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To: Kai-Uwe who wrote (8798)11/11/1997 12:46:00 AM
From: Kai-Uwe  Respond to of 97611
 
Intel Corp.: Fighting Perception With Reality
08:04am EST 10-Nov-97 Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Inc. (Nirenberski/Glavin)

Ticker: INTC Current-Rating: BUY Target Price: $ 100
Price : $77 7/16 Previous-Rating: BUY
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Fiscal Year : DECEMBER
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EPS 1996A 1997 1998E 1999E
QTR. Actual Prior Current Prior Current Prior Current
1Q $0.51 $1.10A $ $0.91 $ $ $
2Q 0.59 0.92A 0.99
3Q 0.74 0.88A 1.05
4Q 1.06 0.91 1.15
Total EPS: 2.91 3.80 N/C 4.10 N/C
P/E: 26.6 20.4 18.9
Rel. P/E: 1.18 1.00 1.00
Consensus 3.80 4.20
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
CFPS: $ $ $ $ $ $ $
P/CF:
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Shares Outstanding (MM): 1,797 : Market Cap ($MM): $139,155
Return on Equity (1997): 31% : Debt To Total Cap: 3%
Dividend Yield: 0.13% : 5 Year EPS Growth: 20%
Current Book Value/Share: $11.42
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KEY POINTS:
*Breadth of products and road map puts INTC in great shape for transition.

*Capital investment addresses long-term PC market growth rate in 17-18% range.

*Asia may be the only fly in the ointment from our vantage point.

*Current quarter appears on track with 3Q97 conference call guidance.

*Stock may tread water in the near term but this too will pass; maintain BUY
rating.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Breadth of products and road map puts INTC in great shape for transition: At
its analysts' meeting on Friday INTC detailed a product road map that addresses
10 different segments of the PC market from high-end servers and workstations
down to the basic PC and lean client below $1,000. Our key take-away was INTC's
architecture is flexible enough and its process technology responsive enough to
cost effectively address virtually every segment of the PC market.
>$2K PCs and <$1K PCs squeezing the mid-range: INTC presented data which
suggests that the mid-range has been squeezed out by the high- and low-ends in
the US consumer market recently. The latest data show nearly 60% of consumer PC
purchases are above $2K, and 20% are below $1K versus 50%/10% split a year ago.
INTC has 65% share of all sub-$1K and 90% of the $900-$1K segment.
Segment 0 fears gone awry: While it is an undeniable fact that INTC's ASPs have
shrunk in recent months, we believe fears over the sub-$1,000 PC are out of
control. We are not trying to dispel the possibility nor the need for millions
of cheap PCs but let's put a few things in perspective:
* MIPS are MIPS, the processing has to be done somewhere: Lets assume for a
moment the world goes Segment 0 or even dumb terminals and power reverts to the
network. Something has to process the data if we are to continue enjoying the
productivity enhancements and access to information anytime/anywhere the PC has
given us. It's kind of like a balloon: squeeze one end and the other bulges
and INTC is going to be in a position to leverage the bulge. Best of all the
balloon is growing. No other company is going to be able to produce the number
of high-powered CPUs in servers that will run tomorrow's networks as cost
effectively as INTC. Most of the major customers including Compaq, Dell,
Hewlett Packard and IBM are already preparing IA-64- based road maps.
* Low-end expansion is normal: Looking back over 486/386 transition and
Pentium/486 transition, ASPs declined and the low-end (sub-$120 ASP) expanded to
over 40% of unit sales in certain quarters, which is certainly more than what
we have seen so far. We actually think the trend will continue upward through
1H98 and reverse as Pentium II crosses Pentium in mid 1998.
Ain't no such thing as a killer app: Lack of a killer app to soak up the
processing power of the P-II is another reason cited for the success of sub-$1K
PCs as it was during the Pentium transition. Lotus 1-2-3 circa 1985, and to a
lesser degree Win 3.1 in 1992 were the last pieces of software that had the
ability to single-handedly drive a shift in the PC market that we can think of.
It's the growing number of things we expect to do on our PCs and the secular
trend to user-friendliness (text to graphical to speech and manageability) that
inevitably leads to the upgrade cycle because these things require more
processing power.
Competition has missed its window of opportunity: While AMD has certainly had
an impact of INTC pricing, it has not been able to execute on its K-6 plans. By
the time AMD is in a position to ramp production of 0.25-micron K-6's, INTC
will have been producing 0.25-micron Pentium and Pentium II CPUs for 3 or 4
quarters. Cyrix's success appears limited to the very low-end product where it
is able to sell roughly 1-1.5 million units per quarter. National Semiconductor
will eventually be able to make 0.25-micron CYRX processors but this won't
occur until the end of 1998.
Intel embracing the low-end should drive incremental opportunity: We are
encouraged by INTC's decision to aggressively pursue the low-end. We continue
to believe the low-end offers an incremental opportunity to the entire PC
industry and having the key component supplier behind it should bring volume
economics that is ultimately beneficial for the industry. We are also
encouraged by the breadth of possibilities for INTC processors in thin clients,
basic PCs, set-tops and other home entertainment appliances. Time will tell how
successful this segment will be but INTC will surely garner its "fair" share.
Ironically AMD and CYRX have been proponents of the low-end and they just got
what they asked for...the worst competitor.

