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Technology Stocks : The *NEW* Frank Coluccio Technology Forum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Frank A. Coluccio who wrote (33493)	5/4/2010 5:19:42 PM
From: Frank A. Coluccio	Respond to of 46821

How Technology Failed in the Gulf Spill The disaster exposes overreliance on blowout preventers that has been long disparaged by insiders. By Peter Fairley \| MIT Technology Review \| May 04, 2010 The unabated flow of crude oil from a well off the Louisiana coast speaks to "the tyranny of distance and the tyranny of depth," according to Coast Guard Admiral Thad Allen, named by President Obama last week to be national incidence commander to take control of the response effort from BP. Allen has expanded already extensive efforts to disperse, skim, and block the oil that is surfacing from the well blowout that destroyed the Deepwater Horizon drill rig last month. But he told a media briefing this weekend that his top job is stopping the flow of new oil into the sea--a complex and risky process at the one-mile depths where Deepwater Horizon drilled. The oil leak also reveals an overreliance on one piece of equipment that academic and industry experts have warned of for close to a decade: The blowout preventers, or BOPs, that are the industry's primary line of defense against deepwater oil spills. Cont.: technologyreview.com ------

To: Frank A. Coluccio who wrote (33493)	5/4/2010 7:11:44 PM
From: aladin	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 46821

Frank, With regards to your thoughts: FAC: I see a common thread emerging here with respect to all three: (1) my previous post concerning dependence on submarine cables; A good map is at: pccwglobal.com I have one client with a worldwide network with 10gig and OC-48 backbone circuits. The application they sell operates at 6 9's so the network is designed at 7. To do this we have to spread risk across cable providers and geoseismic risk locations. Think 4 links across each pond. No more than 2 circuits in any one risk pool (such as the north Pacific route). Of course some issues emerge with latency on some routes. (2) the oil platforms, about which the article above speaks; Anything that can happen will - however improbable. Designers should plan accordingly - 5 9's is not nearly enough. (3) natural disasters of the type we witnessed with Katrina. Higher population, taller buildings, coastal living - all combine for higher risk. Katrina was bad - but it was hyped as the apocalypse. Remind me again how many murders and rapes occurred at the Super dome? How did Humana fair compared to State and City owned Hospitals? Imagine the next one with something like FEMA running all the Hospitals. :-( John