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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: lorne who wrote (37649)	10/6/2009 11:47:57 AM
From: DuckTapeSunroof	Respond to of 71588

Gulf Officials Deny Plan to Replace Dollar OCTOBER 6, 2009, 10:57 A.M. ET online.wsj.com By TAHANI KARRAR-LEWSLEY and SUMMER SAID DUBAI -- Arab officials in the Persian Gulf strongly denied Tuesday a report that they're in secret talks to replace the U.S. dollar with a basket of currencies to price oil. "We have never heard of this or discussed this, not even secretly," Qatar's oil minister Abdullah bin Hamad Al Attiyah told Zawya Dow Jones by telephone. Arab states in the Gulf account for about half the crude pumped by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or OPEC. British newspaper The Independent reported earlier that Gulf oil producers, including Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, are negotiating with Russia, China, Japan and France to replace the dollar with a basket of currencies to trade crude. The basket would include the Japanese yen, Chinese yuan, euro, gold and a new currency planned by Gulf Cooperation Council members, the report said. "We're not aware of any discussions on this matter," Kuwait's Finance Minister Mustafa Al Shamali said by phone. His comments were echoed by another senior Gulf oil official who said no discussions were underway to ditch the dollar as a benchmark for oil. Oil-rich Arab states shifting away from the dollar to price oil could add to mounting pressure on the greenback as the world's reserve currency. Dogged by concerns that rock-bottom interest rates and soaring government debt in the U.S. will undermine its value, the dollar has lost ground against a basket of rival currencies this year. "There is no genuine alternative to the dollar as a reserve currency therefore we are more likely to see oil continue to be priced in dollars," said Marios Maratheftis, regional head of research at Standard Chartered Bank in Dubai. Iran, OPEC's second-largest producer, would encourage Gulf Arab oil exporters to replace the dollar with a currency basket in oil trading, its OPEC Governor Mohammad Ali Khatibi said Tuesday. "Iran did this about three years ago. We replaced dollars with other valuable, stable currencies including the euro and yen for our oil income and we are very happy and not sorry we did this because the dollar is becoming weaker," Mr. Khatibi told Zawya Dow Jones by telephone from Tehran. "If anybody wants to use our experience we will be happy to help." —Maria Abi-Habib and David Roman contributed to this article.

To: lorne who wrote (37649)	10/6/2009 1:53:44 PM
From: Peter Dierks	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 71588

Iran has been plotting to undermine the dollar for international payments. Obviously Russia and China want to facilitate that.

To: lorne who wrote (37649)	10/22/2009 10:08:15 AM
From: Peter Dierks	Respond to of 71588

