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To: Gary105 who wrote (38739)11/3/1997 6:55:00 AM
From: William Hunt  Respond to of 186894
 
JOEY
The Wall Street Journal -- November 3, 1997

Doubts on Asia Cut Confidence in Profits

----

By Greg Ip
Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

Will the debacle in Southeast Asia undercut the remarkable growth in U.S. corporate profits? Maybe, maybe not. But it's that very uncertainty that appears to have played a big role in the stock market's tumble.

The third quarter was another strong one for corporate America, and so far the implosion of Hong Kong's stock market and Asian economic turmoil have produced no surge in estimate-cutting.

But Asia has created enormous uncertainty about which companies will be hurt, which will benefit, and by how much, and that, analysts say, is undermining the confidence in profit growth that explained the high, and rising, price-to-earnings multiples investors were willing to assign to stocks.

Investors have beaten down valuations in the past two weeks because of "uncertainty about the earnings estimates they are using, rather than as a result of lower estimates themselves," strategists at Smith Barney Inc. said in a Friday report. "The markets' violent reaction to problems in a region which represents just 3% of overall U.S. gross domestic product reflects equities' vulnerability to any question about the sources of future earnings growth."

Says Smith Barney strategist John MacNeil, "More of what's happening is psychological: We don't know what will happen, so we'll discount the worst case."

Certainly, the current profit situation still looks great. In the third quarter, 690 companies on the Dow Jones U.S. Stock Index saw their profits rise a healthy 12.7% from a year ago, well ahead of the second quarter's 10.6% pace, according to data compiled by First Call Corp. They beat analysts' estimates by 1.8 percentage points, a spread that is down from 2.3 percentage points in the second quarter. But Chuck Hill, director of research at First Call, says that's because many sectors such as semiconductors and commodities had a profit slump in 1996, and analysts' estimates were too low when those sectors bounced back in the first half of the year.

More to the point, Mr. Hill said he has seen no downward revisions as a result of the recent debacle in Asia.

That may be about to change. On Friday, Smith Barney semiconductor analyst James Barlage cited Asia for lowering his 1998 earnings estimate for Intel Corp. to $4.25 a share from $4.70, although he maintained his "buy" rating on the stock.

The prospect of slower growth in Southeast Asia, he says, probably will reduce the growth in world-wide personal-computer sales to 15% from 17% next year, hitting Intel's microprocessor sales.

But there's a silver lining that illustrates why the impact of the turmoil is so unclear. Mr. Barlage says Intel's gross margins might actually benefit because it does so much assembly and testing in the region, and the fall in local currencies will reduce its costs.

So future profits could be under pressure. There's just no evidence of it, yet. Indeed, Peter Canelo, strategist at Morgan Stanley, Dean Witter, Discover & Co., examined a list of 18 technology companies with above-average exposure to Asia and found that although they did miss analysts' estimates more than most companies in the third quarter, they didn't any more than technology companies with minimal Asian exposure -- suggesting the problem lay elsewhere. (Technology companies are considered among the most vulnerable to Asian problems due to a large presence in that region.)

"You can't see Southeast Asia in these numbers," he said. "We had some negative price trends in memory chips and some of the semiconductors before. It's just a little early to take a look at these numbers and come to any strong conclusions."

Still, you might want to get ready. "For some reason, stocks always seem to go down before estimates do," cracked Tom McManus, U.S. investment strategist for NatWest Securities Corp.

The companies considered most vulnerable to earnings hits are those involved in construction and engineering in Asia, such as United Technologies Corp. (which makes elevators, among other things), and Ingersoll-Rand Co.; those with big exports to the region, like Boeing Co.; and some financial companies, like Citicorp. Most beat estimates in the third quarter, and those that missed did so for reasons that appear unrelated to Asia, Mr. Hill says.

Mr. Canelo suspects there are revisions to come, but at present analysts are holding off. "I don't know how much company guidance the analysts are getting. Judging from our shop, it's like they're listening to anything the company will say, and the companies aren't saying much," he said.

