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Strategies & Market Trends : Conversion Solutions Holdings Corp. - A Scam? -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: scion who wrote (4434)1/28/2010 7:35:11 PM
From: scion  Respond to of 4624
 
01/28/2010 66 MOTION for (404b) Information of defendant or any co-defendant Regarding evidence of independent and separate offenses, wrongs or acts by Rufus Paul Harris. (Manchel, Howard) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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MOTION FOR PRETRIAL DISCLOSURE OF EVIDENCE OF INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE OFFENSES, WRONGS, OR ACTS

Comes now RUFUS PAUL HARRIS, by his counsel, and moves the Court to order the Government to disclose prior to trial all evidence of independent and separate offenses, wrongs, or acts which the prosecution may attempt to introduce at trial to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident regarding the Defendant’s actions or conduct.

This request is aimed at all crimes, wrongs, or acts not enumerated in the indictment of which the Government has knowledge and Defendant’s relies on Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) as authority for said request.

WHEREFORE, the Defendant prays that this motion be granted and disclosure be ordered immediately.

Howard J. Manchel
Howard J. Manchel
Ga. Bar No. 468550
729 Piedmont Avenue, NE
Atlanta, Ga. 30308
404-522-1701



To: scion who wrote (4434)1/28/2010 7:35:50 PM
From: scion  Respond to of 4624
 
01/28/2010 67 MOTION for Bill of Particulars by Rufus Paul Harris. (Manchel, Howard) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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MOTION FOR BILL OF PARTICULARS

Comes now Defendant RUFUS PAUL HARRIS and moves this Court for an order directing the United States of America to file a bill of particulars on the following matters embraced within the indictment:

1. Regarding Count One, paragraph 5 (B) the Government alleges the following:

Defendants Harris and Stanley, and others working for and with CSHC, represented that CSHC owned and maintained …

Please provide the names of the people the Government alleges were working for and with CSHC who the Government is referring to in that paragraph.

2. Regarding Count One, paragraph 5(B) the Government further alleges the following:

The bond investors were told this and other substantial assets would form the basis of CSHC’s ability to raise large amounts of capital for its profitable funding ventures.

Please provide the names of the bond investors.

3. Regarding Count One, paragraph 5 (C) the Government alleges the following:

Over $2 milllion was invested in CSHC by individuals induced to purchase “convertible notes.”

Please provide a list of the individuals the government contends were induced to purchase “convertible notes.”

4. Regarding Count One, paragraph 5(C) the Government alleges the following:

“the company could and in most if not all cases did decide to give the bondholder equity shares in CSHC instead of a cash payment.”

Is the Government contending that CSHC violated any law by deciding to convert the notes to stock instead of providing a cash payment?

Defendant's request seeks the names of those victims of the alleged fraud and those in addition to the named defendants who perpetrated the alleged fraud. In the category of victims, the defendants believe the first determination must be whether such persons exist and if so, did they purchase stock based on allegations from the defendants named in the indictment or allegations from “other parties.” In the category of others working for and with CSHC their identities are necessary in order to defend the conspiracy charge. Without the names of the “other parties” it would be difficult to rebut claims that they were working for the Defendants.

The purpose of a bill of particulars is to apprise the defendant of the essential facts of the crime for which the defendant has been indicted, especially in instances where the indictment itself does little more than track the language of the statute allegedly violated. United States v. Salazar, 485 F2d 1272, 1278 (2d Cir. 1973). It serves to inform the defendant of the charge against him with sufficient precision to allow him to prepare his defense, to minimize surprise at trial, and to enable him to plead double jeopardy in the event of a later prosecution of the same offense. United States v. Warren, 772 F.2d 827 (11th Cir. 1985).

Wherefore, Defendant requests this Court direct the Government to respond to the Bill of Particulars.

Respectfully submitted,
Howard J. Manchel
Howard J. Manchel
Attorney for Rufus Paul Harris
Ga. Bar No. 468550
Manchel, Wiggins & Kaye, P.C.
729 Piedmont Avenue, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
404-522-1701



To: scion who wrote (4434)1/28/2010 7:38:12 PM
From: scion  Respond to of 4624
 
01/28/2010 68 MOTION to Suppress Testimony from Deposition by Rufus Paul Harris. (Manchel, Howard) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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Preliminary Motion to Suppress Defendant’s SEC Deposition Taken Pursuant To A Subpoena But Without Benefit of 5th Or 6th Amendment Warnings

Comes now Defendant RUFUS PAUL HARRIS and requests this Court to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his 5th and 6th Amendment rights were violated when attorneys from the United States Securities and Exchange Commission deposed Defendant Harris without advising him of his right to counsel and/or his right not to incriminate himself. In support of his motion Defendant Harris shows the following:

1. Defendant has been indicted for conspiracy to commit to commit securities fraud (18 U.S.C. §1349); securities fraud (18 U.S.C. §1348); five counts of fraud by wire (18 U.S.C. §1343); and false certification of a financial statement (18 U.S.C. §1350).

