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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Maurice Winn who wrote (95307)10/7/2012 6:17:48 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 219783
 
am unsure where you picked up on my alleged interest on solar plays as an investment object

if you mean my investment in bekaert, that which as a then monopoly supplied key consumable (sawing wire) to the solar wafer plants, a relatively inexpensive widget to make but indispensable to wafering plants costing hundreds of millions of dollars, yes, bekaert was a sweet-victory play

i play manias and tend to do well by how i play manias - bekaert was a win win win, as in triple win where i stopped when win win

speaking of manias, there is currently a paper mania going on, almost past its best-use-by date, and best played by engaging in what the central banks must eventually engage with, that be gold

unless we can figure out a way to beat the gold imperative, we best be one with gold, and for thrills, also engage with the silver prerogative

i am merely playing the game full-on, all-in, all along the value chain

i mean to chronicle the gold gaming so as to pass wisdom to the next generation, along with whatever platinum i manage to exit the game with

gold gaming is still so very young

obama or romney, the very best rewards are still ahead of us



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (95307)6/4/2021 5:03:02 AM
From: TobagoJack1 Recommendation

Recommended By
marcher

  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 219783
 
Re <<As presciently predicted by me>>

I do not do prescient. I do wild stabbing guesses.

Am guessing that by Team Biden carrying on what Team Obama started, going to war with Team China, shall go into the same history heap.

At some juncture Team America might become aware that to win-win, must cooperate, as opposed to trying to trip up others more determined, organised, and laser-focused. IOW, one ought to pick strong team members, and not hang out with the wrong sort, like-minded or not, for fate of empire at the stake, and no one is paying attention to ideology except GOP / DNC.

I started in the solar industry engagement at its dawning days in China and was well out by Oct 2012 Message 28459018
if you mean my investment in bekaert, that which as a then monopoly supplied key consumable (sawing wire) to the solar wafer plants, a relatively inexpensive widget to make but indispensable to wafering plants costing hundreds of millions of dollars, yes, bekaert was a sweet-victory play
finance.yahoo.com


Now, today, my wild guess is that China shall bifurcate the global semiconductor industry for sure, and if picked on by bad-actors looking for easy responses to diligence and VVV, shall extinguish the other branch of the hard-fork, just as China did w/ solar, and and and

I base my wild guess on earlier wild guesses ...

2008 01 11 I chanced upon the Bekaert opportunity and rolled with it Message 24203532
Purchased a starter but tranche of Bekaert finance.yahoo.com on the Brussels Bourse at Euro 84, intending for a 18+ months hold.
It is a boring old company bekaert.com , conservative, family controlled, existing in an ancient sector - they also make the wires from which shopping carts are made from.
It could be more valuable than the market judges it, because it may be hiding something very extremely good - good enough for a punt.
Drama, mystery, thrills, and an on-going story that I will keep track for you over the next 18 months.


2008 08 19 At the get-go China controlled 80% of thin film but not at all polysilicon based cells value chain and polysilicon manufacturers embargoed China on production knowhow, thus sealing their eventual and joint fate with no survivors - had one broke rank that one would have inherited the world by way of China Message 24858620
as poly silicon needs to be purified, i guess
for thin film solar, china controls 80% of global reserve of indium - that could turn interesting as chips and cells gets ever more popular


2010 09 25 Bekaert did not embargo China. Bekaert engaged Message 26847009
"... BRUSSELS, Sept 21 - Stunning growth in China and expectation-smashing results have propelled shares in steel wire and cord maker Bekaert to all-time highs, but after doubling in the past year has the rally run out of steam?


2010 12 14 Bekaert did well and continues to do well in China, because there is an old Chinese saying, that "when drinking the water, do not forget those who dug the well" Message 27025358
bekaert is the world's largest and globally dominant tirecord maker, and produces mostest in china, and its share price is finance.yahoo.com going through the roof, and not because china is losing the tire fight


2011 04 04 but polysilicon was the way, and polysilicon was embargoed by three oligopolists working as a cabal (USA, Japan and France or some such) Message 27283514
China suppliers should provide plenty of competition to all suppliers elsewhere.
Solar is getting economical. Worked as consultant from 2007-2009 to big upstream consumable supplier to wafer maker. The tech Is on small base, growing fast but still small overall. The various solar techs are duking it out.
To me, Poly silicon based cells for distributed systems are of more merit than thin film, and utility scale solar concentrator tech makes sense for the proverbial long run.


