SI
SI
discoversearch

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor.  We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community.  If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.
Technology Stocks : LinkedIn Corporation -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/9/2011 10:04:47 PM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Respond to of 272
 
Sequoia, Greylock, Bessemer To Stay Put In LinkedIn IPO

By Zoran Basich
Wall Street Journal
May 9, 2011, 6:41 PM ET

So who’s selling shares in LinkedIn’s IPO? Not its top three venture investors.

Monday’s amended SEC filing by the company revealed its estimated IPO terms – the business networking company plans to sell 7.8 million shares, 4.8 million of them by the company itself, at $32 to $35 per share. That would bring in $274.4 million at the upper end of the price range, with $169 million going to the company and $105.4 million going to shareholders.

LinkedIn founder Reid Hoffman, now a Greylock Partners partner, will see a nice little windfall by selling off 115,335 shares – just over $4 million. Hoffman will still hold more than 20% of the company and remain its largest shareholder, with a stake worth $663.3 million. That assumes the IPO prices at the upper end of its range, which would give the company a market cap of $3.31 billion.

Sequoia Capital, Greylock Partners and Bessemer Venture Partners won’t be seeing any of the windfall, though – at least not yet. LinkedIn’s top VC backers are not selling shares in the offering, banking on the stock to rise after its debut.

Sequoia will own 17.8% of the company after its shares get diluted, making its stake worth a potential $589.4 million or so at the upper-range market cap. Greylock’s 14.9% stake would be valued at $491.7 million, and Bessemer’s 4.8% stake would be worth about $160.2 million.

Bain Capital, though, is getting a bite of cake while saving the rest for later. The firm, which owns 4.8% of company shares going into the IPO, is unloading 653,880 shares, which will bring it $22.9 million if the IPO prices at the upper-end $35 figure. It also still leaves it with a 3.9% stake, worth $129.7 million.

Among other shareholders, Goldman Sachs owns less than 1% of LinkedIn and is selling all 871,840 of its shares, which will bring it $30.5 million if the IPO prices at the upper-end $35 figure.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/11/2011 7:13:05 AM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Respond to of 272
 
Plans for LinkedIn’s I.P.O. May Make Few Friends

By STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF
New York Times
DealBook
May 10, 2011, 5:42 pm

LinkedIn is looking to connect with new shareholders.

The Internet company is rushing headlong toward an initial public offering that could value the company at more than $3 billion. But while investors may be eagerly waiting to befriend it, LinkedIn is living up to a common criticism of social media — that online “friendship” doesn’t count for much.

In this case, LinkedIn is planning to adopt a governance structure that not only disenfranchises its future shareholders, but contains elements that have been heavily criticized by corporate governance advocates.

The most controversial part of LinkedIn’s proposed governance is its use of dual-class stock. Shareholders who purchase stock in the LinkedIn initial public offering will receive Class A shares, which have only one vote apiece. LinkedIn’s current shareholders, including LinkedIn’s co-founder and chairman, Reid Hoffman, will hold Class B shares, which entitles them to 10 votes apiece.

According to LinkedIn’s latest filings, this dual-class stock will guarantee that after the I.P.O. Mr. Hoffman, who will own about 20 percent of LinkedIn, will control the company with three venture capital shareholders, Sequoia Capital, Greylock Partners and Bessemer Venture Partners. Public shareholders will have less than 1 percent of the voting power in this newly public company.


The effect will grow worse as the venture capital shareholders sell off and Mr. Hoffman, by virtue of his Class B shares, will most likely remain in control of the company even though he owns less than a majority.

This type of dual-class stock came under heavy criticism in the 1980s. Management used this type of stock to fight off hostile takeovers. Shareholders protested, accusing management of entrenching itself.

In 1988, the Securities and Exchange Commission responded to shareholder complaints by trying to outlaw dual-class stock, but the rule was struck down a year later by a federal court. The stock exchanges then adopted their own rules forbidding a company from adopting dual shares after it listed. This ended the ability of management to adopt this structure to fight off a hostile bid. The exchanges, however, allowed a big exception: a company can go public with a dual-class share structure.

Dual-class stock was then virtually forgotten, until the Google I.P.O. Google, the company that adopted the mantra “don’t be evil,” adopted a dual-class stock in anticipation of its offering. The net effect was to keep majority voting control of the company with its founders, Sergey Brin and Larry Page. The two still share voting control despite selling their stake down to about 17 percent.

Google’s use of dual-class stock points to its justification. Placing voting control with a founder or the founder’s family allows them to preserve and protect a distinctive corporate culture. It is for these reasons that dual-class stocks tend to be used by media companies. (The Washington Post Company and The New York Times Company have two classes of stock.) And Google may be one such enterprise that can make the case for a dual class. Another outside the media sphere may be Ford Motor. The Ford family owns Class B shares of the carmaker that account for only about 2 percent of Ford’s outstanding stock, but they also have 40 percent voting control.

Ford, of course, was the only one of the Big Three automakers that did not seek bankruptcy. Still, there is a question whether that alone justified paying William C. Ford Jr. more than $43 million in total compensation for serving as Ford’s executive chairman for the last two years. Or was it because his family controlled the company?

This is another ground for challenging these dual-class share arrangements. These shares allow poorly performing management teams to stay in control and arrange side benefits to the detriment of the company and its shareholders.

A study in 2008 by Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii and Andrew Metrick found evidence of this self-interest. The authors found that dual-class stock could destroy value where the holders had a much more significant voting interest than an economic one. The LinkedIn prospectus itself echoes this finding, stating that “this concentrated control will limit your ability to influence corporate matters for the foreseeable future, and, as a result, the market price of our … common stock could be adversely affected.”

