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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 1:22:06 PM
From: Haim R. Branisteanu  Respond to of 217616
 
China says massive area of its soil polluted
by Staff Writers

Beijing (AFP) April 17, 2014

A huge area of China's soil covering more than twice the size of spain is estimated to be polluted, the government said Thursday, announcing findings of a survey previously kept secret.

Of about 6.3 million square kilometres (2.4 million square miles) of soil surveyed -- roughly two thirds of China's total area -- 16.1 percent is thought to be polluted, the environmental protection ministry said in a report.

The study, which appeared on its website, blamed mining and farming practices among other causes.

"The national soil pollution situation is not positive," the ministry said, adding that more than 19 percent of the farmland which was surveyed is polluted.

The ministry last year described the results of its soil pollution survey as a state secret and refused to release the results, a move which incensed environmental campaigners.

The government has come under increasing pressure in recent years to take action to improve the environment, with large parts of the country repeatedly blanketed in thick smog and waterways and land polluted.

In response to public pressure, China has released more accurate data about air pollution.

More than 80 percent of the soil pollution was caused by "non-organic contaminants", the ministry said in its report. The survey was carried out over an eight-year period from 2005 to 2013.

The ministry last year acknowledged the existence of "cancer villages", years after Chinese media first reported on more than 100 polluted rural areas with a higher incidence of the disease.

Premier Li Keqiang announced in March that Beijing was "declaring war" on pollution, as he sought to address public concerns on issues ranging from smog to food safety, but experts warn that implementation will be the key.



Beijing (AFP) April 17, 2014 - At least 170 dead pigs have been found in a Chinese river, state media reported Thursday -- the latest in a string of similar incidents that have raised fears over food safety.

The animals were found floating in a tributary of China's second-longest waterway, the Yellow River, in northwestern Qinghai province, the official Xinhua news agency said.

The grim discovery follows a series of scandals involving dead pigs in Chinese rivers. Last year 16,000 carcasses were found drifting through the main waterway of the commercial hub of Shanghai.

In Qinghai -- the furthest west such an incident has been reported -- "the source of the dead pigs is still under investigation," Xinhua said, citing local authorities.

Industry analysts say sick pigs are sometimes dumped in rivers by farmers hoping to avoid paying the costs of disposing of the animals by other means.

Around 500 dead pigs are recovered every month from a Chinese reservoir in the southwestern province of Sichuan, state-run media reported in March.

Authorities also found 157 dead pigs last month in a river in central Jiangxi province.

China is a major producer of pork, which surveys have found to be the country's most popular meat.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:24:26 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217616
 
this day i noted the following pieces of news (please excuse me to address multiple posts to you) per my watch / brief

all going pretty much as expected, so okay

Guest post: China’s investment to shape Asean’s destiny

blogs.ft.com

By Gavin Bowring, Asean Confidential

China’s two-way trade with the 10 nations of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean) has grown more than fivefold over the past decade and is course to reach nearly $500bn this year. However, Chinese direct investment into Asean has been relatively anemic by comparison, accounting for only 7 per cent of China’s total foreign direct investment (FDI) stock.

But if Beijing gets its way, this is set to change. China plans a fivefold ramp up of its FDI in the region to a cumulative $150bn by 2020 from $30bn currently. Over the same period, it sees a doubling in bilateral trade to $1trn by 2020. The map below sets out the dynamics.

Source: Asean Confidential

Achieving the goal of boosting investment, however, may not be as straightforward as it sounds. Concerns in Asean are rising over China’s growing strategic ambitions as it boosts its military spending and digs in over territorial disputes in the South China Sea.

From a commercial perspective, China also needs to compete not only with Japan – which is investing strongly in manufacturing, agriculture, clean energy, healthcare and infrastructure throughout the region – but also with cross-border investments from within the region.

Yet the leverage that China enjoys in Asean through its trade ties is often overstated. Only 22 per cent of China-Asean trade actually stays within the region, while 60% is re-exported to developed markets. Malaysia, China’s largest trading partner in the region, provides a perfect example; electronics and semiconductor supply chains alone accounted for roughly 45% of this trade.

Nevertheless, the trade flows are clearly growing, and coming increasingly from the non-multinational sector. China’s southwestern provinces, Yunnan and Guangxi, saw the fastest growth rates in Asean trade last year, as consumer spending in the frontier economies of the Mekong continues to boom.

Myanmar alone accounted for one third of Yunnan’s exports to the region (see map) – particularly consumer electronics – and the true total volume of Myanmar-Yunnan trade is heavily under-reported because much of it slips across porous border controls. This surge in trade has taken place in spite of a recent cooling in relations between Beijing and Yangon.

Infrastructure investment is key to China’s advance.

Chinese companies provided important sources of infrastructure financing in the years after the 1997 Asian crisis. Examples range from Naypyidaw Airport in Myanmar, to highways and hydropower projects in Cambodia, to the Java-Madura Bridge and the 10,000MW first fast track coal power program in Indonesia. The march of Chinese investments in hydroelectric power plants is shown in the chart below.

Source: Asean Confidential

However, Chinese companies have generally been unwilling to take on project risk in infrastructure, with lenders such as China Exim, Sinosure and China Development Bank often requiring sovereign guarantees or other forms of collateral as a prerequisite to project lending. Such “subsidized lending” accounts for roughly 60-70 per cent of China Eximbank’s overseas financing, according to one estimate.

Sovereign guarantees have become increasingly unpalatable for many Asean governments, and the infrastructure-for-resources model appears increasingly untenable. In Laos, a planned US$6.2bn railway linking Vientiane with the Chinese border is on hold, given its potential to saddle the Lao government with debt, as well as requests from Chinese counterparts for large land concessions adjacent to the track.