2010 12 14 Bekaert's at the time was solar wafer sawing wire, monopoly supplier, centered around China, deliberately not separated listed, puzzling its tire cord competitors as their margins shrank whereas Bekaert went to the moon. It was all so funny at the time as far as I was concerned Message 27025797
bekaert price was 60 euro in 2005, now split adjusted is 240 euro
almost all china sourced
bekaert cord => china tires => global market
to think team usa can win on tire manufacturing is not realistic - no place to buy the rubber or the steel cord
resistance is futile


2016 12 23 China had to have the polisilicon block making know-how Message 30904215
... i saw during the early 90s how china gold inc tried to joint venture w/ the south african gencor for joint exploitation of suitable rocks by way of bio-leaching, as china had a lot of highly suitable tailings and less suitable low-grade ore.
the south africans decided to 'ring-fence' china and backed out of the proposed venture. team china hired the needed people directly and is now the leading developer and user of bio leaching, which helped china to become the largest gold producer on the planet
... i saw china being ring-fenced on capability to manufacture polysilicon (for solar cell fabrication), and by hiring roving teams of retired expertise and is now ...
... i saw china being denied intel xeon chips in 2015, and in 2016 come up w/ alternative to continue global #1 supercomputer rollout
... i saw ...after awhile even i get it, that continental scale / separate universe / super-heated environment / diligence / learning / studying / organising / saving / investing ... works wonders, and big enough to matter


2017 02 26 when the Trump decided to follow up Obama's failed China tire war w/ a China solar war, I reckoned the outcome would be no different Message 31004384
Solar Squabble Shows How a Trump Trade War With China Could Backfire


2018 04 07 then the outcome for a lot of other stuff Message 31562489
there had always been willing sellers, i.e. Ericsson, Motorola, GE, GM, ...
and there were some unwilling sellers who decided to ring-fence China, i.e. Gencor (bio leaching of gold) of S.Africa, polysilicon players, etc etc
on the whole, the former group did much better than the latter, because China gets what is needed irrespective of willingness to cooperate, because there are always willing sellers, to leverage China scale.


2019 04 11 the solar war progressed about as expected Message 32110721
and w/r to busy, so much too do, productively, per imperatives give rise to solutions, some positive news, but per 'china china china' meme, perhaps the deep-state shall, in addition to the space force, the south china sea strutting around, tee-up the solar patrol, which, by the way, is difficult to do unless allowing trade deficit w/ team china to incline upward, from the lower left to the upper right, that which we can term alt-decline :0)
Chinese solar industry starts to hit grid parity
Breakthrough means photovoltaic sector can compete against coal without subsidies

2020 01 22 Trump achieved less than nothing by waging solar war against China as Obama achieved nothing by waging tire war against China Message 32513893
Trump’s Solar Tariffs Turn 2 Years Old, Blistering an Industry

2020 08 25 Now, at the dawn of semiconductor war, that Team Biden continues what Team Obama started (Intel Xeon chip) and Trump upped by tempo Message 32899523
what happened in other industrial categories (carbon fibre, polysilicon, etc etc) that were formally embargoed w/r to Team China is starting to happen in chips, same protocol, and shall result in some wealthier engineers and scientists who come together as implementation teams, going from enterprise to enterprise, to start production chains
results should be w/i 6-8 years, coincidentally leading into 2026 in time for onward 2032
caixinglobal.com
Over 100 TSMC Engineers Poached by Chinese Mainland Rivals Striving for Chip Leadership



2020 09 14 Solar war went and went Message 32932707
Impact of the U.S. – China trade deal on solar


2020 09 14 Likely solar cooperation would have worked out better Message 32932721
The Solar-Powered Future Is Being Assembled in China
The solar supply chain is punishingly cheap, and Longi dominates it like no one else.


Now, Teams USA and China pivots to semiconductors, and once that front line is breached, teotwawki. Team Biden is doing precisely what Trump and Obama did, expecting a different outcome from tires, Intel Xeon chips, 5G, and solar everything.

I do not know why expectation is different when the protocol remains the same.

No one considers cooperation as such voices are muted. The wrong moves ensure the outcome being exactly the same as in tires, rare earths, polysilicon, solar, whatever.

I am guessing that the Dutch shall lose their market for semiconductor lithography machines, and Taiwan shall lose its crown jewel, chip manufacturing, and none of it would take root in USA.

In the meantime, the world wins big, with almost free solar.

Recommendation, GetGold.
bloomberg.com
How China Beat the U.S. to Become World's Undisputed Solar Champion

China went all in on solar manufacturing and now produces three-quarters of the world’s supply

Jennifer A Dlouhy
4 June 2021, 12:01 GMT+8
For Mayor Tom Hughes and the other politicians gathered to cheer the opening of a $440 million solar panel plant in Hillsboro, Oregon, it was a moment of glory.

