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To: Wharf Rat who wrote (181668)12/4/2009 12:10:02 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 361973
 
Johnson, Gorbachev, Obama
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By NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF
Op-Ed Columnist
The New York Times
December 3, 2009

Imagine you’re a villager living in southern Afghanistan.

You’re barely educated, proud of your region’s history of stopping invaders and suspicious of outsiders. Like most of your fellow Pashtuns, you generally dislike the Taliban because many are overzealous, truculent nutcases.

Yet you are even more suspicious of the infidel American troops. You know of some villages where the Americans have helped build roads and been respectful of local elders and customs. On the other hand, you know of other villages where the infidel troops have invaded homes, shamed families by ogling women, or bombed wedding parties.

You’re angry that your people, the Pashtuns, traditionally the dominant tribe of Afghanistan, seem to have been pushed aside in recent years, with American help. Moreover, the Afghan government has never been more corrupt. The Taliban may be incompetent, but at least they are pious Muslim Pashtuns and reasonably honest.

You were always uncomfortable with foreign troops in your land, but it wasn’t so bad the first few years when there were only about 10,000 American soldiers in the entire country. Now, after President Obama’s speech on Tuesday, there soon will be 100,000. That’s three times as many as when the president took office, and 10 times as many as in 2003.

Hmmm. You still distrust the Taliban, but maybe they’re right to warn about infidels occupying your land. Perhaps you’ll give a goat to support your clansman who joined the local Taliban.

That’s why so many people working in Afghanistan at the grass roots are watching the Obama escalation with a sinking feeling. President Lyndon Johnson doubled down on the Vietnam bet soon after he inherited the presidency, and Mikhail Gorbachev escalated the Soviet deployment that he inherited in Afghanistan soon after he took over the leadership of his country. They both inherited a mess — and made it worse and costlier.

As with the Americans in Vietnam, and Soviets in Afghanistan, we understate the risk of a nationalist backlash; somehow Mr. Obama has emerged as more enthusiastic about additional troops than even the corrupt Afghan government we are buttressing.

Gen. Stanley McChrystal warned in his report on the situation in Afghanistan that “new resources are not the crux” of the problem. Rather, he said, the key is a new approach that emphasizes winning hearts and minds: “Our strategy cannot be focused on seizing terrain or destroying insurgent troops; our objective must be the population.”

So why wasn’t the Afghan population more directly consulted?

“To me, what was most concerning is that there was never any consultation with the Afghan shura, the tribal elders,” said Greg Mortenson, whose extraordinary work building schools in Pakistan and Afghanistan was chronicled in “Three Cups of Tea” and his new book, “From Stones to Schools.” “It was all decided on the basis of congressmen and generals speaking up, with nobody consulting Afghan elders. One of the elders’ messages is we don’t need firepower, we need brainpower. They want schools, health facilities, but not necessarily more physical troops.”

For the cost of deploying one soldier for one year, it is possible to build about 20 schools.

Another program that is enjoying great success in undermining the Taliban is the National Solidarity Program, or N.S.P., which helps villages build projects that they choose — typically schools, clinics, irrigation projects, bridges. This is widely regarded as one of the most successful and least corrupt initiatives in Afghanistan.

“It’s a terrific program,” said George Rupp, the president of the International Rescue Committee. “But it’s underfunded. And it takes very little: for the cost of one U.S. soldier for a year, you could have the N.S.P. in 20 more villages.”

These kinds of projects — including girls’ schools — are often possible even in Taliban areas. One aid group says that the Taliban allowed it to build a girls’ school as long as the teachers were women and as long as the textbooks did not include photos of President Hamid Karzai. And the Taliban usually don’t mess with projects that have strong local support. (That’s why they haven’t burned any of Mr. Mortenson’s schools.)

America’s military spending in Afghanistan alone next year will now exceed the entire official military budget of every other country in the world.

Over time, education has been the single greatest force to stabilize societies. It’s no magic bullet, but it reduces birth rates, raises living standards and subdues civil conflict and terrorism. That’s why as a candidate Mr. Obama proposed a $2 billion global education fund — a promise he seems to have forgot.

My hunch is that if Mr. Obama wants success in Afghanistan, he would be far better off with 30,000 more schools than 30,000 more troops. Instead, he’s embarking on a buildup that may become an albatross on his presidency.