Capital investment addresses long-term PC market growth rate in 17-18% range:
INTC indicated capital spending was on track for $4.5 billion in 1997 though we
think it might be conservative, which is the reason for our $4.2-4.3 billion
estimate. If the DEC fab acquisition goes through before year-end, it would
effectively add $600 million to 1997 cap-ex. Otherwise it would be additive to
1998. We continue to believe 1998 spending will be flat to up from our
underlying run-rate forecast for 1997. Fears that INTC will cut capital
spending because PC growth are unfounded. Frankly we think INTC hasn't much
choice but to invest to serve the long-term 17-18% secular growth rate of the PC
industry even if 1998 PC growth slows because it cannot afford to second guess
the market. We would remind investors that one reason AMD captured 20-30% of the
X86 market in 1992 and part of 1993 was INTC's inability to produce enough for
the market. Since then the company has vowed to maintain aggressive capacity
and technology investment, which is the nature of the game. Much of 1998
capital investment really serves the market in 1999 and 2000 so near-term
perturbations from inventory clearing or the initial impact of the currency
crisis are unlikely to drive a revision in spending.

Asia may be the only fly in the ointment from our vantage point: In addition to
seeing the usual seasonal pickup in Europe and the US, INTC indicated that it
had seen a slowdown in Asia with the exception of China. Japanese consumer
buying has slowed but business growth continues. While the company seems
reasonably confident the Asian currency crisis has been factored into guidance
in the near term, we are somewhat concerned looking at 1998. We are still in
the midst of an Asian economic crisis and we don't expect it to reverse itself
over the next 2-3 quarters. The question is whether other geographic areas or
segments of the market can mitigate the impact. If Asia doesn't grow at all in
1998 it would probably cost INTC 4 million units and knock $0.30 off our $4.10
EPS estimate including a 14% increase in operating expenses as we currently have
modeled.
Current quarter appears on track with 3Q97 conference call guidance: INTC
indicated that it is currently on track with guidance of slightly up revenues
and margins in 4Q97 including the effects of Asia and channel inventory
reductions. While we believe our 23 million unit estimate may be aggressive for
the quarter, our $215 ASP assumption is probably conservative and our 58.2%
gross margin also looks conservative. As a result, we are not altering our
estimates at this time.
INTC estimates inventory channel reductions cost $500-750 million in 1997: INTC
tried to quantify the effects of channel inventory reductions by hypothesizing
that 1 week of inventory reduction is equal to roughly $250 million of revenue,
which knocked $500-750 million off INTC's top line in 1997 given the 2-3 week
reduction that has occurred. We believe inventory reductions are ongoing but
expect them to be complete by the end of 1Q98.

Stock may tread water in the near-term but this too will pass; Maintain BUY: It
seems that every time INTC goes through a processor transition investors raise
concerns about competition, lack of reasons to upgrade, prices, and market
saturation to name a few. Customer concentration has increased but if anything
their business models have changed more dramatically. The effects of the
Segment 0 phenomenon in the US may actually be more the result of a price war in
the retail channel. Other than the Asian currency problem, we haven't seen
anything unusual about this transition other than INTC being better positioned
to leverage future growth opportunities than ever before. We can certainly
appreciate the fact that there is more uncertainty over earnings predictability
than there was 6 months ago, but we do not believe the company's ability to
control its own destiny has changed. During previous troughs INTC has traded as
low as 4x sales and roughly 75% of the S&P multiple. With these valuation
parameters in mind, we believe the stock will probably trade in the $65-80 range
over the next couple quarters and would buy it aggressively on weaker days in
anticipation of the transition to Pentium II in mid-1998. We still believe the
stock can trade to $100 in 12-months.



To: Kai-Uwe who wrote (8798)11/11/1997 1:03:00 AM
From: Kai-Uwe  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 97611
 
PC Hardware: Preview November Monthly Monitor Report
08:03am EST 10-Nov-97 Lehman Brothers (Kimberly Alexy, CFA)

Today's Date : 11/10/97
******************************************************************************
* In our November Monthly Monitor report, we highlight end demand trends in
both the corporate and consumer PC market, discuss average selling price (ASP)
and margin trends and focus on recent trends in the data storage industry.