According to the Institutional Shareholder Services Governance Risk Indicators’ database, only about 6 percent of companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index have dual-class stock.

In the case of LinkedIn, management has clearly done a good job of creating value over the years, but it does not appear to have a compelling reason to disenfranchise its shareholders. Yet LinkedIn is following a trend. Facebook has already internally adopted a dual-class stock likely to leave Mark Zuckerberg firmly in control after an I.P.O. Google is already there, and Zynga will possibly join the club. Dual-class stock is the new status symbol of Internet billionaires. It allows them to have their company and sell it off, too.

The problem is that 10 years down the line, LinkedIn’s controllers may no longer be as committed or effective, but may still have control. This could become a corporate governance nightmare and leave shareholders with little leverage to effect change other than simply defriending LinkedIn and selling shares.

Why is LinkedIn adopting these mechanisms? The most likely reason is that it can get away with it, particularly since this will be a hot I.P.O. Institutional Shareholder Services, the influential proxy advisory service, does not provide a rating of corporate governance until the company is public. The reason is that many of I.S.S.’s customers — institutional shareholders — are going to flip shares acquired in an I.P.O., and therefore do not scrutinize the company’s corporate governance provisions at the going-public stage.

LinkedIn is thus leveraging a gap in shareholder accountability to adopt this dual-class mechanism.

As for shareholders who buy these shares, they may rue the day they friended these companies without stopping to consider the consequences.

Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/11/2011 2:52:41 PM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Respond to of 272
 
BranchOut, a LinkedIn competitor feeding off of Facebook:

branchout.com

Exclusive: BranchOut Raises $18M For Facebook-Focused Professional Network

By Leena Rao
TechCrunch
May 11, 2011

Exclusive: BranchOut, a professional social network for Facebook, has raised $18 million in Series B funding led by Redpoint Ventures with Accel Partners, Norwest Venture Partners, and Floodgate also participating the the round. This investment brings BranchOut’s total funding to $24 million. Geoff Yang, founding partner of Redpoint Ventures, will join Accel Partner Kevin Efrusy on BranchOut’s board.

Launched in July 2010, BranchOut has often been compared to a LinkedIn for Facebook because it allows you to network and find jobs through your friends on the social network. BranchOut’s Facebook app lets you search for companies and then shows you all your friends who either work there or know somebody who does. The application does what LinkedIn hasn’t done with Facebook— it unlocks the massive amounts of career data about your social graph on the world’s largest social network that was just impossible to get to before.

And BranchOut allows users to create professional profiles, importing professional data from Facebook profiles, including employment histories, and also allows you to import skills, education, and job history from LinkedIn as well. Within your profile, you can earn badges for specific types of work or education, and contacts can post recommendations (limited to 140 characters). Soon, founder Rick Marini says that the site will allow users to tag friends profiles with specific attributes and skills (i.e. hard worker, loyal, etc.) BranchOut profiles only display only professional data, and won’t surface personal pictures or information from your Facebook profile.

The app also allows companies (and individuals) to post jobs to networks, which you can share amongst your friends. Currently, BranchOut allows you to search over three million jobs and 20,000 internships, which impressive considering the app only launched nine months ago. BranchOut lets you search these listings by location, position, company or any other keyword.

And today, is releasing its newest product along with announcing the funding—a Jobs Tab. BranchOut’s
Jobs Tab publishes job openings to a company’s Facebook Page and allows Facebook users to apply, share the job, and see their inside connections at the company that posted the opening. The tab can be easily integrated into a company’s Facebook page. For brands and companies that have thousands, hundreds of thousands or even millions of likes, the Tab seems like a compelling way to advertise job listings which already public on a company site.

So far Levi’s, Groupon, Kiva, charity: water and Readyforce are using the Jobs Tab. Here’s an example of Kiva’s Jobs Tab.

As for the funding, Marini says that the $18 million will be used to hire additional staff, particularly in engineering and sales. He tells us that for the past nine months, the company has focused on building out the consumer-facing product and will now also be focusing on building out enterprise products. For example, BranchOut will soon offer a specialized interface for recruiters and sales people to search the app’s database for prospective connections and leads.

Of course, it’s hard not to recognize the power of LinkedIn, the giant in the professional social networking space with over 100 million users. But while LinkedIn has been adding a number of social elements to its platform, including a Twitter integration, the company has yet to implement a deep integration with Facebook. CEO Jeff Weiner said last year that while Facebook is great for showing how we spend our time and expressing ourselves, most employers probably shouldn’t see all of your extracurricular activities.

But Marini contends that Facebook, with nearly 700 million members and growing, is an integral part of professional networking. As Facebook’s social graph continues to dominate your experiences on the web, people will want to harness the sheer power of their most extensive social graph in their professional lives, he says.

BranchOut is certainly on to something. The app currently has 300,000 monthly active users and is steadily growing, as BranchOut expands to international markets. And LinkedIn, which is about to IPO, hasn’t cornered the market on using Facebook in professional social interactions. And Marini sees LinkedIn’s success in the market as illustrating the potential in the professional social networking space.

As Facebook continues to grow, explains Marini, everyone that matters to you, whether it be friends, family, colleagues and co-workers will be part of your social graph. “The future of professional networking is going to be driven by Facebook,” Marini says.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/11/2011 8:03:40 PM
From: Glenn Petersen  Respond to of 272
 
According to Renaissance Capital, the LinkedIn IPO is scheduled for the week of 5/16:

renaissancecapital.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/12/2011 4:59:34 PM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Respond to of 272
 
A Deeper Look at LinkedIn’s Structure

By STEVEN M. DAVIDOFF
New York Times
May 12, 2011, 4:01 pm

I wrote earlier this week about LinkedIn’s dual-class share structure and its potential to turn into a corporate governance nightmare. Following up on that, let’s take a deeper look at LinkedIn’s other corporate governance arrangements as it prepares for its initial public offering.

