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To: longnshort who wrote (43851)6/27/2010 11:53:21 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
O's deadly deadline
A'stan exit plan = failure
Last Updated: 5:11 AM, June 26, 2010
Rich Lowry

To succeed in Afghanistan, we'll need the support of the likes of Abdul Sattar Abu Risha. He was the daring tribal sheik in Anbar province whose pivot against al Qaeda in the summer of 2006 began to turn the Iraq War.

He marshaled other tribal leaders in what grew into a nationwide anti-al Qaeda movement. Sattar acted knowing that the Americans had his back. "Instead of telling [the Iraqis] that we would leave soon and they must assume responsibility for their own security," Col. Sean MacFarland, who worked with Sattar, has explained, "we told them that we would stay as long as necessary to defeat the terrorists."

He knew W wouldn't cut and run: Abdul-Sattar Abu Risha (r.), a man vital to turning Iraq around, with then-President Bush in 2007.

Sattar trusted President George W. Bush, and admired him "for sticking to his principles despite public opinion." All of this is recounted in the new book on the Anbar revolt, "A Chance in Hell," by Jim Michaels. As Mark Moyar writes in a review in The Wall Street Journal, it was only by winning the confidence of elites like Sattar -- who was killed in September 2007 -- that we had a chance to win over the Iraqi population.

What would Sattar have made of President Obama, who has set a deadline of July 2011 for the beginning of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, and of Vice President Joe Biden, who has guaranteed in a Newsweek interview -- "Bet. On. It." -- that there will be large numbers of troops leaving by then? We know what Afghan President Hamid Karzai thinks -- that he'd better explore an accommodation with his enemies well before any helicopters leave the US Embassy rooftop.

Obama implicitly promised a departure from the bumptious ways of George W. Bush as commander in chief. Where Bush was stubborn, he'd be flexible; where Bush was unconditional, he'd be nuanced; where Bush went all in, he'd avoid overcommitting. But ambivalence doesn't play well in a war zone, especially in a war of insurgency that's partly a contest over staying power.

If Obama's July 2011 deadline showcased his deliberative care as the honorary faculty chairman of national-security meetings, it played disastrously in Afghanistan. In sacking Rolling Stone subject Gen. Stanley McChrystal and replacing him with Gen. David Petraeus, Obama has a chance to hit "reset." But only if he finds his inner cowboy.

There's no way the Afghan equivalent of Sattar sitting somewhere on the outskirts of Kandahar can know Obama's intentions when members of his council of war don't know them. Biden says July 2011 marks the start of major withdrawals; Defense Secretary Robert Gates disagrees. Who's to say?

To put the severity of a hard July 2011 deadline in perspective, the last unit of the surge Obama ordered last December won't arrive in Afghanistan until toward the end of the year. The deadline gives the fully surged forces all of six months to operate, in an environment Petraeus says is more difficult than Iraq.

Obama should redefine the deadline as the time frame for a review of the current strategy rather than its endpoint. If it's not working, then he can reconsider. Until then, he should shut down the rancorous internal debate within his administration and maintain the same firm tone he struck in his excellent Rose Garden remarks upon McChrystal's departure.

His left might not like it, but they won't berate him as a "chicken hawk," as they did with Bush, or flail his chosen commanding general as "General Betray Us," as MoveOn.org did during the Iraq surge.

Besides, his base isn't his target audience. As President Bush always said, there were four key audiences during the Iraq War -- the American public, the troops, our Iraq allies and the enemy. "The enemy thinks that we are weak," he said in a candid White House interview during a low point of the surge. "They're sophisticated people, and they listen to the debate."

That's just as true of the enemy in Afghanistan. Now that Obama has picked Bush's general, he should replicate his stalwart style.

Read more: nypost.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)8/2/2010 12:45:05 AM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
The CIA Solution for Afghanistan
There's no 'victory' to be had there. But we can prevent it from becoming a haven for al Qaeda with a covert strategy based on Predator drones and alliances with local leaders.
JULY 29, 2010.

By JACK DEVINE
The U.S. military will not achieve anything resembling victory in Afghanistan, no matter how noble the objective and heroic the effort.

It's time to face this reality. We should start by developing a new covert action plan to be implemented by the Central Intelligence Agency. The strategy should focus on forging the kinds of relationships necessary to keep Afghanistan from re-emerging as al Qaeda's staging ground once our forces depart, and also on continuing the hunt for Osama bin Laden.

If there is any lasting lesson from the recent demise of Gen. Stanley McChrystal, it's that the large and visible occupying army he commanded in Afghanistan is simply the wrong force to wage the battles being fought there. The British and the Russians know this too well.

View Full Image

David Klein
.Having run the CIA's Afghan Task Force—which covertly channeled U.S. support to the Afghans fighting to drive the Soviets out of their country—I recognize the playbook our policy makers are using today. It didn't work for the Soviets then, and it won't work for us now. However different our current objective, our efforts are alarmingly similar to those of the Russians. Instead of ignoring the lessons of that history, what we need to do is to be more like ourselves in the 1980s and in the months immediately following the attacks of 9/11.