Indonesia, currently one of the largest recipients of FDI in the region, has also been wary of providing new sovereign guarantees, and has also reduced the access of Chinese and other foreign companies to large scale mining and plantation concessions. Many investment pledges announced at high level meetings between Chinese and individual country leaders fall short of expectations.

Chinese real estate investment in Asean leaps

Nevertheless, there are clear signs that China’s approach to investment in the region is both evolving and becoming more diversified. Real estate is one example. According to CBRE, mainland Chinese investors accounted for 30% of major investments (transactions above US$10m) into Asean commercial real estate last year, from near negligible levels in previous years. A number of China’s biggest retail developers are hoping to replicate their models in markets like Vietnam and Thailand as these countries continue urbanising.

Malaysia has been a major target for residential property investments; major Chinese residential developers such as Country Garden, Agile Property, and Guangzhou R&F have over US$10bn cumulative planned projects in Malaysia’s Iskandar zone. PRC buyers also directly invested in US$2bn of residential properties, given the saturated markets of Hong Kong and Singapore.

Source: Asean Confidential

China has also begun investing in Asean manufacturing, despite being a competitor on many fronts. Companies such as SAIC and Great Wall have made major recent investments in the auto industries of Thailand and Malaysia. Chambers of Commerce in northeastern Thailand have been hosting roadshows in China, with growing Chinese interest in agri-processing.

In Vietnam, approved Chinese FDI jumped 710 per cent YoY last year to $2.3bn, with Chinese textile companies anticipating Vietnam’s inclusion into the Transpacific Partnership, which China is unlikely to win early membership to.

Indonesia’s Investment Coordinating Board (BKPM) claims that Chinese companies are financing a number of metal smelters that have already begun construction, inching progress in bringing local value-add to its natural resource industries. Some Chinese investors we have spoken to say that, contrary to popular perception, smelting investments are actually cost-effective for Chinese companies despite significant overcapacity in China.

Indeed, Indonesia, the region’s largest consumer market and supplier of natural resources, is likely to prove a key litmus test for future momentum in Chinese FDI trends. Much rests, however, on the ability of Chinese companies to provide both more flexible financing arrangements, to invest in local manufacturing, and to compete on quality as Asean continues to integrate not just with China but with other regional and global economies.

Gavin Bowring is Director of Consumer Research at Asean Confidential, a research service at the Financial Times









To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:24:54 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217616
 
bloombergview.com

Is Japan Heading From Deflation to Stagflation?April has been a disorienting month for Tokyoites as prices for from everything from coffee to T-shirts to DVDs seem to be jumping inexplicably.

We residents of the world's most expensive city expected a slight bump after the government's April 1 move to hike the sales tax by 3 percentage points. What we may be getting instead is a touch of the price gouging that marred the introduction of the euro 15 years ago. This is no cash-register conspiracy theory: Japanese media reports indicate that giant companies from Suntory Beverage and Food Ltd. to beef bowl chain Yoshinoya Holdings Co. are indeed using the new tax levy as an excuse to raise base prices on the sly.

After nearly 20 years of deflation, one understands the impetus. The pent-up demand on the part of executives to boost prices is dovetailing with excitement over the Bank of Japan's efforts to boost inflation to 2 percent. But is Japan getting too much inflation too quickly? Worse, isn't this really the bad kind of price rise, based more on corporate opportunism than economic fundamentals? Yes, and sticker-shock could ruin the BOJ's plans to convince Japanese that inflation is good thing.

The headline-effect won't help. The April inflation rate could turn out to be 3.5 percent, the fastest since 1982, economist Yoshiki Shinke of Dai-ichi Life Research Institute tells Bloomberg News (he's been the most accurate Japan forecaster for two years running now). The trouble is, consumer prices are racing far ahead of the salary increases Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is counting on to restore sustainable growth. Now, his revival plans face a triple-whammy: too much inflation, too little wage growth and higher taxes.

When Abe met with Governor Haruhiko Kuroda for lunch on Tuesday, you can bet prodding the central bank to print even more yen was high on the menu. But more quantitative easing would just exacerbate Japan's too-much-inflation-too-soon problem. The weaker the yen gets, the pricier energy imports become. This too is bad inflation, the kind that will eventually roil the bond market of the nation with the world's biggest debt burden.

Kuroda's confidence game has worked so far. He's managed to keep 10-year-bond yields well under 1 percent and, recent losses in equities aside, to convince many overseas investors that Japan Inc. is back. Yet the magic that surrounded the BOJ's move last year to double bond purchases is wearing thin as Abe drags his feet on the structural reforms needed to end deflation.

For an economy ensnared in a liquidity trap, monetary policy isn't enough. Only genuine confidence will spur companies to hike wages and to unleash the virtuous cycle Abe desires. Instead, Japan may be experiencing some of the same pitfalls that befell Europe when its single-currency arrived in 1999.

Then, from Lisbon to Vienna, consumers were enraged by dramatic price surges. Italians and Spaniards joined in nationwide shopping strikes, Germans overwhelmed price-gouging hotlines set up by the government, French newspapers were loaded with tirades about how statisticians were monkeying around with official inflation data. By November 2001, then-French Finance Minister Laurent Fabius was quoted in the New York Times railing against " scandalous" euro-camouflaged markups. Most public officials, though, denied that the art of rounding up had become the norm and a cottage industry emerged to debunk the idea. Almost daily, then-European Central Bank Governor Wim Duisenberg insisted that the euro-cash changeover hadn't significantly affected prices.

As Europe's experience shows, households vote their pocketbooks. If the perception among Japanese is that prices are suddenly surging, Abe and Kuroda have a huge problem on their hands. After so many years of deflation, says BOJ board member Sayuri Shirai, most people see price gains as " unfavorable." Any increases perceived as excessive could lead Japan down the road toward stagflation.