Copyright 2009 The New York Times Company



To: Wharf Rat who wrote (181668)12/4/2009 12:22:15 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361973
 
Obama's Afghan 'Strategy' – Another American Tragedy
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by Dr. Joseph Gerson
t r u t h o u t | Op-Ed
Wednesday 02 December 2009

Shortly after President Obama's Afghanistan War escalation speech, I was contacted by the Voice of America's Russian Language Service. They wanted to interview me. These are the questions they asked: What do you think about Obama's new strategy for Afghanistan? Were you surprised by it? Do you think it would be possible to carry out all Obama's objectives by 2011? Would Afghanistan, you think, cease to being a failed state?

Weighted down by a sense of the tragic implications of the speech, I answered as follows: How could we be surprised? During the 2008 election campaign, candidate Obama repeatedly and unknowingly said that the Afghanistan war is a "good war." Back then, that was the politically expedient thing to do, and many of his supporters who were rightfully outraged by the damage wrought by Bush and Cheney simply ignored what he was saying. Now he's stuck with that commitment, whether he believes in it or not. Politically, given the power of the Pentagon and the military-industrial complex, as well as widespread cultural assumptions of US dominance, he has not been in a good position to reverse course, as Vice President Biden reportedly urged. It should, however, be noted that President Obama ruled out General McChrystal's 80,000-plus troop increase option from the beginning. Obama has sought a middle way between powerfully contending forces - including the US peace movement. It won't work.

Obama's so-called "strategy" means years of tragedy and lost opportunities for generations of Afghans, Americans and people of many other countries. It is "Bush Lite" with enormous negative consequences to follow. Think about the jobs that won’t be created here in the US, the money lost to investment in health care, our children's educations, and building the 21st century infrastructure needed for the US to complete economically with rising and less belligerent powers. President Obama's strategy, as Russians should know from prior experience, can't possibly succeed.

While the President denied comparisons to Vietnam, his approach mirrors that of Vietnam-era Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and Presidents Johnson and Nixon: "coercive diplomacy." The mistaken "logic" underlining the contradictions of massively increasing the number of US warriors sent to Afghanistan with the vague commitment to begin some withdrawals in late 2011 is to increase his bargaining leverage with the Taliban. Obama wants to augment US power and influence in Afghanistan before the US approves Karzai negotiations with the Taliban or publicly begins them on its own. In fact, back-channel US discussions with the Taliban are widely reported in Europe, and the United States' British and German allies have encouraged Karzai to enter into a process initiated by the Saudis.

Unfortunately, like LBJ and Nixon, Obama's approach won't work. With its extraordinary corruption, its reliance on repressive and misogynist warlords, and the deaths and suffering of civilians caused by US-NATO attacks, Afghan hearts and minds will not rally to the Karzai government or to US occupation forces. Similar to the failures of "Vietnamization" in the early 1970s, the idea that the US will be able to triple the size of the Afghan military, isolate it from corrupting warlord and Karzai government influences and provide it with élan and modern war-fighting capabilities in just two years is a deadly pipe dream. So too is his plan to vastly increase the size of and professionalize the Afghan police.

Note too that President Obama's pledge to begin reductions of US forces in Afghanistan in late 2011 was very vague. At best, we will likely see a minimal reduction of forces in the months leading up to the 2012 presidential and congressional elections. There remains, however, the possibility of further increases in US forces as the war continues to go south.

The most obvious flaw in Obama's so-called strategy is the impossibility of the US transforming Afghanistan's corrupt and failing government into a modern functioning state. Here too the similarities with Vietnam, where the US imposed and supported a series of corrupt dictators, is striking. The question that President Obama failed to answer was what happens when Karzai, the warlords on whom his power depends and his corrupt allies refuse to cooperate with the US plan. If a US victory in Afghanistan is so "vital to US interests," would the US simply withdraw its troops and leave in defeat when Karzai and company continue to make matters worse? This leads us to a situation analogous to that described in the Pentagon Papers in which 85 percent of the reason for continuing the war, and even escalating it, will be "perception," to defend the image of the US as a military superpower that must not be challenged.

Like the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, this is a strategy that will bleed the foundations of prosperity within the US and its global reputations and influence.

Societies are not changed in two years or even in a single generation. The way forward is for the US to press for all party negotiations within Afghanistan to create a new Afghan social contract. This would need to be reinforced by an international conference and actions on the part of all major states involved in the war to help build and support that social contract. This, of course, also means dealing with the source of Indian-Pakistani tensions, and the geostrategic ambitions of the major powers who have insisted on playing, and losing, the "Great Game."

*Dr. Joseph Gerson is Director of Programs and Director of the Peace and Economic Security Program of the American Friends Service Committee.