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.In the '80s we essentially ended the Cold War with a well-funded and broadly supported covert action program. In 2001, under similar political circumstances, a small band of CIA operators restored old ties to Afghan tribal leaders, teamed up with U.S. Special Forces and, backed with U.S. air power, toppled the Taliban in a matter of weeks.

Our presence in Afghanistan is better left unseen. Most Afghans, even those willing to deal with us, would rather we get our military out of their country. A covert action program would address this concern. It would also cost less than a military effort in treasure and lives, and allow the U.S. to continue to protect its interests and the interests of the Afghans who desire nothing more than to see their country enter a period of calm.

A smart covert action program should rest on worst-case scenarios. Afghanistan will likely enter a period of heightened instability leading up to and following our planned 2012 departure, so we should figure out now which tribal leaders—and, under specially negotiated arrangements, which Taliban factions—we could establish productive relationships with. We must also consider the possibility that our departure could precipitate the eventual collapse of the Karzai government. Thus we should cultivate relationships with leaders inside and outside the current regime who are most likely to fill the power vacuum.

It's a good bet that the CIA already has substantial relationships with many of these personalities, particularly in areas where agency operators have long enjoyed relative freedom of movement. Afghanistan is a tribal society, not a nation state, and tribal interests are often easy to accommodate with cash and other assets that help tribal leaders maintain their power. Make no mistake: We're not talking about supporting advocates for Jeffersonian democracy here. But these partnerships have proven dependable and highly advantageous to U.S. policy makers in promoting regional stability in the past.

The cornerstone of a revitalized covert action plan in Afghanistan must be based on an updated Presidential Finding, which is required for any covert initiative. The president himself would have to authorize ample funding for the remains of the Karzai government, its opposition, tribal warlords and even some Taliban elements, as long as they're willing to help us achieve our objectives. The fact that many of them don't like each other will probably work to our benefit and against our enemies in al Qaeda.

My experience at the CIA helped me develop a few rules of engagement that I consider critical to successful covert action programs. First, they must have sufficient funding and bipartisan congressional approval. Second, a general consensus backing the effort must exist among the American public. Third, there must be robust support among key players and interest groups in the country where our covert action program functions. Perhaps most importantly, the rationale behind the program must be anchored in sound policy objectives.

It bears mentioning that covert action has been controversial, and has many opponents in and out of government. But such critiques often highlight flawed policy rather than failed execution. The CIA's work in Chile during the 1970s and in Central America during the 1980s are generally viewed as mistakes or failures. But in both cases the agency was operationally successful. The real issue was the flawed policy, which the CIA has no part in determining.

Congress, the executive and the public were justifiably disturbed by some of the means used to carry out covert action since 9/11, including waterboarding and other "enhanced interrogation techniques." Advocates for the expanded use of covert action must be clear in their refusal to countenance these practices, and in their commitment to strong oversight measures. More generally, an updated covert strategy should establish clearer rules of engagement. Predator drone attacks, which have been effective in killing al Qaeda leaders, should be relied upon. Covert activities should not be outsourced to private contractors, as has reportedly occurred in Afghanistan.

Preventing a return to a pre-9/11 version of Afghanistan is a realistic and achievable goal as long as our strategy is calibrated to the Afghan political, cultural and physical landscapes. A CIA-run covert action program is by nature custom-tailored to the reality on the ground. As such, it is a highly valuable tool that we should use to advance a modified objective in Afghanistan.

Mr. Devine is a former CIA deputy director of operations and chief of the CIA Afghan Task Force 1986-87. He is president of the Arkin Group, a private sector intelligence company based in New York.

online.wsj.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)8/9/2010 12:29:43 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Why Are We In Afghanistan If Our Government Won’t Even Designate the Taliban a Terrorist Organization?

August 06, 2010 7:14 AM By Andy McCarthy

Back in May, while disagreeing with the Obama administration’s knee-jerk decision to treat the would-be Times Square bomber as a criminal defendant rather than an enemy combatant, I pointed out that the administration might have had a good legal argument. That was because Faisal Shahzad appeared to be connected to the Pakistani Taliban (something that has since been corroborated). It’s not clear that Taliban operatives qualify for enemy treatment.

To be an enemy combatant, an operative must be affiliated with the enemy we are fighting in a war. Yet, though we have been at this for nearly nine years now, though Americans have been told we need to continue the fight in Afghanistan because the Taliban must be defeated, though the Pakistani Taliban is closely linked to the Afghan Taliban, and though the Pakistani Taliban is plainly plotting to attack our homeland, Congress has never amended the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF) enacted after 9/11. The AUMF does not expressly name either Taliban organization, much less both of them, as enemies. Nor does it name other jihadist organizations targeting our forces, such as the Haqqani Network and Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin (the faction of Gilbuddin Hekmatyar, whom I discussed in Tuesday’s column).

