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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: lorne who wrote (38780)11/19/2009 11:33:33 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Americans Deserve a Transparent Fed
Trillion-dollar interventions in the economy merit scrutiny by taxpayers and their representatives.
NOVEMBER 19, 2009, 9:58 A.M. ET.

By RON PAUL AND JIM DEMINT
For nearly a century the Federal Reserve has operated in the shadows, away from the prying eyes of Congress, journalists and the American people. Created in 1913, the Fed was given enormous responsibility to protect the value of our currency. Yet in the last 96 years the U.S. dollar has lost more than 95% of its purchasing power. The Fed's unprecedented actions over the past year in attempting to stabilize the financial system have now forced it into the spotlight, and caused millions of people around the country to question the opacity of the Fed's financial transactions.

While the Fed is more transparent now than it was 20 or 30 years ago, there is still a long way to go. If the Fed were fully transparent, organizations such as Bloomberg and Fox News wouldn't have to sue its board of governors to receive materials that should be available through Freedom of Information Act requests. These include information on which banks and companies received loans and for what amounts after the 2008 financial meltdown.

One puzzling assertion made by the Fed and its supporters is that the Federal Reserve has some sort of independence from the government and independence in undertaking monetary policy. Nothing could be further from the truth. The Federal Reserve is a government-created banking monopoly, and its top decision makers are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. If they do not perform satisfactorily in the eyes of politicians, they will not be renominated.

The Fed has also, for the past three decades, been required to engage in monetary policy with the goal of maintaining stable prices and full employment. Since the natural trend over time is for prices to decrease, a mandate to maintain stable prices is a mandate to pursue an expansionary monetary policy and inflate the money supply to counteract the lower prices we would expect from increased productivity.

The Fed chairman is required to appear twice a year before Congress to explain the Fed's actions, and how the Fed is complying with its mandates of stable prices and full employment. However, the idea that this constitutes any sort of oversight is laughable.

Each congressman who questions the chairman receives only a few minutes in which to ask questions and receive answers. Having been on the receiving end of Alan Greenspan's notoriously obtuse "Greenspan-Speak" answers and Ben Bernanke's similarly convoluted statements, we can assure you that the process is completely ineffective at getting any real answers.

No matter how direct the questions are, Fed chairmen answer with a vagueness common to bureaucrats. The whole process is window dressing for public consumption, not any sort of attempt to exercise oversight or gain any real insight into the Fed's actions.

What is needed is a full audit of the Fed, something that has never happened. We need to know who the Fed is giving money to, what types of securities are being purchased and what backs those securities, how much money is being paid for those securities, etc.

While Rep. Mel Watt's (D., N.C.) efforts to audit the new lending facilities authorized to bail out private firms such as AIG is a step in the right direction, it is still just a first step. These facilities have the same effect on the money supply as securities purchased through open market operations. Why should securities placed on one line of the Fed's balance sheet be subject to audit while the exact same securities placed elsewhere on the balance sheet are not subject to audit? The loopholes need to be closed.

In coming weeks we plan to offer companion amendments to legislation already before the House and Senate that will open the Fed up to a complete audit. The amendments set a six-month time lag on the publication of previously unreleased audit data to address the Fed's concerns that actions undertaken in support of monetary policy would immediately be politicized. The transcripts and minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee meetings would continue to be made public at the Fed's discretion, with unpublicized details of meetings not subject to any additional scrutiny. Finally, the amendments make clear that the purpose of the audits is not to interfere with or dictate monetary policy.

As strong opponents of government intervention into the economy, we do not want to see Congress directly dictate monetary policy. But while the Fed is involved so heavily in monetary policy and its actions so heavily influence the future of our economy, it is necessary that it be fully transparent. Interventions into the economy on the order of trillions of dollars cannot continue to escape public scrutiny. American taxpayers deserve better.

Mr. Paul is a Republican congressman from Texas. Mr. DeMint is a Republican senator from South Carolina.

online.wsj.com

FWIW - The accusation the Fed operated in the shadows is wrong. To protect markets from rash reaction to Fed actions they do delay release of minutes for 90 days.



To: lorne who wrote (38780)11/20/2009 8:55:36 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
AIG and Systemic Risk
Geithner says credit-default swaps weren't the problem, after all.
NOVEMBER 20, 2009.

TARP Inspector General Neil Barofsky keeps committing flagrant acts of political transparency, which if nothing else ought to inform the debate going forward over financial reform. In his latest bombshell, the IG discloses that the New York Federal Reserve did not believe that AIG's credit-default swap (CDS) counterparties posed a systemic financial risk.

