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Politics : American Presidential Politics and foreign affairs -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: greatplains_guy who wrote (62645)3/30/2013 10:44:05 AM
From: greatplains_guy  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 71588
 
Why China Is Reading Your Email
Beijing's cyber attacks are rooted in military strategy, says one of America's foremost experts. The best way to combat them is for the U.S. to go on the cyber offensive too.
March 29, 2013, 6:24 p.m. ET.

Timothy L. Thomas By DAVID FEITH
Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

For several years, Washington has treated China as the Lord Voldemort of geopolitics—the foe who must not be named, lest all economic and diplomatic hell break loose. That policy seemed to be ending in recent weeks, and Timothy Thomas thinks it's about time.

The clearest sign of change came in a March 11 speech by Tom Donilon, President Obama's national security adviser, who condemned "cyber intrusions emanating from China on an unprecedented scale" and declared that "the international community cannot tolerate such activity from any country." Chinese cyber aggression poses risks "to international trade, to the reputation of Chinese industry and to our overall relations," Mr. Donilon said, and Beijing must stop it.

"Why did we wait so long?" wonders Mr. Thomas as we sit in the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office, where the 64-year-old retired lieutenant colonel has studied Chinese cyber strategy for two decades. More than enough evidence accumulated long ago, he says, for the U.S. to say to Beijing and its denials of responsibility, "Folks, you don't have a leg to stand on, sorry."

U.S. targets of suspected Chinese cyber attacks include news organizations (this newspaper, the New York Times, Bloomberg), tech firms (Google, Adobe, Yahoo), multinationals (Coca-Cola, Dow Chemical), defense contractors (Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman), federal departments (Homeland Security, State, Energy, Commerce), senior officials (Hillary Clinton, Adm. Mike Mullen), nuclear-weapons labs (Los Alamos, Oak Ridge) and just about every other node of American commerce, infrastructure or authority. Identities of confidential sources, hide-outs of human-rights dissidents, negotiation strategies of major corporations, classified avionics of the F-35 fighter jet, the ins and outs of America's power grid: Hackers probe for all this, extracting secrets and possibly laying groundwork for acts of sabotage.

China's aggression has so far persisted, Mr. Thomas says, because "it makes perfect sense to them." The U.S. has difficulty defending its cyber systems, the relatively new realm of cyber isn't subject to international norms, and years of intrusions have provoked little American response. "I think they're willing to take the risk right now because they believe that we can't do anything to them," he says. "You have to change the playing field for them, and if you don't, they're not going to change. They're going to continue to rip off every bit of information they can."

Hence the promise of Washington's apparent shift in policy. "There's something going on," Mr. Thomas says, and the Donilon speech was only one part. This month's more significant news, he argues, was the announcement that the U.S. military's Cyber Command (founded in 2009) would for the first time develop and field 13 offensive cyber-warfare teams. The Chinese "now know we are ready to go on the offense. There's something that's been put in place that I think is going to change their view."

Not that he expects Beijing to back down lightly. On the contrary, Mr. Thomas points to the literature of the People's Liberation Army to demonstrate that China's cyber strategy has deep—even ancient—roots.

The essence of China's thinking about cyber warfare is the concept of shi, he says, first introduced in Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" about 2,500 years ago. The concept's English translation is debated, but Mr. Thomas subscribes to the rendering of Chinese Gen. Tao Hanzhang, who defines shi as "the strategically advantageous posture before a battle."

"When I do reconnaissance activities of your [cyber] system," Mr. Thomas explains of China's thinking, "I'm looking for your vulnerabilities. I'm establishing a strategic advantage that enables me to 'win victory before the first battle' "—another classic concept, this one from the "36 Stratagems" of Chinese lore. "I've established the playing field. I have 'prepped the battlefield,' to put it in the U.S. lexicon."

Or, as Chinese Gen. Dai Qingmin wrote in his 2002 book, "Direct Information Warfare": "Computer network reconnaissance is the prerequisite for seizing victory in warfare. It helps to choose opportune moments, places and measures for attack." Says Mr. Thomas: "He's telling you right there—10 years ago—that if we're going to win, we have to do recon."

A 1999 book by two Chinese colonels put it more aggressively (albeit in a sentence as verbose as it is apocalyptic): "If the attacking side secretly musters large amounts of capital without the enemy nations being aware of this at all and launches a sneak attack against its financial markets," wrote Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, "then, after causing a financial crisis, buries a computer virus and hacker detachment in the opponent's computer system in advance, while at the same time carrying out a network attack against the enemy so that the civilian electricity network, traffic dispatching network, financial transaction network, telephone communications network, and mass media network are completely paralyzed, this will cause the enemy nation to fall into social panic, street riots, and a political crisis." No kidding.

