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Politics : Sioux Nation -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: cirrus who wrote (187741)3/6/2010 10:06:02 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361946
 
GM's Back, Wall Street's Ready to Roll

online.wsj.com

By ANDREW BARY
BARRON'S INSIGHT
MARCH 7, 2010

General Motors has staged an impressive recovery since it emerged from bankruptcy protection last July, and it may go public again in what could be the hottest initial public offering of 2010.

GM's turnaround isn't as advanced as that of rival Ford Motor, which in February outsold GM for the first time in decades in the U.S. Still, Wall Street has been impressed with the auto maker's progress. GM's U.S. market share has stabilized, global costs are down, vehicle incentives and inventories have dropped, while resale values are up.

GM has some hot cars like the Chevrolet Camaro and Cadillac SRX crossover vehicle. Even once-stodgy Buick is having success with the redesigned LaCrosse and the curvy Enclave crossover.

If GM does go public in late 2010, its market value could top $50 billion, more than that of either Ford or Germany's Daimler, the maker of Mercedes-Benz cars. Why such a high value? GM now has a great balance sheet, thanks in large part to the generosity of the U.S. government, which pumped $50 billion into the company in 2008 and 2009.

GM ended the third quarter -- the most recent period for which results are available -- with $42 billion in cash, against $29 billion in debt and preferred-stock obligations. If total U.S. sales of cars and light trucks rise toward 14 million in 2011, GM could be very profitable.

GM also has joint ventures in China that control 15% of what has become the world's largest auto market.

The U.S. government, which now owns 60.8% of the equity in GM, is eager to see the company go public so that it can begin to cash in. The Canadian government has an 11.7% interest. A health-care trust for GM's unionized workers holds 17.5%, while creditors of the old GM have 10%.

Some intrepid investors are seeking to play new GM via the $27 billion of old GM debt that now trades for about 30 cents on the dollar. Bondholders probably will get a package of new GM equity and stock warrants after GM goes public. Investors probably should avoid GM's old stock, called Motors Liquidation.

Sophisticated investors can play GM's revival via the debt markets, but, until the initial offering takes place, it's easier and probably safer to invest in a recovering global auto sector with shares of either Ford or Daimler.

For more, visit barrons.com



To: cirrus who wrote (187741)3/7/2010 2:17:35 AM
From: koan  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 361946
 
Clinton raised taxes again after bush sr when asked how to balance the budget.

The right wing yelled disaster coming and the economy went on to create 22 million jobs and balance the budget.

Bush only created a few million jobs and doubled the deficit from 5 to 10 trillion dollars.

And the dumbass right wing cannot figure that out.



To: cirrus who wrote (187741)3/9/2010 9:31:06 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361946
 
What happened to Obama's middle path on health reform?
_______________________________________________________________

Op-Ed Column
By Michael Gerson
The Washington Post
Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Whatever the legislative fate of health reform -- now in the hands of a few besieged House Democrats -- the reformers have failed in their argument. Their proposal has divided Democrats while uniting Republicans, returned American politics to well-worn ideological ruts, employed legislative tactics that smack of corruption, squandered the president's public standing, lowered public regard for Congress to French revolutionary levels, sucked the oxygen from other agenda items, reengaged the abortion battle, produced freaks and prodigies of nature such as a Republican senator from Massachusetts, raised questions about the continued governability of America and caused the White House chief of staff to distance himself from the president's ambitions.

It is quite an accomplishment. For the president, it must also be quite a shock, because he thought he was taking a reasonable, middle path on health reform.

At the start of this process, many Democrats preferred a single-payer health system -- essentially, Medicare for everyone. Short of this goal, they advocated a public option that would compete with private insurance companies and prove the superiority of government-run care. But President Obama rejected a single-payer approach and signaled early that the public option was expendable.

Obama also rejected the one genuinely bipartisan health reform proposal -- made by Sens. Ron Wyden (D-Ore.) and Bob Bennett (R-Utah) -- that would have ended employer-based insurance and given individuals a deduction to buy their own coverage from a menu of private insurance options. (Wyden has turned out to be the ignored prophet of the health debate. "If you . . . just pound it through on a partisan vote," he said last June, "you have people practically as soon as the ink is dry looking to have it repealed.")

Instead, the president chose the current complex, regulatory approach to reform, precisely because it seemed less radical and disruptive than the other options. It was patterned in part on health reforms in Massachusetts signed by then-Gov. Mitt Romney, a Republican, thereby applying at least a veneer of bipartisanship.

So what went wrong? Some analysts blame structural factors, particularly the growth in partisanship. It is true that the Republican caucus in Congress has become more homogeneous in its conservatism. But it is also true that Obama wants to seriously expand the role of government at a moment when skepticism of government is widespread. His health-reform plan may have seemed moderate on the congressional ideological spectrum. But the creation of a new middle-class entitlement can't be considered moderate in the context of the times when even previous entitlement commitments seem unsustainable. And it has not helped that the Massachusetts model of health reform has resulted in unchecked cost increases, requiring higher taxes and benefit cuts. These financial concerns not only unify Republicans of every ideological stripe, they reach into the right of the Democratic coalition.