Hello?

For the last year, the entire Beltway theory of the financial panic has been based on the claim that the "opaque," unregulated CDS market had forced the Fed to take over AIG and pay off its counterparties, lest the system collapse. Yet we now learn from Mr. Barofsky that saving the counterparties was not the reason for the bailout.

In the fall of 2008 the New York Fed drove a baby-soft bargain with AIG's credit-default-swap counterparties. The Fed's taxpayer-funded vehicle, Maiden Lane III, bought out the counterparties' mortgage-backed securities at 100 cents on the dollar, effectively canceling out the CDS contracts. This was miles above what those assets could have fetched in the market at that time, if they could have been sold at all.

The New York Fed president at the time was none other than Timothy Geithner, the current Treasury Secretary, and Mr. Geithner now tells Mr. Barofsky that in deciding to make the counterparties whole, "the financial condition of the counterparties was not a relevant factor."

This is startling. In April we noted in these columns that Goldman Sachs, a major AIG counterparty, would certainly have suffered from an AIG failure. And in his latest report, Mr. Barofsky comes to the same conclusion. But if Mr. Geithner now says the AIG bailout wasn't driven by a need to rescue CDS counterparties, then what was the point? Why pay Goldman and even foreign banks like Societe Generale billions of tax dollars to make them whole?

Both Treasury and the Fed say they think it would have been inappropriate for the government to muscle counterparties to accept haircuts, though the New York Fed tried to persuade them to accept less than par. Regulators say that having taxpayers buy out the counterparties improved AIG's liquidity position, but why was it important to keep AIG liquid if not to protect some class of creditors?

Yesterday, Mr. Geithner introduced a new explanation, which is that AIG might not have been able to pay claims to its insurance policy holders: "AIG was providing a range of insurance products to households across the country. And if AIG had defaulted, you would have seen a downgrade leading to the liquidation and failure of a set of insurance contracts that touched Americans across this country and, of course, savers around the world."

Yet, if there is one thing that all observers seemed to agree on last year, it was that AIG's money to pay policyholders was segregated and safe inside the regulated insurance subsidiaries. If the real systemic danger was the condition of these highly regulated subsidiaries—where there was no CDS trading—then the Beltway narrative implodes.

Interestingly, in Treasury's official response to the Barofsky report, Assistant Secretary Herbert Allison explains why the department acted to prevent an AIG bankruptcy. He mentions the "global scope of AIG, its importance to the American retirement system, and its presence in the commercial paper and other financial markets." He does not mention CDS.

All of this would seem to be relevant to the financial reform that Treasury wants to plow through Congress. For example, if AIG's CDS contracts were not the systemic risk, then what is the argument for restructuring the derivatives market? After Lehman's failure, CDS contracts were quickly settled according to the industry protocol. Despite fears of systemic risk, none of the large banks, either acting as a counterparty to Lehman or as a buyer of CDS on Lehman itself, turned out to have major exposure.

More broadly, lawmakers now have an opportunity to dig deeper into the nature of moral hazard and the restoration of a healthy financial system. Barney Frank and Chris Dodd are pushing to give regulators "resolution authority" for struggling firms. Under both of their bills, this would mean unlimited ability to spend unlimited taxpayer sums to prevent an unlimited universe of firms from failing.

Americans know that's not the answer, but what is the best solution to the too-big-to-fail problem? And how exactly does one measure systemic risk? To answer these questions, it's essential that we first learn the lessons of 2008. This is where reports like Mr. Barofsky's are valuable, telling us things that the government doesn't want us to know.

In remarks Tuesday that were interpreted as a veiled response to Mr. Barofsky's report, Mr. Geithner said, "It's a great strength of our country, that you're going to have the chance for a range of people to look back at every decision made in every stage in this crisis, and look at the quality of judgments made and evaluate them with the benefit of hindsight." He added, "Now, you're going to see a lot of conviction in this, a lot of strong views—a lot of it untainted by experience."

Mr. Geithner has a point about Monday-morning quarterbacking. He and others had to make difficult choices in the autumn of 2008 with incomplete information and often with little time to think, much less to reflect. But that was last year. The task now is to learn the lessons of that crisis and minimize the moral hazard so we can reduce the chances that the panic and bailout happen again.