This vision from 1999 reads like an outline of the report published last month by Mandiant, a private-security firm, about "Unit 61398," a Shanghai-based Chinese military team that since 2006 has mounted cyber assaults to steal terabytes of codes and other information from U.S. assets. Among the targets of Unit 61398 was Telvent Canada, which provides remote-access software for more than 60% of the oil and gas pipelines in North America and Latin America.

Unit 61398 is said to engage in "spearphishing," whereby would-be cyber intruders send emails with links and attachments that, if clicked, install malware on target computers. Lesser hackers might spearphish while posing as Nigerian princes, but Unit 61398 developed sophisticated ways, including colloquial language, to mimic corporate and governmental interoffice emails.

Spearphishing, too, draws on traditional Chinese stratagems: "The Chinese strive to impel opponents to follow a line of reasoning that they (the Chinese) craft," Mr. Thomas wrote in 2007. With this kind of asymmetric approach, he says, "anybody can become an unsuspecting accomplice."

In this context Mr. Thomas mentions a cartoon published last year in Army magazine in which one Chinese general says to another: "To hell with 'The Art of War,' I say we hack into their infrastructure." Good for a chuckle, perhaps, but Mr. Thomas warns against taking the message seriously. China's hacking is in fact "a manifestation of 'The Art of War,' " he says, and if the U.S. military doesn't realize that, it "can make mistakes. . . . You have to stay with their line of thought if you're going to try to think like them."

"Boy," he later laments, "we need a lot more Chinese speakers in this country"—a point underscored by the fact that he isn't one himself. He reads Chinese military texts in translation, some published by the U.S. government's Open Source Center and some he has found himself. He stumbled upon Gen. Dai's "Direct Information Warfare" on a trip several years ago to Shanghai, when an associate led him (and an interpreter) to an unmarked military bookstore on the top floor of a building on the outskirts of town. "I could tell when I walked in that the people behind the cash register were stunned I was there," he recalls. In public bookstores, he says, material addressing Chinese national security is often marked "not for foreign sale" on the inside cover.

The Ohio native does speak Russian, having focused most of his military service (from West Point graduation in 1973 until 1993) on the Soviet Union. That language skill still comes in handy, and not just because Russia is suspected of having carried out cyber assaults against Estonia in 2007 and Georgia in 2008.

Look at the Mandiant report's map of Chinese cyber intrusions (at least those tied to Unit 61398): Russia is untouched. "That's a huge area. . . . I really would wonder why they're after South Africa, the U.A.E. and Singapore but not Russia. And Luxembourg. They went after Luxembourg but not Russia?" Together with Iran, he argues, China and Russia make up "not the axis of evil but the axis of cyber."

So what is to be done? Security firms are working to harden networks against hackers, and members of Congress are promoting legislation to let the government work more closely with Internet service providers without opening up the companies to lawsuits or infringing on civil liberties. Washington could challenge Chinese cyber espionage with targeted economic sanctions. Meanwhile, there is much talk about establishing international standards for cyber space, but it is unclear what that would mean—which probably explains why top officials in Washington and Beijing have both endorsed the idea.

None of this seems promising to Mr. Thomas, who stresses building deterrence through offensive capabilities, such as the 13 new teams at U.S. Cyber Command. The implication is that the best defense is a good offense.

And doesn't that suggest, in turn, that the U.S. and China are headed toward a dynamic of mutually assured cyber destruction? "It seems like it," he says.

It's heartening to hear, then, that Chinese military literature isn't uniformly aggressive toward America. This includes writings about the "China Dream," which posits that China will overtake the U.S. economically and militarily by midcentury—and which has been adopted as the signature cause of new President Xi Jinping.

"They give you both versions," says Mr. Thomas. "They give you a model that says, 'There will be no way we'll ever fight [the U.S.], we'll work on cooperation.' A chapter later, 'There could be a time where if pushed hard enough, we'll have to do something and there will be a battle.' "

But what about the argument that the U.S. is shedding crocodile tears? America (and Israel) were almost certainly behind the most successful known cyber attack to date: the Stuxnet virus that impeded Iran's uranium-enrichment program. There might be some comfort in knowing that the U.S. is doing unto China what China is doing unto the U.S., says Mr. Thomas, but "we don't seem as intrusive as the other side." That is illustrated especially, he says, by China's state-sponsored commercial espionage. He frequently hears complaints from U.S. firms dealing with Chinese counterparts who know their secrets, adding that "I don't think people really get the security briefing of just how invasive it is."

Then there's the argument that all this is overblown because no cyber attack has ever killed anyone. Mr. Thomas responds, somewhat impatiently: "If I had access to your bank account, would you worry? If I had access to your home security system, would you worry? If I have access to the pipes coming into your house? Not just your security system but your gas, your electric—and you're the Pentagon?"

