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To: stockman_scott who wrote (256213)	6/23/2010 11:30:38 AM
From: saveslivesbyday	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 306849

People have been fighting wars in Afghanistan for centuries and nobody has every "won" - so this time it's different?

To: stockman_scott who wrote (256213)	6/23/2010 11:36:32 AM
From: Les H	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 306849

The Pakistan Taliban threatens the Pakistan government, while the Pakistan government supports the Afghan Taliban that's fighting the US. Pakistan supports the Taliban? Which ‘Taliban’ is that? Another bombshell fell on Pakistan last week when the prestigious London School of Economics released a report linking the intelligence services to direct support of the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s premier intelligence agency, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), is accused not only of links with the militants, but funding, training and providing sanctuary to them. Pakistani agents are even supposed to be sitting on the Quetta shura council and planning operations. The findings are based on interviews with nine Taliban “field commanders”. It concludes, obviously, that the ISI is actively supporting the Afghan Taliban to counter Indian influence in the country. First of all, it is nothing new that Pakistan maintains links with the Afghan Taliban. Indeed, as I have argued before, it is in Islamabad’s interest to keep open lines of communication with militant groups as long as they do not pose a threat to Pakistan. What is more questionable is the extensive tangible aid that the report finds. It would be surprising if these Taliban were beneficiaries of ISI assistance, and then disclosed the details, thus embarrassing their benefactor and risking losing the assistance. From another angle, it should be remembered that the “Afghan Taliban” are a diverse group. Where did the authors find nine field commanders and which chapter of the Taliban did they belong to? If, as seems to be the case, all nine were in Kabul or its immediate environs, that would be telling about who was actually providing the information. If the report is sourced from Taliban in the area of Kabul, they do not represent Mullah Omar or the Quetta shura, the Tehrik-i-Taliban forces of Hakimullah Mehsud or the Haqqani group. In short, none of the groups that are effectively resisting American “occupation” would venture into Kabul merely to grant an interview. The only Taliban located in the vicinity of Kabul are those belonging to Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s chapter called the Hizb-e-Islami. This was the group that the ISI and the CIA gave maximum support to in the 1980s and early 1990s, but Hekmatyar could not deliver in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal. He and his followers have slowly been marginalised and the faction is crumbling. A couple of months ago, his supporters fell out with the Haqqani group and only escaped with the help of Afghan government forces. These are the Taliban to be found in Kabul: starving, hopeless, and isolated. They are almost as discredited amongst the Afghans as the president Hamid Karzai’s government’s security forces, and they would certainly have an axe to grind with the ISI, which gave up on them in 1994. Many Afghans residing in Peshawar in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province believe the report was engineered by Amrullah Saleh, the former Afghan spy chief. Mr Saleh is a Tajik who headed the National Directorate of Security under Mr Karzai for almost six years before resigning earlier this month after a loya jirga promoting reconciliation was attacked. Mr Saleh has been strongly opposed to any effort at reconciliation with the Taliban. There is certainly enough enmity between Tajiks and Pashtuns. Among many Afghans in Pakistan’s North West Frontier Province, Mr Saleh is even believed to be on the payroll of India’s intelligence service, the Research and Analysis Wing. But wide-ranging conspiracy theories aside, there are undeniable elements of truth to the recent report. It’s an open secret that the ISI retains links with some chapters of the Taliban, and with good results. The rear of the Pakistan army was left vulnerable to the Wazir tribe and the Haqqani group, both of which are based in North Waziristan, when it undertook operations in South Waziristan recently. As the end game nears in Afghanistan, all parties are jockeying for their own ends. Why shouldn’t Pakistan? If the United States begins to pull out in 2011 as it has promised and Mr Karzai is negotiating with relatively insignificant Taliban chapters, why shouldn’t Pakistan retain links with those Taliban who are likely to be of some significance? It is also an open secret that Pakistan looks the other way when Taliban chapters are supported by sympathetic tribal groups. Islamabad is also well aware of the funding that they receive both from Pakistanis and from donors in Arab countries. I would not be surprised if the ISI continues to fund chapters of the Taliban: but training them or helping to plan operations? The days that the Taliban needed ISI expertise is long past; today, they could probably teach the ISI a thing or two. But the most ludicrous claim, which casts serious doubt on the entire report, regards the president, Asif Ali Zardari. To imagine that Mr Zardari, whose personal security routine is legendary, making him a virtual prisoner in his home, would expose himself by meeting Taliban members is beyond imagination. What is more, the prevailing view is that when the US tells Mr Zardari to jump, he asks, “How high?” The only ones who would dare to assert Pakistan’s interest, even if it conflicted with the US, would be general headquarters and the army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani. Brig Gen Shaukat Qadir is a former Pakistani infantry officer thenational.ae