It gets worse. Yesterday, after three months of delay, the State Department finally issued its congressionally mandated annual terrorism report. It shows that the United States has not even designated the Taliban as a terrorist organization — not in Afghanistan, not in Pakistan. Similarly, the government has also failed to designate both the Haqqani Network and HIG. (Hekmatyar himself, in his individual capacity, has been designated as a “global terrorist” since 2003.)

The full list of designated terrorist organizations is here. The designation is very important, and not just because it stands as a formal declaration by our government. Providing material support to an organization once it has been designated a serious federal crime — and prosecution for it helps us starve terror organizations of resources, making it harder for those organizations to attack our country. Yet, as you can see, the State Department does not list the Taliban organizations with which we are at war, even though it continues to list the Basques, the Tamil Tigers, Kahane Chai (an Israeli group that disbanded about 16 years ago), a renegade wing of the Irish Republican Army, and several other groups that have nothing to do with anti-American terrorism.

This is bizarre. Here is part of State’s reporting on Afghanistan:

… Afghanistan continued to … face … a sophisticated, multi-faceted insurgency that primarily relied on asymmetric tactics. The insurgency targeted coalition forces, the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), foreign diplomatic missions, Afghan government officials and security forces, and Afghan civilians.

Separate but intertwined and affiliated extremist organizations led by Mullah Omar (Taliban), Sirajuddin Haqqani (Haqqani Network), and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin – HIG) increased their use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and coordinated attacks using multiple suicide bombers, resulting in an increase from 2008 in overall casualties. The Taliban, in particular, stepped up the pace of its attacks and simultaneously increased its shadow government presence throughout the country. Al-Qa’ida (AQ) and the Taliban senior leadership maintained an operational relationship, but AQ’s direct influence in Afghanistan has diminished over the past year due to effective counterterrorism operations.


The report goes on to describe how – besides targeting our troops, the Afghan government, and foreign diplomats – these organizations are mass-murdering civilians (with particular attention to young girls attending school).

The Pakistan section of the report catalogues an array of horrors carried out by the Pakistani Taliban and other groups, such as Lashkar-i-Islam (also not designated). (Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, which carried out the 2008 attacks in Bombay — now “Mumbai” — and mainly targets India, has been designated since 2001.) State’s report also offhandedly refers to Pakistani Taliban honchos as “terrorists” who have “jockeyed for power” since the death of their leader Baitullah Mehsud. But it does not mention the attempted Times Square attack. I presume this is because, though the attempt happened months ago, this report is supposed to cover 2009. (The section on Yemen does recount the Christmas 2009 attempt by al Qaeda operative Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab to blow up a plane over Detroit.)

Why has our government failed to declare that the Taliban branches, the Haqqani Network, and HIG are both terrorist organizations and our enemies in the war? If they are sinister enough for us to commit our troops to fight them, shouldn’t we be taking every legal step to support that effort?

HTPD

nationalreview.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)11/1/2010 7:22:41 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Respond to of 71588
 
Karzai and the Scent of U.S. Irresolution
Our longest war is now being waged with doubt and hesitation, and our ally on the scene has gone rogue, taking the coin of our enemies and scoffing at our purposes..
OCTOBER 27, 2010.

By FOUAD AJAMI
'They do give us bags of money—yes, yes, it is done, we are grateful to the Iranians for this." This is the East, and baksheesh is the way of the world, Hamid Karzai brazenly let it be known this week. The big aid that maintains his regime, and keeps his country together, comes from the democracies. It is much cheaper for the Iranians. They are of the neighborhood, they know the ways of the bazaar.

The remarkable thing about Mr. Karzai has been his perverse honesty. This is not a Third World client who has given us sweet talk about democracy coming to the Hindu Kush. He has been brazen to the point of vulgarity. We are there, but on his and his family's terms. Bags of cash, the reports tell us, are hauled out of Kabul to Dubai; there are eight flights a day. We distrust the man. He reciprocates that distrust, and then some. Our deliberations leak, we threaten and bully him, only to give in to him. And this only increases his lack of regard for American tutelage. We are now there to cut a deal—the terms of our own departure from Afghanistan.

The idealism has drained out of this project. Say what you will about the Iraq war—and there was disappointment and heartbreak aplenty—there always ran through that war the promise of a decent outcome: deliverance for the Kurds, an Iraqi democratic example in the heart of a despotic Arab world, the promise of a decent Shiite alternative in the holy city of Najaf that would compete with the influence of Qom. No such nobility, no such illusions now attend our war in Afghanistan. By latest cruel count, more than 1,300 American service members have fallen in Afghanistan. For these sacrifices, Mr. Karzai shows little, if any, regard.