This means a more complete explanation from Mr. Geithner of what really drove his decisions last year, how he now defines systemic risk, and why he wants unlimited power to bail out creditors—before Congress grants the executive branch unlimited resolution authority that could lead to bailouts ad infinitum.

online.wsj.com



To: lorne who wrote (38780)12/1/2009 12:23:31 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Saying No to Spitzer, Four Years Later
AIG now asks the CEO it ousted for advice.
DECEMBER 1, 2009.

Taxpayers and AIG shareholders won a notable victory last week, when the insurer announced it will cease its legal warfare against former CEO Hank Greenberg and focus instead on business. What a long, strange, wasteful trip this has been.

In 2005, New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer threatened to indict AIG if its board didn't fire Mr. Greenberg. The essence of the Spitzer charges, which the bullying prosecutor proclaimed on television but never proved in court, was that Mr. Greenberg had fraudulently created a reinsurance transaction to boost the company's loss reserves. AIG's board bowed to Mr. Spitzer's request and ousted the man who had spent decades building the firm. Thus began the destruction of a great American company.

AIG has now repudiated that decision. Last week the company agreed to drop all claims against Mr. Greenberg, pay his legal bills, return a favorite rug and photographs from his old office, and provide access to files for the production of his memoirs.

The settlement, in which Mr. Greenberg agreed to drop his counter suits, was not driven simply by the weakness of AIG's legal position. New CEO Robert Benmosche wants Mr. Greenberg, who remains a large shareholder, to help figure out how to repay the taxpayers who have provided $182.3 billion in assistance.

So after firing him in 2005, the company is now asking Mr. Greenberg for advice. This change is all the more ironic given that government pressure led to his ouster and the CEO welcoming him back was essentially hired by the federal government, which took ownership of almost 80% of AIG last year. If market concerns about the reserves in AIG's traditional insurance businesses are well founded, then the company could definitely use the help. AIG stock fell almost 15% yesterday after a negative report from analysts at Bernstein Research.

There remains one large legal distraction. Mr. Spitzer's successor as New York AG, Andrew Cuomo, is still pursuing some of the civil charges that Mr. Spitzer originally filed against Mr. Greenberg. The bulk of the case collapsed in 2006. Even if the state were to win, it likely cannot collect damages because the shareholders on whose behalf Mr. Spitzer claimed to be suing have already settled. If this litigation is about proving a point, here's one worth making: that just once the government can restrain itself from intervening in AIG to the detriment of taxpayers and shareholders.

The federal government can do its part by presenting a credible exit strategy as well. The government's serial "rescues" of AIG benefited the company's trading counterparties—including foreign banks like Societe Generale and Calyon—much more than AIG itself. The officials responsible now say that they weren't acting to protect the counterparties, abandoning the "systemic risk" claim that an AIG default on its derivatives contracts would have cratered the financial system. In any case, the panic has passed and AIG's derivatives book has shrunk. So why should the government continue to own this business?

Mr. Greenberg has argued since last year that the company's legitimate shareholders would have been better off filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11. These shareholders were denied the vote to which they were entitled when the New York Federal Reserve gained control by giving AIG's directors a way to avoid the liability nightmare of bankruptcy.

The real shareholders of AIG deserve to have their company back. Taxpayers deserve relief from a $182.3 billion commitment on a company that increasingly seems small enough to fail. No less important, consumers and competitors in the insurance market deserve a free AIG.

online.wsj.com



To: lorne who wrote (38780)1/9/2010 9:10:08 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Can AIG Be Saved?
The former chairman wonders why Goldman Sachs got paid in full on its AIG exposure while AIG itself was forced into slow-motion liquidation.
JANUARY 9, 2010.

By HOLMAN W. JENKINS, JR.
Goldman Sachs has a new enemy—as if it needed another one.

Hank Greenberg, as we sit in his Park Avenue office, is telling me how to do my job, saying reporters need to get to the bottom of the events that preceded and followed the government bailout of AIG, the insurance company he built into a global giant.

In particular, they need to get to the bottom of the part played by the investment bank of Goldman Sachs. He waves a sheaf of press reports from the New York Times, Washington Post and McClatchy papers about the firm's doings before and during the subprime meltdown. "We're dealing with a jigsaw puzzle where all the pieces are not in the box. Bit by bit, we're getting the pieces. The pieces are failing into place and the picture on the face of the puzzle is not a pretty picture."

Let me get this straight. Is Mr. Greenberg saying the machinations of Goldman Sachs were responsible for the disastrous failure of AIG amid the recent financial crisis? "Well, it certainly wouldn't be difficult to come to that conclusion."