What to do? Abe must deliver on his pledges to encourage entrepreneurship, alter an antiquated corporate tax code, lower trade barriers, loosen labor markets and empower his underutilized female workforce. Abe and Kuroda also must resist the urge to treat consumers like idiots. If European officials had taken steps to offset rising costs instead of pretending it was some mass delusion, the region might not be the stagnant mess it is today. Japan needs to do better, and soon.

To contact the writer of this article:
William Pesek at wpesek@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this article:
Nisid Hajari at nhajari@bloomberg.net



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:25:51 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217616
 
nytimes.com

ASIA PACIFIC
Photo

A visitor at the Zhou family’s ancestral graves in Xiqiantou, eastern China. Intrigue surrounds the family after a spate of arrests. Credit Sim Chi Yin for The New York Times

Continue reading the main story
Continue reading the main story

HONG KONG — His son landed contracts to sell equipment to state oil fields and thousands of filling stations across China. His son’s mother-in-law held stakes in pipelines and natural gas pumps from Sichuan Province in the west to the southern isle of Hainan. And his sister-in-law, working from one of Beijing’s most prestigious office buildings, invested in mines, property and energy projects.

In thousands of pages of corporate documents describing these ventures, the name that never appears is his own: Zhou Yongkang, the formidable Chinese Communist Party leader who served as China’s top security official and the de facto boss of its oil industry.

But President Xi Jinping has targeted Mr. Zhou in an extraordinary corruption inquiry, a first for a Chinese party leader of Mr. Zhou’s rank, and put his family’s extensive business interests in the cross hairs.

Even by the cutthroat standards of Chinese politics, it is a bold maneuver. The finances of the families of senior leaders are among the deepest and most politically delicate secrets in China. The party has for years followed a tacit rule that relatives of the elite could prosper from the country’s economic opening, which rewarded loyalty and helped avert rifts in the leadership.

Continue reading the main storyGraphicZhou Family TiesZhou Yongkang, a member of China’s ruling Politburo Standing Committee from 2007 to 2012, is the subject of one of the highest-level corruption investigations in the history of the People’s Republic of China. Several members of his family, over the years Mr. Zhou was in power, made investments in companies with ties to the China National Petroleum Corp., the state oil company formerly run by Mr. Zhou, although there is no evidence to show that Mr. Zhou was personally involved in the dealings.



OPEN Graphic

Whether to wipe out Mr. Zhou’s influence or to send an unmistakable signal to the entire party elite, Mr. Xi appears to be rewriting the rules. He has widened the inquiry into Mr. Zhou to include his wife, a son, a brother, a sister-in-law, a daughter-in-law and the son’s father-in-law, all of whom have been taken away by the authorities in recent months, according to relatives and witnesses.

Zhan Minli, one of the few members of the clan who remain free, said her granddaughter — who is also Mr. Zhou’s granddaughter — has been left in the care of a kindergarten in Beijing because the rest of the family is in custody. “It is too cruel for a 5-year-old child,” she said in an interview in her home in Southern California. “The government needs to answer to the people as well as the leadership itself,” she added.

Officially, the Chinese leadership has said nothing about the corruption investigation into Mr. Zhou or the detention of his immediate relatives, and Mr. Xi’s ultimate intentions about how to handle the case remain a matter of speculation.

Some political analysts argue that a leader of Mr. Zhou’s status would not face an inquiry of this kind unless Mr. Xi regarded him as a direct threat to his power. In other words, Mr. Zhou is the loser in a political struggle. His family’s financial dealings lost their immunity only because Mr. Zhou fell from favor, not because elite business dealings were being criminalized.

But another school of thought is that Mr. Xi considers the enormous agglomeration of wealth by spouses, children and siblings of top-ranking officials a threat to China’s stability by encouraging mercenary corruption and harming the party’s public standing. Those people say he has pushed the Zhou investigation beyond traditional bounds to signal that the rules have changed and that top leaders will be held responsible for their family’s business activities, even though Mr. Xi’s own family members have been among those who have grown rich.

If that is so, the case has the potential to alter the political compact of China’s boom years. For many elite clans, like Mr. Zhou’s, acquiring stakes in lucrative enterprises that did business in the realm that the family patriarch supervised was not effectively banned — and sometimes not even well disguised.

Continue reading the main story
An investigation by The New York Times of the assets held by Mr. Zhou’s relatives highlights the considerable sums involved and illustrates how deeply invested members of the party establishment are in industries where political connections are important.

Three of Mr. Zhou’s relatives — a sister-in-law, a son and Ms. Zhan, the son’s mother-in-law — hold or have controlled stakes in at least 37 companies scattered across a dozen provinces, from Audi dealerships to property firms, according to corporate documents filed with the government. Seventeen focus on investments in energy, mostly in ventures with the state-owned oil giant China National Petroleum Corporation, which Mr. Zhou headed in the 1990s. Nine center on Sichuan Province, where Mr. Zhou served as party chief from 1999 to 2002.

“Because of his connections to energy, land and the internal security system, in effect the family had kind of carte blanche to go into anything they wanted,” said Andrew Wedeman, a professor of political science at Georgia State University who studies corruption in China.

In all, the holdings examined by The Times are worth at least one billion renminbi, or about $160 million, though that estimate is based on a limited assessment of each company’s value and does not include real estate or overseas assets, which are more difficult to identify and assess.

Even so, these assets make Mr. Zhou the third member of the nine-man Politburo Standing Committee that ruled China from 2007 to 2012 to have family members with documented wealth exceeding $150 million.

In 2012, The Times reported that relatives of Wen Jiabao, then the prime minister, controlled investments worth at least $2.7 billion. And Bloomberg News linked hundreds of millions of dollars in assets to the extended family of Mr. Xi, who was China’s vice president and leader in waiting at the time. There is no indication that authorities have investigated the financial dealings of Mr. Wen’s or Mr. Xi’s relatives.