In his latest outburst, Mr. Karzai said the private security companies that guard the embassies and the development and aid organizations are killer squads, on a par with the Taliban. "The money dealing with the private security companies starts in the hallways of the U.S. government. Then they send the money for killing here," Mr Karzai said. It is fully understood that Mr. Karzai and his clan want the business of the contractors for themselves.

The brutal facts about Afghanistan are these: It is a broken country, a land of banditry, of a war of all against all, and of the need to get what can be gotten from the strangers. There is no love for the infidels who have come into the land, and no patience for their sermons.

In its wanderings through the Third World, from Korea and Vietnam to Iran and Egypt, it was America's fate to ride with all sorts of clients. We betrayed some of them, and they betrayed us in return. They passed off their phobias and privileges as lofty causes worthy of our blood and treasure. They snookered us at times, but there was always the pretense of a common purpose. The thing about Mr. Karzai is his sharp break with this history. It is the ways of the Afghan mountaineers that he wishes to teach us.

When they came to power, the Obama people insisted they would teach Mr. Karzai new rules. There was a new man at the helm in Washington, and there would be no favored treatment, no intimacy with the new steward of American power. Governance would have to improve, and skeptical policy makers would now hold him accountable (Vice President Joe Biden, Special Representative Richard Holbrooke, et al.). Mr. Karzai took their measure, and everywhere around him there were signs of American retreat, such as the spectacle of the Pax Americana eager to reach a grand bargain with the Iranian theocrats.

Mr. Karzai didn't need to be a grand strategist. He had, as is necessary in his world of treachery and betrayal, his ear to the ground, his scent for the irresolution of the Obama administration. He saw the scorn of Iran's cruel leaders for America's diplomatic approaches. He could see Iranian power extend all the way to the Mediterranean, right up to Israel's borders with Lebanon and to Gaza. The Iranians were next door and the Americans were giving away their fatigue. Why not accept the entreaties from Tehran?

A year ago, the U.S. ambassador to Kabul, Karl Eikenberry, laid out the truth about Mr. Karzai and his regime in a secret cable that of course made its way into the public domain. "President Karzai is not an adequate strategic partner," Mr. Eikenberry wrote. The Karzai regime could not bear the weight of a counterinsurgency doctrine that would win the loyalty of the populace. There were monumental problems of governance but "Karzai continues to shun responsibility for any sovereign burden, whether defense, governance, or development. He and much of his circle do not want the U.S. to leave and are only too happy to see us invest further. They assume we covet their territory for a never-ending war on terror and for military bases to use against surrounding powers." In Mr. Eikenberry's cable, Mr. Karzai is a man beyond redemption, who was unlikely to "change fundamentally this late in his life and in our relationship."

In one of his great tales of the imperial age, "Lord Jim," Joseph Conrad depicts the encounter between a criminal and a noble figure. "Gentleman" Brown and a band of robbers had come into Tuan Jim's domain—a small world, Patusan, where Jim's writ ran and the natives honored and deferred to him. Everything was on the side of Jim—possession, security, power. But Brown senses the hidden irresoluteness of Jim, a man who had come to this remote, small world in the Pacific in search of redemption. We are equal, says Brown: "What do you know more of me than I know of you? What did you ask for when you came here?" Jim pays with his life. He had let the ruffian set the terms of the encounter.

A big American project, our longest war, is now waged with doubt and hesitation, and our ally on the scene has gone rogue, taking the coin of our enemies and scoffing at our purposes. Unlike the Third World clients of old, this one does not even bother to pay us the tribute of double-speak and hypocrisy. He is a different kind of client, but then, too, our authority today is but a shadow of what it once was.

Mr. Ajami is a professor at The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies and a senior fellow at Stanford University's Hoover Institution.

online.wsj.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)2/14/2012 7:48:31 PM
From: Peter Dierks  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Experts say Iran has "neutralized" Stuxnet virus
By Mark Hosenball | Reuters – 1 hour 33 minutes ago..

Iranian engineers have succeeded in neutralizing and purging the computer virus known as Stuxnet from their country's nuclear machinery, European and U.S. officials and private experts have told Reuters.

The malicious code, whose precise origin and authorship remain unconfirmed, made its way as early as 2009 into equipment controlling centrifuges Iran is using to enrich uranium, dealing a significant but perhaps temporary setback to Iran's suspected nuclear weapons work.

Many experts believe that Israel, possibly with assistance from the United States, was responsible for creating and deploying Stuxnet. But no authoritative account of who invented Stuxnet or how it got into Iran's centrifuge control equipment has surfaced.

U.S. and European officials, who insisted on anonymity when discussing a highly sensitive subject, said their governments' experts agreed that the Iranians had succeeded in disabling Stuxnet and getting it out of their machinery.

The officials declined to provide any details on how their governments verified that the Iranians had ultimately defeated the virus. It was not clear when it occurred but secrecy on the subject has been so tight that news is only now emerging.

