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Pastimes : Ask Mohan about the Market -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Zeev Hed who wrote (6838)11/2/1997 2:23:00 PM
From: Joseph G.  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 18056
 
Zeev, the Fed cut discount rate by one step of 1.5% in Oct 29, prior to the crash. It followed through, and cut again in Jan 1930, and again in Feb, and again in Apr, and again in May (to 2.5%), and again in Nov. At that time call rate for brokers' loans was 2%. Discount rate was cut to 0.5% in 32.

While 10% margins were legal, very few, mostly rich customers were allowed to borrow that much, more common was 25 and 40%, while most investors and even some speculators did not use margin at all. Total margin borrowing was between 7 and 8.5% of total market cap throughout the 1920's. There were no credit cards then, and most people could not get a mortgage to buy a home. In general, use of credit was much less then than now.

refs: M. Friedman and A. Schwartz, Monetary history of the United States, 1867 - 1960;
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914 - 1941.
In general, it is believed that the relative monetary tightness in 1928 - Sept 1929 contributed to the onset of the depression, however, the tighness resulted not from restrictive Fed policy (which it was not), but by the fact that money was sucked into the stock bubble, in particular, into the call money market. E. g., comercial paper outstanding decreased nearly 50% in this period, because more attractive interest rates were available in the call market. Likewise, corporatins prefered to issue stock or bonds, rather than borrow at banks or via commercial paper. Since the depression was international, obviously, its causes were not limited to the US. Further, extremely easy money since early 1930, social programs, government spending did not end the depression which lasted into the WWII. Social and government programs started well before FDR came to power. In fact, the Democratic party ticket in 1932 elections was "to stop reckless government spending" and "to curtail massive goverment relieve programs". Democrats were compaining agains Republicans who run up Federal deficit to levels above those during US participation in WWI. The joke was that when FDR was elected, he implemented not the Democratic party ticket, but the Socialists' ticket. And, again, spending and programs did not end the depression, WWII did twelve years later.

Joe

PS. FDR assumed office in MArch 1933.



To: Zeev Hed who wrote (6838)11/2/1997 3:56:00 PM
From: Bilow  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 18056
 
About those margin rates...

Those who want to take big risks in the stock market can now
do so using the futures. The margin rate there is, I believe, 3%

Another thing I believe but I seem to be alone in, is that public
purchases of options from the market makers is destabilizing to
markets. That is, they accentuate market movements.

The market for a stock consists of all the orders in the stock that
are still active. The most stable sort of order is a limit order. Limit
orders tend to stabilize stock prices. A limit order to buy helps
prevent the stock price from dropping below the limit. A limit order
to sell helps prevent the stock price from rising above the limit.
So limit orders are generally positive in terms of stability. If we
only had limit orders available, there could never be an order
imbalance, though occasionally there would be no trading.

Market orders are neutral in terms of stability. (This is not to say
that a bunch of market orders to sell will not result in a drop in
price, only to say that the ability of the market maker to determine
a fair price for the stock is neither helped nor hurt by market orders.)
If too many market orders come in on the same side, they can "use
up" all the limit orders on the other side. This resulsts in an order
imbalance, and a discontinuous stock price change.

Stop loss orders are negative in terms of stability. The existence
of a stop loss order (which is the epitome of momentum investing,
in my opinion) causes more pressure to be placed on a stock that
moves in the direction of the order. Stop loss sales are inherent
in investing on margin. Stop loss purchases are similarly
destabilizing to the up side.

Actions on the futures market are immediately hedged into the
market, so limit, market, and stop loss orders have the same
effect on the market maker as the same orders on the underlying
stocks.

The options market is more complicated. Assuming that the public
is net purchasers of options. (Unlike that hedge trader, Need...
who went short SPX puts Monday and got cleaned out) then
options orders are (short term) destabilizing to the market. The
reason is that the option market maker hedges the option by
its delta, and that delta changes positively with positive (for the
options holder) movements in the underlying security. (I.e. we all
want our options to go deep in the money where the delta is one.)
This means that the market maker has to hedge deeper as the
option becomes more valuable, and this is anti-stabilizing to the
market.

I think the huge number of people playing the options games are
why our volatility is up, which has, of course, increased the volatility
index to the point where options are now extremely expensive.

-- Carl