2. The above indictment follows an SEC investigation, temporary restraining order, and finally a permanent injunction against Defendant from trading in his company, acting as an officer or director of a public corporation for seven years, disgorgement of any profits, and a civil penalty of over 1.3 million dollars. Said findings and penalties were imposed by Judge Clarence Cooper in this Court on or about September 10, 2008.

3. On information and belief Defendant Harris was deposed pursuant to a subpoena issued by the SEC directing him to appear at a time and place; said subpoena and deposition occurred after the temporary restraining order was granted by Judge Cooper which suspended trading in Conversion Solutions stock and froze the bank and brokerage accounts of his family. The deposition by three government SEC counsel at their offices lasted at least two days in October and November, 2006. According to the transcripts of the deposition Defendant Harris was not warned by Government counsel of his right not to incriminate himself, or that what he said in the presence of the three attorneys could and would be used against him. Nor is there any advice by Government counsel of the Defendant’s need for counsel or that the matter could be delayed a reasonable time until he obtained counsel.

4. Defendant’s deposition will be used in the Government’s case in chief to establish the elements of the crimes charged against Defendant.

5. The United States Securities and Exchange Commission describes itself
on its web site as being:

First and foremost, the SEC is a law enforcement agency. The Division of Enforcement assists the Commission in executing its law enforcement function by recommending the commencement of investigations of securities law violations, by recommending that the Commission bring civil actions in federal court or before an administrative law judge, and by prosecuting these cases on behalf of the Commission. As an adjunct to the SEC's civil enforcement authority, the Division works closely with law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and around the world to bring criminal cases when appropriate.

6. The 5th Amendment privilege against self incrimination prohibits the state from compelling an individual to incriminate oneself. It was added to the Bill of Rights in the conviction that too high a price may be paid for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free society should not be sacrificed. This provision of the 5th Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure. Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479 (1951).

7. The right to assistance of counsel, under the 6th Amendment is essential because it is the means by which defendants assert all other constitutional rights. U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 654 (1984). The right to counsel can be waived but only where such waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. Benitez v. U.S., 521 F3d. 1072 (6th Cir. 2008). The question this Court must ask was the Defendant made sufficiently aware by government counsel of his right to have counsel present and the fact that answers he provided could lead to a criminal prosecution. In other words, did Government counsel advise the Defendant of the nature of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, and the consequences of abandoning those rights, so the waiver of each right will be considered a knowing and intelligent one? See Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 292-93 (1988).

8. In this case the Government cannot establish that Defendant Harris knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his right to an attorney and thereafter knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right not to incriminate himself by allowing himself to be deposed by attorneys for the SEC.

Wherefore, Defendant requests that this Court conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Defendant knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his 5th and 6th Amendment rights not to incriminate himself and his right to counsel.

Respectfully submitted,

Howard J. Manchel
Attorney for Rufus Paul Harris
Ga. Bar No. 468550
729 Piedmont Avenue, NE
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
404-522-1701



To: scion who wrote (4434)1/28/2010 7:41:49 PM
From: scion  Respond to of 4624
 
01/28/2010 69 MOTION to Dismiss Counts Rufus Paul Harris (1) Count 1s,2s,8s for duplicity by Rufus Paul Harris. (Manchel, Howard) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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Motion to Dismiss Indictment on Grounds of Duplicity

Comes now Defendant RUFUS PAUL HARRIS and requests this Court to dismiss Count One and Two of the above styled indictment on the grounds that it is duplicitous and multiplicitous. In support of his motion Defendant Harris shows the following:

Counts One, Two and Eight Are Duplicitous

1. In Count One of the attached indictment Mr. Harris is charged with conspiring to commit securities fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1349. Count One, paragraph 2 states that the object of the conspiracy was to “knowingly and willfully execute and tempt to execute a scheme to defraud with regard to the publicly-traded securities of Conversion Solutions Holdings Corporation, in violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §1348”.

18 U.S.C.§1348 charges as follows:

Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice—
(1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d); or

(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d); shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years or both.

