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Politics : President Barack Obama -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/4/2010 7:43:51 PM
From: tejek  Respond to of 149317
 
Have a nice evening Ted.

You too.

Getting ready to go to a barbeque.......its raining and 55º. <g>



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/6/2010 12:43:49 AM
From: tejek  Respond to of 149317
 
CHART OF THE DAY: Reminder, The Deficit You're Freaking Out About Is Bush's Fault



cnbc.com



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/9/2010 6:53:10 PM
From: tejek  Respond to of 149317
 
GOP CLIQUES ALREADY CAUSING SOME TENSIONS....

How certain are House Republicans that they'll reclaim the majority in the next Congress? There's some evidence that they're moving past the "confidence" phase, and have already adopted the "internal factions fight for power" phase.

The first real hint of tensions came about a week ago, when a Politico piece noted a disagreement between House Minority Leader John Boehner (R-Ohio) and House Minority Whip Eric Cantor (R-Va.) over the "America Speaking Out" gimmick.
Cantor wanted it housed in a campaign committee, so the initiative could be exploited for fundraising and email lists, and Boehner wanted it kept inside the official GOP leadership structure, where it wouldn't face campaign law limitations. A "heated exchange" soon followed, and Cantor is now reportedly ignoring the while "America Speaking Out" project.

The tensions seem to be growing -- and expanding.

A member of the House Republican leadership on Thursday jabbed Minority Whip Eric Cantor (R-Va.) for opposing the elimination of the GOP policy committee.

Rep. Thaddeus McCotter (R-Mich.) publicly locked horns with Cantor in their high-profile spat over a proposal to eliminate the House Republican Policy Committee, on which McCotter serves as chairman.

McCotter, a Boehner ally, wants to eliminate the House GOP's policy committee, which doesn't really do anything anyway, and save $360,000 in taxpayer money. Cantor wants to keep the committee in place, prompting McCotter to go on Fox News and say the Minority Whip is "absolutely mistaken." Taking a shot at one of Cantor's pet gimmicks, the Michigan Republican added, "As for the whip, I would encourage him, especially when he's got his 'YouCut' program up there, to turn it into 'WeCut' first." (ThinkProgress has the video.)

It sounds a bit like high school, only with far less adult supervision.<b/>

I've heard from a couple of Hill staffers this week about the behind-the-scenes "drama," and it seems like a dynamic worth watching. It's not ideological -- all of the players agree on nearly every issue -- but there are personality-driven differences that are exacerbated by the assumption that these guys will be running the House in January.

Boehner has his clique, which includes McCotter and NRCC Chairman Pete Sessions (R-Texas), while Cantor has his faction, which includes NRCC Recruitment Chair Kevin McCarthy (R-Calif.).

This may prove to be nothing more than pre-election positioning, and the tensions could ease if expected wins materialize in November. Or it could be the start of a meaningful fissure and larger food fight. Stay tuned.



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/21/2010 11:41:15 PM
From: stockman_scott  Respond to of 149317
 
Workers on BP Rig Voiced Concern About Safety
_______________________________________________________________

By IAN URBINA
The New York Times
July 21, 2010

WASHINGTON — A confidential survey of workers on the Deepwater Horizon in the weeks before the oil rig exploded showed that many of them were concerned about safety practices and feared reprisals if they reported mistakes or other problems.

In the survey, commissioned by the rig’s owner, Transocean, workers said that company plans were not carried out properly and that they “often saw unsafe behaviors on the rig.”

Some workers also voiced concerns about poor equipment reliability, “which they believed was as a result of drilling priorities taking precedence over planned maintenance,” according to the survey, one of two Transocean reports obtained by The New York Times.

“At nine years old, Deepwater Horizon has never been in dry dock,” one worker told investigators. “We can only work around so much.”

“Run it, break it, fix it,” another worker said. “That’s how they work.”

