To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (94712 ) 9/18/2012 6:48:04 AM From: elmatador Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217755 the impact on capital flows by temporary controls is pretty much “zero”. USD will flow com gusto. Brazil-style capital controls have “zero” effect September 18, 2012 7:38 am by Stefan Wagstyl There were ructions in the global financial markets when Brazil announced the start of the “currency wars” in 2010 and responded to monetary easing in the west by imposing capital controls in the form of extra taxes on foreign securities purchases. South Korea, Peru and Thailand followed suit with actions of their own – all designed to cool inflows, calm markets and counter rapid currency appreciation. But did it all have any effect? No, says a report this month from the Brookings Institution. The authors argue that the impact on capital flows, economies and exchange rates of such temporary controls is pretty much “zero”. With the Fed now launching a new round of monetary easing in the shape of QE3 , the debate is anything but academic. In the paper entitled Capital Controls: Gates and Walls , Professor Michael Klein of Tufts University argues that there is a clear difference between “long-standing capital controls” – as employed by China and India – and the temporary “episodic” capital controls that were implemented by Brazil and other countries after the 2008 financial crisis. In a nutshell, long-standing controls are “walls” and short-term ones are “gates”. Walls work and gates don’t. Klein writes: Episodic controls are likely to be less efficacious than long-standing controls for a number of reasons. Evasion is easier in a country that already has experience in international capital markets than in a country that does not have this experience. Countries with long-standing controls are likely to have incurred the sunk costs required to establish an infrastructure of surveillance, reporting and enforcement that makes those controls more effective. Furthermore, countries with pervasive capital controls also tend to have less developed financial markets and, therefore, fewer options for evading capital controls. Finally, …countries with long-standing inflow controls offer fewer routes of evasion since these countries tend to impose controls on a wider set assets than countries with episodic controls. Comparing China and Brazil he says: For example, there is a widespread view that Chinese capital controls are important for the government’s ability to manage the value of the renminbi. Did a policy like the Brazilian [securities tax] temper appreciations a well? The estimates in this paper suggest that the answer is no. There is also a view that countries like China and India, which had long-standing controls in place, were spared the financial upheavals that roiled more open economies. As discussed later in this paper, evidence does not point to the same protection from episodic controls. As Klein writes, the consensus in economic theory has long said that long-standing capital controls hamper economic development. But recent theoretical papers have argued that short-term temporary controls could benefit an economy by controlling financial volatility, especially the ebb and flow of hot money. Even the International Monetary Fund, a long-standing promoter of liberalisation, has in the last few years conceded that short-term controls can have a place in the financial armoury, though only as a last resort. But Klein’s paper questions these views. The core of his work is an analysis of 44 countries with differing financial control regimes ranging from open to closed, which readers can study by following this link . He concludes that long-standing controls on capital inflows do help financial stability, or, has he puts it, “have a significant negative effect on on the growth of variables associated with financial vulnerabilities”. Countries with long-standing controls have higher year-to-year economic growth, although this may be a coincidence as they don’t have a positive effect on longer-run growth. But short-term controls “had essentially zero effect on financial variables and no significant effect on year-to-year GDP growth (with some exceptions for controls on financial credits, equities, and collective instruments). Neither long—standing nor episodic controls are found to have an effect on year-to-year changes in the real exchange rates.” As Klein rightly says: These results are important from a policy perspective. Practical discussion on the desirability of capital controls is about episodic controls because these can be imposed and removed as conditions change. But the results in this section do not show any evidence of the efficacy of these controls. All this matters to policy makers. Supporters of short-term controls, notably Guido Mantega, the Brazilian finance minister, argue that they are useful at times of financial turmoil. But if they don’t work they may be worse than useless. The political controversy that they generate may be distracting policy makers from other, perhaps more effective, approaches.