Will Obama Finally Pay Attention to Sudan? The Darfur genocide continues. After months of ambivalence, the administration says it will pressure Khartoum. OCTOBER 21, 2009, 10:37 P.M. ET. By JOHN PRENDERGAST For the past seven months, U.S. diplomacy toward Sudan has veered dangerously in the direction of appeasing Sudan's ruling National Congress Party (NCP). Since taking power in a 1989 coup, the NCP has engaged in a systematic assault on the Sudanese people. The use of starvation as a weapon in Southern Sudan and the genocide in Darfur have killed nearly two and a half million people. Omar al-Bashir, the country's president, is the first sitting head of state indicted by the International Criminal Court. Under his rule, the body count continues to climb. Some of the Obama administration's recent lowlights have included public and private rhetoric favoring incentives over pressure, talk of lifting longstanding sanctions without demanding anything in return, and a disconcerting lack of emphasis on the need to hold this heinous regime accountable for what this and the previous U.S. administration have declared genocide. Barack Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Joe Biden talked tough when they were presidential candidates, but this administration's day-to-day diplomacy on Sudan has been troubling. This has emboldened the ruling NCP to harden its positions at the negotiating table, continue military operations in Darfur, crack down on independent voices throughout the country, stir trouble in the South, and shut down efforts by international entities to independently monitor key developments on the ground. Engagement by the Obama administration with Robert McFarlane and others lobbying on Sudan's behalf only furthered the impression that Khartoum was on a fast track to normalization. Finally, a ray of hope emerged on Monday. After months of delay due to internal disagreements, the administration unfurled its new Sudan policy. On paper, the new approach seems to have an appropriate balance of carrots and sticks that would only take effect, according to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, based on "verifiable changes on the ground." Precisely what sticks the administration has in mind remains classified. But an acknowledgment of the need for genuine pressure is a welcome dose of reality—particularly after Maj. Gen. Gration said recently that "cookies and gold stars" are the best way to change the regime's behavior. As the administration moves forward with this new strategy, it must not ignore the substantial track record of evidence that sustained pressure leveraged by meaningful sticks is what has moved the NCP during the last 20 years of authoritarian rule. Only when there have been real consequences has the Sudanese regime altered its behavior, such as when it severed its ties with al Qaeda in the late 1990s, ended aerial bombing and support for slave-raiding militias in the South, and agreed to the North-South peace deal in 2005. The administration's new strategy contains additional subtle shifts that will be crucial to supporting justice, human rights and peace in Sudan. First, for years U.S. policy has been murky with respect to a planned 2011 self-determination referendum for the South. A peace agreement brokered by the Bush administration allows for the possibility of an independent Southern Sudan. But since the deal was done, the U.S. has not given its full support to that possible outcome. The new policy appears to be more honest about the overwhelming likelihood that Southern Sudan will opt for independence. U.S. efforts should be designed to support a soft and peaceful landing for the new state that would be created in the aftermath of the referendum. Second, the policy recognizes that counterterrorism cooperation should not trump other U.S. policy priorities. It would be a grave error if the administration allowed the NCP to evade culpability for carrying out a genocide simply by supporting U.S. antiterrorism initiatives. Third, the new policy prioritizes accountability—though the nonclassified version is short on specifics—for the enormous crimes against humanity that have been committed. This marks a reversal from some of the administration's previous public comments, which seemed to put justice on the back burner. Crafting a sensible strategy on paper is a necessary but insufficient step. The real test is implementing these fine principles. To do so, U.S. officials must first recognize that the status quo in Darfur, Southern Sudan, and other vulnerable areas is unacceptable. The ongoing government offensive in Darfur, and the increasingly deadly attacks by militias in the South—including some by militias that were previously supported by the NCP—are fundamental obstacles to peace. If these trends continue, and the administration doesn't lead international efforts to impose a steep cost to the regime in Khartoum, the trends will deepen and war will escalate. The U.S. should immediately focus on building a coalition of countries that support this new plan and are willing to utilize multilateral incentives and pressures when needed. If the president and other cabinet officials fail to follow up on Monday's announcement with the necessary action—bilateral meetings with key countries and aggressive diplomacy at the U.N. to rally support for this approach—Sudan will continue to burn. Mr. Prendergast is co-founder of Enough, the anti-genocide project at the Center for American Progress. online.wsj.com

To: lorne who wrote (37649)	10/23/2009 9:55:19 AM
From: Peter Dierks	Respond to of 71588

OCTOBER 23, 2009.The Cost of Trade 'Enforcement' China emulates America's bad habits. China's move to impose stiff antidumping duties on nylon imports from the U.S. this week is not by itself a sign that a bilateral trade war is imminent. But it is a clear warning of how other countries are picking up America's bad trade habits, which have been getting worse precisely when U.S. leadership is needed. The Ministry of Commerce in Beijing announced Monday it is imposing preliminary antidumping duties on imports from four countries of "nylon 6," a synthetic textile used in products ranging from socks to toothbrushes. The order covers imports from Taiwan, the European Union, Russia and the U.S., but American companies came in for the stiffest duties by far. Honeywell and a U.S.-based unit of Germany's BASF get hit with 36% and 30%, respectively, compared to rates as low as 4% for some of the others. Antidumping laws, which punish companies for selling products abroad at prices less than the cost of production, have long been irritants in international trade. The argument for such laws is that they deter unfair trading practices and make freer trade more politically palatable. But differential pricing in different markets is a normal part of business, and defining the cost of production can be a politically elastic process. This kind of "enforcement" can also quickly escalate into tit for tat actions that raise the cost of trade generally. China has imposed antidumping duties on U.S. companies in 17 cases, including nylon, since it joined the World Trade Organization in late 2001. The U.S. has imposed 59 antidumping or countervailing (antisubsidy) duties on China in the same period, and the number of cases is growing. From 2003-2006, only 10 antidumping petitions filed with the U.S. International Trade Commission became active cases. In the last three years, the number is 42. Previous U.S. Presidents have minimized damage from antidumping cases by bolstering their trade bona fides in other ways, such as negotiating free-trade agreements. But President Obama has sparked a trade spat with Mexico over trucking, and last month the U.S. imposed discretionary tariffs of 35% on imports of Chinese tires. He and his advisers have also declared that "enforcement" is a cornerstone of their trade policy. The nylon case suggests Beijing is finding it harder to resist domestic pressure to employ protectionist measures when Washington is walloping China. "To always retreat in trade friction will only embolden the protectionist forces in trading partners to launch more disputes with China," Mei Xinyu of a think tank linked to the Commerce Ministry told Dow Jones Newswires this week. Such thinking probably explains why U.S. companies are bearing the brunt of the nylon duties. Globally, the number of antidumping investigations launched by governments between July and September this year has climbed by 53% compared to the same quarter last year, according to Chad P. Bown of the World Bank Research Group. The number of cases in which duties were imposed increased by 21% in the first nine months, versus a year earlier. This kind of creeping protectionism imposes costs across the global economy even if it doesn't become a full-fledged trade war. Beijing's nylon duties show that American companies and consumers will also suffer as the world emulates the U.S. government's antidumping bad habits. An enforcement-centered trade policy may look appealing, but it can get very expensive very quickly. online.wsj.com