Long Ties to Oil Industry

The first hint of a move against Mr. Zhou came in late 2012, shortly after Mr. Xi formally became China’s top leader. Within three weeks of Mr. Xi’s elevation, and Mr. Zhou’s retirement, party investigators detained a senior official in Sichuan Province who had risen under Mr. Zhou’s wing. Since then, the authorities have detained and announced investigations into more than two dozen of Mr. Zhou’s former aides and colleagues, and their business allies, including seven men who worked as senior managers at China National Petroleum Corporation or its listed arm, PetroChina.

No evidence has emerged that proves Mr. Zhou, 71, was involved in the investments or did anything illegal. Nor is it clear that his relatives violated any Chinese laws or actively used their relationship with Mr. Zhou to secure deals. But Mr. Xi appears confident that he has enough evidence to eliminate Mr. Zhou’s influence.

Continue reading the main story
The son of a beet farmer who caught eels as a sideline, Mr. Zhou rose to become one of the most feared politicians in China. He began his career as an oil field technician, spending more than a decade in the 1970s and early 1980s working his way up the administration overseeing the Liaohe Oil Field in northeastern China. He kept rising through the ranks until he became head of C.N.P.C., the nation’s largest energy company, which accounts for more than half of China’s oil production and three quarters of its gas production.

Mr. Zhou later became party chief of Sichuan, one of the country’s most populous provinces. In 2002, he was appointed minister of Public Security and, in 2007, he joined the Politburo Standing Committee, the party’s top echelon, and assumed control of the body overseeing the police, courts and intelligence agents.

Continue reading the main story
But even as a domestic security chief, Mr. Zhou kept a proprietorial eye on the oil and gas sector, occasionally visiting C.N.P.C. facilities in China and abroad. Mr. Zhou’s last known public appearance was a visit in October to his alma mater, the China University of Petroleum in Beijing, where he exhorted students to abide by the university’s motto: “I will contribute oil for the motherland.”

Mr. Zhou’s relationship with C.N.P.C. gave him influence over a unique player in the Chinese economy, a giant firm with annual revenue in excess of $400 billion, operations from Sudan to Venezuela and tendrils in every corner of China. Enjoying near monopoly status in some regions and industries, the company is a magnet for politically connected people seeking money-making opportunities.

At least three of Mr. Zhou’s relatives profited from C.N.P.C.’s rise: his oldest son, Zhou Bin; Ms. Zhan; and his sister-in-law, Zhou Lingying, the wife of a younger brother.

Zhou Bin, 42, is majority owner of a Beijing company that sells equipment to Liaohe as well as to C.N.P.C. oil fields in at least three other provinces, corporate records show. His mother-in-law, Zhan Minli, 71, owns companies selling natural gas with C.N.P.C. in two provinces. And Zhou Lingying, 63, teamed up with C.N.P.C. to sell natural gas in another province and owns stakes in companies that also work with C.N.P.C. in western China, according to the documents.

All told, the three relatives hold or have recently held ownership stakes in at least 11 companies that have done business with C.N.P.C. or the other state-owned oil giant, Sinopec, company documents show. At least four of the companies are owned in part by C.N.P.C. subsidiaries.

In each case, the investments came long after Mr. Zhou left C.N.P.C. and had ascended to the Politburo.

An Office Suddenly Closes

A short walk south from C.N.P.C. headquarters in Beijing, the offices on the 21st floor of the gleaming New Poly Building are dark and locked. It was here that Zhou Lingying and her business partners, through their company, Beijing Hongfeng Investment Company, bought control of C.N.P.C. assets in Sichuan, the province Mr. Zhou ran until 2002.

Late last year, employees abruptly stopped coming to work after government officials showed up one day to examine the company’s records, a security guard said. A wilted potted plant remained as evidence of a sudden end to business. The offices are on the same floor as the China Investment Corp., the country’s $575 billion sovereign wealth fund.

Much of what can be traced of Ms. Zhou’s businesses leads to the New Poly Building. She owns stakes in at least seven companies with addresses there, investing in energy, mining and real estate projects across the country. They include a mining project in China’s far western Xinjiang region, property and energy investments in Sichuan and a struggling potash mine there acquired from C.N.P.C.

Zhou Lingying began her career as a shop girl at a general store, working her way up to become manager and later running a supply company before retiring at age 50 in 2001, according to a résumé included in corporate documents and residents in the Zhou family village of Xiqiantou in eastern China.

But Ms. Zhou made a major new foray in December 2007, weeks after her brother-in-law was elevated to the Politburo Standing Committee, setting up her principal holding company, Beijing Honghan Investment Company, with her son, Zhou Feng. Records show at least four other companies linked to Mr. Zhou’s relatives sprang up about the same time.

Even as Mr. Zhou prepared to retire, his sister-in-law was still working to forge relationships with C.N.P.C., forming a venture with a subsidiary to sell natural gas and invest in gas filling stations in the family’s home city of Wuxi.

Continue reading the main story
At a condominium development in Wuxi sprinkled with ponds and walking paths, Ms. Zhou and her husband Zhou Yuanqing lived in a fourth-floor duplex, where the authorities detained them in early December. Asked if the couple were still living in the apartment, one of the two security guards at the gate jested, “No, and they probably won’t be in ever again.”

Links Stretch to California

On the other side of the Pacific Ocean, Zhan Minli lives in an Orange County, Calif., retirement community of ranch-style homes and broad lawns. Short and silver haired, she opened the door to her house after reading written questions passed under her door about the companies she owned in China.

Ms. Zhan said the holdings in her name were actually controlled by Mr. Zhou’s son, Zhou Bin, who is married to her daughter, Huang Wan. She said it was customary in China to put assets in the name of one’s parents, and suggested that her son-in-law used her name because his own mother had died in a traffic accident.

