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Strategies & Market Trends : The coming US dollar crisis -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Real Man who wrote (25000)11/29/2009 11:28:56 PM
From: HH  Respond to of 71407
 
When you won, you divided the profits amongst you, and when you lost, you charged it to the Bank.

Brilliant !



To: Real Man who wrote (25000)11/30/2009 6:43:42 AM
From: RockyBalboa  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71407
 
Vi: Congrats to the nice #grub... only 75 to go to 100!



To: Real Man who wrote (25000)11/30/2009 7:14:05 AM
From: RockyBalboa2 Recommendations  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71407
 
Here, an interesting mention on how the US defaults on its debt (or alternatively, devaluation) >>>

>>>>

When governments go bankrupt it's called "a default."

Currency speculators figured out how to accurately predict when a country would default.
Two well-known economists - Alan Greenspan and Pablo Guidotti - published the secret formula in a 1999 academic paper. That's why the formula is called the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. The rule states: To avoid a default, countries should maintain hard currency reserves equal to at least 100% of their short-term foreign debt maturities. The world's largest money management firm, PIMCO, explains the rule this way: "The minimum benchmark of reserves equal to at least 100% of short-term external debt is known as the Greenspan-Guidotti rule. Greenspan-Guidotti is perhaps the single concept of reserve adequacy that has the most adherents and empirical support."

The principle behind the rule is simple. If you can't pay off all of your foreign debts in the next 12 months, you're a terrible credit risk. Speculators are going to target your bonds and your currency, making it impossible to refinance your debts. A default is assured.

So how does America rank on the Greenspan-Guidotti scale? It's a guaranteed default. ...

Message 26136288



To: Real Man who wrote (25000)11/30/2009 10:10:53 AM
From: carranza23 Recommendations  Respond to of 71407
 
The abject ignorance of today's economists and policymakers of historical antecedents is mind-boggling. Bernanke may know his Depression, but does he know about the Panic of 1873, etc.

With a few variations to account for the passage of time, everything and I do mean everything happening now has happened before.

A great example directly relevant to today is this great pamphlet, readable in a sitting, written in the early 1900s.

mises.org

A partial quote, concerning the issuance of inconvertible currency:

EVEN worse than this was the breaking down of the morals of the country at large, resulting from the sudden building up of ostentatious wealth in a few large cities, and from the gambling, speculative spirit spreading from these to the small towns and rural districts. From this was developed an even more disgraceful result,—the decay of true sense of national good faith. The patriotism which the fear of the absolute monarchy, the machinations of the court party, the menaces of the army and the threats of all monarchical Europe had been unable to shake was gradually disintegrated by this same speculative, stock-jobbing habit fostered by the superabundant currency. At the outset, in the discussions preliminary to the first issue of paper money, Mirabeau and others who had favored it had insisted that patriotism as well as an enlightened self-interest, would lead the people to keep up the value of paper money.

The very opposite of this was now revealed, for there appeared, as another outgrowth of this disease, what has always been seen under similar circumstances. It is a result of previous, and a cause of future evils. This outgrowth was a vast debtor class in the nation, directly interested in the depreciation of the currency in which they were to pay their debts. The nucleus of this class was formed by those who had purchased the church lands from the government. Only small payments down had been required and the remainder was to be paid in deferred installments: an indebtedness of a multitude of people had thus been created to the amount of hundreds of millions. This body of debtors soon saw, of course, that their interest was to depreciate the currency in which their debts were to be paid; and these were speedily joined by a far more influential class;—by that class whose speculative tendencies had been stimulated by the abundance of paper money, and who had gone largely into debt, looking for a rise in nominal values. Soon demagogues of the viler sort in the political clubs began to pander to it; a little later important persons in this debtor class were to be found intriguing in the Assembly—first in its seats and later in more conspicuous places of public trust. Before long, the debtor class became a powerful body extending through all ranks of society. From the stock-gambler who sat in the Assembly to the small land speculator in the rural districts; from the sleek inventor of canards on the Paris Exchange to the lying stock-jobber in the market town, all pressed vigorously for new issues of paper; all were apparently able to demonstrate to the people that in new issues of paper lay the only chance for national prosperity.