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Non-Tech : The Brazil Board -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: THE ANT who wrote (1033)7/5/2012 2:19:54 PM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 2504
 
We're stopping being the last fat xmas turkey.

While mentioning the ongoing structural changes in the economy of the country he quoted interest rate reduction and the mix of macroeconomic policy formed by fiscal policy and inflation under control.
According to him, this new structure is making Brazil a pole of attraction for productive investment and no longer a destination of speculative capital.

Ao mencionar que mudanças estruturais em curso na economia do país ele citou redução da taxa de juros e o mix de política macroeconômica formada pela política fiscal e inflação sobre controle. Segundo ele, essa nova estrutura está tornando o Brasil um pólo de atração de investimentos produtivos e não mais um destino de capital especulativo. "Estamos deixando de ser o último peru gordo do Natal", comentou.
economia.uol.com.br

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To: THE ANT who wrote (1033)7/7/2012 1:47:46 PM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 2504
 
Tombini must be laughing all the way to the (central) bank. The decision of Brazil’s central bank to start hacking away at inerest rates back in August last year seemed a little mad at the time. At that point, none of the other major emerging markets were embarking on such dramatic easing cycles and the economic data did not seem to justify the dovish policy.

However, with the worsening of the international scenario since, Tombini has been proved either right or very lucky. Further justification for the current easing cycle came in the form of June’s inflation data on Friday, which showed the monthly rate had fallen to the lowest level since August 2010.

The country’s benchmark IPCA consumer price index rose only 0.08 per cent in June, while annual inflation was recorded at 4.9 per cent.

To be fair, Tombini did have some help from Guido Mantega over at the Finance Ministry. Tax cuts for the car industry announced in May, caused a near 5.5 per cent drop in new car prices, helping to bring down the wider index.

However, fuel and electricity prices also fell and some of the previously “hottest” categories such as clothing and education showed little change.

Economists see the central bank cutting interest rates by 50 basis points next Wednesday, but if we keep getting data like this it seems the easing cycle could last well over a year.

This from Alberto Ramos at Goldman Sachs:

The inflation curve seems finally to have started to turn down as inertial forces and demand-pull pressures are weakening given the underperformance of the economy since 2Q2011. Our own computation of annualized monthly seasonally adjusted inflation measures and inflation generalization indices shows a break in headline and core inflation momentum and generalization pressures over the last couple of months.

The improvement in the short-term inflation outlook (including among the most rigid components), the sluggish pace of real activity, and a still very uncertain and risky global backdrop are likely to encourage the central bank to continue to ease in the months ahead and the government to deliver additional fiscal and quasi-fiscal stimulus to the economy. Furthermore, if the economy fails to respond and the external backdrop deteriorates, we would not rule out the possibility that the government could formally announce a reduction in the primary fiscal surplus target (currently at 3.1% of GDP).

blogs.ft.com



To: THE ANT who wrote (1033)7/24/2012 10:29:11 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 2504
 
Historically, it used to be developing countries whose dysfunctional political systems produced pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Almost all of them showed a positivew correlation between government spending and the business cycle from 1960 to 1999. But things have changed. About a third of emerging-market countries’ governments – including authorities in China, Chile, Malaysia, South Korea, Botswana, and Indonesia – managed to reverse the historical correlation. They took advantage of the 2003-2007 boom to strengthen their budget positions, saving up for a rainy day. They were thus in a good position to use fiscal stimulus when the global recession hit them in 2008-2009.

In fact, a majority of the governments that have pursued countercyclical fiscal policies since 2000 are in emerging-market or developing countries. They figured out how to achieve countercyclical fiscal policy during precisely the decade when so many politicians in “advanced countries” forgot..

The First World’s Fiscal Follies

CAMBRIDGE – The world’s advanced economies remain divided over whether to strengthen budget balances in the short term or to use fiscal policy to promote recovery. Those worried about the short-run contractionary effects on the economy call the first option “austerity”; those concerned about long-term sustainability and moral hazard call it “discipline.”
ther way, the debate is akin to asking whether it is better for a driver to turn left or right; depending on where the car is, either choice might be appropriate. Likewise, when an economy is booming, the government should run a budget surplus; when it is in recession, the government should run a deficit. CommentsView/Create comment on this paragraph

To be sure, Keynesian macroeconomic policy lost its luster mainly because politicians often failed to time countercyclical fiscal policy – “fine tuning” – properly. Sometimes fiscal stimulus would kick in after the recession was already over. But that is no reason to follow a destabilizing pro-cyclical fiscal policy, which piles spending increases and tax cuts on top of booms, and cuts spending and raises taxes in response to downturns.