Ms. Zhan said she and her husband were longtime United States passport holders despite Chinese documents that said they had retained Chinese citizenship. Property records show they have lived in the United States for nearly three decades, moving from Maryland to New Jersey and finally to Southern California, where their house has an estimated value of more than $700,000, according to the online real estate database Zillow.

Ms. Zhan’s home in Beijing looks to have been much more expensive. In 2010, a company document listed her residence in a luxury development in northeastern Beijing where units can sell for more than $11 million.

Her official business address was listed several miles away inside a dusty compound at the end of a dirt road. The building appears long abandoned, but for the red light on a surveillance camera peering from above the front entrance and the ferocious barking of a dog.

Several firms in deals with C.N.P.C. are registered at the address under Ms. Zhan’s name and that of a business partner, Mi Xiaodong, 43, identified by the Chinese business magazine Caixin as a college friend of and proxy for Mr. Zhou’s son. The companies have invested in gas projects on Hainan Island and in Hebei Province outside Beijing as well as in a housing development outside the capital. Ms. Zhan and Mr. Mi also owned a Beijing company, dissolved in February 2009, that held an oil drilling firm in northwestern China’s Shaanxi Province, where C.N.P.C. ran an oil field.

Ms. Zhan denied any wrongdoing or having much knowledge of these investments. “I’ve never seen the oil field we owned,” she said. “I don’t know how money laundering works.”

An Elusive Figure

Mr. Zhou’s son, Zhou Bin, is more elusive, though records show he is also plugged into the family business.

Zhou Bin studied English at an oil industry university in Sichuan, according to recent profiles of him in Chinese news media. He then moved to the United States, attending the University of Texas at Dallas and living in the state for much of the 1990s, according to school and property records.

Ms. Zhan described her son-in-law as “taciturn” and “plain-spoken,” a “good kid” who was introduced to her daughter by a mutual friend. When they started dating, Ms. Zhan said, she did not even know he was the son of Zhou Yongkang.

He remained a shadowy figure when he returned to China more than a decade ago, with few photos or media reports about him published even abroad despite his father’s prominence.

His name appears in the records of only one of the 37 companies examined by The Times, an energy investment firm in Beijing named Zhongxu Yangguang Energy Technology Company. His wife and his wife’s parents also feature in the company’s filings.

Though Ms. Zhan denied any knowledge of Zhongxu, company records show she owned 80 percent of it when it was set up a decade ago. Its assets climbed more than sixfold in the years after Zhou Yongkang joined the Politburo Standing Committee in 2007, to $27 million in 2012.

In 2009, Zhou Bin assumed control of the firm, taking Ms. Zhan’s stake. An audit that year showed the company was selling products to C.N.P.C. oil fields across the country. It also sold sales management systems to 8,000 C.N.P.C. filling stations.

Even Zhou Yongkang’s other brother, Zhou Yuanxing, a farmer turned liquor distributor, was placed under 24-hour police surveillance in Xiqiantou, a village of 400 people near the Yangtze River in Jiangsu Province, neighbors said. Among the Zhou family members, he at least is certain to escape prosecution. He died of bone cancer in February.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:26:20 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217616
 
scmp.com

Liu Han corruption case highlights extensive and tangled web of briberyThe investigation into the dealings of tycoon Liu Han has revealed the intricate relationships between officials and businesspeople on the mainland.

Liu, who was tried on charges including murder and leading a mafia-style gang, built his empire into a vast web connecting many senior officials across the country, according to people with direct knowledge of the investigation. The 21-day hearing into the dealings of Liu and 35 associates adjourned on Saturday.

The mining magnate denied most of the allegations against him, including running a criminal gang, when he appeared at the Xianning People's Intermediate Court in Hubei province, according to a court summary.

Liu's political connections ensured his case was given priority by President Xi Jinping, one of the sources said.

The leadership needs more time to settle disputes among the inner circle
Former Yunnan political adviser
The 48-year-old businessman could be sentenced to death if found guilty and his 855 million yuan (HK$1.1 billion) fortune confiscated. Most senior officials with connections to Liu would escape censure, said the sources, who declined to be identified citing the matter's sensitivity.

So far, Xinhua has reported only that three junior police officers in Sichuan, Liu's home province, have been convicted of corruption and covering up gang activities, despite the case being described as the largest prosecution of a criminal gang on the mainland for many years.

The sources said the long list of senior cadres who may have received money from Liu included high-ranking current or former officials from Hainan, Yunnan and Chengdu, capital of Sichuan.

While close ties between the business community and party officials are common on the mainland, Liu's case has exposed in surprising detail large networks of the rich and their uncertain role in political struggles.

Liu met Zhou Bin, the eldest son of retired domestic security tsar Zhou Yongkang, in 2003 through a senior official from Aba autonomous prefecture, in Sichuan, sources said.

After their first meeting, Zhou Bin sold an Aba-based tourism company to Liu for some 12 million yuan, even though it was said to be worth less than six million yuan, because Liu wanted to "maintain a relationship with Zhou Bin", one source said.

Liu later gave the Aba official a gift worth a few hundred thousand yuan, they added. Years later, the official took up a senior position in Chengdu.

Both Zhou Bin and his father are under detention for corruption investigations, while the Chengdu official remains in office after he returned the gift to authorities and assisted their investigation of the Zhous, another source said.

Investigators also discovered another senior Sichuan official, who was promoted and moved to Hainan, received about 1 million yuan in gifts from Liu, including rare artefacts and thousands of yuan for his daughter's wedding.

The Hainan official appeared at the 2014 Boao Forum for Asia earlier this month, a high-profile international gathering of political and economic figures, and even made a speech at the event.