Some officials said they believe that the Iranians were helped in their efforts by Western cybersecurity experts, whose detailed technical analyses of Stuxnet's computer code have circulated widely on the Internet.

Once the Iranians became aware that their equipment had been infected by the virus, experts said it would only have been a matter of time before they would have been able to figure out a way of shutting down the malicious code and getting it out of their systems.

"If Iran would not have gotten rid of Stuxnet by now (or even months ago), that would indicate that they were complete idiots," said German computer security consultant Ralph Langner. Langner is regarded as the first Western expert to identify the ultra-complex worm and conclude that it was specifically targeted toward equipment controlling Iranian nuclear centrifuges.

Peter Sommer, a computer security expert based in Britain, said that once Iran had detected the presence of the worm and figured out how it worked, it shouldn't have been too hard for them to disable it.

"Once you know that it's there it's not that difficult to reverse engineer... Neutralization of Stuxnet, once its operation is understood, would not be that difficult as it was precisely engineered to disrupt a specific item of machinery.

"Once Stuxnet's signature is identified it can be eliminated from a system," Sommer added.

Private experts say that however well-crafted the original Stuxnet was, whoever created it probably would have to be even more clever if they want to try to supplant it with new cyber-weapons directed at Iran's nuclear program.

"Aspects of Stuxnet could be re-used, but it is important to understand that its success depended not only on 'clever coding' but also required a great deal of specific intelligence and testing. It was the first known highly-targeted cyber-weapon, as opposed to more usual cyber weapons which are more diffuse in their targeting," Sommer said.

'CAT AND MOUSE GAME'

David Albright, a former United Nations weapons inspector who has extensively investigated Iran's nuclear program for the private Institute for Science and International Security, which he leads, said that spy agencies would have to go back to the drawing board if they're intent on continuing to try to hobble Iran's nuclear program via cyber-warfare.

Iran says that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes but many Western officials believe it is seeking to build nuclear weapons.

"I would assume that once Iran learned of Stuxnet, then intelligence agencies looked at this method of cyber attack as compromised regardless of how long it has taken Iran to neutralize it. It is a cat and mouse game."

But Albright added that "intelligence agencies have likely been looking at more advanced forms of attack for a couple of years that they hope will catch the Iranians unprepared."

Reports first surfaced in 2010 that Iran's main nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz was hit by Stuxnet, though some experts later said it likely first was deployed a year earlier. Experts who later analyzed the Stuxnet code said it was engineered specifically to attack machines made by the German company Siemens that control high-speed centrifuges, used to purify uranium which can fuel a nuclear weapon.

Tehran accused the United States and Israel of planting the virus. In November 2010, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that malicious software had created problems in some of Iran's uranium enrichment centrifuges, although he said the problems had been solved.

Several experts said, however, that while they believed the virus' potency waned over time, they had not heard confirmation that the Iranians had defeated and purged it.

Experts say the inventors of Stuxnet had to be unusually clever because the centrifuge control equipment at which it was targeted - and which it apparently succeeded in hobbling - was entirely cut-off from the Internet. So not only did the worm's creators have to write a code that would cause targeted equipment to malfunction but they had to figure out a way to physically introduce the code into a "closed system."

Most experts think the virus was somehow introduced into Iran's control systems via some kind of computer thumb drive.

European and U.S. experts have said that they believe that Stuxnet, at least for a time, caused serious malfunctions in the operations of Iranian nuclear centrifuges.

Iran and its antagonists today appear to be engaged in multiple levels of clandestine warfare, with unknown assailants killing Iranian nuclear scientists and, in the last few days, bomb attacks on Israeli embassy personnel in India and Georgia. Israel has blamed Iran.

ca.news.yahoo.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)3/3/2012 11:23:57 PM
From: greatplains_guy  Respond to of 71588
 
The Man Vladimir Putin Fears Most
Alexei Navalny, the rising star of Russia's opposition, on his political strategy and why the latest czar is 'trapped' by power.
March 3, 2012.

By MATTHEW KAMINSKI
Moscow

The outcome is a foregone conclusion. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, Russia's paramount ruler since 2000, will reclaim his old job as president in Sunday's elections. The drama comes in the aftermath.

Anticorruption blogger and activist Alexei Navalny will be in the middle of it—as he has been over the past three months of Russia's unexpected political awakening. By the tens of thousands, Russians shed their fear and apathy to protest December's fraud-ridden parliamentary elections and Mr. Putin's hold on power. From a crowded stage of opposition figures, Mr. Navalny has emerged as the charismatic and fresh face of the movement.

The next phase will test him and the opposition. The series of large demonstrations after December exposed the shallowness of support for Mr. Putin in the large cities and public frustration with the political stagnation and lack of accountability in Russia. Yet the rallies forced no notable government concessions. Though weakened, Mr. Putin gets a new term and possibly energy to reverse his slide or to crack down.

