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To: 2MAR$ who wrote (32233)12/27/2012 8:28:54 PM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 69300
 

Contrary to popular belief, Lincoln’s famous Emancipation Proclamation did not “free” a single Black person from chattel slavery—not one. When it looked like the Union was losing the war, Lincoln “freed” slaves in the South so that they could fight against their masters. In that same document he made sure that slavery was not disturbed where it existed in the North!

Here are a few more points:

• While still engaged in the war, Union General Benjamin F. Butler placed his troops at the disposal of the governor of Maryland to repress a rumored slave insurrection.

• In 1861, when General John C. Fremont freed all slaves in the state of Missouri, Lincoln fired him. When General David Hunter freed the slaves in three states, Lincoln cancelled and reversed the order.

• Union military camps were closed to runaway slaves, and some poor Black souls were actually captured by Union soldiers and returned to their rebel owners!

• Most abolitionists were White workers who HATED Blacks but wanted an end to slavery so that they—Whites—would not have to compete with Black workers.

• Lincoln had no intention of establishing “integration” and in 1862 sent 450 “freed” slaves to an island off the coast of Haiti in an ill-fated colonization scheme. The navy had to be sent to retrieve the beleaguered Blacks.

• Lincoln publicly voiced support for the Fugitive Slave Law, which made every American citizen—North and South—responsible for catching runaway slaves.



To: 2MAR$ who wrote (32233)12/27/2012 8:30:53 PM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 69300
 
"Silly me. I had naively assumed that when a writer as well known and respected as Lerone Bennett Jr. came out with a provocative book arguing that Abraham Lincoln was a racist who kept more blacks in bondage than he ever emancipated, it would kick up a stir. After all, Bennett, the executive editor of Ebony and the author of such works of black history as Before the Mayflower (1962), has long been one of America's most eloquent voices on racial issues. And the target of his furious screed is perhaps the most revered figure in American history. Putting the two together seemed like a surefire recipe for controversy.
True to its billing, there is hardly a page in Forced into Glory: Abraham Lincoln's White Dream (Johnson Publishing Co.; 652 pages; $35) that won't rile Lincoln's defenders. To start with, says Bennett, Lincoln was a crude bigot who habitually used the N word and had an unquenchable thirst for blackface-minstrel shows and demeaning "darky" jokes. He supported the noxious pre-Civil War "Black Laws," which stripped African Americans of their basic rights in his native Illinois, as well as the Fugitive Slave Act, which compelled the return to their masters of those who had escaped to free soil in the North. But Bennett's main theme is that Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation was only "a ploy" designed to keep as many slaves in bondage as possible until Lincoln could build support for his plan for ending slavery: "colonization," a preposterous scheme to ship the black population either to Africa or South America. His fondest dream, Bennett writes, was of a "lily-white America without Native Americans, African Americans and Martin Luther Kings."

These facts are not new, of course, in part because other historians have responded to a furious anti-Lincoln article Bennett wrote for Ebony in 1968 by providing less heroic profiles of the 16th President. What's new is Bennett's emphasis. As he writes, even now some white scholars tend to consign the unflattering truth about Lincoln's racist ideals to "footnotes and asides." Glory rips off the cover. And yet, since it was published in February, Glory has been met with what Bennett calls a "conspiracy of silence." By last week not a word had appeared in the book-review sections of the New York Times, the Washington Post, USA Today or even the Chicago Tribune, Bennett's hometown newspaper. Or the New York Review of Books. Or the New Yorker. What's going on here?



Read more: time.com



To: 2MAR$ who wrote (32233)12/27/2012 9:15:52 PM
From: longnshort  Respond to of 69300
 
lincoln a fascist ?