According to a separate 112-page equipment assessment also commissioned by Transocean, many key components — including the blowout preventer rams and failsafe valves — had not been fully inspected since 2000, even though guidelines require its inspection every three to five years.

The report cited at least 26 components and systems on the rig that were in “bad” or “poor” condition.

A spokesman for Transocean, who confirmed the existence of the reports, wrote in an e-mail message that most of the 26 components on the rig found to be in poor condition were minor and that all elements of the blowout preventer had been inspected within the required time frame by its original manufacturer, Cameron. The spokesman, Lou Colasuonno, commenting on the 33-page report about workers’ safety concerns, noted that the Deepwater Horizon had seven consecutive years without a single lost-time incident or major environmental event.

The two reports are likely to broaden the discussion of blame for the April 20 explosion, which killed 11 workers and led to the gusher on the seafloor that has been polluting the Gulf of Mexico for months.

BP has been under the harshest glare for its role, but the Justice Department has said its criminal investigation of the disaster will look at the role of the many companies involved.

Together, these new reports paint a detailed picture of Transocean’s upkeep of the rig, decision-making and its personnel.

BP was leasing the rig from Transocean, and 79 of the 126 people on the rig the day it exploded were Transocean employees.

The first report focused on the its “safety culture” and was conducted by a division of Lloyd’s Register Group, a maritime and risk-management organization that dispatched two investigators to inspect the rig March 12 through 16. They conducted focus groups and one-on-one interviews with at least 40 Transocean workers.

The second report, on the status of the rig’s equipment, was produced by four investigators from a separate division of Lloyd’s Register Group, also on behalf of Transocean.

These investigators were scheduled to inspect the rig in April. While the report described workers’ concerns about safety and fears of reprisals, it did say that the rig was “relatively strong in many of the core aspects of safety management.” Workers believed teamwork on the rig was effective, and they were mostly worried about the reaction of managers off the rig.

“Almost everyone felt they could raise safety concerns and these issues would be acted upon if this was within the immediate control of the rig,” said the report, which also found that more than 97 percent of workers felt encouraged to raise ideas for safety improvements and more than 90 percent felt encouraged to participate in safety-improvement initiatives.

But investigators also said, “It must be stated at this point, however, that the workforce felt that this level of influence was restricted to issues that could be resolved directly on the rig, and that they had little influence at Divisional or Corporate levels.”

Only about half of the workers interviewed said they felt they could report actions leading to a potentially “risky” situation without reprisal.

“This fear was seen to be driven by decisions made in Houston, rather than those made by rig based leaders,” the report said.

“I’m petrified of dropping anything from heights not because I’m afraid of hurting anyone (the area is barriered off), but because I’m afraid of getting fired,” one worker wrote.

“The company is always using fear tactics,” another worker said. “All these games and your mind gets tired.”

Investigators also said “nearly everyone” among the workers they interviewed believed that Transocean’s system for tracking health and safety issues on the rig was “counter productive.”

Many workers entered fake data to try to circumvent the system, known as See, Think, Act, Reinforce, Track — or Start. As a result, the company’s perception of safety on the rig was distorted, the report concluded.

Even though it was more than a month before the explosion, the rig’s safety audit was conducted against the backdrop of what seems to have been a losing battle to control the well.

On the March visit, Lloyd’s investigators reported “a high degree of focus and activity relating to well control issues,” adding that “specialists were aboard the rig to conduct subsea explosions to help alleviate these well control issues.”

The mechanical problems discovered by investigators found problems with the rig’s ballast system that they said could directly affect the stability of the ship. They also concluded that at least one of the rig’s mud pumps was in “bad condition.”

The report also cited the rig’s malfunctioning pressure gauge and leaking parts and faulted the decision by workers to use a type of sealant “proven to be a major cause of pump bearing failure.”

Federal investigators have been focusing on the role that inadequate mud weight played in the blowout. Shortly before the explosion, workers on the rig replaced the heavy drilling mud with a lighter seawater. Drilling experts have speculated that having chosen a better mud weight could have prevented the disaster.

