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To: maceng2 who wrote (74132)10/29/2010 12:32:50 PM
From: Maurice Winn1 Recommendation  Respond to of 74559
 
BP had an in depth strategy. Did you forget the blowout preventer? Oooopsss.... Halliburton messed up on concrete and then the blowout preventer was bung too. It's hard to hire good help these days: <If you are in a high risk business like the oil business, you keep your safety defence strategy in depth. You maintain multiple levels of safety so if one critical level breaks another kicks in. >

Actually, another strategy is to not have multiple levels of safety but to put all the effort into not crashing in the first place.

It's easier to make an A380 not crash than to have it bounce safely if it does.

One of the risks with multiple levels of safety is that everyone assumes the other guy is keeping things safe so they can save some money by leaving out the cement or sleeping on the job or otherwise cutting corners. When it turns out that everyone was thinking somebody was doing it, the result is often that nobody is doing it.

Personally, I prefer multiple safety processes such as seat belts, ABS brakes, air bags, crumple zones, safe speed, care and attention, tolerable tyres.

My experience decades ago with BP was obsession with safety, but as so often in big companies [and small ones and life in general] most people prefer form over substance. They put on a good show to look good, but are not actually particularly honest, or capable. Bosses like to boss and employees cringe for fear of their income and cushy number being lost so we get the result.

I was told by the boss of BP New Zealand that I should have gone from Wellington to an environmental conference in London [in house] in 1984. The travel expense, hotels, loss of work time etc seemed a big waste to me, so I didn't do it. They could send the proceedings to me and I'd read them in a few hours. He was more interested in being seen to do the right thing. I was more interested in results.

The American shareholding is not as high as you think. For the dinkum oil on the spill, read my posts. Turns out they were spot on. The harm was not a big deal. The plumes didn't exist. etc etec etc etc....

Mqurice



To: maceng2 who wrote (74132)10/29/2010 12:42:01 PM
From: Maurice Winn1 Recommendation  Respond to of 74559
 
That was my argument back in 1986 when I was warning BP that now that they were American [in assets owned], they were subject to being sued by crazed American juries for everything they had and so the casual carelessness of the rest of the world was unacceptable. <Incidentally, BP is more American now then British. >

After Exxon Valdez, I thought BP would take the warning seriously. Perhaps they did and just got unlucky. I left 20 years ago. From the public point of view they seem to have adopted a green image, but in 1995 they were doing the old style fighting confrontational approach when I was taking them and others on over lead in petrol and petrol quality.

Old habits die hard.

Mqurice