Lincoln’s Presidential Warrant to Arrest Chief Justice Roger B. Taney
'A Great Crime' or a Fabrication?
by Charles Adams
by Charles Adams


Frederick S. Calhoun, the Chief Historian for the United States Marshal’s Service, at the Department of Justice, recently wrote a 200 year history of Federal Marshals, entitled, The Lawmen: United States Marshals and their Deputies, 1789–1989 (Smithsonian Institute, Washington, D.C. 1989). This historical study gives a detailed account of an arrest warrant, signed by President Abraham Lincoln, in the early days of his administration. The warrant was to arrest the Chief Justice of the United States, Roger B. Taney, following his opinion in the case of Ex parte Merryman (May, 1861). The account is found in the chapter entitled, "Arrest of Traitors and Suspension of Habeas Corpus." It was taken from the private papers of the Federal Marshall, Ward Hill Laman, at the Huntington Library in Pasadena:

Taney’s opinion seriously embarrassed Lincoln and his advisers. Southern sympathizers and Northern opponents of the war praised Taney as a partisan of civil liberties standing alone against military tyranny. Taney’s opinion exacerbated the delicate situation in Maryland, a border state yet undecided in its commitment to the Union. According to Marshal Lamon, "After due consideration the administration determined upon the arrest of the Chief Justice." Lincoln issued a presidential arrest warrant for Taney, but then arose the question of service. "Who should make the arrest and should Taney be imprisoned?"

It was finally determined to place the order of arrest in the hands of the United States Marshal for the District of Columbia. Laman then recalls that "Lincoln gave the warrant to him, instructing Lamon to "use his own discretion about making the arrest unless he should receive further orders."

The account of the warrant to arrest the Chief Justice cannot be found in any of the innumerable Lincoln biographies or accounts of the early days of the Civil War. Since it only recently surfaced, Lincoln historians and biographers have never mentioned the story, probably because it has been outside the main stream of historical information, and hence has not been known. Once it surfaced, Lincoln apologists and Civil War gatekeepers, have been quick to attack the account as a fabrication, because Lincoln would never have done such a thing; and, it would have set off "a political firestorm," so they say; and hence, it is just too preposterous to be true.

It does seem too preposterous to be true, probably because of all the grave errors and wrongs allegedly committed by Lincoln’s administration, this would rank at the top of the list. It would have destroyed the separation of powers; destroyed the place of the Supreme Court in the Constitutional scheme of government. It would have made the executive power supreme, over all others, and put the President, the military, and the executive branch of government, in total control of American society. The Constitution would have been at an end.

But as outrageous as this may appear, during those chaotic first months of the Civil War, it would not have been so unthinkable to arrest and silence Taney. The military arrested people in all walks of life. Charles W. Smith, a biographer of Taney (1973), gives this account of the scope of the arrests of civilians:

Without the sanction of law the federal government arrested men by the thousands and confined them in military prisons. The number of such executive arrests was certainly over 13,000, and it has been estimated to have been as high as 38,000 (Columbia Law Review, XXI, 527–28, 1921). This policy was bitterly criticized in some quarters, but it is generally assumed that the people as a whole supported the arrest policy.

Taney’s Ex parte Merryman decision, if followed by the executive branch of the government, would have given comfort to the enemy, so it was claimed, by letting an accused traitor go free. His decision was condemned, "steeped in the crown of treason," wrote one editor. The New York Times wrote that he used "the powers of his office to serve the cause of traitors." The editor of The Missouri Democrat,went so far as to suggest that getting rid of Taney "will be a good riddance for the country." Northern editors for weeks after the decision enflamed their readers with hate for Chief Justice Taney. But this attack was just plain nonsense. All the Merryman decision did, was to require the government to follow the ancient rule of English liberty – which was set forth in the Constitution – that only the Congress could take away the right of habeas corpus. That would have required Lincoln to call Congress into session, and ask Congress to suspend the right to habeas corpus. How was that so bad?

Thus Merryman decision, it was erroneously claimed, loomed as a serious obstacle to the government’s policy of stamping out secessionists and secessionist sympathizers. If Lincoln obeyed the Court’s order thousands of those arrested illegally would have been freed. Lincoln and most Northerners, during the war, accepted the Machiavellian doctrine that the end justified the means, when the end was to preserve the Union, and was to be achieved regardless of the Constitution and rulings of the Supreme Court. Lincoln expressed that policy to a Chicago clergyman:

"As commander in chief of the army and navy, in time of war, I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy."