Transocean’s equipment report also may shed new light on why the blowout preventer failed to stop the surging well, which is one of the biggest remaining mysteries of the disaster.

Federal investigators said Tuesday at a panel that continuing to drill despite problems related to the blowout preventer might have been a violation of federal regulations that require a work stoppage if the equipment is found not to work properly.

While the equipment report says the device’s control panels were in fair condition, it also cites a range of problems, including a leaking door seal, a diaphragm on the purge air pump needing replacement and several error-response messages.

The device’s annulars, which are large valves used to control wellbore fluids, also encountered “extraordinary difficulties” surrounding their maintenance, the report said.

Despite the problems, multiple pressure tests were taken of the blowout preventer’s annulars and rams and the results were deemed “acceptable,” the report said.

The two Transocean-commissioned reports obtained by The Times echo the findings of a maintenance audit conducted by BP in September 2009. That audit found that Transocean had left 390 maintenance jobs undone, requiring more than 3,500 hours of work. The BP audit referred to the amount of deferred work as “excessive.”

-Robbie Brown contributed reporting from New Orleans, and Griffin Palmer from New York.



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/23/2010 1:07:16 AM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 149317
 
Obama Family To Vacation in the Gulf Coast

blogs.abcnews.com



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)7/28/2010 7:51:11 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 149317
 
Democrats Are Different

swampland.blogs.time.com



To: SiouxPal who wrote (79083)8/1/2010 4:53:11 PM
From: stockman_scott  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 149317
 
Documents indicate heavy use of dispersants in gulf oil spill

washingtonpost.com

By David A. Fahrenthold and Steven Mufson
Washington Post Staff Writer
Sunday, August 1, 2010; A01

While the BP well was still gushing, the Obama administration issued an order that limited the spreading of controversial dispersant chemicals on the Gulf of Mexico's surface. Their use, officials said, should be restricted to "rare cases."

But in reality, federal documents show, the use of dispersants wasn't rare at all.

Despite the order -- and concerns about the environmental effects of the dispersants -- the Coast Guard granted requests to use them 74 times over 54 days, and to use them on the surface and deep underwater at the well site. The Coast Guard approved every request submitted by BP or local Coast Guard commanders in Houma, La., although in some cases it reduced the amount of the chemicals they could use, according to an analysis of the documents prepared by the office of Rep. Edward J. Markey (D-Mass.).

The documents indicate that "these exemptions are in no way a 'rare' occurrence, and have allowed surface application of the dispersant to occur virtually every day since the directive was issued," Markey wrote in a letter dated Aug. 1 to retired Coast Guard Adm. Thad W. Allen, the government's point man on the spill. Markey chairs the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming.

Some of them dealt with separate dispersant applications on the same day. Markey said it appeared that the order "has become more of a meaningless paperwork exercise" than a real attempt to curb use of the dispersants.

In an interview Saturday, Allen defended the decisions to grant the waivers, saying that overall use of dispersants declined sharply after that May 26 order to limit their use. The total use of dispersants underwater and on the surface declined about 72 percent from its peak, according to the Environmental Protection Agency.

Allen said that on some days the amount of oil on the surface justified a "tactical" decision, by on-scene Coast Guard commanders, to spray some dispersants.

"There's a dynamic tension that goes on when you're managing an incident that has no precedent," Allen said. "You establish general rules and guidelines, but knowing that the people on scene have the information" means trusting them to make decisions, he said.

In the end, Allen said: "You can quibble on the semantics related to 'rare.' I like to focus on the effects we achieved" by dispersing the oil. Officials have said that, in the days since the gusher was stopped, thick sheets of oil have nearly disappeared from the gulf's surface.

EPA Administrator Lisa P. Jackson conceded that there had been "frustration in the field" from EPA officials about the waivers. But Jackson said it was partly alleviated June 22, nearly a month after the order was issued, when Coast Guard officials began giving the EPA a greater role in the discussions over whether to approve dispersant use.