He adds: "Maybe nobody's been killed yet, but I don't want you having the ability to hold me hostage. I don't want that. I don't want you to be able to blackmail me at any point in time that you want." He cites the Chinese colonels' vision, back in 1999, of "social panic" and "street riots." "I wonder what would happen if none of us could withdraw money out of our banks. I watched the Russians when the crash came and they stood in line and . . . they had nothing."

Mr. Feith is an assistant editorial features editor at the Journal.

online.wsj.com



To: greatplains_guy who wrote (62645)5/19/2014 9:44:03 PM
From: greatplains_guy  Respond to of 71588
 
Implications Of U.S. Indictment Of Chinese Officers For Cyber Espionage
Sean Lawson, Contributor
5/19/2014 @ 5:53PM

Today, the United States Department of Justice indicted five Chinese military officers related to alleged cyber espionage against U.S. companies. At the same time, John T. Chambers, Chairman and CEO of Cisco Systems CSCO -0.08%, sent a letter to President Obama arguing that NSA efforts to undermine global Internet security undermine the future of the Internet and the United States’ technology industry. The two developments point to a number of possible implications for the U.S. government’s ability to protect companies from foreign espionage, as well as the future of the ongoing U.S.-China cyber dispute.

First, disclosures over the last year that indicate that NSA engages in cyber espionage against foreign companies help to bolster claims that the U.S. lacks credibility when confronting China about its engagement in economic espionage. This, in turn, undermines the United States’ ability to protect its companies from other states’ military and intelligence agencies.

We know that NSA has targeted companies in a number of countries, including China. Though no evidence has been presented that the U.S. government passes this information directly to U.S. companies–the primary basis of its complaint against China–it is nonetheless clear that its own economic espionage can benefit U.S. companies indirectly.

For example, NSA has targeted the servers of Chinese telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Huawei, while U.S. officials have warned against the use of that company’s products for fear of the kinds of “backdoors” we now know that NSA sometimes plants in Cisco equipment. Ultimately, the Chinese company decided to pull out of the U.S. market, citing the difficulties caused by such warnings. Even if the U.S. government did not pass Huawei corporate secrets directly to its U.S. competitors, driving them from the marketplace certainly provided an indirect benefit nonetheless.

Next , we also know that NSA surveillance has aided the U.S. in trade negotiations. The United States having a better chance of getting its way in such negotiations is certainly a benefit to U.S. industry, even if intelligence gathered from foreign companies and officials is never passed directly to U.S. companies.

But these benefits must be weighed against the potential harm done if or when others learn of such activities. In this case, we see the possibility that the benefits of NSA targeting foreign companies could be outweighed by a diminished capacity for the U.S. to protect its own companies when subjected to the same kind of behavior–or worse, which is what is alleged against China–by foreign intelligence agencies.

Predictably, China is taking advantage of our newfound knowledge of NSA targeting of its companies in its official response to the U.S. indictment, alleging that China is the true victim, not the United States.

None of this is to dismiss the possibility or seriousness of the actions for which the Chinese officers have been indicted. But to the degree that NSA actions lend credibility to the Chinese counter narrative, they represent one more way in which NSA surveillance has harmed U.S. companies.

But there are implications beyond the ability of the U.S. to protect its companies from foreign espionage and theft of intellectual property. As Attorney General Eric Holder noted, this is the first time the United States has taken this kind of action. As such, it sets a new precedent with serious potential consequences.

First, this is an escalation of U.S. efforts to deal with cyber threats using the criminal justice system. We can see this also in the FBI’s arrest of almost 100 hackers around the world today. Thus far, as I have noted many times, U.S. cybersecurity rhetoric, especially as it relates to China, has been dominated by talk of “cyber war.” This is in contrast to the reality that most cyber incidents are more properly characterized as instances of crime or espionage. So, perhaps this move signals a shift away from such bellicose cyber rhetoric.

Second, though a move away from war rhetoric should be welcomed, an aggressive pursuit of foreign military and intelligence officers for cyber crime in the wake of the NSA revelations could open U.S. officials to similar indictments from governments whose companies have been targeted by NSA. Will we see China or Brazil “naming and shaming” NSA employees? Only time will tell.

Third, if the Chinese are as persistent in carrying out espionage against U.S. companies as government officials insist, it is hard to imagine that this indictment will curtail those activities to any significant degree. Instead, what we have seen thus far is China suspending its participation in the Sino-U.S. network working group, which was meant as a forum for the two countries to work on resolving differences in the area of cybersecurity. This is a possibility that U.S. officials must certainly have anticipated. If so, the decision to proceed with the indictments could indicate that the working group was not succeeding in its mission and that the U.S. felt the time was right for an escalation in the ongoing cyber dispute.

Whatever the case, today’s events should serve to highlight the difficulties in using the power of the national security state to promote and protect the interests of U.S. industry. These actions can turn out to be a double-edged sword or to work at cross purposes to one another. Finally, today’s events also mark an important turning point in the ongoing cyber dispute between the United States and China.

forbes.com