Indictments charging two or more distinct offenses in a single count are duplicitous. Duplicitous indictments prevent the jury from separately deciding the issue of guilt or innocence with respect to each particular offense, thus creating uncertainty as to whether the defendant’s conviction was based on a unanimous jury decision. Further, duplicitous indictments raise the risk of prejudical evidentiary rulings and make meaningful appellate review difficult. Thus the failure of the Government to allege which section of 18 USC §1348 was the object of the conspiracy in Count One violates the Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. Count Two is also duplicitous. Although it charges Mr. Harris and his two codefendants with violating 18 U.S.C. §1348, and the wording of the Count suggests the Government’s intention is to establish a violation of 18 U.S.C. §1348 (2). However, the first paragraph of Count Two states “The Grand Jury includes by incorporation and re-alleges Paragraphs 1-5 of Count One, above” it adopts the same pleading error contained in Count One. Also in alleging the violation of Title 18 U.S.C. §1348 it fails to specify which section of the statute Defendant violated.

3. Count Eight is duplicitous. It charges Mr. Harris with either violating 18 U.S.C. §1350 (c)(1) and (c)(2), but fails to include the necessary language in the charge to warrant charging (c)(2).
WHEREFORE, Defendant Harris requests this Court either order the Government to strike the offending charges or for this Court to dismiss Counts One and Two of said indictment for the reason that it is duplicitous.

Respectfully submitted,

Howard J. Manchel
Howard Manchel
Ga. Bar No. 468550
Attorney for Rufus Paul Harris
729 Piedmont Avenue
Atlanta, Georgia 30308
404-522-1701



To: scion who wrote (4434)1/28/2010 7:45:02 PM
From: scion  Respond to of 4624
 
1/28/2010 70 MOTION to Provide Access to Cooperating Government Witnesses by Benjamin Stanley. (King Grant, Ethenia) (Entered: 01/28/2010)

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MOTION FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO PROVIDE ACCESS TO COOPERATING GOVERNMENT WITNESSES

COMES NOW, BENJAMIN STANLEY defendant herein, who, makes, files and serves the above-titled motion.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CHARGES

Benjamin Stanley is charged in an eight count indictment that was returned on November 9, 2009. Mr. Stanley is charged with conspiracy to commit securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and failure to certify financial reports pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1348, 1349, 1343 and 1350. Mr. Stanley is alleged to have knowingly participated in a scheme to defraud investors of the publicly traded entity, Conversion Solutions Holding Corporation “CSHC” of which he was the Chief Operating Officer. Specifically, Mr. Stanley is charged with conspiring to issue false press releases and financial statements about CSHC for the purpose of inflating the stock price of CSHC and transferring his shares to his family members who sold the stock at inflated prices. The discovery in this case is voluminous and consists of thousands of pages of documents; Yet, in spite of the seriousness of the charges, there are only a few pages at most referring to Mr. Stanley.

Discovery provided in this case indicates that the government intends to rely upon unindicted coconspirator cooperating individuals as key government witnesses against Mr. Stanley. This motion does not speak to the situation where indicted co-conspirators named in the indictment later enter into a plea and cooperation agreement. If those defendants are named in the style of the case and have counsel, defense counsel will be able locate them.

Rather, this motion speaks to the situation, as in this case, where seemingly some of the evidence of the conspiracy will be testimonial by unindicted co-conspirators. Defense counsel cannot ascertain their whereabouts because they do not even know who they are, much less where they are. The Government knows who these individuals are and how they can be located.

If, as is expected, most of the evidence intended to be used against Mr. Stanley is cooperating testimony or co-conspirator hearsay, then he must have access to them. Without access to the Government’s witnesses, and unless additional discovery exist and is provided to defense counsel other than the few pages pertaining to Mr. Stanley that have been received, he will be utterly powerless to mount a defense. He will be totally blindsided at trial.

In order to properly prepare for trial, and in order to render Mr. Stanley effective assistance of counsel, the defense must at least have access to these witnesses so they can be interviewed and/or subpoenaed. Otherwise, the Sixth Amendment rights to compulsory process and to effective assistance of counsel are impotent.

It is further believed by the defense, that some, if not all of the cooperating individuals and co-conspirator witnesses, have entered into, or will enter into, some form of a cooperating agreement with the government, including motions for a downward departure based on substantial assistance before sentencing or a further reduction of sentence after sentencing. These individuals and their counsel may be of the belief that if they agree to be interviewed by the defense, the government will hold it against them when assessing their level of cooperation for favorable sentencing or post-sentencing recommendations.

At a minimum, the government should be required to:

(1) Identify all cooperating government witnesses and how they can be contacted by defense counsel, including revealing the location of the facilities where the witnesses are being detained (whether detained locally or incarcerated in federal custody), so that defense counsel may interview them;

(2) Be instructed to notify each of the cooperating government witnesses and their respective attorneys, that if they agree to be interviewed by the defense, their doing so will not jeopardize their plea agreements with the government or be held against them when assessing their level of cooperation for favorable sentencing or post-sentencing recommendations.