The arrival of SolarWorld AG promised to be a turning point for his hometown just west of Portland. “Not just because of SolarWorld itself,” Hughes recalled, “but because of the other companies it would drag along with it to create this silicon-based and solar-based manufacturing cluster in Hillsboro.”

That was in 2008 and solar was on the cusp of becoming one of the fastest-growing sources of energy in a world rattled by warnings of climate change. From the White House to statehouses, U.S. leaders promised that green jobs could not only replace those threatened in the nation’s oilfields and coal mines, but guarantee safer and more stable employment.

Yet across the Pacific, a rapidly growing competitor had also set its sights on dominating solar manufacturing. China, eager to prove the supremacy of its socialist-market model, was mustering government investments that dwarfed the U.S. effort and coupling them with national mandates that forced utilities to use renewable power.

It established an end-to-end supply chain — the country now makes most of the world’s polysilicon, a key material in solar panels — and ignored pleas by environmentalists to close coal plants that supply the cheap electricity needed to make solar equipment. It also kept its labor costs lower than those in most industrial countries and has been willing to prop up unprofitable operations.

The result? Chinese firms now supply three quarters of the world’s solar panels.



An employee inspects photovoltaic modules at a factory in Xi'an, Shaanxi Province, China in 2020.

Photographer: Qilai Shen/Bloomberg

U.S. companies, which 20 years ago made 22% of them, now produce just 1% on American soil, according to Jenny Chase, head of solar analysis at BloombergNEF. At one point there were 75 major solar parts factories in the U.S., a number that was expected to grow as the industry flourished. Most have since been shuttered.

The Hillsboro plant has just joined them, closing its doors after just 13 years.

The industry failed to take root in the U.S. despite billions of dollars in government incentives and nearly two decades of pledges from presidents, starting with George W. Bush, that the nation would be a clean-energy superpower. Even the crushing tariffs imposed by former presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump succeeded mostly in pushing the work out of China and into other Asian countries.

Critics, such as Oregon Senator Ron Wyden, allege that China benefited from unfair trading practices and the use of forced labor in its supply chain — charges the nation rejects and that analysts say is unlikely to have played a significant role in the success of its solar strategy. Rather, China's dominance is a result of Beijing's commitment to corner the market.

“They tried harder than us,” said Sarah Ladislaw, a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “China had a plan and they executed to the plan. They had policies to create supply, they had policies to create demand, and they executed on it.”

U.S. InconsistencyAt the same time, the U.S. dabbled with short-lived incentives and punishing trade barriers that spurred retaliation instead of a manufacturing renaissance. The inconsistent, piecemeal policy of the U.S. was no match for a China-styled “industrial strategy” to dominate solar manufacturing, Ladislaw said. “You can’t take the sum of a bunch of half-hearted measures and hope that it equals a durable outcome.”

For President Joe Biden, who’s made investment in renewable energy a centerpiece of his climate-change initiatives and multitrillion-dollar infrastructure plan, the failed strategies of his predecessors serve as a stark warning: Fulfilling his promise to make climate policy a jobs engine won’t be easy.

Solar SurgePanel-making capacity has soared in China while languishing in the U.S.

Source: BloombergNEF

Note: Chart depicts production capacity for the dominant crystalline silicon solar panel technology, with capacity reflecting the total power rating of panels that can be produced through a year assuming the factories are fully running



And while solar manufacturing never generated a hoped-for bonanza of jobs in the U.S., where employment peaked at about 30,000, the next clean energy contest with China will be more painful to lose. Both nations believe the future will be driven by electric vehicles, and Biden has vowed the U.S. will win the race to build them.

Yet while Detroit is planning an EV makeover, Congress is still bickering over tax credits and whether to pay for charging stations. China, meanwhile, has installed some 800,000 public chargers -- about eight times the number in the U.S. -- and has parlayed a combination of tax incentives, land grants, low-interest loans and other subsidies into becoming the world’s biggest producers of the vehicles for six years running.

Hundreds of companies are building electric vehicles in dozens of specialty manufacturing hubs set up around the country to take advantage of inexpensive semiconductors and batteries — two other industries Beijing has set out to dominate.

The comprehensive strategy, part of China President Xi Jinping’s blueprint to become a manufacturing superpower, echoes the one used to conquer global solar panel manufacturing. China’s victory on solar panels was so thorough that even erstwhile supporters of the U.S. renewable strategy say it’s time to give up the fight and make do with the installation jobs created by the low-cost Chinese equipment.