View Full Image

Zina Saunders
.Until a few years ago, Mr. Greenberg was enjoying a stellar career as an insurance CEO, but not a melodramatic one. That all changed in 2005 when he became one of several business titans turned into unwilling stepping stones for the advancement of an ambitious New York attorney general named Eliot Spitzer.

Mr. Greenberg, a genuine captain of industry but little known to the public, had built AIG over 30 years to become the biggest and most admired company in the global insurance industry. Then Mr. Spitzer, riding a wave of righteous distrust of business after Enron, accused him and AIG of accounting fraud. Mr. Spitzer, on national television, pronounced Mr. Greenberg guilty even before any evidence had been presented to a jury.

AIG was on the rack, its business about to be destroyed if Mr. Spitzer criminally indicted the firm. So the board jettisoned its long-serving chief to appease the crusading attorney general. Mr. Greenberg, at age 80, settled in for what he must have known would be a long siege of lawsuits and regulatory investigations to occupy his declining years. He couldn't have anticipated, though, that the drama of his non-retirement was only just beginning and would lead to a fight in which something even bigger than his reputation would be at stake—the very survival of the firm he'd built and been ousted from.

That's exactly what came to pass. In the months after he left, AIG amped up its bets on the housing market by writing what where, in effect, insurance policies on derivative securities backed by subprime mortgages. These securities were created by Wall Street firms, notably Goldman Sachs, and held on their own books or sold to investors. AIG, in turn, had committed not only to insure them again eventual loss, but to make cash payments in the meantime to compensate for any drop in price or downgrade of their Triple-A ratings by credit agencies—both of which promptly happened as housing collapsed and panic spread about the possible failure of large financial institutions.

Suddenly, AIG was bleeding vast amounts of cash at a time when a spooked market was increasingly unwilling to lend to the firm. Finally, Washington stepped in to prevent AIG's bankruptcy, fearing the alternative was an economic meltdown.

How did it all come apart so quickly? Here are the pieces Mr. Greenberg says he sees falling into place. In 2005, a trade group called the International Swaps and Derivatives Association got together and drafted new standards for the kinds of credit default swaps AIG had been writing.

Previously, Mr. Greenberg explains, losses to the underlying securities were paid off at maturity. Now, cash payments would have to be forthcoming to cover any drop in value or credit downgrades even before any losses were realized.

"I don't know whether Goldman Sachs was the force behind the ISDA change or Deutsche Bank," Mr. Greenberg concedes. "That's something investigative reporters are going to have to spend time digging out."

The next piece fell into place, he says, with recent reports in the press about how, at the top of the housing bubble, "a couple of people there [at Goldman Sachs], bright guys, decide the housing market is going to collapse." Goldman went to work creating new subprime housing-backed derivatives , Mr. Greenberg says, and "began marketing the hell out of them and at the same time shorting them" (or betting they would fall in value).

Bingo. When the housing boom imploded, Goldman demanded giant cash collateral payments from AIG on a "mark to market" basis for housing-backed securities whose price was plummeting even if the underlying payment streams were intact. True, Goldman was hardly the only one demanding cash, but Mr. Greenberg is suspicious about the size of the payments Goldman demanded based on Goldman's own "marks" (i.e. estimate of the securities now-depressed value). "Goldman had the lowest marks on the Street by everything I hear," he says. "There was no exchange. Where was the price discovery? It was all in the eye of the beholder."

In short, it added up to a perfect trap for AIG. As panic spread through the financial sector, impossible amounts of cash were required of the firm under insurance contracts that had years to run and (as Mr. Greenberg argues and events seem to be showing) would likely end up performing adequately in the long run.

But this is just half the puzzle, he says. When the government took over AIG, why did it insist that Goldman and other firms receive 100 cents on the dollar on their AIG exposure, while the terms of AIG's own bailout were so onerous as to force the firm into slow-motion liquidation? When the government's bailouts of Citigroup, Bank of America, GM and Chrysler were clearly designed to restore the firms to health, why was AIG's apparently designed to create a wasting asset that would wither and die in taxpayer hands?

Most of all, he cannot fathom why Treasury and the Federal Reserve let billions of dollars in taxpayer cash fly out the backdoor to Goldman and other firms. Washington could simply have ordained that AIG's debts were the government's debts and so no collateral was due give Uncle Sam's bulletproof credit rating.