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Pro-cyclical fiscal policy worsens the dangers of overheating, inflation, and asset bubbles during booms, and exacerbates output and employment losses during recessions, thereby magnifying the swings of the business cycle. Yet many politicians in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the eurozone seem to live by it. They argue against fiscal discipline when the economy is strong, only to become deficit hawks when the economy is weak.

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Consider the positions taken over the last three decades by some American politicians.

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In his 1980 campaign and again in 1981, a period of recessions, President Ronald Reagan urged immediate action to reduce the national debt.

In 1988, however, as the economy approached the peak of the business cycle, candidate George H.W. Bush was unconcerned about budget deficits, even though the national debt was rapidly approaching three times the level that it had been under Reagan. “Read my lips: no new taxes,” Bush famously declared.

Predictably, Bush and the US Congress finally summoned the political will to raise taxes and rein in spending growth at precisely the wrong moment – in 1990, just as the US was entering a recession. Although the timing of the legislation was poor, the action was courageous: pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) budgeting rules and other reforms deflected government finances back onto a path that eliminated the budget deficit by the end of the decade.

But, three years later – at the start of the most robust recovery in American history – all Republican congressmen voted against President Bill Clinton’s 1993 legislation to maintain Bush’s spending caps, PAYGO, and tax increases. Even after seven years of strong growth, at the peak of the business cycle in 2000, with unemployment at record lows, George W. Bush based his 2000 campaign on a platform of large tax cuts.

After recovery from the 2001 recession had gotten underway, and the inherited budget surpluses had nonetheless turned to record deficits, the Bush administration pushed through a second round of tax cuts in 2003, and maintained a rate of spending growth that was triple the rate under Clinton. As Vice President Richard Cheney put it, “Reagan proved that deficits don’t matter.”

These policies were maintained for another five years, as another $4 trillion was added to the national debt. Predictably, when the worst recession since the Great Depression hit in 2007-2009, politicians were reluctant to launch an adequate fiscal response, owing to the huge deficits and debts that the government had already been running.

Republicans suddenly re-discovered the evil of budget deficits. They opposed Obama’s initial fiscal stimulus in February 2009, and succeeded in blocking further efforts when its effects petered out two years later. In my view, the government spending cutbacks of the last two years are the most important reason why the economic recovery that began in June 2009 subsequently stalled in 2011.

Here, then, are three generations of politicians who favored fiscal expansion during booms (1982-1989, 1992-2000, 2002-2007) and austerity during recessions (1980, 1981, 1990, 2008-09). A similar unfortunate cycle – large fiscal deficits when the economy is already expanding, followed by fiscal contraction in response to a recession – has also been visible in the UK and the eurozone in recent years.

Turning left every time the road goes right, and vice versa, is worse than switching policies randomly.
But the pattern is understandable: when the economy is booming, there is no political support for painful spending cuts or tax increases. There is a hole in the roof, but the sun is shining. Then, when the thunderstorms roll in, sinners suddenly get religion and proclaim the necessity of reforming – just when it is most difficult to fix the problem.

Historically, it used to be developing countries whose dysfunctional political systems produced pro-cyclical fiscal policies. Almost all of them showed a positive correlation between government spending and the business cycle from 1960 to 1999.

But things have changed. About a third of emerging-market countries’ governments – including authorities in China, Chile, Malaysia, South Korea, Botswana, and Indonesia – managed to reverse the historical correlation. They took advantage of the 2003-2007 boom to strengthen their budget positions, saving up for a rainy day. They were thus in a good position to use fiscal stimulus when the global recession hit them in 2008-2009.

In fact, a majority of the governments that have pursued countercyclical fiscal policies since 2000 are in emerging-market or developing countries. They figured out how to achieve countercyclical fiscal policy during precisely the decade when so many politicians in “advanced countries” forgot..