To: lorne who wrote (37649)	11/11/2009 2:26:48 AM
From: Peter Dierks	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 71588

America Leaves Itself Behind A world of trade deals without the U.S. NOVEMBER 11, 2009. President Obama heads for Asia this week to talk about U.S. economic recovery and reform, and one theme that we expect he'll hear from Asian leaders is this: America is leaving itself behind as the rest of the world tries to liberalize trade. The numbers tell the story. At least 266 bilateral or regional trade deals are in force, according to the World Trade Organization, and there are roughly 100 more of which the WTO has not yet been formally informed. The U.S. is a party to only five of the 64 trade pacts that have taken effect since 2005—with Australia, Morocco, Bahrain, Oman and Peru. In contrast, eight of those 64 deals involve the European Union (plus a round of EU expansion) and Japan has signed nine. Overall the U.S. has trade deals with only 17 countries including Canada and Mexico under Nafta. The EU has struck 29 deals on trade ranging from customs unions to larger free-trade agreements with 40 economies. Of the deals the WTO knows about, an average of seven took effect each year in the five years after the WTO's founding in 1995. For 2004-2008, the annual average rose to 15. Another 12 have kicked in this year. New Zealand and Malaysia signed a pact last week, for instance, and China and India are in talks. Oh, and there's also the newly signed EU-Korea trade deal, and the one signed last year between Canada and Colombia. These deals are proliferating for many reasons. Some countries are losing patience with the Doha round of global trade talks that has dragged on for eight years. Others view bilateral deals as a way of liberalizing beyond what Doha would accomplish—including areas like intellectual-property protection. These deals can also firm up alliances or build political influence, which is one reason China is aggressively pursuing trade deals with its neighbors. The danger is that U.S. companies could find themselves on the wrong side of deals negotiated among other countries. The EU-South Korea pact, for example, will tear down almost all remaining tariff barriers between the two sides. It will also address such technical barriers as the excessive safety standards that Seoul has long used to block imports, and it will open Korea to European services. The U.S. has long tried to address these hurdles so American companies could gain better access to the world's 13th-largest economy. The EU is now beating Washington to the punch—largely by copying the trade deal the Bush Administration negotiated with Seoul but that Congress refuses to ratify. The same holds for Canada's deal with Colombia. That deal eliminates Colombia's average 12% tariffs on nonagricultural goods from Canada; U.S. exporters will still have to pay those tariffs even as Colombians keep tariff-free access to the U.S. under an earlier agreement. Over time Canadian farmers will gain tariff-free access to Colombia for most of their agricultural exports while farmers in Iowa or Nebraska will be stuck with tariffs of between 5% and 80%. Bilateral trade deals are far from ideal as a way to promote global growth. Far better for governments to lower their own trade barriers unilaterally to all comers, or for all governments to sign a multilateral deal like the Doha round. A complex web of bilateral and regional trade deals can saddle businesses with the costs of complying with multiple sets of rules. This "spaghetti bowl" approach also distorts economies to the extent that businesses make trade and investment decisions based more on where they can get trade preferences than on the highest return on capital. But when the U.S. sits on the sidelines, the rest of the world is going to find its own trading way, however imperfect. The nearby table shows some of the benefits U.S. companies will be missing. A start to getting the U.S. back in the game would be for Congress to ratify the pending deals with South Korea, Colombia and Panama. Mr. Obama and U.S. Trade Representative Ron Kirk need to rethink their emphasis on trade "enforcement," which is code for introducing higher barriers, and instead renew the push for more deals. Mr. Obama could also become a leading voice pushing for progress on Doha. Especially as other countries expand their own trading opportunities, the costs of Washington dithering are growing every day.