"EPA may not have concurred with every single waiver," Jackson said. But, she said, the Coast Guard had the ultimate say: "The final decision-making rests with the federal on-scene coordinator. That's where the judgment, the ultimate decision-making ability, had to lie."

The dispersants -- variants of a Nalco product called Corexit -- break up the oil, acting like a detergent on kitchen grease. They are intended to keep the oil from reaching shore in large sheets and to make it easier for microbes to consume the oil underwater.

Charles M. Pajor, a Nalco spokesman, said that the amount of dispersant the company recommends depends on the acreage sprayed and the amount of oil spilled, with variations for oil quality, degree of weathering, temperature and thickness. Typically, two to 10 gallons per acre are used or one gallon for every 10 to 50 gallons of oil, Pajor said.

Similar dispersants were used after the Exxon Valdez spill in Alaska in 1989, and afterward government officials vowed to study their environmental effects more carefully. But urgency faded, research dollars evaporated, and when this spill arrived, the questions were still unanswered.

Now, scientists say, it's difficult to tell what the added use of dispersants permitted by the Coast Guard meant for the gulf. The chemicals may have helped break up some oil before it reached sensitive marshes along the Louisiana coast. But it also may have poisoned ecosystems offshore, helped deplete underwater oxygen and sent oil swirling through the open-water habitats of fish and coral.

"It's still a trade-off. I mean, you're using dispersants to protect the shoreline, and you're going to be killing things in the water column," said Carys Mitchelmore, a professor at the University of Maryland. By using more dispersants, Mitchelmore said, "you're just going to be killing more things in the water column."

In May, under pressure from environmental groups, the EPA and the Coast Guard issued a directive to BP, ordering the company to "eliminate" the use of dispersants on the surface. The directive said BP could seek an exemption in rare cases when other cleanup methods were not feasible.

The government allowed BP to continue injecting dispersants below the surface, as oil leaked from the well on the gulf floor. Their logic was that the chemicals could be used more efficiently underwater, where the gushing of BP's well provided a turbulence that helped them work.

"Because so much is still unknown about the potential impact of dispersants, BP should use no more dispersant than is necessary," Jackson wrote in a letter to BP that day.

But, over the next nine days, BP made daily waiver requests for the use of surface dispersants. Every day the Coast Guard gave its approval. On May 28, for instance, BP sprayed 6,400 gallons of dispersant on the surface, saying it was needed to control dangerous fumes -- volatile organic compounds -- where rig and platform workers were trying to get the blowout under control.

In early June, federal documents show, an EPA official raised concerns about the ease with which BP was obtaining waivers.

"The approval process appears to be somewhat pro forma, and not as rigorous as EPA desires," the official wrote, according to a Coast Guard memo that quoted him. It said BP "must be put on notice that the request for exemptions cannot be presumed to be approved at the point they are submitted."

Two weeks later, on June 22, Jackson said that the Coast Guard had begun giving her agency a greater role in the approval of dispersant use. But federal documents show that the chemicals were still being used, sometimes more than 10,000 gallons a day. A federal official said the last surface dispersants were sprayed July 19.

Scott Dean, a BP spokesman, said that his company had been careful to obtain federal permission before using dispersants on the ocean's surface.

"Since the very beginning, BP has operated in a unified command and we have always worked hand in hand with the Coast Guard and EPA on dispersants," Dean said, "and we've complied with EPA requests regarding dispersants." He added that "dispersants are an EPA-approved and recognized tool in fighting oil spills."

Aaron Viles, at the Louisiana-based Gulf Restoration Network, said the Obama administration gave the impression of controlling the controversial dispersants while allowing their use to continue. The result, he said, was that more oil sank out of sight and out of reach of the cleanup operation.

"Clearly, you know, there was a bit of a show here," Viles said. "Whether EPA wasn't serious, or the Coast Guard didn't care, they kept cranking, and kept exposing the Gulf of Mexico to this giant science experiment."