In addition to dual-class stock, LinkedIn is also adopting a staggered board. A staggered board is generally a board of directors who are elected in one-third tranches every year. The staggered board acts as a powerful antitakeover device because it takes two years to replace a majority of the board. This type of mechanism has been heavily criticized for entrenching directors. The criticism has led to action as many boards have moved away from staggered terms in the last decade. According to FactsetSharkrepellent, staggered boards exist in only 29 percent of the companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index, compared with 60 percent in 2000.

But LinkedIn goes even farther here. To eliminate a staggered board, LinkedIn’s shareholders would have to vote to amend LinkedIn’s certificate of incorporation after a board recommendation that shareholders do so. LinkedIn’s high-vote Class B shares do not have a separate vote to amend LinkedIn’s charter. In other words, when there is a vote to amend the charter, all of LinkedIn’s shares have only one vote. This is a concession to shareholders. It effectively means that shareholders can vote equally to amend LinkedIn’s charter and eliminate the staggered board.

But through another provision, LinkedIn effectively takes back any right shareholders might have to vote to amend the certificate and eliminate the staggered board. The reason is that LinkedIn’s certificate requires that 80 percent of all shareholders approve any amendment to the staggered board’s terms. This is an almost impossible threshold to reach. It effectively means that LinkedIn will always have a staggered board, even if a majority of shareholders do not desire it.

LinkedIn has also adopted bylaw notice provisions that are intended to discourage shareholder activism and that are typical of the provisions that companies are increasingly adopting. These notice provisions require any shareholder nominating directors or who otherwise makes a proposal to provide written representations as to shareholders it is acting in concert with, derivative holdings, intent and background. The disclosure mandated is more copious that would otherwise be required to be disclosed in a Schedule 13D, a form required to be filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission when a shareholder has more than a 5 percent interest in a public company. And if the shareholder is found to misrepresent its disclosures in any way, LinkedIn’s bylaws allow the company’s board to disqualify the proposal or nomination. This is a nice backdoor way to claim a violation of Schedule 13D’s disclosure obligations, particularly since the remedies for Schedule 13D are not likely to be as harsh.

LinkedIn is also joining more than 70 public companies with charter provisions selecting Delaware as a forum for all shareholder litigation. I previously discussed this type of provision. As Charles M. Nathan of the law firm Latham & Watkins recently wrote, these provisions have become increasingly popular provision among companies that want to select Delaware as a more favorable forum for litigation. And by placing the provision in its charter, LinkedIn can avoid arguments that it is not binding on shareholders because they did not consent to it, a reason why such a clause was struck down by a California federal court.

LinkedIn, like almost all Delaware corporations, does not opt out of Delaware’s business combination statute. This statute is an antitakeover law that requires that any shareholder who acquires 15 percent or more of LinkedIn, but less than 85 percent, must wait three years to acquire the rest or otherwise obtain approval of a majority of the remaining shares. The provision is intended to discourage hostile tender offers, though its importance is diminished these days in light of the poison pill, which acts as a board’s main defense against a hostile bid. A poison pill must first be redeemed before this statute even becomes an issue, and typically if the board agrees to a deal. it will agree not only to make the pill inapplicable but waive the business combination statute.

In fairness to LinkedIn, the dual-class structure could have been more favorable to its controlling shareholders. The venture capitalist Marc Andreesen wrote an interesting blog post in 2009 on why dual-class stock should be considered for technology companies. He sets out criteria for adopting these provisions so that they do not unduly and adversely affect public shareholders, including a requirement that “Class B shareholders have a commitment to treat Class A shareholders fairly and equally in all respects other than voting power.”

LinkedIn has not made such a sweeping statement, but the company has made the high-vote Class B shares nontransferable (except to heirs and for estate planning purposes). LinkedIn’s certificate of incorporation also explicitly states that differential consideration cannot be paid to the Class B shareholders if LinkedIn is acquired in a merger. This is important because controlling shareholders have previously leveraged their control to get obtain extra consideration in an acquisition. Less than two years ago, Darwin Deason, the founder and chairman of Affiliated Computer Services, was able to arrange an extra $300 million payout to himself for selling his high-vote shares in the company to Xerox. This was money that could have gone to all of the shareholders.

Finally, the staggered board can be seen as a way to temper the Class B shareholders’ control, because it would also take these shareholders two years to replace a majority of the board. In LinkedIn’s case, the net effect of these provisions is to ensure that only the current Class B holders control the company and that their ability to get special treatment is somewhat limited.

John Carney of CNBC argued this week that LinkedIn’s dual-class stock could be a useful device:

“‘Good’ corporate governance may be too costly for its alleged benefits. And government policy is constantly making it costlier. Consider, for instance, recently proposed changes in proxy access rules and ’say on pay’ … Similarly, dual class companies can better avoid the short term ‘beat the quarter’ thinking that debilitates so much of corporate America.”

Mr. Carney makes an intelligent point, but the question I pose is whether LinkedIn is the type of company that qualifies for Mr. Andreesen’s permission to use dual-class stock. In other words, is there a net benefit to this type of stock in this situation as a means to preserve a corporate culture or goal? Alternatively, is dual-class stock necessary to fight off short-term thinking or shareholder activists? Or are these other notice provisions sufficient?

