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To: No Mo Mo who wrote (27956)9/17/2012 11:14:50 AM
From: TimF  Respond to of 85487
 
Pretty much the same in both cases.

What the act did was formerly allow firms to be both investment banks and retail banks. It didn't change things as much as is often claimed even in doing this, because before the act you already had both relaxations of the old Glass Steaal law, and ways to work around it.

The reason why FSMA/Gramm–Leach–Bliley gets so much attention is simply because people on the left are so sold on the idea that the financial crisis was all about deregulation and its hard to find examples of significant deregulation leading up to the crisis, so they fixate on this law.



To: No Mo Mo who wrote (27956)9/17/2012 11:17:56 AM
From: TimF1 Recommendation  Respond to of 85487
 
Securitization was not introduced in the 1990s; it was invented in the 1970s and became popular in the 1980s, as chronicled in Liar's Poker. (As an aside, if you haven't read it, you really must. Especially now).

GLB had nothing to do with either lending standards at commercial banks, or leverage ratios at broker-dealers, the two most plausible candidates for regulatory failure here.

Most importantly, commercial banks are not the main problems. If Glass-Steagall's repeal had meaningfully contributed to this crisis, we should see the failures concentrated among megabanks where speculation put deposits at risk. Instead we see the exact opposite: the failures are among either commercial banks with no significant investment arm (Washington Mutual, Countrywide), or standalone investment banks.

meganmcardle.theatlantic.com

(I would say the failures are concentrated in those areas, its not like they where the only failures)

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Given a history like this people wonder how repealing the law could have been a good thing. But a significant academic literature has investigated these claims and rejected them. Eugene White, for example, found that national banks with security affiliates were much less likely to fail than banks without affiliates. Randall Kroszner (now at the Fed.) and Raghuram Rajan found that (jstor) securities issued by unified banks were (ex-post) of higher quality that those issued by investment banks. A powerful book by George Benston went through the entire Pecora hearings which supposedly revealed the problems with unified banking and found them to be a complete sham. My colleague, Carlos Ramirez later showed that the separation of commercial and investment banking increased the cost of external finance (jstor). Finally, my own work (pdf) unearthed the real reasons for the separation in a titanic battle between the Morgans and Rockefellers.

Thus, the history of banking before Glass-Steagall and now our recent experience after is consistent, generally speaking unified banking is safer and repeal was a good idea.

Posted by Alex Tabarrok on September 19, 2008

marginalrevolution.com

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Ferguson on Regulation and Deregulation

Human beings are as good at devising ex post facto explanations for big disasters as they are bad at anticipating those disasters. It is indeed impressive how rapidly the economists who failed to predict this crisis — or predicted the wrong crisis (a dollar crash) — have been able to produce such a satisfying story about its origins. Yes, it was all the fault of deregulation.

There are just three problems with this story. First, deregulation began quite a while ago (the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act was passed in 1980). If deregulation is to blame for the recession that began in December 2007, presumably it should also get some of the credit for the intervening growth. Second, the much greater financial regulation of the 1970s failed to prevent the United States from suffering not only double-digit inflation in that decade but also a recession (between 1973 and 1975) every bit as severe and protracted as the one we’re in now. Third, the continental Europeans — who supposedly have much better-regulated financial sectors than the United States — have even worse problems in their banking sector than we do. The German government likes to wag its finger disapprovingly at the “Anglo Saxon” financial model, but last year average bank leverage was four times higher in Germany than in the United States. Schadenfreude will be in order when the German banking crisis strikes.

Niall Ferguson writing in the NYTimes. Recommended.

Posted by Alex Tabarrok
marginalrevolution.com

...So starting in the late 1970s, state bank regulations were relaxed or eliminated, increasing the efficiency of the banking sector and fostering economic growth. But the move also increased concentration. In 1980, there were 14,434 banks in the United States, about the same number as in 1934. By 1990, this number had dropped to 12,347; by 2000, to 8,315. In 2009, the number stands below 7,100. Most important, the concentration of deposits and lending grew significantly. In 1984, the top five U.S. banks controlled only 9% of the total deposits in the banking sector. By 2001, this percentage had increased to 21%, and by the end of 2008, close to 40%.

The apex of this process was the 1999 passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed the restrictions imposed by Glass-Steagall. Gramm-Leach-Bliley has been wrongly accused of playing a major role in the current financial crisis; in fact, it had little to nothing to do with it. The major institutions that failed or were bailed out in the last two years were pure investment banks — such as Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, and Merrill Lynch — that did not take advantage of the repeal of Glass-Steagall; or they were pure commercial banks, like Wachovia and Washington Mutual. The only exception is Citigroup, which had merged its commercial and investment operations even before the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, thanks to a special exemption...

nationalaffairs.com

Also see
meganmcardle.theatlantic.com


From: TimF1/14/2010 12:17:45 PM
To: Wayners who wrote (24594)Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 78804

Well there is one way which Gramm-Leach-Bliley contributed to the finacial crisis.

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The bill then moved to a joint conference committee to work out the differences between the Senate and House versions. Democrats agreed to support the bill after Republicans agreed to strengthen provisions of the anti-redlining Community Reinvestment Act and address certain privacy concerns; the conference committee then finished its work by the beginning of November.

en.wikipedia.org


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