In fact, these structural obstacles were increased by a major strategic miscalculation. Obama clearly believed that the economic crisis was fully fungible -- that a turn to government activism in one policy area would translate into support in other areas. So he attempted a rhetorical sleight of hand, arguing that economic recovery required health reform and a cap-and-trade system for carbon emissions. Few bought it. To the contrary, the massive -- and, in my view, necessary -- bank bailout only increased public skepticism about government and congressional concerns about spending.

The final reason for Obama's failed argument on health reform is neither structural nor strategic. It is psychological. As the evidence mounted that the body politic was rejecting Obama's health-system transplant, Obama faced a choice about the nature of his presidency. He could retreat toward incrementalism or insist on transformation. Obama had previewed his impatience with incrementalism during the campaign. Similar to his predecessor, George W. Bush, Obama turned hard against the Clinton model. "Ronald Reagan changed the trajectory of America," he said, "in a way that Richard Nixon did not and in a way that Bill Clinton did not. He put us on a fundamentally different path because the country was ready for it."

In retrospect, Obama's greatest achievement during the 2008 campaign was to combine soothing reassurance with a message of transformational change in a single political persona. Governing, however, has required a choice between reassurance and transformation.

Because Obama has chosen liberal transformation, the political outcomes are limited: He can appear radical in victory or weak in defeat. Given his health-reform decisions, it is no longer possible for Obama to be a president both strong and unifying.



To: cirrus who wrote (187741)3/10/2010 3:36:39 AM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 361946
 
Health-care reform's sickeningly sweet deals
______________________________________________________________

By Kathleen Parker
Columnist
The Washington Post
Wednesday, March 10, 2010

Skipping through the Candy Land of the health-care bill, one is tempted to hum a few bars of "Let Me Call You Sweetheart."

What a deal. For dealmakers, that is. Not so much for American taxpayers, who have been misled into thinking that the sweetheart deals have been excised.

Not only are the deals still there, but they're bigger and worser, as the Bard gave us permission to say. And the health-care "reform" bill is, consequently, more expensive by billions.

Yes, gone (sort of) is the so-called Cornhusker kickback, extended to Nebraska Sen. Ben Nelson when his 60th vote needed a bit of coaxing. Meaning, Nelson is no longer special. Instead, everyone is. All states now will get their own Cornhusker kickbacks. And everything is beautiful in its own way.

Originally, Nelson had secured 100 percent federal funding for Nebraska's Medicaid expansion -- in perpetuity -- among other hidden prizes to benefit locally based insurance companies. When other states complained about the unfair treatment, President Obama and Congress "fixed" it by increasing the federal share of Medicaid to all states through 2017, after which all amounts are supposed to decrease.

Nelson's deal might have escaped largely unnoticed, if not for his pivotal role on the Senate vote last December. The value of what he originally negotiated for Nebraska -- about $100 million -- wasn't that much in the trillion-dollar scheme of things, but the cost of the "fix" runs in the tens of billions, according to a health lobbyist who crunched the numbers for me.

Other sweetheart provisions that remain in the bill include special perks for Florida ("Gatorade"), Louisiana ("The Louisiana Purchase"), Nevada, Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota and Utah ("The Frontier States"). There may well be others, and staffers on the Hill, who come to work each day equipped with espresso shooters, magnifying glasses and hair-splitters, are sifting through the stacks of verbiage.

Wearily, one might concede that this is, well, politics as usual. But weren't we supposed to be finished with backroom deals? Whither the transparency of the Promised Land?

During last month's health-care summit, Sen. John McCain had the audacity to raise -- "with respect" -- the specter of opaque and "unsavory" dealmaking, whereupon Obama reminded his former presidential foe that the campaign was over. Which isn't exactly true, of course, but point taken.

The effort to push any health-care bill through Congress is relentless, no matter how many Americans oppose it. All reasons are known and understood, at least politically. But taunting comprehension is how any member of Congress can view his reflection while carving out expensive deals instead of seeking every possible way to cut costs and reduce the likelihood of crippling taxes. It's not as though any of this is free.

To his credit, Obama conceded McCain's point in a post-summit letter to Congress, noting that some provisions had been added to the legislation that shouldn't have been. His own proposal does not include the Medicare Advantage provision mentioned by McCain that allowed extra benefits for Florida, as well as other states. The president also mentioned that his plan eliminates the Nebraska yum-yum (not his term), "replacing it with additional federal financing to all states for the expansion of Medicaid."

More fair? Sure, but at mind-boggling cost to taxpayers. To correct a $100 million mistake, we'll spend tens of billions instead.

Throughout the health-care process, the Democrats' modus operandi has been to offer a smarmy deal and then, when caught, to double down rather than correct course. The proposed tax on high-end "Cadillac" insurance policies to help defray costs is another case in point. Pushed by the president, and initially passed by the Senate, the tax was broadly viewed as an effective way to bend the cost curve down. But then labor unions came knocking and everyone caved. The tax will be postponed until 2018.

And the cost of the union compromise? According to the Congressional Budget Office, the original Cadillac tax would have saved the Treasury $149 billion from 2013 to 2019. Under the postponed tax, the savings will probably plunge to just $65 billion, or a net loss to the Treasury of $84 billion.

Regardless of what the CBO reports in the coming days, no one can claim the bill is as lean as it could be. A spoonful of sugar may indeed help the medicine go down, but even King Kandy and the Gingerbread People can choke on too many sweets.

kathleenparker@washpost.com