Mr. Greenberg has no doubt the destruction of AIG was the politically-dictated goal at the time. He points to Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson's statement on Sunday morning television shortly after the rescue, saying the purpose was to "allow the government to liquidate" the company.

Mr. Greenberg invokes the loaded constitutional word "takings" for the government's seizure of a 79.9% stake in AIG as part of the package dictated to the company's board. "They just took the goddamn thing. What's the basis for taking it? You gotta explain, How did you get to 79.9%? I'd be curious to know."

From his present perch, he sees only three ways the AIG mystery will ever be plumbed. "Either investigative journalists continue to add the missing pieces of the puzzle," he says. "Or, two, members of Congress call for an investigation and put people under oath. Or, three, if these two things fail, aren't there likely to be class-action suits that put people under oath in depositions and discovery?"

Mr. Greenberg recognizes he's playing a dangerous game here, since his goal ultimately is to coax Washington into softening the terms of the AIG bailout.

For one thing, the obvious party to lead a class-action shareholder lawsuit is none other than Mr. Greenberg himself, in his status as chief of Starr International, a company that for decades has been the largest single holder of AIG shares (and a whole other story in itself). Indeed, he acknowledges that he and other large shareholders have batted around the idea of a lawsuit. Fellow investors wanted him to take the lead, but he demurred, saying his other AIG-related litigation at the time and his Spitzer victimization had made him too much of a lightning rod. His fellow investors, however, were no keener on serving as lead plaintiff, fearing to antagonize the government and not wishing a distraction from their main business of portfolio management.

For the time being, then, a lawsuit challenging the AIG takeover is not in the cards, but Mr. Greenberg hasn't given up on political suasion. His goal is a major revision of the terms of the bailout to put private capital back in charge—a goal he quite evidently believes can be advanced by airing the secret history behind the AIG debacle.

"There's too much smoke, too many smart people asking questions that deserve an answer. I would hope that investigative reporters do the job they love to do and bring out the truth. I would hope that Congress would then say we must do something about this in all fairness. The American people should know about this and then bring about the changes necessary to avoid the total destruction of a great company that was the pride of America in the insurance industry."

To that end, he has drawn up (with the help of investment banker Joseph Perella) a plan that's now in the hands of Treasury and the Fed. He wants the government's $112 billion loan stretched out to, say, 20 years and the interest rate slashed to something closer to the government's own cost of borrowing.

He also wants Washington unilaterally to dial back its 79.9% stake in the firm. Taxpayers would be better off, he says, effectively returning a big chunk of the government's stake to AIG's existing shareholders. Majority government ownership only serves to scare off the private capital that could revive the firm as a taxpaying and job-creating corporate citizen. "In fact, if the government owned 15% or 20%," he says, "that would probably be worth more in the marketplace than the 79.9%."

Finally, he wants reform of Maiden Lane II and III, the Federal Reserve vehicles that relieved AIG of some of its subprime exposure and have been reaping the lion's share of the gains (75%, compared to 25% for AIG) as the securities rebound in value now that the economy is mending and the crisis has passed.

Of course, any softening or forgiveness of the AIG "rescue" terms would be politically fraught at this point. But if Mr. Greenberg is right, attitudes may evolve in the months ahead given public receptivity to a new storyline that AIG was a victim of Goldman sharpies. Hence another of his proposals—to have Goldman and other counterparties who seemingly profited from AIG's troubles return some of their taxpayer-subsidized winnings in the form of low-interest loans to help the insurer back on its feet.

Mr. Greenberg has been to the White House three times since Barack Obama became president, and not on social calls. But the discussions revolved around North Korea and foreign relations, issues of interest in his role as a leader of the organization Business Executives for National Security. On AIG, however, he keeps plugging away. "I don't give up easily. What was done, in my view, was done, as Paulson said, to liquidate the company. I think that was wrong. And I think it's important to fight against things that are wrong. A lot of people at AIG lost their life savings. They spent year after year building the greatest insurance company in history and we owe it to them to fight to help make the company great again and get back some of the value that was lost."

Mr. Greenberg has already got his reputation back. Mr. Spitzer was forced to leave office under shameful circumstances, and his supposedly open-and-shut case against Mr. Greenberg vanished. An SEC complaint was settled without Mr. Greenberg admitting guilt (and in fact denying it vehemently). A jury handed him a victory in a recent trial in which AIG claimed he and Starr International had improperly come by Starr's large holding in AIG stock.

But he's got at least one more battle to fight. As he points out with unimpeachable accuracy, politicians in Washington may hope the AIG situation will somehow take care of itself, but it won't. Sooner or later, the government will either have to give the firm its life back or pull the plug.