This is subject to legitimate debate. But perhaps there is another reason for the use of dual-class stock by this new wave of media companies. It is likely no coincidence that Facebook has also adopted that structure and that Mr. Andreeson sits on its board. And again, the ultimate question is whether shareholders appreciate this structure at the I.P.O. stage in order to intelligently decide whether this is the right governance. Alternatively, LinkedIn may be using the hot demand for its initial public offering to adopt structures that shareholders will live to regret.

Steven M. Davidoff, writing as The Deal Professor, is a commentator for DealBook on the world of mergers and acquisitions.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/14/2011 9:37:50 PM
From: Glenn Petersen2 Recommendations  Respond to of 272
 
The headline of this article is misleading. Reid Hoffman - a charter member of the PayPal mafia - is only selling 115,335 shares in the offering:

LinkedIn boss poised for $600m payout from sale of shares

Reid Hoffman is middle-aged, portly and nice – and the atypical billionaire is soon to be one of the richest men in Silicon Valley


Dominic Rushe The Observer, Sunday 15 May 2011



Reid Hoffman, founder and president of Linkedln, is behind nearly every social media firm now heading to market. Photograph: Stefano Carofei / Rex Features
_______________

Silicon Valley is a place where the young and thin dream of making millions on the next hot tech startup. Reid Hoffman is portly, "old" and far more successful than most can ever hope to be.

The 43-year-old is set to make himself another $600m after announcing plans to sell shares in LinkedIn, the social network for suits widely used by headhunters to trawl for potential job applicants. LinkedIn will become the first US social network to go public when it joins the New York Stock Exchange on Thursday, as increasingly frenzied investors clamour to get in on the new generation of internet firms.

The share sale will value the whole company at up to $3.35bn (£2bn), significantly higher than the $2bn expected when LinkedIn first filed IPO documents in January. The increase comes as its peers, including Facebook, online discount service Groupon, and social gaming firm Zynga, line up their own IPOs at ever-increasing valuations. Facebook's valuation is now approaching $100bn, Groupon is said to be worth $25bn, and all those people playing Farmville have driven Zynga up to $10bn. Hoffman is first in line to collect on all of them.

The serial entrepreneur seems to be behind nearly every social media firm now heading to market. He founded LinkedIn eight years ago and owns 20% of the company. Hoffman's cash helped start Facebook, Zynga and Flickr. In 2009, he joined venture capital firm Greylock Partners where he has led investments in Groupon, among others. Twitter was about the only major social media pie in which he didn't have a finger. But, in 2009, Twitter bought a geo-location business called Mixer Labs, funded by Hoffman, and he got shares in that too.

Hoffman is California born and bred. He grew up in Berkeley and went to Stanford University, where he got a BA in the university's "symbolic systems programme", an inter-disciplinary study that, according to the university's website, "focuses on computers and minds: artificial and natural systems that use symbols to represent information." Then he went off to Oxford to do an MA in philosophy.

Hoffman's original plan was to become an intellectual. "When I graduated my plan was to become a professor and public intellectual. That is not about quoting Kant. It's about holding up a lens to society and asking 'who are we?' and 'who should we be?' But I realised academics write books that 50 or 60 people read and I wanted more impact," he told Director magazine in 2009.

Academia's loss was the business world's gain. After stints at Apple and Fujitsu, Hoffman struck out on his own, setting up one of the earliest social networking firms, SocialNet.com. He quit after a disagreement with the board and went to join Peter Thiel at PayPal, the online payments company. Hoffman was to become a made man in what's become known as the PayPal mafia.

Auction giant eBay bought PayPal in 2002 for $1.5bn and made fortunes for PayPal's execs. Thiel got about $68m and has gone on to become one of tech's most successful investors. He was one of the first people to back Mark Zuckerberg at Facebook, putting $500,000 into the firm after an introduction from Hoffman. That stake is now worth about $1.7bn. PayPal's other alumni include Elon Musk, co-founder of Tesla Motors, and Steve Chen, Chad Hurley and Jawed Karim, founders of YouTube.

A year after the PayPal sale, Hoffman had set up LinkedIn. According to the company, LinkedIn now has more than 100 million members in 200 countries and is adding about 1 million new members a week. The company makes money by selling its hiring and marketing software offline, and from members who subscribe to its premium services. It posted a profit of $15.4m in 2010, following operating losses from 2007 until 2009. But it doesn't expect to be profitable in 2011 because it is investing in technology and international expansion. In a filing, LinkedIn cautioned that it "may not be able to generate sufficient revenue to sustain our profitability over the long term".

Investors can be fickle. Shares in RenRen, China's answer to Facebook, soared 29% when they debuted on the NYSE earlier this month. They are now below the $14 initial price. Who's to say what's in store for LinkedIn, Facebook, Zynga and co? But there are plenty of other Hoffman-backed firms to take their place, should they flame out.

An executive at one of Hoffman's firms, speaking anonymously, said his secret was he is "a really nice guy. He's very smart and he knows everyone". Middle-aged, chubby, nice and soon to be unbelievably rich. It's one of the weirdest combinations Silicon Valley has ever seen.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/14/2011 9:47:10 PM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 272
 
Putting a value on LinkedIn stock offering

Kathleen Pender
San Francisco Chronicle
Saturday, May 14, 2011

If LinkedIn goes public this week as expected, it will be overvalued by almost any conventional metric, but that won't matter to most investors, at least not initially.

As the first big U.S. social-networking company to make an initial public offering in a market dominated by momentum traders looking to make a quick buck on whatever is going up, LinkedIn is poised to pop.

"Investors are going to be all over this deal. I would imagine that whatever the initial price is, demand will go through that," says Bill Buhr, Morningstar's IPO strategist.

Buhr fears that excitement over social networking already has driven LinkedIn to a price that makes it unattractive long-term.