Taney continued to irritate the Lincoln administration after his Ex parte Merryman decision. When Lincoln was ignoring the Supreme Court’s ruling, Taney sent copies of his opinion to other judges, urging them to issue writs of habeas corpus, and many of them did, even enforcing writs against military arrests of civilians. In his circuit in Maryland, Taney delayed a number of treason trials, as it was his right to do controlling the docket, because with the passion of the times, he doubted a fair trial could be had.

No doubt Taney’s obstructionism reached the ears of the President. And it was then that the plan was hatched to arrest and silence old Justice, who just wouldn’t shut up. Lincoln sent a letter to Taney following his decision in the Merriman case, but the letter has never been found. (New York Herald, June 2, 1861). But that could explain why Taney told others, "The government had considered the possibility of arresting him." Someway, he got the word.

The near-arrest of the Chief Justice is not just found in the history of the United States Marshal’s Service. Until recent research, there was a second account supposedly corroborating the story of the Federal Marshal Laman. This second account was in a footnote in Professor Harold Hyman’s A More Perfect Union (1973), p. 86, n. 15, citing the private papers of Frances Lieber, also at the Huntington Library. Lieber wrote the Lieber Code which became the Laws of War for Northern armies. That should have been enough proof, with two independent sources. Unfortunately, the Curator at the Huntington Library reports that the Lieber papers contain no reference to Lincoln’s warrant to arrest the Chief Justice. That left only the papers of Ward Hill Laman. When this became known, Laman’s character was attacked by the gatekeepers, to support the theory that the whole story was a fabrication. It seems he was a heavy drinker. Lincoln’s apologist could relax and maintain the whole account was a fabrication by the Federal Marshal.

Unfortunately, for Lincoln’s apologists, research recently unearthed two other solid sources to corroborate the account set forth in the private papers of the Federal Marshal, Laman.

In 1887, George W. Brown, the mayor of Baltimore, later a Supreme Court judge for Baltimore, wrote in his book, Baltimore and the Nineteenth of April, 1861: A Study of War, (John Hopkins University, 1887) p. 90, of a conversation he had with Taney following theMerryman decision:

"Mr. Brown, I am an old man, a very old man, (he had completed his 84th year) but perhaps I was preserved for this occasion." I replied, "Sir, I thank God that you were."

He then told me that he knew his own imprisonment had been a matter of consultation, but the danger had passed, and he warned me from information he had received, that my time would come.

It did.

Eight years before in 1879, The Memoirs of Benjamin Robbin Curtis’s were published. Justice Curtis was one of the most prominent lawyers in that period. He represented President Johnson in his trial before the Senate following his impeachment. Most important, he served as a Justice on the Supreme Court. He wrote the dissenting opinion in Dred Scott, which Lincoln carried in his pocket while debating with Stephen A. Douglas. He resigned from the Court after a dispute with Taney over that case. Yet he admired the Chief Justice for his Merryman decision, and makes reference to the plan to arrest Taney, calling it a "great crime."

If he had never done anything else that was high, heroic, and important, his noble vindication of the writ of habeas corpus and the dignity and authority of his office against the rash minister of State who, in the pride of a fancied executive power, came near to the commission of a great crime, will command the admiration and gratitude of every lover of constitutional liberty so long as our institutions endure. Vol. 1, p. 240.

Commenting on this, Mayor Brown wrote 8 years later:

"The crime referred to was the intended imprisonment of the Chief Justice. Although this crime was not committed, a criminal precedent had been set and was ruthlessly followed."

Brown then cites the oft quoted remark by Secretary Seward to Lord Lyons (British ambassador to the United States), boasting of his power to imprison just about anyone.

Finally, it was Secretary of State, William Seward, who signed the executive orders suspending the right of habeas corpus throughout the war, when it should normally have been the President. Curtis’s account refers to "the rash minister of State," who could be none other than William Seward. History shows that it was Seward who urged the President to embark on a policy of unrestrained arrests of private citizens by the military. Most likely it was Seward who urged the President to sign the warrant to arrest Taney, and most likely on second thought, Lincoln did not permit the arrest to take place. Chief Justice Taney and Seward were bitter enemies. So much so that Taney said, if Seward were elected President, he would not administer the oath of office to him. So arresting and imprisoning Taney would have been Seward’s final triumph over the Chief Justice.