* We will be resuming our Weekly PC Retail Sales survey, designed to assess
Christmas PC sales trends, next week. This month, we summarize ongoing impact
of sub-$1,000 and discuss consumer demand trends by vendor.

* Unit demand in both corporate and consumer PC market remained strong through
the month of October. We continue to believe sub-$1,000 are stimulating
incremental unit growth.

* While unit growth remains strong, however, we are seeing downward pressure
on ASPs from mix shift in the consumer market and increased price
aggressiveness in corporate markets.

* Unit growth remains strong for the drive stocks as well, but pricing
aggressiveness is pressuring earnings results.
*****************************************************************************

PC Demand Themes
PC demand through the month of October has remained strong at both corporate
and consumer markets. Concerns surrounding currency devaluation and weakness
in Asia Pacific economies caused a sell-off across the market and in
technology stocks, in particular. In general, unit PC sales into A/P remain
relatively small at approximately 12% of total unit volume. We estimate
minimal impact on total revenue growth as a result of such weakness. Our
larger concern is the continued decline in ASPs and reduced gross margin
contribution.

Throughout October, PC unit demand trends in both corporate and consumer
channels remained strong. However, while unit growth continues to be strong,
ASP declines continue to pressure revenue growth. For some companies, this
negative mix shift towards lower-margin consumer sales is causing margin
pressure. We believe ASP compression is occurring in both corporate and
consumer markets. Several factors are triggering ASP declines.

First, the strength of consumer PC demand coupled with the negative mix shift
associated with demand for sub-$1,000 systems is placing downward pressure on
ASPs. In addition, more aggressive price actions by indirect PC vendors in
the corporate market -- we believe, in an effort to compete more aggressively
against Dell -- have led to further pressure on desktop ASPs. Lastly, excess
notebook inventory are also contributing to weaker ASPs in this segment.
Positively, PC server growth remains strong and with ASPs two to four times
desktop ASPs, some offset is provided for those companies focusing on PC sever
sales.

PC Survey Summary
This month we continue our telephone survey checks of the consumer retail PC
market. With the holiday selling season fast approaching, we will soon be
reinstating our weekly surveys. The results of these surveys will be
published in weekly First Call notes, as well as summarized in future Monthly
Monitor reports.

In our survey this month, products from Compaq, Hewlett-Packard and Packard
Bell continued to be mentioned as the most popular. Each of these vendors has
delivered compelling price/performance packages into the consumer market.
While Packard-Bell remains the price leader, the strength of the Compaq and HP
brand names have provided competitive differentiation, especially on the low-
end frontier. With all three of these brands, plus Acer and some third-tier
players, having sub-$1,000 offerings, consumers now have available to them a
whole family of offerings in this price range. IBM has also announced a $999
product (the Aptiva E16) which, though supposedly shipping since October, has
not shown up in our surveys to date. Big Blue was late to market with a
product in this space and has suffered because of it.

We note the absence of the Japanese vendors from the popularity charts so far
in the second half of this year. While desktop systems from Sony and Toshiba
are still widely available, they have yet to repeat the strong showing in our
survey results that they turned in last year. Going forward, we will closely
monitor the success of these brands in the consumer retail desktop PC market,
as any continued weakness could signal a pullback by these companies from this
market segment (whether strategic or unintentional), and in any case would be
a further positive for the remaining players.

Compaq's three-tiered approach in its Presario desktop line aligns well with
the consumer market segments described above, and we believe that this has
helped the company in its exceptional consumer retail performance during the
last several months. Over the last month, Compaq has remained the dominant
consumer brand, as reported by our survey respondents. With their recent
Presario price cuts, we expect them to continue to be a category killer in the
consumer retail space.

Another market trend we are watching is the success of built-to-order PCs in
the retail channel. CompUSA entered this market in mid-September with its
"American" and "American Pro" PC lines. On their latest earnings conference
call, the company reported that demand for the machines dramatically exceeded
expectations. Even so, CompUSA management reported, there believe there is
little issue with vendor conflict, as they see the house-branded machines as
going primarily after markets where the major vendors are seeing little
penetration. This would imply the "screwdriver shop" systems builders, who
sell at low cost with little brand recognition. We still see vendor conflict
this as an area of risk for the program, as is the risk associated with so
directly staking the company's brand franchise on its internal product
business; if any major foul-ups do occur with the machines, CompUSA will have
to shoulder the burden of blame.

Addressing the profitability of the BTO business, margins on the machines were
described as being similar to the margins realized on sales of systems made by
other vendors. Tandy's Computer City chain is also said to be stepping up its
BTO efforts, reportedly negotiating with a third-party to partner in corporate
and consumer BTO programs, with goals of eventually making the systems
available through retail as well as on-line.

