To: Grommit who wrote (43732 ) 8/5/2011 6:07:02 PM From: E_K_S Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 78702 Re: Ashford Hospitality Trust Inc. (AHT) I have a few observations. First typical of a lot of these REITs they carry a lot of leverage debt. In their case it's about 5:1 (equity/debt) which seems a bit high for me. Of course their loans are collateralized by their Hotel assets and if in general one considers them under valued that that is part of the value proposition. Another item that caught my attention are the two tranches of debt that need to be rolled over : From their conference call:"...Looking at upcoming debt maturities, the next key date is December 2011, when a $203 million loan comes due followed by May 2012, when $167 million loan matures. We are continuing to negotiate with several lenders and servicers on restructuring solutions and will pursue actions we believe are most accretive to our shareholders...." That's a total of $307M in the upcoming 10 months. Management was not too clear about their strategy for this debt (issue a new preferred series), issue common shares (probable not share price too low) or refinance w/ senior loans. Preferreds are paying 9% for capital which is at the high end.San Diego hotels feeling less financial distress signonsandiego.com Note: According to the article lenders rather renegotiate loans than foreclose. From the article:"...the number of lender-owned hotels rose from 6 to 20, although only one hotel -- the 141-room Lake San Marcos Resort -- was foreclosed on during the second quarter, said Alan Reay, owner of Atlas Hospitality. Rather than foreclose on hotels whose owners have been unable to make payments on mortgages financed when the economy was stronger and real estate values were much higher, lenders have been more willing to re-work the loans or sell them, Reay explained. "In terms of distress, we're starting to see it taper off, and that’s because of the improving economy," he said. "Also, a lot of lenders are choosing to sell their hotel loans, and the buyers (of those loans) are either working out new arrangements with the borrowers or offering a discount on the loan, and the borrowers are paying them off. "In still other cases, investors have come in and basically re-worked the loans with the borrowers and taken them out of default." Finally I am a bit skeptical of their " peer acquisition cost" of over $300K they state in their conference call. "...We were able to obtain these 28 luxury upper-upscale and upscale hotels for $158,000, per key, a 44% discounts replacement cost. This represents a 47% discount to recent peer acquisitions at an average of over $300,000 per key. From an operational standpoint this portfolio continues to demonstrate improved performance for those 11 hotels, the 28 in the portfolio that are brand or third-party managed....". They got a very good price per unit at $158K/unit but I think their peer acquisition number is high at $300K. They probably got a pretty good deal especially if they are "luxury" units located at a high end hotel property. Bloomberg recently reported that hotel foreclosures were up significantly in the last 6 months (at least in CA) and the average acquisition price was $192K/unit. California Hotel Foreclosures Jump 91% as Lenders Seek to Sell Properties By Nadja Brandt - Aug 2, 2011 2:26 PM PT bloomberg.com From the article:"...The average U.S. hotel purchase price climbed to $192,479 a room in the second quarter, up more than 25 percent from 2006, during the property boom, according to Real Capital Analytics Inc. Values are being driven up this year by a surge in luxury- hotel transactions, the New York-based research company said....". ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Lots of insider selling through automatic sales w/o any new buys. I guess management receives a lot of stock (and/or options) as part of their compensation. Your conclusion regarding the non-cash expenses seem to appear correct; however their interest rate swaps are deemed necessary because of their large amount of debt and is an expense incurred every time they change their debt profile , and the convertible preferred converted to common shares would result in common share dilution too. The conversion provision may have hosed one of their largest insiders SECURITY CAPITAL PREFERRED GROWTH INC resulting in the assignment of common shares at an average price of $11.80/share. Hopefully they sold all of these high price share shares in May-Aug. Based on today's closing price of $8.14/share, there s/b enough of a floor value to offer downside protection with a possible upside back to $11.80/share where SECURITY CAPITAL PREFERRED GROWTH INC was assigned their shares in May 2011 (just under 2M shares) OR $12.50/share where the company priced their recent public offering of 7 million shares June 2011. Therefore, the upside could provide for a 45% -55% gain if the stock just gets back to these recent levels. That's a pretty good risk/reward and the dividend is a bonus. Seems like you found a good value opportunity but watch the news closely on the status of their debt refinancing. I suspect the lender(s) will come around and restructure their current loan(s) providing for a longer term, ok interest rates and new covenants providing for their payoff (or pay down to a set loan/Value ratio) on the future sale of any of their properties. EKS