It’s a bitter pill for Hillsboro and its 106,000 residents. In the early days, Hughes, the former mayor, saw the solar factory as a chance to diversify an area that was so dominated by computer chip manufacturing it had been dubbed the “Silicon Forest.” Job losses at a local Intel Corp. campus underscored the risks of the city’s reliance on the volatile high-tech sector.



A worker inspects a panel at the SunPower facility in Hillsboro, Oregon in 2019.

Photographer: Moriah Ratner/Bloomberg

SolarWorld, in turn, was wooed by the promise of trained silicon workers and a state tax credit that offset 35% of project costs. Local colleges launched programs to train workers in solar manufacturing. Flush with the potential, Hughes began recruiting other manufacturers, even traveling to trade shows in Germany and Spain to pitch solar suppliers on the promise of the Pacific Northwest.

At least a dozen companies drifted through town, “some of whom looked pretty seriously at sites,” Hughes said. But “right about the time they would have been following through on funding, the whole thing fell apart.”

SolarWorld’s U.S.-made panels just couldn’t compete with better and cheaper subsidized options from China. Even the Oregon Convention Center just 18 miles (28.968 kilometers) away opted for Chinese imports.

SolarWorld filed for bankruptcy protection in 2017 and a year later sold the Hillsboro factory to competitor SunPower Corp., which is now shutting the plant.

It wasn’t supposed to be this way.

Obama won election to the White House in 2008 on a promise to create 5 million green jobs -- and a surge of solar projects in the sun-drenched Southwest promised to deliver many of them. When businesses and homes go solar, every panel is “pounded into place by a worker whose job can’t be outsourced,” Obama boasted.

The work was spurred along by a 2005 tax credit that allowed developers to deduct 30% of solar project costs. Although that tax break didn’t require the use of American parts, the Obama administration tried to cultivate a domestic panel-making industry by paring tax bills for clean energy manufacturers, too.



President Obama looks at a solar panel during a tour of the Solyndra facility in Fremont, California in 2010.

Photographer: Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images

The 2009 stimulus package created a separate 30% tax credit to steer $2.3 billion toward more than 180 advanced energy manufacturers, though only eight recipients made solar panels and the incentive program ran out of money after just one year. The Obama administration also funneled seed money to solar companies through a loan guarantee program created under Bush to nurture advanced energy technologies.

The spending looked like it would bear fruit in 2010 when Obama stopped by a solar startup’s new factory in Fremont, California, to extol the industry’s potential.

“Before the Recovery Act, we could build just 5% of the world’s solar panels,” Obama said at that Solyndra LLC. facility. “In the next few years, we’re going to double our share to more than 10%.”

But Solyndra defaulted on its $535 million loan guarantee after almost all of it had been paid out, causing a scandal and casting an enduring pall over the program. The government largely stopped offering loan guarantees through the program by late 2011. And the U.S. didn’t hit Obama’s 10% benchmark.

China was using every tool at its disposal to develop its own solar industry. Local governments offered cheap land and state-backed banks provided friendly financing terms. Beijing also created demand for the products with generous subsidies that helped make the country the world’s largest purchaser of panels.

Flush With Solar FactoriesChina dominates the world in number of panel manufacturing facilities

Source: BloombergNEF



Chinese factories also worked to improve efficiency and reduce costs. For example, they used new tools to slice thinner polysilicon wafers with less waste, producing more solar cells from the same amount of raw material. That innovation has helped lower costs by 80%, making solar as cheap as coal now in many parts of the world.

The surge of cheap panels from China dealt a crushing blow to U.S. manufacturers -- and Solyndra wasn’t the only casualty. After three other U.S. solar manufacturers sought bankruptcy protection, Obama in 2012 slapped duties as high as 249% on the imports. Manufacturers responded by moving operations out of China, but they didn’t head to the U.S. Instead, large manufacturers skirted the U.S. tariffs by building facilities to assemble solar cells and modules across Southeast Asia.

Retaliatory DutiesMaking matters worse, China retaliated by imposing its own duties of up to 57% on imports of U.S.-made polysilicon -- tariffs that crippled U.S. producers of the conductive material used in solar panels.

“It was a disaster for the U.S. brands,” said BloombergNEF solar analyst Xiaoting Wang.

Before the Chinese tariffs, U.S.-made polysilicon had been shipped to the country and used to produce ingots, the next stage of solar cell manufacturing. But the tariffs made American polysilicon too expensive, Wang said, and the U.S. went from making 50% of the world’s polysilicon in 2007 to less than 5% today.

