathered during a March trip to Israel for American journalists paid for by the American Israel Education Foundation. The AIEF is a supporting charity affiliated with the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).

Note: America—and the West as a whole—cannot afford to ignore the battles waged, lessons learned and indignities suffered by the Israelis who share our values and fight to preserve them in the most inhospitable of climates.This article is from the June issue of Townhall Magazine. To subscribe to twelve issues of Townhall Magazine and receive a free copy of Andrew Learsy's Over a Barrel: Breaking Oil's Grip On Our Future, click here.

townhall.com