To: ChinuSFO who wrote (77928 ) 6/10/2010 11:11:17 AM From: stockman_scott Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 149317 U.S. Chemical Safety Board to Probe 'Root Causes' of BP Oil Rig Blast By Sue Reisinger Corporate Counsel June 10, 2010 The U.S. Chemical Safety Board has agreed to investigate the "root causes" of the April 20 blast on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig in the Gulf of Mexico. The board is becoming an expert on probing the British oil company, BP -- it's the third BP incident the board's investigated since 2005. The request came in a letter from Reps. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., chairman of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, and Bart Stupak, D-Mich., who chairs the subcommittee on oversight and investigations. And CSB Chairman John Bresland quickly issued a statement accepting the challenge. Waxman's committee is probing the largest oil spill in U.S. history. The explosion killed 11 workers and continues spilling oil into the Gulf at an unprecedented rate. The letter asked the CSB to answer five questions: • Do the circumstances and events leading up to the Deepwater Horizon explosion reflect problems in BP's corporate safety culture? • What role, if any, did cost-cutting and budgetary concerns play in BP's decisions about well design and testing? • How did BP, Transocean, and other contractors apply "management of change" programs to assess the consequences of modifications to process, technology, and equipment on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig as well as organizational changes, including changes to personnel, training, and budget? • Did BP provide adequate oversight of the contractors working on the well? • Can the CSB draw any parallels between the root causes of the April 20 oil rig explosion and the causes of the 2005 BP Texas City refinery explosion? BP did not immediately respond to requests for comment on this story. Waxman's letter said the CSB has a unique perspective on BP's "safety culture and practices," because the board previously examined the cause of the explosion at BP's Texas City refinery that took 15 lives in 2005. In its refinery probe, the CSB concluded that cost-cutting, a lax safety culture and production pressures from BP executives were key factors that led to the explosion. For example, the probe found that four BP workers who were filling a vertical tank with chemicals when it exploded had all been working 12-hour shifts for more than four weeks without a day off. The study concluded that cost cuts mandated by the company's London headquarters contributed to the tragedy -- and that managers ignored warnings that an accident was imminent. "The Texas City disaster was caused by organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of BP Corporation," the board said. "Warning signs of a possible disaster were present for several years, but company officials did not intervene effectively to prevent it." BP at the time said it "strongly disagreed" with many of the board's findings. But it promised to consider all its recommendations alongside the steps it had already taken to improve safety. Even so, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration accused BP of 301 "egregious, willful violations" of safety rules at the refinery. It fined the company $21 million -- the largest penalty in the agency's 35-year history, according to news reports at the time. In 2006, the CSB compared the refinery explosion with the massive leak at a BP pipeline in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. The board found "striking similarities" between the reported causes of these two incidents, including a focus on budgetary concerns rather than sound risk analysis. On Tuesday, Bresland pointed out that in 2005 BP had hired -- at the board's urging -- a yearlong independent review of the safety culture at all of BP's North American refineries. For that study, BP chose the Houston law firm Baker Botts. Most of BP's America operations are based in Houston. Former Secretary of State James Baker III, a partner at the law firm, led the review. Baker's report, published in early 2007, concluded that BP lacked proper safety processes. "The system as a whole does not ensure adequate identification and rigorous analysis of hazards," the report said. Many employees told the panel that BP put "profits before safety." The interviews of hundreds of workers "established that a significant portion of the U.S. refining workforce believed that production goals, operational pressures, or budgetary constraints sometimes overrode process safety concerns," it said. But all the fines, reports and recommendations did not stop the Deepwater Horizon from exploding in April. Nor are they helping to stem the flow of oil gushing into the Gulf of Mexico. And now the CSB and Congress want to know why.