To: koan who wrote (298649 ) 12/17/2010 2:35:01 PM From: joseffy Respond to of 306849 Obama healthcare judicial opinion reveals 11th hour deceit by Congress to avoid scrutiny Flopping Aces 12-17-10 floppingaces.net The most surprising revelation I've read in the opinions and various rulings thus far on the major lawsuits that have hit the news is the inadvertent confession of the lead counsel for Obama's HHS in oral arguments during the Commonwealth of Virginia vs Sebelius process. Because the oral argument transcripts are not found online, and need to be ordered from the US District Court for eastern Virginia, I'm going to quote the source of this revelation directly. Do I trust that source? You betcha. It is none other than <B?Judge Roger Vinson in the US District Court for the northern Florida/Pensacola division, using specific citations and quotes for verification. Vinson shook the lib/prog world back in mid October when he denied the Obama admin's motion to dismiss. That ruling shares much in common with the latest final ruling that the health care mandate was unConstitutional by Judge Henry Hudson in the Commonwealth of Virginia vs Sebelius case, mentioned above. But what Vinson's preliminary decision to proceed revealed back in October was more extraordinary.... and unreported. The decision to call the fee for noncompliance a penalty instead of a tax was a last minute deliberate swap by Congress. It had been specifically called a tax in the previous incarnations. So why the 11th hour change in terms? In Obama's counsel's own words, it was so that Congressional Dems could avoid scrutiny and accountability for raising taxes. From pg 26 of Vinson's October ruling: In Virginia v. Sebelius, 3:10cv188, one of the twenty or so other lawsuits challenging the Act, the federal government’s lead counsel (who is lead defense counsel in this litigation, as well) urged during oral argument in that case that the penalty is proper and sustainable under the taxing power. Although that power is broad and does not easily lend itself to judicial review, counsel stated, “there is a check. It’s called Congress. And taxes are scrutinized. And the reason we don’t have all sorts of crazy taxes is because taxes are among the most scrutinized things we have. And the elected representatives in Congress are held accountable for taxes that they impose.” See Transcript of Oral Argument (Virginia case), at 45 (emphasis added). This foregoing statement highlights one of the more troubling aspects of the defendants’ “newfound” tax argument. As noted at the outset of this order, and as anyone who paid attention to the healthcare reform debate already knew, the Act was very controversial at the time of passage. Irrespective of the merits of the arguments for or against it, the legislation required lawmakers in favor of the bill to cast politically difficult and tough votes. As it turned out, the voting was extremely close. Because by far the most publicized and controversial part of the Act was the individual mandate and penalty, it would no doubt have been even more difficult to pass the penalty as a tax. Not only are taxes always unpopular, but to do so at that time would have arguably violated pledges by politicians (including the President) to not raise taxes, which could have made it that much more difficult to secure the necessary votes for passage. One could reasonably infer that Congress proceeded as it did specifically because it did not want the penalty to be “scrutinized” as a $4 billion annual tax increase, and it did not want at that time to be “held accountable for taxes that they imposed.” In other words, to the extent that the defendants are correct and the penalty was intended to be a tax, it seems likely that the members of Congress merely called it a penalty and did not describe it as revenue-generating to try and insulate themselves from the potential electoral ramifications of their votes. Regardless of whether the members of Congress had this specific motivation and intent (which, once again, is not my place to say), it is obvious that Congress did not pass the penalty, in the version of the legislation that is now “the Act,” as a tax under its taxing authority, but rather as a penalty pursuant to its Commerce Clause power. Those two exactions, as previously noted, are not interchangeable. And, now that it has passed into law on that basis, government attorneys have come into this court and argued that it was a tax after all. This rather significant shift in position, if permitted, could have the consequence of allowing Congress to avoid the very same accountability that was identified by the government’s counsel in the Virginia case as a check on Congress’s broad taxing power in the first place. In other words, the members of Congress would have reaped a political advantage by calling and treating it as a penalty while the Act was being debated, see Virginia v. Sebelius, 702 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (E.D. Va. 2010) (referring to “preenactment representations by the Executive and Legislative branches” that the penalty was not “a product of the government’s power to tax for the general welfare”), and then reap a legal advantage by calling it a tax in court once it passed into law. See Def. Mem. at 33-34, 49 (arguing that the Anti-Injunction Act bars any challenge to the penalty which, in any event, falls under Congress’s “very extensive” authority to tax for the general welfare). This should not be allowed, and I am not aware of any reported case where it ever has been.