Mr. Jenkins writes the Journal's Business World column.

online.wsj.com



To: lorne who wrote (38780)1/27/2010 9:21:31 AM
From: Peter Dierks1 Recommendation  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
The Never-Ending Goldman-AIG Saga
Suspicions of malfeasance without much evidence.
By HOLMAN W. JENKINS, JR.
JANUARY 26, 2010, 9:49 P.M. ET.

Even among those who usually find themselves in agreement, much screaming and fighting has centered on Goldman and the AIG bailout. The controversy will be the subject of yet another potentially inflamed congressional hearing today. At issue is whether the New York Fed (proprietor, Tim Geithner) engaged in shameful and scurrilous activity in OK'ing terms that fully covered Goldman Sachs and other counterparties on certain AIG commitments to cover losses on mortgage-related derivatives.

Let us attempt to clear the air with some role-playing. Let's say you are Mr. Geithner. Across the table sits one of the counterparties, a group whose number includes French, German, British and U.S. banks. Let's say in this case it's a representative of Goldman, stylishly turned out in red velvet, with horns and pitchfork.

Mr. Geithner: The U.S. government is rescuing AIG and would like you to accept a discount of 40% in return for the taxpayer settling AIG's outstanding obligations to you.

Goldman: Fine. Just give me a reason why I should accept. I am happy to comply, but this is a negotiation, so you must tell me what's in it for me.

Mr. Geithner could give a couple of answers, either of which would likely bring Goldman into compliance with the Fed's wishes. He could say: Because if you don't agree, we will let AIG go belly-up and you will get even less, especially in a general collapse of the financial system. The only problem here is that the U.S. government has intervened precisely because it has decided an AIG bankruptcy is unacceptable given the fragility of market sentiment and fears of a wholesale run on the nation's banking system. It would have been contrary to the government's entire purpose at the time to breathe to anyone in the market that AIG might be allowed to collapse.

Or Mr. Geithner could say: I am your regulator and soon-to-be Treasury secretary in the Obama administration, and things will not go well for you in the future unless you agree to my demands.

Reading between the lines of various investigations, Mr. Geithner eschewed this approach because he deemed it "improper." Perhaps also because Goldman would have said: Fine, but give it to me in writing. I'm surrendering billions in claims on a promise that I will be subject to political and regulatory favoritism in the future, and I want a letter that I can wave to remind you of that promise.

Mr. Geithner knows of course that he cannot control what his successors or the administration or Congress will do in the future. Even if Goldman were inclined to accept a verbal assurance, worse than any fallout from paying Goldman 100 cents on the dollar would be the political fallout when Goldman made public that such assurances were given.

Faced with these options, the New York Fed appears to have dropped the matter of haircuts rather quickly and moved on, which now leads to unflattering insinuations. Many also no doubt will say that Goldman and others should have saluted and accepted the proposed haircuts simply because they were asked to. Perhaps Goldman (but not the others) wishes now it had done so given the trouble the issue has caused the firm.

But let us remember these events were compressed into an extraordinarily hectic period in late 2008. Goldman was not in a position to know that haircuts were a DefCon issue unless the Fed and Treasury took the trouble to communicate as much—and it appears that, with a zillion other things on policy makers' agenda, such a meeting of minds did not crystallize, perhaps because all involved had more important things to worry about.

Yes, subsequent evidence suggests the New York Fed did come to consider the subject embarrassing, since it tried to discourage AIG from disclosing the exact terms of the counterparty payments. This has infused an air of malfeasance into the matter and probably sooner or later will cost Mr. Geithner his job. But what should really be regretted is that policy makers at the time did not have the bureaucratic daring to treat the offending AIG affiliate, known as AIGFP, the way they did Citigroup or J.P. Morgan, simply extending a taxpayer guarantee to the questionable assets.

In all likelihood, taxpayers would not have lost a dime on the AIG bailout—they would have earned millions in fees for a guarantee that never would be invoked. AIG would be a thriving global insurer today, albeit one with a manageable exposure when and if the underlying mortgage securities defaulted. There'd be no giant cash payments to Goldman for anyone to be scandalized about.

A lot of considerations got pushed aside in the rush to rescue AIG, which we still suspect was done for the legitimate reasons offered by Mr. Geithner, Ben Bernanke and Hank Paulson—to stave off a financial crisis. But rushed work is sloppy work, and that certainly applies in this case.