The Mountain View company, which operates an online network for professionals, plans to sell up to 9 million shares at $32 to $35 each, probably Thursday.

If it sells 9 million shares at $35 apiece, LinkedIn would raise $315.6 million. After the deal, the company will have about 95 million shares outstanding, giving it a market value of about $3.3 billion.

That market value is 13.5 times its 2010 revenue or 11 times its revenue for the 12 months that ended March 31.

By comparison, Google's market value is about 5.5 times its latest 12 months' revenue, Apple's is 3.6 times, Microsoft's is three times and Amazon's is 2.5 times.


LinkedIn's price-to-earnings ratio - at more than 200 - is even more outrageous, because like most fast-growing companies, its earnings are so modest. It netted $15.4 million in 2010.

Some analysts say it's useless to look at these metrics for companies such as LinkedIn, which, in the words of its chief executive Jeffrey Weiner, is "transforming the way the world works."

Paul Bard, director of research at IPO investment firm Renaissance Capital, says, "When you have companies growing that fast in an evolving industry or market, it's very hard to ground your valuation in a set point like today or a trailing number." Bard says it's better to look at the growth of their revenue and user base.

Over the past three years, LinkedIn's revenue has almost tripled, to $243 million in 2010.

For the first quarter of 2011, its revenue was $94 million, versus $44.7 million the same period last year.

Its user base has grown from 32 million registered members in 2008 to 102 million today, but the company notes in its offering document that its actual number of members is lower because some registered members are dead, have multiple registrations or signed up under fake names.

How it operates

LinkedIn is like Facebook for professionals. Members can set up a page for free, where they can post their occupation, career history and business activities. They can update their page when they change jobs or attend a conference. They can invite others into their network and use it to keep track of business contacts, develop sales leads and recruit employees.

LinkedIn "leverages its network" (makes money off its members) by:

-- Selling advertising. Advertising generated 30 percent of LinkedIn revenue in the first quarter, down from 33 percent in 2008.

-- Selling premium subscriptions. These let users get additional information about members, contact people outside their networks and post job openings. This segment accounts for 21 percent of revenue, down from 45 percent in 2008.

-- Selling hiring services, mainly to corporate and agency headhunters. This helps them find and contact people, including "passive candidates" who are not actively looking for a job.

These might include some services premium subscribers get, plus others such as the "ability to search and view every profile on our network ... using keywords found anywhere in a member's profile, such as schools attended and languages spoken ..." the company says. This accounts for 49 percent of revenue, up from 22 percent in 2008.

'Valuable tool'

Dan Stumpf, a senior corporate recruiter with McKesson, says LinkedIn "has been a very valuable tool in our arsenal," especially when it comes to seeking out passive candidates.

Under the old model, he says, you post a job opening, "then you sit back and are deluged with resumes. Most are not qualified or they are way overqualified. This lets us be a little more targeted with our time."

Stumpf adds that services are improving. "Each month, there is a new feature where I can filter out and search for people."

Back to the future?

To believe in LinkedIn as an investment, you also have to look at where it's going, not where it is, says David Menlow, president of IPOfinancial .com.

"The variable is going to be the technology transition of their existing platforms. LinkedIn is not going to be the same company three, four, six months from now that it is today," he says. "Valuations will only become a critical component for assessing the investment potential once the adrenaline wears off."

If you think this sounds reminiscent of the dot-com bubble, you're not alone.

Fred Hickey, author of the High Tech Strategist newsletter, says that in the late 1990s, investors sold good stocks to buy technology and telecom stocks with no earnings.

Big stocks languish

"Here we go again. People are willing to buy (social-networking companies) but all the big stocks are languishing. Even Google. Google beat earnings last quarter. But there's no interest in Google because it doesn't have a story. It's tainted. You need a fresh, clean stock like a LinkedIn."

Hickey says that trading today is dominated by quantitative investors who "don't care about fundamentals. What they care about is whether the stock is going to go higher. Do they think they can sell it to a greater fool? Yes they do."

Others say it's unfair to compare today's market to the late 1990s.

"We are light years away from the valuations we saw in the dot-com era," Bard says.

Back then, companies were going public with market values that were 100 to 200 times their sales.

"These companies coming to market now already have a very impressive set of financial results," Bard says.

Fewer IPOs

Menlow notes that "there are not the vast number of offerings 0now that we had in the 1990s."

Even Hickey doubts the market will get as crazy as it was in the dot-com era because "that pool of pretty darn stupid people is smaller," he says. "That's going to put some limit on this."

Investors are already giving these stocks a short leash. Renren, the Chinese social-networking company that went public this month, soared on its first day of trading but since has fallen below its initial offering price. FriendFinder Networks, a small U.S. social-networking company that went public at $10 per share this month closed at $7.66 Friday.

Most experts think LinkedIn will fare better, given its commanding position in the online professional-networking business. A big risk is that Facebook, or a company leveraging Facebook's network, could usurp LinkedIn.

Cheryl Rhody, a managing director with the Mergis Group corporate recruiting firm, doesn't think so. "People want their business and personal lives separate," she says. "People are loving that (Facebook and LinkedIn) are different companies."

Another thing potential investors should know is that though LinkedIn wants your money, it doesn't want you to have a say in the company. Like Google and some media companies, it has adopted a dual-class structure under which shares sold to the public will have one-tenth the voting power of shares held by pre-IPO investors.
_______________

LinkedIn

Business: Online network for professionals

Headquarters: Mountain View

CEO: Jeffrey Weiner, 41

Employees: 1,288

2010 results: $15.4 million in income on $243 million in revenue.

IPO: Plans to sell 7.8 million to 9 million shares of Class A stock at $32 to $35 each, raising up to $315.6 million.