Among the opposition, Mr. Navalny has carved out the harder line. He says it's time to "escalate" with regular protests, a permanent encampment in downtown Moscow, and maybe calls for nationwide strikes. "We need a real tent city in the heart of Moscow," he says. The opposition wants political reforms, including the return of direct elections for governors and easing rules on political parties, and elections for a new Duma next year and for president in 2014.

"All our protests were very kind of friendly," Mr. Navalny says. "I'm not going to appeal to violence or aggression—of course not. But the mood of the protests should be more and more political. It's not just about the fun, hipster stuff. It has to be a kind of real political protest. The Kremlin should understand these tens of thousands of people will never leave the streets. We will never consider Putin as a president with legitimacy."

As the authorities here know, protests and the occupation of public spaces were used in Ukraine's Orange Revolution, and last year's uprisings in Egypt and Tunisia to depose authoritarian rulers. Suggesting the depth of official paranoia, Moscow police earlier this week rounded up a few activists in a car who turned up in the city center to pass out free tents, keeping them in jail overnight.

Escalation carries risks for the opposition. Confrontation with police and the Kremlin's Nashi youth shock troops may scare away middle-class Muscovites who pinned white ribbons to their coats and joined in the winter's protests.

Some would prefer to start small to revive Russia's experiment with democracy, running candidates in local elections and building new parties. Some want compromises with the authorities, who might look to co-opt parts of the movement. Not Mr. Navalny, who says any change will be "driven by 1% of the population, the politically active part, which lives in the capital," and sees no other option to force the Kremlin's hand.

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Zina Saunders
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To start it off, the anti-Putin coalition wanted to hold a Monday evening rally on Lubyanka, down the street from Red Square. As we talk on Thursday night, an aide enters to tell Mr. Navalny that the city and his opposition colleagues have agreed instead to use Pushkin Square. He makes a sour face and bites his tongue. Mr. Navalny wanted it in the center of town, but to keep everyone happy he won't criticize the decision.

The Kremlin acts as if it fears Mr. Navalny most of all the dissident figures. Websites and television stations friendly to the regime have tried to smear him as a CIA operative or Hitler-like nationalist. His emails were hacked into and published. He is the sole opposition leader still barred from state-controlled television.

"I'm on the very blackest part of the black list," says Mr. Navalny. When television host and Putin family friend Ksenia Sobchak invited him on her popular show on Russian MTV, it was yanked off the air—everyone presumes on government orders. "Sometimes it seems to me that there is a small crazy guy in the Kremlin who works for me," Mr. Navalny jokes. "Relatively few people watch such shows. But because they banned it, there are millions of Russians now who wonder, 'Who is he? Why do they fear him so much?'"

Mr. Navalny, who is 35 years old, leads no party. He oversees a staff of 11 and works from an office of four rooms and barren walls off the Moscow ring road. A couple of young men sit behind laptops and work on his latest civic Internet initiative to register election monitors for Sunday's vote. The Kremlin barred credible challengers and put Mr. Putin up against several stalking horses. Yet election day won't come without suspense. Thousands of people in big cities are going to fan out to prevent and document the fraud everyone expects will be needed to assure Mr. Putin his first-round victory.

Russia last saw this level of civic engagement in the late glasnost years of the Soviet Union. Many of the people behind the current protests have no memory of it. Until recently, opposition politics was the province of marginal activists and Moscow intellectuals beaten down by 12 years of Mr. Putin's "sovereign democracy."

Yet in a matter of weeks, politics went mainstream, even cool. How much so is shown by the presence of Ms. Sobchak, a 30-year-old who runs her own fashion line, at the rallies: The so-called "Paris Hilton of Moscow" is the daughter of the former St. Petersburg mayor, Anatoly Sobchak, who was Mr. Putin's mentor. "It's a very positive sign when all this establishment—the TV people, the writers—who enjoyed life in the Putin years are now escaping it," says Mr. Navalny. "They're deserters."


The Internet virtually created the Navalny phenomenon. Trained as a lawyer, he got into politics through the liberal Yabloko (or Apple) party. He missed out on the politics of the 1990s, a toxic decade of economic chaos. In contrast with older, less popular opposition figures like Boris Nemtsov or Mikhail Kasyanov who served in government, he brings no baggage from that time.

Mr. Navalny dabbled with youth and nationalist groups in the 2000s. Nothing took off. He then found a calling and voice as an anticorruption activist. He bought small stakes in large companies and tried to invoke shareholder rights to open their books. Another effort involves looking into government procurement contracts to find fraud. In Russia, poking into corruption is a serious health risk.

Mr. Navalny publicized his findings on his LiveJournal blog, which has become one of the most popular blogs in Russia. His writing style in posts and tweets is personal, emotional and direct. He can turn a phrase, and stuck the memorable "party of crooks and thieves" label on the ruling United Russia Party. He also brings a common touch, rare among the Moscow liberal crowd, to his public speaking.

