To: Maurice Winn who wrote (103604 ) 11/5/2013 10:49:42 PM From: elmatador Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217588 Prompt action required on eurozone deflation By John Plender Policy makers will be forced to confront reality quicker than Japan Is creeping Japanification of the eurozone inescapable? The annual eurozone inflation rate has fallen progressively from 1.6 per cent in July to 0.7 per cent in last week’s flash estimate for October. That is well below the European Central Bank’s target of just under 2 per cent and does indeed raise the possibility of Japanese-style deflation. There are striking similarities to ponder. Eurozone policy makers have been as tardy as the Japanese in addressing the weakness of bank balance sheets after their respective financial crises. Worries about debt sustainability are another common feature. In both cases politicians have been slow to use the time afforded by loose monetary policy to embark on supply side reform. Decision-making in the face of their financial crises has likewise been extraordinarily dilatory. Yet the similarities only take us so far. Within the very diverse monetary union Germany looks nothing like Japan did at the start of its long period of economic stagnation from 1990. Alone among the big European economies the German economy has grown back up to its peak of 2007 and beyond. Unemployment is at its lowest level since unification, asset prices have been going up not down and the output gap has almost certainly been closed. The ECB seems likely to be delivering low real and nominal interest rates to the Germans for the foreseeable future, given the depressed state of much of the rest of the eurozone. That is giving rise to legitimate concern in the Bundesbank about potential house price bubbles in major cities. Nothing Japan-like about that.Periphery challenge The greater similarity is with the heavily depressed countries in the rest of the eurozone. Yet even there it is hard to see any parallel in labour market conditions. Over the past two decades Japanese unemployment has remained at low levels while eurozone unemployment outside northern European countries such as Germany and Austria has ballooned. Most importantly Japan over that period had exchange rate freedom which ensured that competitiveness was always a manageable problem. That brings us to the heart of what is different about these two episodes. Any potential challenge from deflation in the eurozone lies primarily in Italy and the other peripheral countries. And the challenge is greatly exacerbated by the dynamic of a flawed monetary union. Just as a one-size-fits-all monetary policy gives an interest rate that is too low for Germany, it gives one that is too high for the weaker members of the eurozone. This problem is in turn heightened by the fragmentation of the eurozone since the financial crisis. In the weaker countries bank funding costs are now higher and a combination of weak growth, balance sheet strains and increased credit risk has pushed up retail interest rates. So while the ECB’s policy rate appears low, the monetary transmission mechanism is not working properly. Small business, which ought to be innovating and generating jobs, ends up being starved of credit. This monetary malfunction is more damaging in the eurozone than it would be almost anywhere else in the developed world because so much of non-financial corporations’ debt financing takes place through the banking system rather than through bond markets.No flexibility The eurozone countries with the biggest competitiveness problems have no exchange rate flexibility. They will have to address their cost disadvantage through internal devaluation. That is where the latest eurozone inflation numbers become disturbing, because it is much easier to reduce real wages if there is inflation. With deflation workers would have to accept falls in nominal wages. In unionised countries such as Italy this is unlikely to happen without considerable strife, if it happens at all. The eurozone is also in a less comfortable place than Japan in relation to government debt. Japan, as a big international creditor, has no need of external funds to finance its deficits. Domestic investors have willingly put up the money that has taken gross government debt to over 200 per cent of gross domestic product. The eurozone periphery, in contrast, has seen a big exodus by French and German banks from its sovereign bond markets. Banks in the weaker countries have filled the gap in their home markets, ensuring that the incestuous ties between sovereign borrowers and banks are tighter and more dangerous. Because these countries have been forced into fiscal austerity and borrow at interest rates that exceed the growth rate of nominal GDP, public sector debt rises inexorably. Deflation would further increase that debt burden. A eurozone banking union with a proper resolution authority would have helped avert some of these strains. But even if one were politically feasible, it would not be in place in time to address current fragilities. My hunch is that the eurozone will be forced to confront reality much more quickly than Japan has done.