Half the world’s supply of polysilicon now comes from China’s Xinjiang region, where an estimated 1 million ethnic minorities, including Muslim Uyghurs, have been detained in counter-terrorism internment facilities in recent years, according to a panel of United Nations experts. The U.S., U.K., European Union and Canada have imposed sanctions against Chinese officials over alleged human rights abuses of Uyghurs, including accusations that forced labor is being used in Chinese factories. The Biden administration is weighing a ban on the import of some solar products containing polysilicon from the region too.

Beijing denies the human rights charges and has accused foreign governments of using forced labor claims as a way to help their own companies compete against China’s. When the EU issued sanctions earlier this year, China’s foreign ministry said they were “based on nothing but lies and disinformation.”

Even the deployment of solar power in the U.S. -- which was aided by cheap imported parts -- suffered from uncertainty, as the investment tax credit was haltingly extended at least four times and came close to expiring twice.

“It’s been a stop-start policy -- one or two incentives, you build capacity, and then that was it,” said John Smirnow, vice president of market strategy at the Solar Energy Industries Association. “In a very competitive global environment, for U.S. manufacturers to succeed, especially new companies, you need the same broad-based federal investment that other governments are providing their industries.”

Domestic solar panel manufacturing was already dwindling when Trump took office in 2017 with vows to crack down on China and put “America first.” Even though he was no champion of renewable energy, Trump extended his protectionist policies to the solar industry, too, imposing import limits and tariffs as high as 30% on foreign solar cells and photovoltaic panels in 2018.



An employee works at a renewable energy company in Tonglu, Zhejiang province, China in 2020.

Source: AFP/Getty Images

Trump’s tariffs had the potential to help a handful of panel makers stay afloat, but at the expense of wide swaths of the domestic solar power industry. While manufacturers SolarWorld, Suniva Inc. and First Solar Inc. cheered on the tariffs, they were fiercely opposed by renewable power developers and installers who feared climbing panel prices would put them out of business.

The tariffs briefly boosted some U.S. manufacturers, as both SunPower and First Solar increased production. But America’s hunger for solar power meant that imports from Asia climbed anyway, as domestic developers exploited a loopholeto buy foreign-made double-sided panels not subject to the duties. And Trump’s tariffs weren’t enough to save two of their biggest champions, the now-bankrupt Suniva and SolarWorld.

Though there are now some 231,474 solar jobs in the U.S., only 14% of them are involved in manufacturing, with most of those workers building mounting systems, inverters and other components instead of the photovoltaic panels.

The U.S. is far from alone. Other early solar adopters, including Germany, have seen their panel making plummet. “Germany’s once-thriving PV wafer, cell, and module manufacturers are now largely gone,” Ladislaw and other authors said in a February paper. “All have been out-competed and driven into bankruptcy by the rapid cost reductions achieved by foreign firms.”

Undaunted, Biden is promising his climate policies will cultivate U.S. jobs, but it’s not clear they’ll come in the field of solar-panel manufacturing.

Even some beneficiaries of Trump’s tariffs aren't pushing Biden to renew the levies when they expire next February. First Solar, for instance, has advocated a broader industrial strategy to spur domestic panel making.

Biden is trying to encourage renewable manufacturing with his multitrillion-dollar infrastructure package and a plan to revive the lapsed 2005 tax credit worth nearly a third of the cost of factories making solar panels. Buy-America mandates could also be imposed for federally funded solar projects, an idea advanced by several Republican senators.

Solar JobsU.S. manufacturing jobs declined even as panel installing workforce grew

Source: National Solar Jobs Census 2020

Note: Data on operations and maintenance jobs were not collected before 2018



But a few new U.S. panel plants would do little to loosen China’s stranglehold on the rest of the solar supply chain, which extends beyond panels to the polysilicon that is used to make them. China now produces more than 80% of the polysilicon and roughly 98% of two other key components -- wafers and ingots -- that are used in panels worldwide, even those manufactured and assembled in other countries.

Even as he touts climate action as a job creator, Biden seems focused on the potential of other fields.

“There’s no reason the blades for wind turbines can’t be built in Pittsburgh instead of Beijing, no reason why American workers can’t lead the world in the production of electric vehicles and batteries,” Biden told a joint session of Congress earlier this year.

The U.S. still has a shot at innovating the next generation of solar technology, said Julio Friedmann, a senior research scholar at Columbia University’s Center on Global Energy Policy.

“We’re starting to plateau on existing solar technologies, and we need the next generation,” Friedmann said. “That is another opportunity for America to excel, because we have a great innovation system. We have an opportunity to leapfrog to the next generation.”

To avoid the mistakes of the past, solar supporters say future efforts must be big and long-lasting.