Internet entrepreneur Anton Nossik says the Web offered "a platform for samizdat." It freed Mr. Navalny in another sense, providing an easy way to raise money directly and quickly online. Other NGOs have since adopted his funding model.

Three days before the elections, Mr. Navalny fields calls at his office. Wearing blue jeans and a blue shirt, he has an easy charm about him in his confident English. He is saltier in Russian. Mr. Navalny spent a semester at Yale as a "world fellow" in 2010, which Kremlin propagandists say was part of an American "program to initiate an 'orange coup' in Russia."

It would be inaccurate to say that Mr. Navalny leads the movement, which includes many different faces from the worlds of media, art, business and politics. There are also concerns voiced about his "nationalist tendencies." He clashed with opposition leaders to let ultra-nationalist speakers on stage at the rallies. He has called for a visa requirement for people from Central Asia and said that ethnic Russians are mistreated in neighboring ex-Soviet republics.

Yet for now, the nationalism seems to be worn lightly, and if anything is a political asset. "The left liberals thought it was dangerous to talk about such things—that it will bring problems because it will touch the dark side of the Russian soul, and all that sort of stuff, but it's totally bull—," he says. "People in their kitchens discuss such problems. That's why I am supported more widely [than they are] because I discuss these problems."

Others question his tactical judgment. He provoked the police into arresting him after the first large rally in December. In jail for 15 days, he missed an opportunity to submit an application to run for president. He says it was pointless; the Kremlin would have disallowed his candidacy.

The Kremlin faces its own tough choices. Barring an Egypt-style overthrow, any transition from Mr. Putin to someone new may have to include security guarantees for him and his family. Previous leader Boris Yeltsin negotiated such an arrangement with Mr. Putin. But the former KGB colonel could also "escalate," to use Mr. Navalny's word, the confrontation with the opposition.

Against Mr. Navalny's office wall sits a large framed photograph of two men smiling and shaking hands: Libya's late Moammar Gadhafi and Vladimir Putin. It is a gift from a real-estate mogul who relies on the Kremlin for his good fortune but has turned against Mr. Putin. "The guy told me, 'the worst enemy is the former friend,'" says Mr. Navalny.


'Putin did a lot of good stuff from 1999 until 2003," he says, referring to Mr. Putin's early years, when the economy recovered and some reforms were introduced. But it's the high price of oil that has kept the economy going and notably enriched a clique of Putin friends from St. Petersburg. "People don't believe in positive changes anymore. It's 20 years that he wants to keep absolute power. It's obvious now that his system of power is based on corruption, and people around him depend only on money and corruption."

As his popularity has slid, Mr. Putin's rhetoric has hardened. Earlier this week, he said the opposition would fake evidence of electoral fraud to embarrass him—maybe even kill one of their leaders. Mr. Putin also was badly rattled by the Arab uprising, most of all Gadhafi's fall and murder.

Pointing to the dead Libyan leader in the photograph, Mr. Navalny says, "The history of this guy drives [Putin] crazy. He thinks the only way for him to be alive and healthy and rich is to be president. It's a big problem for us. This guy is trapped."

Mr. Kaminski is a member of The Journal's editorial board.

online.wsj.com



To: longnshort who wrote (43851)9/22/2012 12:25:13 PM
From: greatplains_guy2 Recommendations  Respond to of 71588
 
Romney Can Still Overcome Obama's Dishonest, Divisive Campaign
He can get by his '47 percent' problem and beat Obama by outlining how he will get America back to work
By Mortimer B. Zuckerman
September 21, 2012

The problem for Mitt Romney right now is that he has put his entire candidacy at risk to the point where he may not even qualify for the dismissive equation of Barack Obama that Marco Rubio formulated for the Republican faithful: "Our problem is not that he's a bad person. Our problem is that he's a bad president." Is Romney also "not a bad person, just a bad candidate"? With his "47 percent" remarks at a Republican fundraiser in May, he has given his opponent evidence to initiate a new line of attack.

Voters can forgive a candidate who stumbles in the heat of an election, trapped by "gotcha" questions from journalists, being quoted out of context in cunning TV attack commercials, and in the Twitter age, failing to appreciate that nothing that is said is secret anymore. We all know the game, and Romney has demonstrated that he is not perfect at this game.


The same can be said of President Obama. As a candidate, he ran a brilliantly smooth and targeted campaign four years ago, but even he misspoke, as they say, in what he thought was a private meeting of San Francisco liberals. When the polls suggested he wasn't appealing to rural voters, his response was to blame them for not seeing how different he was from the likes of Bill Clinton and George Bush, who had let them down. "You go into some of these small towns in Pennsylvania and like a lot of small towns in the Midwest, the jobs have gone now for 25 years and nothing's replaced them," he said. "It's not surprising then they get bitter, they cling to guns or religion or antipathy to people who aren't like them or anti-immigrant sentiment or anti-trade sentiment as a way to explain their frustration."