Liu was also a personal friend and long-time mahjong partner of a senior Yunnan official, the sources added. To maintain his relationship with other senior officials in Yunnan, Liu often carried tens of thousands of yuan to mahjong games at the official's home and most often went home empty-handed.

The Yunnan official is currently serving in the national legislature.

A former senior political adviser in Yunnan said he had reported the alleged corruption of senior officials in the province for years, and was disappointed by the authorities' inaction. "Officials higher up still resist punishing those two," the adviser said. "Someone is still protecting them, and the top leadership needs more time to settle disputes among the inner circle."

A large number of officials offered to assist the investigation of Liu, the sources said. Liu and his associates also lavished money on senior officials in Inner Mongolia, state-owned China Development Bank and the Political and Law Commission, investigators claim.

It is not known if officials who received money or gifts returned favours to Liu's gang. Liu built Sichuan Hanlong into a prominent energy conglomerate worth an estimated 855 million yuan, according to Shanghai research company Hurun Report.

Under the mainland's criminal code, officials who "abuse their authority by enabling profit for others" or taking bribes worth more than 100,000 yuan can be sentenced to death.

Zhang Ming, a political scientist with Beijing's Renmin University, said the decision not to punish certain officials showed that Liu's case was entirely political, not judicial.

"The worlds of business and official power are so entwined, and every single official in the country could be punished if the top leaders ordered complete scrutiny," said Zhang. "To choose which officials should be punished depends on political requirements."

A family member, who declined to be named, said Liu was innocent. "You could charge him with anything, including economic crimes. But he is not a gangster," he told the Post earlier.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:26:49 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217616
 
scmp.com

Shanghai court seizes Japanese ore carrier in second world war reparations disputeA court in Shanghai has seized a large Japanese ore carrier at a port in Zhejiang province to enforce a verdict seeking compensation for the sinking of two civilian Chinese cargo ships during the second world war.

Shanghai Maritime Court said on its website on Saturday that it had impounded the vessel Baosteel Emotion, which is owned by Mitsui O.S.K. Lines of Tokyo, in connection with a lawsuit concerning wartime reparations involving Chinese and Japanese shipping companies. The vessel is berthed at Majishan port.

The dispute stems from a deal in the 1930s between Chung Wei Steamship Company and the Japanese shipping firm. Two ships leased to the Japanese firm were "taken over" after war broke out, but were later sunk.

Chung Wei moved to Hong Kong in the 1950s and the Japanese firm merged with Navix Line, which in turn merged with Mitsui.

Two grandchildren of Chung Wei's owner, Chen Zhen and Chen Chun, filed the landmark lawsuit against Navix in 1988 with the Shanghai Maritime Court, seeking wartime reparations of US$160 million.

The maritime court awarded the Chens nearly 3 billion yen in damages and compensation in 2007. The Supreme People's Court rejected the Japanese company's appeal in 2010, according to the maritime court.

The Shanghai court served an enforcement notice on Mitsui in late 2011 but negotiations between the Chens and Mitsui ended with no result, prompting the court to seize Baosteel Emotion on Saturday.

Chen Rulang, a lawyer specialising in maritime lawsuits in Shanghai, said mainland courts had rarely, if ever, taken such a tough stance to recover wartime reparations from Japan.

"The verdict has been made so the action is absolutely legal, but it is quite unusual. In my memory there was not another case," he said, adding that Mitsui had only two options: pay the money or lose the ship.

The Japanese company could not be reached for comment yesterday.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:27:14 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217616
 
bloomberg.com

Bank Defaults Seen as Dark Side of Deposit Vows: China CreditChinese Premier Li Keqiang’s plan to introduce deposit insurance is meant to comfort the nation’s savers as bad loans mount. In the bond market, it’s fueling speculation he’s preparing to let some banks collapse.

Authorities may tolerate failures of smaller banks once depositor safeguards are in place, Kwong Li, chief executive officer of China Lianhe Credit Rating Co. said. Among lender bonds rated at or below AA, the extra yield investors demand to hold the 2022 securities of China Bohai Bank Co. in the northern city of Tianjin surged to an 11-month high of 245 basis points on April 17. The premium on the notes due 2019 of Harbin Bank Co., a lender near China’s border with Russia, has jumped 41 basis points in the past year to 217.

“With the deposit insurance coming online, the government is signaling they may be willing to let some of the smaller banks default or be consolidated,” Li said in an interview in Shanghai on April 15. Bank defaults “probably won’t happen until deposit insurance is in place.” Lianhe Credit is Fitch Ratings Ltd.’s China joint venture.

Premier Li pledged last month to introduce protection for savers this year as he shifts toward letting the market set rates, a move that may push up borrowing costs for smaller lenders even as it forces them to pay higher interest to depositors. Almost 1,000 customers rushed to outlets of Jiangsu Sheyang Rural Commercial Bank on March 24 amid rumors the lender may go bankrupt, Xinhua News Agency reported March 26.

Cash ShortfallsThe nation’s banking regulator has ordered some smaller lenders to set aside more funds to avoid cash shortfalls, after bad loans jumped to the most since the global financial crisis, three people familiar said in February.

Concern banks may face increasing difficulty collecting debts is mounting after the first default on an onshore yuan note last month when Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science & Technology Co. (002506) missed part of an interest payment. Slowing economic growth is adding to speculation more companies won’t be able to fulfill debt obligations.

Credit-default swaps insuring the nation’s debt against non-payment climbed 9.5 basis points this year to 89.5 basis points, after expansion in gross domestic product cooled to 7.4 percent in the first three months of the year, the least in six quarters.

Stemming UnrestFailures of high-yield trust products have sparked investor protests, highlighting the potential for unrest deposit insurance would seek to preclude. At least 30 people wearing white masks with the words “despicable bank” faced special-forces officers in front of a China Construction Bank Corp. (939) branch in Taiyuan last week, as they demanded their money back from a troubled 973 million yuan ($156 million) trust product.

