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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Alex MG who wrote (715915)5/17/2013 12:30:28 AM
From: joseffy1 Recommendation  Respond to of 1583608
 
Lefty Alex loves his South American commies.

Just like he loves his Stalin, Tito, Castro and Mao.



To: Alex MG who wrote (715915)5/17/2013 11:28:06 AM
From: one_less1 Recommendation  Respond to of 1583608
 
The heart breaking genocide of indigenous people in Guatemala began in the 1940s but you are correct the major effort to wipe them out occurred during the civil war and was mostly perpetrated by the Guatemalan Army while battling the Communist rebels. Reagan was our US president and did not intercede in the attacks on innocent villagers as far as I know. I wasn't a Reagan supporter at the time and this was upsetting to me. He seemed to be operating on strong mandate to win the Cold War once and for all, which he succeeded at. My opinion of Reagan has improved somewhat over time.

Here is another heart breaker that disappointed me (Tutsi Genocide, over a million people).

There were no U.S. troops officially in Rwanda at the onset of the genocide. A National Security Archive report points out five ways in which decisions made by the U.S. government contributed to the slow U.S. and worldwide response to the genocide:

  1. The U.S. lobbied the U.N. for a total withdrawal of U.N. ( UNAMIR) forces in Rwanda in April 1994;
  2. Secretary of State Warren Christopher did not authorize officials to use the term "genocide" until May 21, and even then, U.S. officials waited another three weeks before using the term in public;
  3. Bureaucratic infighting slowed the U.S. response to the genocide in general;
  4. The U.S. refused to jam extremist radio broadcasts inciting the killing, citing costs and concern with international law;
  5. U.S. officials knew exactly who was leading the genocide, and actually spoke with those leaders to urge an end to the violence but did not follow up with concrete action. [114]
Intelligence reports indicate that President Clinton and his cabinet were aware before the height of the massacre that a "final solution to eliminate all Tutsis" was planned.

Fear of a repeat of the events in Somalia shaped US policy in subsequent years, with many commentators identifying the graphic consequences of the Battle of Mogadishu as the key reason behind the US's failure to intervene in later conflicts such as the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.