LEGAL AUTHORITY

In United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1986), the appellate court upheld the trial court’s order permitted the defense to take the deposition of government witnesses, based upon a finding that the government had, at least, strongly implied that these witnesses should not be interviewed by the defense, or otherwise chilled their willingness to do so. The court stated:

"As a general rule, a witness belongs neither to the government nor to the defense. Both sides have the right to interview witnesses before trial. Callahan v. United States, 371 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Long, 449 F.2d 288 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 974, 92 S. Ct. 1191, 31 L. Ed. 2d 247 (1972).Exceptions to this rule are justifiable only under the 'clearest and most compelling circumstances.' Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 86 S. Ct. 1840, 16 L. Ed. 2d 973 (1966)."

United States v. Cook, 608 F.2d 1175 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1034, 100 S. Ct. 706, 62 L. Ed. 2d 670 (1980); accord United States v. Pinto, 755 F.2d 150, 152 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Walton, 602 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (4th Cir. 1979). This view is bolstered by the American Bar Association's Standards for Criminal Justice § 3-3.01(c), providing that the prosecutor will not discourage or obstruct communications between prospective witnesses and defense counsel and that it is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to advise a prospective witness to decline to give the defense information that person has a right to give. See also Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(f).

United States v. Carrigan, 804 F.2d 599, 603 (10th Cir. 1986). The court also recognized that innuendos, implications, and insinuations also constitute a chilling effect and discourages the witness to be interviewed; not just an overt, obvious, and open hindrance by the prosecution.

Furthermore, the government may not advise a government witness that s/he not talk to anyone unless the prosecution is present. If the government interviewed witnesses “unencumbered by the presence of the defense counsel,” then the same should be afforded to the defense. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court opined:

[W]e know of nothing in the law which gives the prosecutor the right to interfere with the preparation of the defense by effectively denying defense counsel access to the witnesses except in his presence. Presumably the prosecutor, in interviewing the witnesses, was unencumbered by the presence of defense counsel, and there seems to be no reason why defense counsel should not have an equal opportunity to determine, through interviews with the witnesses, what they know about the case and what they will testify to. In fact, Canon 39 of the Canons of Professional Ethics makes explicit the propriety of such conduct: "A lawyer may properly interview any witness or prospective witness for the opposing side in any civil or criminal action without the consent of opposing counsel or party." Canon 10 of the Code of Trial Conduct of the American College of Trial Lawyers is an almost verbatim provision.

Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966). “A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal opportunity to interview the persons who have the information from which the truth may be determined. “Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966).

Indeed, it is the government’s duty to seek the truth in every criminal prosecution, not to win at any cost. At the same time, the defense has the duty to interview witnesses and to make an independent examination of the factual circumstances. United States v. Johnson, 615 F.2d 1125, 1128 (5th Cir. 1980). Without access to the prospective government witnesses, defense counsel cannot meet this duty and render effective assistance of counsel.

If the defense can learn facts during an unfettered interview with government witnesses that could exonerate a defendant on trial, the government should applaud and encourage and arrange those interviews, because it will: further the truth, foster the system of justice, and forsake the conviction of an innocent person.

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, based upon the foregoing reasoning and authority, Benjamin Stanley respectfully requests that this Honorable Court will:
(a) GRANT this Motion For The Government to Provide Access to Government Witnesses;

(b) ENTER an Order (1) requiring the government to identify all cooperating government witnesses, including providing at least the city and state of current whereabouts and (2) instructing the government to notify its witnesses and their counsel that their plea agreements with, and favorable sentencing or post-sentencing recommendations by, the government will not be jeopardized if they agree to be interviewed by the defense;

(c) PERMIT Benjamin Stanley to supplement and amend this motion as the same may become necessary or dictated by the progress of the case;

(d) PERMIT Benjamin Stanley to file such other motions as the same may become necessary or dictated by the progress of the case;

(e) ALLOW Benjamin Stanley to file a reply to the government’s response; and,

(f) GRANT Benjamin Stanley such other and further relief in his favor as this Honorable Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted this 28th day of January, 2010. .
/s/ Ethenia F. King Grant
Attorney for Benjamin Stanley
GA Bar No. 420252
KING GRANT & ASSOCIATES, LLC
149 S. McDonough St. ? Suite 160
Jonesboro, Georgia 30236
Tel: 770.210.4886
Fax: 770.477.1869
ekinggrant@kinggrantlaw.com