Fang Xinghai, a bureau director at the Office of the Central Leading Group for Financial & Economic Affairs, said in November one or two small Chinese banks may fail this year because they get about 80 percent of their funding from interbank markets and higher-cost deposits in savings vehicles known as wealth management products. The group is the highest-level agency within the Communist Party for financial and economic policies.

The government will be more willing to let small banks go under once deposit insurance is in place, according to Christine Kuo, a senior credit officer at Moody’s Investors Service.

‘Safety Net’“Chinese regulators are preparing a safety net,” Kuo said in an April 17 interview from Hong Kong. “Going forward, when small financial institutions have some problems perhaps the government won’t necessarily help them out once they have deposit insurance in place to protect retail depositors.”

Sour debt at lenders increased for the ninth straight quarter at the end of last year to 592.1 billion yuan, the highest level since 2008, data compiled by China Banking Regulatory Commission show. New non-performing loans amounted to more than 60 billion yuan in the first two months of this year, compared with 100 billion yuan for all of 2013, China Business News reported on April 9, citing unidentified people in the banking industry.

As it moves to limit the risks from any defaults, the government will “encourage consolidations among the smaller banks, and mergers of the smaller banks with the bigger ones,” Lianhe Credit’s Li said.

Bad DebtThe average non-performing loan ratio for Chinese banks rose to 1 percent at the end of last year, compared with 0.97 percent in September, CBRC, the nation’s banking regulator, said Feb. 13. The figure may climb as high as 2 percent by next year, Moody’s Kuo said.

The People’s Bank of China currently caps interest paid on deposits at 1.1 times its benchmark rate, which stands at 3 percent for one-year deposits.

Central bank Governor Zhou Xiaochuan in November identified deposit insurance as a mechanism needed to handle risks as China moves to a system in which interest rates are set by the market and not regulators. The dominance of state-owned lenders has left savers believing in an implicit government guarantee, even though China is the only major Asian economy without a formal insurance system, according to Citigroup Inc.

Introduction of a deposit insurance scheme doesn’t imply authorities will tolerate bank defaults given the risks such failures would pose to the financial system, according to Brian Ingram, the chief investment officer at Ping An Russell Investment Management Co., Russell Investments Group’s joint venture in China.

‘Unexpected Consequences’“Even a default in a small bank could have consequences the government itself might not be able to foresee,” Ingram said in an interview on April 16 in Shanghai. “Bank runs, as we’ve seen in other parts of the world, can trigger unexpected consequences, in terms of crises of confidence.”

Full deregulation of deposit rates would cut banks’ net interest margins, a measure of loan profitability, by at least 50 basis points, and smaller lenders will be hardest hit, according to a Bloomberg News survey in September.

Benchmark borrowing costs have risen, with the yield on China’s 10-year sovereign note up 86 basis points over the past year to 4.28 percent. The premium investors demand to hold AA-rated similar-maturity corporate securities has climbed 7 basis points over the same period to 393 basis points.

While credit costs may rise further and deregulation will keep pressure on net interest margins, the government will seek to ensure any defaults don’t trigger systemic risks, according to Moody’s Kuo.

“Initially the tolerance is going to be very small,” Kuo said. “Only small banks will probably be allowed to default, which won’t cause any systematic issue.”

To contact Bloomberg News staff for this story: Judy Chen in Shanghai at xchen45@bloomberg.net

To contact the editors responsible for this story: Katrina Nicholas at knicholas2@bloomberg.net; Sandy Hendry at shendry@bloomberg.net Andrew Monahan



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:28:05 PM
From: TobagoJack1 Recommendation

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zerohedge.com

Fueling The New World Order: Where Does China Import Its Crude Oil From?It was roughly half a year ago that China officially surpassed the US as the world's largest importer of oil. Since then, there have been some rather dramatic changes in the global geopolitical landscape, perhaps the most important of which are the ever louder and bolder attacks on the US petrodollar and the reserve currency status of the US dollar which funds the global crude trade. As reported recently, Russia and China, not to mention India and Iran and the other BRICs, are increasingly pushing for a trade system in which the USD is isolated - a key precondition to the loss of reserve status.

However, as China's ravenous appetite for oil surpasses that of the US which is enjoying an unexpected, if transitory, boom of shale oil production, which according to some experts may have already peaked, it means suddenly China is far more are the mercy of its core suppliers - the same way that for decades the US had no choice but to be best friends with Saudi Arabia, at least until Canada became the biggest supplier of crude to the US by a huge margin.

So which are the countries that China relies most on for its daily energy importing needs? The map below has the answer.



Or, in ranked format (for 2011):

  1. Saudi Arabia
  2. Angola
  3. Iran
  4. Russia
  5. Oman
  6. Iraq
  7. Sudan
  8. Venezuela
  9. Kazakhstan
  10. Kuwait
Saudi Arabia on top makes sense, but #2 for... Angola? Well, at least that explains this: " Guess The World's Most Expensive City"...

Also looking at the map above, it is quite clear that if one were so inclined, halting seaborne trade routes at the Strait of Malacca would hobble the entire Chinese economy overnight, something the Chinese leadership is surely aware of, and is certainly considering alternatives to, such as land pipelines into Iran (via India), as well as Kazakhstan and Russia.

So how do these compare with the outside sources of US crude?



Quite clearly, the primary external provider of US energy needs is no longer Saudi Arabia, but Canada, which is now exporting more than double the bpd amount as the second largest oil exporter, one time US bff in the middle east, Saudi Arabia.

Curiously, as Canada's dominance has soared, the influence of all the other traditional petrodollar countries has waned. But only for the US - as the first chart shows, their influence is far greater now when it comes to China.