And so the case stands, the Presidential warrant to arrest the Chief Justice is on solid ground. It represents just one more tough nut the apologists and gate keepers have to live with; it cannot be swept under the rug, so to speak, as a fabrication.



To: 2MAR$ who wrote (32233)12/27/2012 9:43:54 PM
From: longnshort  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 69300
 
more of Lincoln the fascist

Arrest of the Maryland Legislature, 1861Introduction
In early 1861, Maryland was walking a tightrope between the Union and the Confederacy. In addition to being physically between the two sides, Maryland depended equally on the North and the South for its economy. Although Maryland had always leaned toward the south culturally, sympathies in the state were as much pro-Union as they were pro-Confederate. Reflecting that division and the feeling of many Marylanders that they just wanted to be left alone, the state government would not declare for either side.

For the Federal Government, however, there was no question about which side Maryland had to take. If she seceded, Washington D.C. would be surrounded by hostile states, effectively cut off from the rest of the Union. The situation came to a head on April 19, 1861, when the soldiers of the 6th Massachusetts Volunteers, moving through Baltimore on the way to Washington, were attacked by a pro-Southern mob. When the mob started shooting at the regiment, the soldiers returned fire, and when the smoke had cleared, four soldiers and twelve civilians had been killed.

To avoid further riots, it was decided to send troops through the Naval Academy at Annapolis. To ensure the safety of the troops and the loyalty of the state government, the Federal Government sent General Benjamin F. Butler to Annapolis to secure the city on April 22. That same day, Governor Thomas Holliday Hicks decided to call a special session of the General Assembly to discuss the crisis. At that time, the General Assembly met biannually, but popular outcry was so strong that the governor felt it necessary to call together the Assembly during an off year. However, he probably felt that anti-Union sentiment would run high in a city that had just been occupied by Northern troops, so Governor Hicks decided to convene the Legislature in Frederick, Maryland, a strongly pro-Union city.

The General Assembly first met in the Frederick County Courthouse on April 26. However, it was quickly found that the courthouse was too small, and so, on the second day, the Assembly moved to Kemp Hall the meeting hall belonging to the German Reformed Church. On April 30, the weekly Frederick Herald reported: "The Legislature seems comfortable and well provided for in their new halls in the German Reformed Building. The Senate occupies the Red Men's Hall, third story -- the House, the hall in the second story. These halls have been tastefully and appropriately fitted up for their purposes."

The main topic of discussion in those tastefully appointed halls was, of course, the question of whether or not to secede from the Union. As the General Assembly met throughout the long summer, a bill and a resolution were introduced calling for secession. Both failed because the legislators said that they did not have the authority to secede from the Union. Even many of the pro-Southern delegates and senators did not support the bills. At the same time, however, the legislators refused to reopen rail links to the Northern States, for fear the they would be used for military purposes and also by pro-Union agitators bent on revenge for the Baltimore riots. One of the few things the General Assembly did agree upon was a resolution sent to President Lincoln protesting the Union occupation of Maryland. It seems that the General Assembly was primarily interested in preserving Maryland's neutrality, for they neither wanted to secede from the Union, nor to allow Union troops to cross its territory in order to attack the Confederacy.

On August 7, the General Assembly adjourned, intending to meet again on September 17. However, on that day Federal troops and Baltimore police officers arrived in Frederick with orders to arrest the pro-Confederate members of the General Assembly. Thus, the special session in Frederick ended, as did Frederick's summer as the state capital, as Maryland found itself inexorably drawn further and further into the heart of the bloodiest war in American history.

SOURCE: Taken from Maryland State Archives, "The General Assembly Moves to Frederick, 1861"



To: 2MAR$ who wrote (32233)12/28/2012 9:22:12 AM
From: Solon  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 69300
 
I have been studying the bible today in preparation for making 2013 my most MORAL year ever! Today, I learned from the best Christian in America, Betty Bowers, just what makes a bible-based marriage. She is so dedicated to Scripture. You gotta love her.