Promotional activity showed an uptick from last month's meager levels. A
number of package deals were available, with typical package prices in the
$1,200 to $1,400 range. Also, rebates continued on hard drives from Western
Digital and Maxtor, and one retailer offered additional break-point based
discounts on systems (starting on systems priced at $1,200) with additional
rebates on printers and monitors (monitor discount break points based on
screen size).

PC Channel Themes
Throughout our channel checks during the month of October, product demand
levels remained strong. In fact, as a general rule, growth prospects sounded
better than in recent memory. Most resellers indicated product growth levels
tracking between the high-teens and low-thirties.

Pricing aggressiveness by the indirect vendors has appeared to be limiting
Dell's share gains at several corporate accounts. Specifically, Hewlett-
Packard recently designated a pool of funds designed for use in competitive
bids against Dell. IBM is expected to announce a similar program. Resellers
may access this pool at their discretion in an effort to be more competitive
in a timely manner. In the past, even if the indirect vendors were willing to
match Dell's price, they had difficulty matching Dell's response time.
Resellers noted that Dell would frequently come in "at the eleventh hour" and
win the deal. Now, with the pool of funds concept, resellers are not bogged
down waiting for approval to match Dell's bid.

As a result, most resellers state that in large corporate accounts, the Dell
price delta has been successfully eliminated as a result of such pricing
actions.

When asked about Compaq's build-to-order program and any noted improvements in
meeting five-day turnaround objectives, most stated that while demand for the
product was very strong no material improvement I five-day delivery had yet
occurred. Channel assembly programs, however, will be ramping later this
month. Such programs have the potential, pending resellers' successful
execution, to significantly reduce inventory levels and drive fast and timely
order fulfillment.

Inventory levels generally remain unchanged at approximately five to six
weeks. We expect that as end demand levels remain strong and as channel
assembly begins to roll-out that inventory levels will gradually work down.
Indirect vendors continue to target two weeks as the stated inventory goal.
However, PC vendors will soon need to abandon their quarter-end channel
stuffing practices to make progress on such inventory reductions. To
accomplish this objective without risk to sales objectives, end sell-through
levels will need to be strong enough to pull through existing inventory levels
and sales of new BTO/channel configured products.

Data Storage Themes
With the enterprise drive environment not expected to improve for another two
to three quarters, we have been closely monitoring the desktop pricing
environment for signs of similar weakness. The lower capacity points -- below
2.0GB -- had been under pressure in the September quarter, negatively
impacting third quarter earnings results for both Seagate and Western Digital.
Quantum remained generally insulated from this weakness given its focus on
higher desktop capacity points.

Now, price aggressiveness has spread into the 2.0 and 2.5GB capacity points,
and we believe there is risk of further extension into 3GB and higher.
Western Digital's pre-announcement on Friday was triggered by a variety of
factors, but desktop pricing aggressiveness remained the primary culprit.
Fujitsu was targeted as the vendor displaying the greatest level of pricing
aggressiveness. In addition to negative pricing trends, Western Digital was
further impacted by cost difficulties associated with extending the life of
its older inductive product offerings and cited the company's late transition
to MR as now causing a competitive disadvantage.

In our recent meeting with Seagate, aggressive pricing at the 2.0 GB capacity
points was confirmed. Management noted surprise at the recent spread of
pricing degradation to this higher capacity point, but maintained that 2.5GB
desktop products and above remained on allocation.

Quantum has maintained that desktop pricing has generally remained within
normalized levels and cited its product focus on higher desktop capacity
points (3.2GB and above) as reason for reduced exposure to industry price
pressures. We are concerned that on its lower capacity points, Quantum is
experiencing desktop margin pressure. We are further concerned that such
pressures may extend upwards into higher capacity points which until now, have
been experiencing normalized levels of decline. Bleeding of further desktop
price aggressiveness into higher capacity points will be the critical variable
to watch.

Positively, all vendors are scaling back on production and end demand levels
remain strong. With limited capacity coming on board coupled with the
strength of end demand levels, the critical question is at what capacity point
will demand and supply re-align? We continue to monitor pricing trends in an
effort to understand this cross-over.

We would note that Western Digital and Seagate have the greatest exposure to
the HDD pricing weakness in the industry. And while we have already lowered
numbers on both vendors, we expect there may be further downside risk to our
earnings estimates. Quantum, however, is least exposed to such pressures for
two reasons. First, largely as a result of its leadership in the MR
transition, the company is focused on higher desktop capacity points which are
enjoying both strong demand and more normalized levels of price decline.
Second, the company's tape business represents approximately 60% of normalized
earnings. This business has been successfully cushioning HDD price weakness.

Quantum will be the name to watch most closely over the upcoming weeks. If
signs of price aggressiveness at higher capacity points surface, we would
question Quantum's ability to meet current earnings expectations. At this
time, the company continue to track to prior guidance.