“There is a real opportunity to make lasting change to strengthen the industry here at home and create new jobs,” said Wyden, the Democratic senator from Oregon who was at the Hillsboro plant’s opening. “It will take coordinated effort across the government -- on everything from R&D, tougher enforcement of trade laws and reforms to the tax code -- to better incentivize domestic manufacturing, to level the playing field and get the U.S. back in the solar manufacturing game.”

Still, it’s too late for solar workers in Hillsboro, a former farming community whose fortunes were once tied to the price of strawberries and by 2008 had become tethered to the volatile chipmaking industry instead.



Safety hats hang on a door at the manufacturing facility in Hillsboro in 2019.

Photographer: Moriah Ratner/Bloomberg

The region’s economy has managed to diversify despite the loss of the solar plant, though Intel remains one of Oregon’s biggest corporate employers and continues to give the city an occasional scare. Last year, for example, Intel spooked local residents when it reportedly mulled outsourcing some advanced manufacturing to Asia.

“The thing about being a company town is that when Intel sneezes, everybody gets a cold," said Hughes, 77.

The now-retired mayor doesn’t regret the city’s experience with the solar factory and would even open the city gates to another manufacturing upstart.

But he might not try to build an entire strategy around the solar industry. “I suspect I probably wouldn’t do that again,” he confessed, “although it was fun going to all the solar trade shows.”

Before it's here, it's on the Bloomberg Terminal.
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To: Maurice Winn who wrote (95307)6/4/2021 5:34:16 AM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 219783
 
Re <<Car culture ... dimming>>

Perhaps.

In the meantime, cataclysmic struggle shaping up and well underway

Team Germany engaging bloomberg.com "BMW to Build 360,000 EV Charging Sites in China in Green Push"

I think Team Atlantic got some of the lessons wrong

theatlantic.com

The Electric-Car Lesson That China Is Serving Up for America

Beijing’s push to build an entire industry from scratch helps inform how the White House should proceed.

Michael Schuman
May 21, 2021


Qilai Shen / Bloomberg / Drew Angerer / Getty / The Atlantic
Would you drive an electric sedan with a single-charge range of more than 400 miles and automated driving functions, one that costs less than a Tesla Model 3 and, at least according to the manufacturer, can pull off a 2,000-mile road trip along chaotic highways during which the person behind the wheel needed to steer only about once every 60 miles? Those are the advertised specs of the P7, the sleek new model launched last year by China’s hot start-up XPeng.

The Chinese government would certainly be pleased if you did: Another important feature of XPeng cars is ample state support. In the past year, the company has signed deals with investment funds linked to the city of Guangzhou, Xpeng’s hometown, and the surrounding province, Guangdong, worth $700 million. XPeng has also gotten preferential terms on land, low-interest loans and tax breaks, and state subsidies that have helped it reduce the P7’s showroom price.

“The government is actually a lot more open to allow some of the innovative ideas of businesses to … push forward with their research and test their technologies,” Brian Gu, XPeng’s vice chairman, told me.

That’s exactly what worries Washington. Fueled by government largesse, China’s electric-vehicle sector has raced ahead of America’s, sparking fears that the United States has fallen dangerously behind its chief rival in a crucial future industry. China’s “state capitalism” (Beijing prefers “socialism with Chinese characteristics”) is rewriting the rules of how countries and companies compete in the global economy. All governments place their thumb on the scale to favor homegrown firms—recall the Obama administration’s bailout of General Motors—but China bends entire markets to a degree unimaginable in the more laissez-faire U.S. By offering funds and protection for nascent, high-tech industries including electric cars, as well as chips, AI, and a host of other futuristic sectors, the Chinese government could potentially swamp the world with subsidized products.

Beijing’s goal is to leapfrog Western powers into the forefront of next-generation technologies, dominance that could hand China’s leaders the political clout to shove the U.S. aside and become the world’s premier superpower. In the process, they would pulverize a key tenet of the American worldview—that free markets and free people are inseparable, and the sole route to national success—and thus legitimize Beijing’s illiberal policies and practices. The contest over electric cars is therefore a proxy war between the West and China, between their economic models and political ideologies.

This challenge from China has convinced some U.S. policy makers that the business of America can’t just be business. During her 2020 presidential campaign, Senator Elizabeth Warren suggested harnessing government resources to aid targeted industries based on a China-style national plan. Jake Sullivan, now President Joe Biden’s national security adviser, last year advocatedfor a more active government role in shaping the national economy. Noting that Beijing’s subsidy programs “have already paid off handsomely in several areas,” he and his co-author, Jennifer Harris, a fellow at the Roosevelt Institute, argued that “U.S. firms will continue to lose ground in the competition with Chinese companies if Washington continues to rely so heavily on private sector research and development.”