Shares outstanding: After IPO, will have 7.8 million to 9 million Class A shares owned by the public and 86.7 million Class B shares owned by original shareholders.

Voting disparity: Class A stock gets one vote per share; class B gets 10 votes per share, giving those holding class B shares 99.1 percent of the company's voting power.

Market value: $3.3 billion at an IPO price of $35.

Net Worth runs Tuesdays, Thursdays and Sundays. E-mail Kathleen Pender at kpender@sfchronicle.com.

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/16/2011 12:16:43 PM
From: Glenn Petersen1 Recommendation  Respond to of 272
 
Here Are The Top 10 Reasons Why I'm Going To Load The Boat On LinkedIn's IPO

By Inside Man
Business Insider
May 16, 2011, 10:31 AM

In this post, an anonymous institutional money manager explains why he plans to buy LinkedIn's (LNKD) stock when the company goes public and why he thinks other investors should buy it, too.

The Bottom Line

Since most of you won't have the time or inclination to read the full post below, the main take away is that the upcoming IPO of LinkedIn is a unique opportunity for investors to own a truly special and rare Internet company.

LinkedIn is a market leader with reinforcing network effects in a huge, underpenetrated market. It is experiencing rarely seen levels of growth, and is steered by experienced management and a well-respected board. Most of you will agree with these points, but may get hung up on valuation – my recommendation is to look through the near term estimates that are likely too low anyway and invest in one of the next platform plays on the Internet.

Top 10 Reasons Why You Should Buy this IPO

1. The Company Has a Track Record of Success — One of the things that separates this company (and many Internet IPOs lately) is the proven track record – this is in stark contrast to many of the “dot com busts” in 2000, who had little proven merit. Starting with the LinkedIn’s vision of “creating economic opportunity for every professional in the world,” the company has set an ambitious goal. Amazingly though, the company has been executing against that goal, building a registered user base of over 100m, up from just 32m in 2008, for an ~80% compounded growth rate (CAGR):

Registered Members (m)



However, some could be skeptical about this growth, questioning how truly active these members are. Interestingly though, Unique Visitors are up over 60% over the last 5 quarters, and pageviews per member per month, have risen ~25% to 23. While some of this increase in PVs is from recruiters, the members are clearly becoming more active. Moreover, I think the new products that LinkedIn is working on are designed to increase the activity of members on the site in the future.

PageViews per Registered Member per Month



Moreover, this large growing community has attracted the attention of paying corporate customers, who have grown even faster (~130% since 2008) to over 4.8m.

Growth of Corporate Customers



The success LinkedIn is seeing in these metrics, manifests in its financials (which I do into more detail below), further differentiating from the 2000 dot com busts.

2. A True Network Effect Business is Rare — Many companies claim to have a network effect (the idea that the larger the business becomes, the more valuable it becomes to new customers / members). LinkedIn truly becomes more valuable to members the bigger it gets, as it provides more networking opportunities. Moreover, for recruiters, the larger the talent pool is, the more valuable LinkedIn becomes for finding potential job candidates.

Finally, the more recruiters that are on the site patrolling for job vacancy candidates, the more likely a member is to be discovered and find their next dream job. This cycle just continues to feed on itself, forming a very strong barrier to competitors. (i.e. think eBay’ s vast seller & buyer network effect).

3. Linked Becoming a True Platform – I think that much like Facebook and Twitter have built platforms on which others can develop, LinkedIn is also creating a platform where their data can be accessed by 3rd Parties via APIs. This harnesses the “wisdom of crowds” and the vast creativity that one company could never produce. It makes LinkedIn’s data the centerpiece of the Internet’s professional graph and makes LinkedIn ubiquitous. While the monetization and impact to the financials is hard to fully gauge at this point, like most platform stories, the platform manifests its value in the financials eventually - this clearly positions LinkedIn well for the long term. Platform companies are valuable – and rare.

4. The Market Opportunity is Tremendous and Underpenetrated – One of the great things about investing in Internet companies is that the target markets can be tremendous and relatively nascent online. LinkedIn’s market is no exception. IDC estimates the worldwide talent acquisition market as $85b vs. LinkedIn’s 2010 revenues of ~$240m. To hone the market opportunity further, the “hiring solutions market” was $27b in 2010, making LinkedIn’s ENTIRE 2010 revenue base <1%. What’s more enticing is that only ~$100m of LinkedIn’s revenues was from “Hiring Solutions”, so the penetration of the market is much less. Even if one looks at 100% of LinkedIn’s revenues in 2014 growing to ~ $1b, that would still be less than 4% of the market – the point here is that there is a lot of room for LinkedIn to grow. With over 640m people in the worldwide professional labor force and over 3b in the total worldwide labor force, there is also still a lot of room to grow LinkedIn’s membership base further too.

5. Large Barriers to Entry Create a Competitive Advantage – While this point relates to the first three points pretty closely, it is worth emphasizing. The established success of the company, combined with the network effects of the business, and the platform nature of the it make it very difficult for a competitor to steal share. The size will remain attractive to recruiters and leave less of a budget to help support smaller upstart competition.

Facebook and Google have the size and can try to penetrate the “professional graph” but it is not at their core. While Facebook may have cornered the “social graph” on the Internet, I think LinkedIn is clearly a leader in the “professional graph” – further, I don’t think it would be easy for Facebook to spread its social graph dominance into the “professional graph,” as people general want to separate their close friends and family from work colleagues – each group of people should see different information. Smaller, focused sites (i.e. Dice.com for technology jobs) can co-exist due to their hyper specialization, but longer term these sites have to keep an eye on what further products / abilities LinkedIn creates.

