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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: DuckTapeSunroof who wrote (48929)	1/10/2012 6:34:37 PM
From: TimF	Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 71588

Most of them modeled themselves after our Great Depression Glass-Steagall law. Not true. Many of them (significantly Germany, the largest European economy) allowed unified banks. The UK (perhaps the biggest financial player in Europe) allowed deposit taking banks to own investment banks (they've discussed imposing a glass-steagal type restriction against this, but it didn't go in to effect) Outside of Europe Canada had no Glass-Steagal equivalent, and since the mid-80s (until recently) have promoted a light touch on regulation of financial institutions. --------------- It seems clear that if GLB was the problem, the crisis would have been expected to have originated in Europe where they never had Glass-Steagall requirements to begin with. Also, the financial firms that failed in this crisis, like Lehman, were the least diversified and the ones that survived, like J.P. Morgan, were the most diversified. Moreover, GLB didn't deregulate anything. It established the Federal Reserve as a superregulator, overseeing all Financial Services Holding Companies. All activities of financial institutions continued to be regulated on a functional basis by the regulators that had regulated those activities prior to GLB. online.wsj.com --------------- ...But a significant academic literature has investigated these claims and rejected them. Eugene White, for example, found that national banks with security affiliates were much less likely to fail than banks without affiliates. Randall Kroszner (now at the Fed.) and Raghuram Rajan found that (jstor) securities issued by unified banks were (ex-post) of higher quality that those issued by investment banks. A powerful book by George Benston went through the entire Pecora hearings which supposedly revealed the problems with unified banking and found them to be a complete sham. My colleague, Carlos Ramirez later showed that the separation of commercial and investment banking increased the cost of external finance (jstor). Finally, my own work (pdf) unearthed the real reasons for the separation in a titanic battle between the Morgans and Rockefellers. Thus, the history of banking before Glass-Steagall and now our recent experience after is consistent, generally speaking unified banking is safer and repeal was a good idea. marginalrevolution.com