Read: What happens when China leads the world

Biden is listening. His gargantuan infrastructure bill includes a China-like $174 billion program to jump-start the transition to electric vehicles by funding the construction of a charging-station network, aiding automakers, and offering rebates and tax breaks to buyers. The bill also earmarks $50 billion to support semiconductor manufacturing and research, another essential sector heavily subsidized by Beijing. “China and other countries are eating our lunch,” Biden said, and the bill will “put us in a position to win the global competition with China.”

But will it? Do Chinese state programs actually work?

Despite Beijing’s much-heralded capitalist reforms since the 1980s, bureaucrats have never stopped meddling with markets. State direction, state money, and state enterprises remain core features of the Chinese economic model. President Xi Jinping has even reversed the trend toward greater economic freedom, notably with a hefty dose of state-led programs aimed at accelerating the progress of specific sectors.

In 2015, Xi and his team unveiled the “Made in China 2025” initiative, specifying certain advanced industries for special state support, ostensibly to upgrade Chinese manufacturing, but actually for a much grander goal: to use the muscle of government to race out in front in cutting-edge technologies. The program rang the alarm in Washington, and the Chinese government’s subsidization of domestic tech companies was added to the lengthy list of American grievances over Beijing’s discriminatory business practices. To deflect criticism, Chinese policy makers no longer use the “Made in China” name, but its substance (and subsidies) have very much remained in place.

Electric vehicles were one of the plan’s primary targets. Part of Beijing’s motivation was to clear the stifling smog hanging over Chinese cities and reduce the country’s dependence on imported oil. The major impetus, though, was to realize a four-decade dream of building an internationally competitive automobile industry. Although Chinese manufacturers have made inroads against their established American, European, and Japanese rivals in recent years, they never became the world conquerors Beijing desired.

The transition to electric offered China a fresh opportunity: With all automakers at the same starting line with a new type of product, the country “saw an opening to lead, not follow,” Michael Dunne, the chief executive officer of the consultancy ZoZo Go and former president of General Motors in Indonesia, told me.

Waiting for the market to work its mysterious magic could blow China’s chance, though. The government had “to subsidize the hell out of this industry,” in Dunne’s words. “It was a giant gamble on a future technology,” he said.

What followed was a smorgasbord of supportive policies: Manufacturers received subsidies to reduce prices to encourage sales; the state spent on R&D, direct investments into electric-vehicle companies, and charging infrastructure; drivers received other enticements, such as preferential access to license plates, which are restricted in many big cities to control traffic. (Subsidies were offered for foreign-branded cars made in China too—the more companies that joined in, the faster the sector would develop.) The Center for Strategic and International Studies, in a November study, estimated that the Chinese government has lavished more than $100 billion on the sector overall, mostly in subsidies. In 2019 alone, the study noted, government support was equivalent to almost a third of the sector’s total revenue.

The result is an industry built practically from scratch. In 2016, 336,000 electric passenger vehicles were sold in China, according to data from S&P Global Platts. Last year, the number topped 1.2 million, four times greater than in the U.S. An entire supply chain has sprung up too: CATL, headquartered in Fujian province, is now the world’s largest manufacturer of batteries for electric vehicles.

Even more impressive, the program has spawned some nifty start-ups, including XPeng, founded in 2014. Last year, the company’s car sales more than doubledcompared with the year before. It already owns one factory capable of churning out 150,000 cars a year, is building a second, and in April, agreed to a third.

Investors clearly have high expectations. XPeng, which debuted on the New York Stock Exchange last year, has a market value—when combined with two other New York–listed Chinese start-ups, Nio and Li Auto—greater than that of General Motors or Ford.

The big taxpayer bill “was totally worth it,” Tu Le, the founder of the Beijing-based consultancy Sino Auto Insights, told me. “China has become a leader in a short period of time.”

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The sheer enormity of the electric-vehicle industry in China is already being felt around the world. GM’s surprise announcement in January that it would produce only electric cars by 2035 is widely believed to be linked to its large business in China, where it sold more than 40 percent of its cars last year.

There’s more to success than size, though.

Catching up to China in mere sales is not complicated: The Europeans have already done it. The real test of Beijing’s state program is whether it is creating competitive companies that make cars the world wants to drive. It’s early, but indications so far are discouraging.