But despite that expectation, neither Mr. McManus nor Mr. Canelo is prepared to take down his overall earnings estimates for next year. Mr. McManus noted that major multinationals like Coca-Cola Co. don't just sell in Asia; they also produce in Asia, so lower currencies there imply both lower costs and prices. Furthermore, unlike jumbo jets and elevators, their products are low-priced, and thus less subject to economic vagaries. "I think people have it completely wrong when they say you have to watch out for the big consumer multinationals. These companies are the safe havens," he said. Indeed, Coke was up last week, closing at $56.625 from $55.50 a week earlier.

Analysts at Prudential Securities have similar mixed outlooks. Arguing there will be no backlash from weakened demand, given Asia's small share of most PC manufacturers' sales, they argue that most computer makers will enjoy lower component costs from Asia, which will lower PC costs and stimulate demand. (The one loser they cite is Apple Computer Inc., with 24% of its sales in this region.) United Technologies and Boeing, with meaningful Asian exposure, are at risk but Sunbeam, Corp., owing to lower sourcing costs, could benefit.

One reason there has been no rash of profit estimate cuts so far is that Asia's problems still seem relatively inconsequential for the U.S. economy, at least relative to those of Latin America in late 1994 and early 1995, at the time of Mexico's peso devaluation and the ensuing steep recession in some Latin American economies. "Even the most pessimistic forecasts do not call for a repeat of the 1995 Mexican meltdown," noted Edward Kerschner and Michael Geraghty, strategists at PaineWebber Group. "Remember that in 1995, despite the upheaval in Latin America and sluggishness in Europe, S&P 500 operating earnings per share rose 18% and stock prices surged 34%."

But for the time being, such forecasts remain shrouded in uncertainty.

David Shulman, chief equity strategist at Salomon Brothers Inc., said last week that the Asian turmoil has severely shaken the belief that global growth, most prominently in Asia, created an almost unlimited horizon for robust, noninflationary growth, justifying sky-high valuations for U.S. stocks. Hong Kong's troubles "knocked the prop out from under that part of the bull market thesis," he said.

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To: Gary105 who wrote (38739)11/3/1997 6:58:00 AM
From: William Hunt  Respond to of 186894
 
TO ALL INTEL VALUATION
The Wall Street Journal -- November 3, 1997

Manager's Journal:
Stocks Overvalued? Not in the New Economy

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By Lowell L. Bryan

Are stocks fundamentally overvalued? Is last week's turmoil the beginning of a sustained bear market, as stocks return to "normal" valuations? Almost certainly not. The world's equity markets have been driven to today's levels for good reasons: The cost of equity capital has declined, and the value of intangible capital assets has increased dramatically.

There's no question that the world's stocks are priced differently than they were at the start of the 1990s. Market-to-book ratios of U.S. companies are now about 2-to-1, roughly double the average between 1945 and 1990. Price/earnings ratios in the U.S. are at 25, vs. a historic average of about 17. My colleagues at McKinsey and I analyzed the performance of the 100 largest companies world-wide and divided them into groups based on their earnings growth and returns on book equity since 1991. We then took the 20 of these companies with the least change in absolute performance. These 20 companies had an average increase in earnings of 3.8% compounded (little more than inflation) while return on book equity was flat (9.9% in 1991 and 1996). Yet their market capitalization grew by 13.5% compounded.

Since the performance of these companies was unchanged, what must have changed was the price at which the market valued that performance. Many attribute this change to "irrational exuberance." But our research indicates that the underlying cause is that the cost of equity capital is falling. Research by McKinsey two years ago estimated that there will be a $12 trillion increase in household financial assets by 2002 due to the aging of the developed world's population. The research also found that the demographic forces driving this extraordinary demand for financial assets will continue to increase through at least 2010. Many of these household savers, especially in the U.S., have begun to develop a clear preference for equities over bank deposits or bonds.

At the same time, corporate investment in tangible capital stock is declining. The ratio of revenue to the sum of property, plant, equipment and inventory for U.S. companies has increased by some 20% over the past 25 years. This means that U.S. companies are using about $530 billion less financial capital than they would have used otherwise. As companies elsewhere follow the U.S. lead in improving productivity, they too will release significant capital.