6. Top Notch Leadership & Well Respected Board – While many investors will look at the quality of a management team, I think the board quality can be just as important. LinkedIn happens to have high quality in both areas. On the management side, the team is led by CEO Jeff Weiner who earned a strong reputation at Yahoo!, where he worked for 7 years until 2008. Complementing Jeff is CFO Steven Sordello, who has earned a strong reputation as CFO of two public companies: Ask Jeeves and TiVo. The very strong board complements the management team, led by Chairman / Cofounder Reid Hoffman who was also the CEO from 2003-2007 and an EVP at PayPal. Also on the board is well-respected VC partner Mike Moritz (Sequoia), who has been on the boards of Google, Yahoo!, Zappos and is currently on the board of Green Dot.

The rest of the board is very strong as well with the former CEO of Ask Jeeves (Skip Battle), CMO of Netflix (Leslie Kilgore) and respected VCs Greylock and TCV. It’s this leadership that is deciding to build LinkedIn for the long term, investing in the near term against the tremendous long term opportunity – I like that they are focusing on maximizing the long term value, and not feeling pressured to juice near term financials for Wall Street.

7. The Product is Better – It’s more Economical for Recruiting Clients - Not only do I see value in the core of the product (creating a networking base for members), but I also think that LinkedIn provides a more economic means for corporate clients to find job candidates. For example, the average package for a company looking to find a candidate to fill a job opening is $8000 / yr. That compares to the typical 25% of the candidate’s base salary fee that’s usually paid to recruiters (or $25,000 on a $100,000 salary). So a large corporation can use the site to not only fill 1 job opening cheaper, but also it can fill multiple job openings, all for the $8000 fee. That’s a powerful cost savings and likely a large reason behind the explosive clients growth – it’s simply a good product.

8. Very Few “Warnings” in the S-1 — The document that the company files to do its IPO is called an S-1. This is where all the financial information and discussion of the business resides. Moreover, it’s where the company has to disclose as many warnings about its business as possible (i.e. this is where it points out every potential pitfall to protect itself later should something go wrong). For example, when Demand Media filed its S-1 for its IPO, one of the first warnings, was that it was susceptible to any changes by Google’s algorithm – we’ve recently seen how Google’s “panda” algorithm change has hurt Demand Media’s traffic. But what struck me in reading the LinkedIn warnings (officially dubbed “risk factors”), were the lack of any really significant issues. Don’t get me wrong, there were many boilerplate risk factors (short operating history, stock could be volatile, susceptible to cyber attacks, etc), but there wasn’t anything unusual to worry about. This is fantastic for investors, as this is where the company really tries to stress all that could go wrong to protect itself later.

9. Tremendous Financials - All of the points I’ve made above would be mute, without the support of strong financials. LinkedIn should grow revenue >70% this year, with a compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) of >50% through 2013. This should put the company ~ $1b in revenue by 2014. One of the great things about this revenue is that it’s highly visible, as customers commit to yearlong packages. Hiring solutions should represent > 50% of revenues this year, growing over 130%; but the other two segments (Marketing Solutions and Premium Subscriptions) are growing >70% and 50% respectively. International growth is fueling a lot of this but it still represents a large opportunity as International was only 27% of revenues in 2010. Coupled with this strong revenue growth is the long-term margin expansion – currently LinkedIn’s EBITDA (think of as cash operating profit) is only in the mid single digits, as the company is investing for the future (i.e. infrastructure, increased sales people).

Side Note: One point I want to make here is the “Fred Wilson marketing point.” If you’ve followed the Internet sector lately, prominent Union Square VC partner Fred Wilson implied that the best companies don’t need to spend as much on marketing as companies with inferior products (I’m paraphrasing). I agree with this to an extent, as great products tend to get “free” viral marketing. LinkedIn’s near term investments in Sales & Marketing, are not being spent on advertising, but more on ramping the sales force. I believe LinkedIn is a great example of Fred’s point, as it too benefits from the free viral marketing of its product.

After this year, margins should start to grow, hitting mid teens next year and ~20% by 2013 – longer term EBITDA margins should grow north of 30%. This margin expansion means that profits are growing faster than revenues – a great thing for the company and investors. Free Cash Flow (cash flow from operations – capital expenditures) should be near flat this year, as the company invests aggressively. However, as the company spends more at normalized levels, free cash flow should approach $100 in 2013. This metric should grow even faster than EBITDA, as capex reduces to normalized levels of 8% of revenues over time.

Lastly, the company will have a very clean balance sheet as it starts its public life – the company will have no debt and ~ $300m of cash. It can use this cash for further investments, acquisitions, or for a rainy day should the economy turn sour for a while. Once again, this is a great place for the company to be as it gives it cushion, as well as options.

10. Valuation is More Reasonable Then First Glance - Taking the high end of the offering range ($32-35 per share), LNKD appears to have an Enterprise Value of ~$3.5b and can be viewed as richly valued at 45x next year’s EBITDA and 240x next year’s earnings. However, we’ve seen these platform / network effect / hyper growth companies before (this reminds me of OpenTable’s IPO). These types of companies are ones that investors are willing to pay a premium for, and the better way to look at them is to look out a few years and compare the multiples to the growth.

To account for the rapid growth, we need to look out a few years and see where earnings can be to derive a target for the stock in a few years. It seems that the industry expects the company to generate over $950m in revenues, EBITDA margins near 25%, and EPS of > $1 of EPS in 2014. However, I think these estimates may prove conservative, as a company typically gives guidance to its bankers that it feels is readily achievable (so it is more likely to beat Street estimates).