This week, Jay Carney, the White House spokesman, dismissed the condescension as something from the mythic past, not to be compared to the furor over Romney's "47 percent" remark. Yet even now, fully armored and protected by four years of 24/7 press scrutiny and an army of verbal bodyguards, the president stumbles. "You didn't build that" still rankles the millions of taxpayers who have concluded that in making their way they've not had much help from the government and a lot of hindrance.


The trouble with Romney—and for Romney—is that he has etched an unappealing sketch of himself. For independent voters, he made too many flip-flops in policy to appease the right. Indeed, he had an uncanny knack for offering an easy target for his opposition: "I like being able to fire people," "I'm also unemployed," "I'm not concerned about the very poor," and "Ann drives a couple of Cadillacs." He seems to be living in another world, referring to middle income as being in the range of "$200,000 to $250,000," when the median income is more like $50,000. By the way, after four years of Obama's economic stewardship, that figure represents a dramatic decline of 10 percent and, in fact, is a strong point to Romney's case against the administration.

Such careless remarks have made it easy for the Obama campaign to get away with a program that pits "the millionaires and billionaires" against the people. It is a dishonest, divisive campaign. It's discouraging of enterprise. It does the opposite of uniting the country to deal with the current economic crisis. The argument on taxes is not just about whether the super-rich should pay more, a reasonable position which I support in a country where income and equality disparities have become more glaring than they already were. It is about whether individuals, households, and small businesses should now be seen to cross the threshold into a plutocracy when earnings reach $250,000 a year—which buys much less in metropolitan areas than in the heartland. It is outrageous to infer that aspiring to reach such a level is somehow un-American, and the Obama campaign surely must know that. Shame on them if they don't!


Instead of making this part of his own case, Romney has exposed himself to the charge that he is out of touch, out of sympathy, and clueless about the lives of the mass of Americans. But there is this to be said for him: His gaffes until this bad week have not been policy gaffes. They are embarrassments rather than indications of incompetence.

He risks being portrayed as an unfeeling venture capitalist willing to overlook the poor, who are struggling in the dark of the Great Recession. Not to mention that someone so admiring of Israel may imperil his ability to help forge a durable Middle East settlement. Neither is true. In fairness, on peace in the Middle East, Romney just frankly recognizes how much Obama has made the Palestinians more obdurate and less willing to compromise than they have been. A new NBC/Wall Street Journal poll has Obama up by 50 to 45 percent among likely voters, suggesting that Romney's careless talk and the headlines that exacerbated his comment may have cost him support that he can't afford to lose.

The fact is that while there are a number of things wrong with his remarks, there are also a number of things right in his convictions about the economy and the Middle East (more on that on another occasion). Properly framed, he should keep on making them. First Romney has to acknowledge that yes, he did blunder by implying the 47 percent whom he saw as inclined to vote against him are just people who don't pay taxes or moochers who see themselves as victims, who think "government has a responsibility to care for them" and thus have no appetite for accepting their individual responsibilities. There is no way to duck this. Waffling will just make it worse.


Romney surely didn't mean to insult all those people who don't earn enough to be hit by federal income taxes but who take their responsibilities seriously, such as the elderly, the military, the disabled, and the millions devastated by the Great Recession, who month after month go on the heartbreaking search for work that is not there. It also is an insult to the vast majority of the 46 million people on food stamps, the 10.6 million drawing Social Security benefits, and the millions who are on disability.

He cannot hope to win the election if he leaves any doubt about this commitment to a safety net. It is fair to point out that when previously he said he was not concerned about the poor, he did point out that this was because of the Social Security safety net.


What Romney must do from now on with more conviction, more specifics, and more clarity is to outline just how he will get America back to work after four years of a demoralizing economy that, in American politics, is held to be the responsibility of the incumbent president. It is not enough to talk about creating 12 million new jobs in his first term, which is the common prediction of the likely course anyway. It's still "the economy, stupid" that matters, and Romney has time to spell out how he would hope to do much better than an administration fixated on government, deficits, and regulations. In a New York Times/CBS poll of likely voters surveyed from September 11-17 in Colorado, Virginia, and Wisconsin, respondents were asked, "Which comes closer to your opinion? The United States is more successful when the government emphasizes self-reliance and individual responsibility, or the United States is more successful when the government emphasizes community and shared responsibility?" Self-reliance was preferred by a few points in Colorado and in Wisconsin, and by 25 percentage points or more among Republicans. But—and here's the key—in all three states the majority of independents voted "self-reliance."

Romney's new language talks about appealing to the 100 percent. He will be doing well to reach 50 percent. But he still has a chance at reversing the weak position if he will go all out on the economy, discourage personal attacks on the president (who is well liked anyway), and always remember the injunction the British were faced with every day when World War II started, "Loose talk costs lives. Think before you talk."

usnews.com