Meanwhile, governments in the developed world have dramatically slowed down the pace of new debt issuance; their bonds thus will absorb less household savings. In the past two years, we have reduced our estimate of the amount of government debt that will be outstanding in 2000 by $4 trillion. Our research also indicates it will be a decade or more before emerging markets will have a significant impact on world-wide supply and demand for capital. It therefore appears that there will be plenty of liquid financial capital seeking equity returns at least through the next decade. And whereas market breaks quickly eliminate speculative demand, it would take massive changes in investor demand, or massive new debt issuance by governments, to increase the cost of equity.

Also driving the market up is the strong performance of companies pursuing global opportunities. To understand this effect we took a different list of 100 global companies -- those with the greatest increase in market capitalization since 1992. These companies grew their market cap by 24% compounded and produced returns to shareholders of 30% compounded over the past five years. Overall, their market capitalizations increased from $1.6 trillion to $4.7 trillion, of which $2.7 trillion represents an increase in market value over book. That is, their market-to-book ratios doubled, to 4.2 from 2.1.

Outstanding stock market performance for this group is not surprising given that their earnings increased at 23% compounded and their return on book equity increased from 9% to 17%. But is a market-to-book ratio of 4.2 reasonable?

It could well be. Consider that historic accounting conventions understate both earnings and book capital when companies spend on "intangibles" -- people, patents, brands, software, customer bases and so forth -- which are increasingly the sources of value in today's global economy. Money that companies spend to create these intangible assets is considered an "expense" rather than a capital investment. For example, a rough estimate of the costs of the installed base of software in the U.S. is over $1 trillion, but most of this investment has been "expensed" even though as a by-product of this spending, intangible assets are being created that have value that will endure for years.

The inadequacy of our accounting conventions is not new. What is new is that the forces driving us toward a global economy -- deregulation, lower transaction costs, more liquid capital markets -- have made the potential value of intangible assets much higher. What's also new is that companies are investing in these intangible assets more strategically and consciously. Commercial life insurers, for example, are building cross-border expansion plans around their ability to understand risk rather than nondistinctive portfolio balancing and selling skills.

Investors know this -- but we have no accounting methodology for recognizing the value of investments in intangible assets. As companies accelerate spending on intangibles to capture global opportunities, "earnings" are being understated while returns on book equity and market-to-book and price/earnings ratios are being overstated. In other words, current stock market valuations are more reasonable than they appear.

As companies are learning how to use their intangible assets by moving them around the world -- through licensing agreements, alliances and other strategies -- they are also learning how to create and hold options -- making investments in brands, technologies, local market knowledge and so forth in order to stake claims on future global opportunities. Increasingly, investors are placing value on these options.

Thus, we believe that many companies with high market capitalizations have real option value built into their stock price. When a company is a standalone, this option value is transparent. The Internet search company Yahoo! has a market capitalization of $1.4 billion on annualized revenues of about $70 million and a book value of $110 million -- clearly a reflection of its option value. Less obviously, companies like General Electric, Smith Kline Beecham, Intel and Citibank have real global option values built into their market capitalizations.

These developments have outstripped the financial accounting conventions, the capital budgeting methodologies and even the mental models most firms use to run themselves. Investors hoping for the market to fall to levels that feel more "normal" are likely to have a very long wait.

---

Mr. Bryan is a partner in McKinsey's New York office.

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To: Gary105 who wrote (38739)11/3/1997 10:11:00 AM
From: Joe NYC  Respond to of 186894
 
Gary,

So the only way for AMD and Cyrx to compete is to sell product below cost?

AMD and Cyrix have to sell their chips at discount to intel in order to overcome the barrier that billions of Intel advertising dollars created.

Whether the price will be below cost depends on Intel.

Below cost is kind of relative in this business where volume rules. If Intel sold 1 million units, it would be very unprofitable. If Cyrix sold 20 million units, it would be very profitable. I don't know about AMD.

Joe