Silicon Investor (SI) -- The First Internet Community

STOCKTALK

We've detected that you're using an ad content blocking browser plug-in or feature. Ads provide a critical source of revenue to the continued operation of Silicon Investor. We ask that you disable ad blocking while on Silicon Investor in the best interests of our community. If you are not using an ad blocker but are still receiving this message, make sure your browser's tracking protection is set to the 'standard' level.

Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: bentway who wrote (750538)	10/31/2013 2:46:20 PM
From: Tenchusatsu	1 Recommendation Recommended By TideGlider Read Replies (2) \| Respond to of 1573242

Bentway, Keynesianism doesn't advocate it go on forever and has to be "sustained" forever. Then explain why Keynesians advocate "Abenomics" despite over a decade of deficit spending in Japan without any signs of stimulus. Tenchusatsu

To: bentway who wrote (750538)	10/31/2013 9:49:26 PM
From: RetiredNow	Respond to of 1573242

That description, which is what Keynes originally intended is not a bad theory. However, as practiced by Dems and Repubs both, they just deficit spend in bad times and continue to do so in good times. Only Clinton ever got us to a small, short lived surplus. So this neo-Keynesianism is nothing more than fiscal profligacy and irresponsibility dressed up as helping the masses. It's bullshit and it's killing the economy of this country and putting a massive weight on future generations, that they most certainly will not be able to carry. David Einhorn of "The Big Short" fame asks some simple but insightful questions about Bernanke's Keynesian monetary stimulus nightmare. ----------- From David Einhorn of Greenlight The amount of media and market attention focused on whether the Federal Reserve will taper its quantitative easing (QE) would border on comical if it weren’t so serious. In August, the San Francisco Fed published an economic research paper that estimated that the $600 billion spent on QE2 added a meager 0.13% to real GDP growth in late 2010 (about $20 billion) and that the benefit fades after two years. Given that, what practical difference does it make whether the Fed buys a monthly $85 billion or $75 billion or no additional securities at all for that matter? We maintain that excessively easy monetary policy is actually thwarting the recovery. But even if there is some trivial short-term benefit to QE, policy makers should be focusing on the longerterm perils of QE that are likely far more important. Here are some questions that come to mind: How much does QE contribute to the growing inequality of wealth in this country and what are the risks this creates? How much systemic risk does the Fed create by becoming what Warren Buffett termed “the greatest hedge fund in history”? How might the Fed’s expanded balance sheet and its failure to even begin to “normalize” monetary policy four years into the recovery limit its flexibility to deal with the next recession or crisis? No one is sure what the Fed is focused on. After spending several months bracing the market for fewer QE donuts, the Fed decided that it was premature to taper. Even a token reduction (from a baker’s dozen to a dozen?) was ruled out despite the fact that the economic trajectory has not materially changed. We responded the next morning with our own stimulus by ordering jelly donuts for the entire office.