Despite the taxpayer cash lavished on Chinese electric-vehicle companies, Tesla’s Model 3 was the best-selling battery-powered passenger car in China last year, while the runner-up was a low-tech, low-priced micro-car produced by a GM joint venture. As the CSIS report noted, “at this stage it appears Chinese firms have not leapt ahead of their foreign rivals.”

Part of the problem facing XPeng and other Chinese newcomers is poor brand recognition compared with Tesla and other established nameplates. A bigger hurdle, however, is that China’s companies don’t have clear technological advantages over their foreign rivals. XPeng is considered one of China’s most advanced outfits, with its well-engineered and good-looking cars, but as Sino Auto’s Le told me, the company is “still a ways away from Tesla’s capabilities, from a technology and software standpoint.” (Tesla founder Elon Musk has accused XPeng of stealing his technology, a charge the Chinese company denies.)

If XPeng is facing an uphill climb, imagine the challenge for other businesses. And there are a lot of them. In a way, Beijing’s industrial policies were too successful, attracting more players—119, by CSIS’s count—than even the giant Chinese market can possibly sustain. Yet more keep joining the race anyway: The cellphone maker Xiaomi plans to enter the sector with a $10 billion investment.

In a more market-oriented economy, the inevitable consequence would be a loss-inducing shakeout, with many companies shut down or absorbed. In China, though, state-led development may do more harm than good. Each provincial or city government wants its own piece of the EV action, and is willing to pay for it. That could prevent weak or financially troubled entrants from failing. One of XPeng’s competitors, Nio, got rescued from probable ruin last year by a $1 billion investment organized by the city of Hefei, where the company agreed to base some of its operations. Many Chinese carmakers are state-owned enterprises, which are unlikely to be allowed to close. The result could be a kaleidoscope of small players fighting it out with one another and (usually better-equipped) foreign brands for slivers of market share.

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In theory, Beijing’s coddling should allow Chinese firms to gain scale and gorge on profits at home, which they can then leverage to attack foreign markets. (This strategy launched the telecom giant Huawei into the world.) But in practice, once China’s electric-car companies venture away, they lose their government protections and have to compete based on their brand, technology, services, and marketing—all areas in which they possess no special advantages. Persuading the Chinese to drive a P7 over a Model 3 is difficult enough; wooing Americans, Europeans, and others will be harder. Rather than a cutting-edge new export industry, overrunning the old-timers of the West, the Chinese electric-vehicle sector could become an industrial island; companies and brands would hold great influence at home but marginal sway in major international markets.

What all this means is that government intervention can be supportive, but not decisive. In China’s case, its industrial policies helped create conditions for the sector to thrive, but they can’t on their own generate the innovation that leads to ultimate commercial success. That’s why China’s industrial program has resulted in a lot of production, but only questionable competitiveness.

Even Beijing’s spendthrift bureaucrats seem to have awoken to that—sort of. They’ve been rolling back direct subsidies to carmakers, with an eye on eliminating them. XPeng’s Gu believes that Chinese policy makers have come to realize the program “may not be the most efficient way to support this industry,” adding that “they have given a lot of subsidies, but it did not really build world-class companies or world-class products.”

Still, at least some state support is likely to continue. Scott Kennedy, a senior adviser at CSIS, told me in an email that “with the U.S. heavily focused on the sector, there’s now an international competitive dynamic that was not there before,” which could compel Beijing to keep the cash flowing. China’s latest five-year plan, released in March, doubles down on the drive for technological development, and likely the industrial policies meant to spur it. The plan “seeks above all to promote a large and hi-tech manufacturing sector,” Julian Evans-Pritchard, an economist at the research firm Capital Economics, wrote in an analysis. But, he warned, “technological progress is complex and unpredictable … Attempting to dictate it from above may continue to bear less fruit than hoped for.”

If Washington does head down China’s state-heavy road, Beijing’s experience offers crucial lessons. Subsidies to automakers and their customers might be necessary to give the industry the initial push it needs, but excess generosity could prop up failing firms. Taxpayer money might be more productively spent supporting R&D and building infrastructure such as charging stations, because in the end, the electric-vehicle war will be won in research labs and car showrooms, not the halls of Congress.

But perhaps the most important lesson is geopolitical: The Chinese won’t give up. XPeng’s Gu, for example, told me his company is preparing to go global, possibly rolling out showrooms in major European cities this year.

“Yes, there will be a lot of challenges,” Gu said. “But I think as long as we have a unique and differentiated way of producing attractive and technologically advanced products, and really something that the consumer likes, I think those challenges can be overcome.”

Michael Schuman is the author of Superpower Interrupted: The Chinese History of the World and The Miracle: The Epic Story of Asia’s Quest for Wealth.