Hence, I think that the company can probably do over $1b in revenues in 2014, likely still growing >20% for $1.2b in revenues for 2015. At a 27% margin (the company said long term margins should be > 30%), that would equate to ~$325m of EBITDA, EPS > $1.60 and FCF >$210m. Quality Software as a Service (SaaS) companies like Salesforce or Concur can trade anywhere from 5-7x forward sales. So with $1.2b in revenues in 2015, a 6x multiple would imply an Enterprise value of $7.2b in 2014 - adding in the cash and cash flow over that time and that would be a over an $8b equity value for >$80 a share 3 years from now. That would imply over 125% return from the IPO if done at $35. Similarly, applying a 50x forward PE multiple (reasonable as EPS should still be growing 50%+ at that point) to the EPS of $1.60 in 2015 would imply a target >$80 a share. Applying a similar free cash flow multiple would also support this level. Lastly, the top SaaS names can warrant a forward EBITDA multiple of 20-30x. Applying a 25x forward multiple would also derive a stock greater than $80 in 2014.

How Big can LinkedIn Be? I think the most difficult part for investors will trying to sketch “how big LinkedIn can be?” As I mentioned above, the market for Hiring Solutions is almost $30b Is it reasonable that 20% is online over time (ecommerce expected to get up to 20% over time). That’s a $6b online hiring solutions market online. If LinkedIn establishes itself as the pre-imminent player in the space, it’s reasonable to think it could be a third of the online market or $2b of revenue from Hiring Solutions alone.

Next, layer on top of that the Talent Based Advertising market, which LinkedIn cites as $25b currently. Should 20% migrate online as well for another $5b target opportunity? Maybe LinkedIn takes 20% of that market for another $1b revenue opportunity? Together, that implies LinkedIn could reach $3b in revenues – at a 35% EBITDA margin that would be over $1b in EBITDA and $600m in earnings (40% tax rate) or $6 share. SaaS companies trade anywhere from 30-60x forward earnings. Since LinkedIn would be more likely more mature at this point, if we applied the low end of the range (30x multiple), that would imply a $180 stock. To be clear, I’m not saying this is where the stock should be immediately after the IPO, but I’m merely sketching the potential for the company should it continue to execute.

Summarizing. It’s hard to argue that LinkedIn is a unique company with strong leadership that is executing against a large opportunity. I think many investors will agree with that but will struggle with trying to figure out the right valuation. While the IPO may look expensive on short term numbers, I think by looking a little more long term, investors will appreciate what valuation LinkedIn could grow into. Lastly, investors should take note that not one of the 3 largest VCs are selling any shares (and management is barely selling any either) – it would appear as if they may agree with me.

May the markets always move your way, - Buyside Insider

(I can be reached via Henry Blodget, if needed)

tinyurl.com



To: stockman_scott who wrote (29)5/16/2011 2:18:02 PM
From: Glenn Petersen  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 272
 
LinkedIn's primary competitor postpones its IPO plans:

Social network Viadeo shelves IPO plan

By Leila Abboud and Marie Mawad

PARIS | Mon May 16, 2011 12:24pm EDT

PARIS (Reuters) - Viadeo, the world's second-biggest social network for professionals behind LinkedIn, is deferring a plan to go public, preferring instead to focus on growth in emerging markets, its chief executive said.

The French group had been mulling an initial public offering (IPO) in Europe, the United States or Hong Kong in a bid to surf on a wave of investor interest in technology start-ups that has sent valuations sky-rocketing in recent months.

Chief Executive Dan Serfaty told the Reuters Global Technology Summit that Viadeo could revisit the question of going public in about 18-24 months.

"We saw a tremendous level of interest by bankers, private equity investors and venture capitalists," said Serfaty. "But we decided that our fundamentals were good enough that we could wait for a listing and instead focus on growing the business."

LinkedIn will launch its IPO on Thursday in what is widely seen as a test of investor hunger for shares in hot social media start-ups. It hopes to raise around $150 million to further its product expansion, hiring and acquisitions.

Last week, Renren Inc (RENN.N), one of China's biggest social networking companies, rose 29 percent in its debut on the New York Stock Exchange.

Viadeo's decision not to do an IPO could bolster the view held by some investors that the valuations of Internet companies are hitting a ceiling.

They worry that social media sites like Facebook and Twitter, group-buying site Groupon and social gaming company Zynga cannot grow fast enough to keep pace with their valuations, and that the frenzy is another bubble akin to the late 1990s.

Viadeo's Serfaty said the "euphoria" among investors was causing valuations to climb far more quickly than the fundamentals of the businesses often justified.

Serfaty added that bankers he had met with in the U.S. attributed much higher valuations than those of European investment houses.

"We are in an IPO frenzy in the U.S. and at some point it will hit its limit," he said.


After several months of examining its IPO options, Serfaty decided against a flotation because he worried that such a move would hamper the company's ability to invest heavily in emerging markets in Asia and Latin America in the coming years.

"We want to grow and not be faced with the pressure to deliver profitability right away," he said. "There is a risk of going public too early."

Viadeo, which says it has more than 35 million users, is seeking to position itself as the more international cousin of LinkedIn, with its users coming from Europe, China, India and Latin America.

Serfaty added that there was so much money available from private equity and venture capitalists that even if the company needed funds to fuel its expansion, it could collect them easily without going public.

LinkedIn, which says it has more than 100 million users, focused in the U.S., has set a price range for its IPO that values it at $3 billion or around 12 times 2010 sales.

In comparison, search engine giants Google (GOOG.O) and Yahoo (YHOO.O) are valued at 6 and 3.5 times 2010 sales respectively.

Both LinkedIn and Viadeo have business models focused on free initial access for users to post their resumes, followed by paid access for premium users. The sites also sell advertisements to generate revenue.

(Editing by James Regan)

tinyurl.com