So isn't it only logical that it is only a matter of time before the New (Oil) World Order decides to eliminate the USD - an anachronism from when the US relied first and foremost on just these oil exporting countries - entirely from the oil trade, and moves on to the Chinese Renminbi. Of course, that would require the Chinese currency to be flexible and convertible, something it certainly isn't now... but what about 1 year from now, or 2 years or 3? And how long before the PBOC also reveals just what its true and updated gold holdings are? What is the probability the two events would coincide?

For some more curious observations and thoughts on fueling the New World Order, we recommend the following recently released research paper by the Brookings Institute ( link)



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:35:04 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217616
 
ft.com

Washington on back foot in web negotiations
©AFPBrazil president Dilma Rousseff was a target of US surveillance

A meeting in Brazil this week will reveal whether Washington has succeeded in preventing international anger over the Edward Snowden revelations clouding discussions about future governance of the internet.

São Paulo is to host a two-day international meeting, starting on Wednesday, called by Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff, one of the international leaders who was a target of US surveillance.

International unrest over US and British internet surveillance has weakened Washington’s ability to shape the debate about the internet’s future, according to people involved in the process.

“The US has lost the moral authority to talk about a free and open internet,” said a former senior US government official.

The São Paulo meeting had the potential to become deeply political and expose rifts between countries over future control of the internet, said Greg Shatan, a partner at law firm Reed Smith in Washington. “It was called under extraordinary circumstances, it’s a reaction to a perceived crisis,” he said.

The US made a highly symbolic gesture last month in an attempt to defuse the situation.

In a move that had long been urged by Brussels, Washington said it planned to give up its last remaining direct role in controlling the internet. This involves checking the accuracy of changes to internet addressing made by ICANN, the international body that oversees the system. Though a limited and highly technical function, this has long been a focus for international discontent at US influence over the internet.

Even with the proposal to end its direct involvement, Washington still regards itself as an important guarantor of the internet naming system, which is key to maintaining a single, unified internet.

“It’s not as though we’re closing up shop and saying we’re done here,” Lawrence Strickling, an assistant secretary at the Department of Commerce, said this month.

Yet the offer to end the formal US link has stirred up wider questions about control of the internet, as Mr Strickling himself admitted.

Fadi Chehadé, president of ICANN, said after symbolic US control had been removed, it had to “be replaced with clear strengths and clear safeguards” to ensure the continued openness of the system.

This has thrust the unusual international arrangements for governing the internet into the spotlight while they are still being debated.

“We’re really setting up a non-statebound system of international governance, there isn’t anything like it,” said Milton Mueller, a professor at Syracuse University. At stake were the “long-term evolution of institutions and the establishment of certain norms” that would shape the medium’s future, he added – a delicate process that could be knocked off course by the tensions stirred up by the Snowden leaks.

Political pressures are becoming evident. Republicans in Washington have raised the stakes by denouncing the White House’s proposal to step back from its formal role in ICANN, arguing that this risked handing control of the internet to repressive governments.

Administration officials said this overstated the significance of what was a purely technical proposal. The officials also said they would only give up the address-checking function if an alternative were found that was completely free of government influence.

“Governments can no more take over ICANN than Google can take over ICANN,” Mr Strickling said.

Yet keeping undue government influence out of the internet as US authority recedes will be hard to maintain.

The US, along with countries in Europe, has backed a system that balances the influence of a number of interest groups: governments, companies, bodies representing civil society and the engineers who maintain the standards and protocols on which the internet relies.

The São Paulo meeting will serve to show whether progress towards this so-called “multi-stakeholder” approach is at risk from the fallout from the Snowden leaks.

There are signs that governments might see themselves as “more equal than others”, Mr Shatan said. Government representatives would have half the key seats at the meeting and carefully worded communiqués before the event pointed to a debate about how far their role should extend, he added.

The São Paulo meeting is likely to set the tone for international discussions on internet governance, culminating at a meeting in October of the International Telecommunications Union, an arm of the UN. The ITU took a stab at exerting more control over the internet at a divisive meeting in Dubai in 2012, prompting a US walkout.

With its moral authority waning because of the surveillance scandal, Washington’s hopes of holding together what it sees as a coalition of right-thinking nations dedicated to the openness of the internet could soon be in for a more severe test.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:36:23 PM
From: TobagoJack1 Recommendation

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Haim R. Branisteanu

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ft.com

Ukrainian lessons can help the US in Asia China’s new aircraft carrier may have pride of place in the country’s growing fleet but it is actually a refitted hull that once belonged to Ukraine. Before he became the first foreigner to board the Liaoning, US defence secretary Chuck Hagel used a trip to Asia this week to draw a much broader connection between Crimea and China’s maritime ambitions.

“You cannot go around and redefine boundaries, violate territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations by force, coercion and intimidation – whether it’s in small islands in the Pacific, or large nations in Europe,” he told an audience in Tokyo. “So I want to talk to our Chinese friends about this.”

The implications of the Ukraine crisis will be felt well beyond Europe. One of the most important side-effects will be the lessons China draws, and whether it concludes that the status quo in Asia can be easily brushed aside without consequence.

Asia combines the most sophisticated manufacturing networks of the 21st century global economy with some strong hints of the late 19th century: surging nationalism, growing navies and toxic territorial disputes. Across the region, there is concern that Russia’s latest exercise in re-drawing borders will embolden China to push its own island claims. Mr Hagel has spent his week trying to address those fears.

On one level, it might seem a stretch to draw too close a link between Ukraine and Asia’s maritime disputes. Crimea presented a unique set of circumstances for an opportunistic leader to exploit. By virtue of its naval base in Sevastopol, Russia already had forces pre-positioned in Crimea. President Vladimir Putin was helped by political instability in Kiev and genuine popular support in Crimea (whatever one thinks about the referendum).

Most of all, the basic geography of the region meant that the US and Europeans had no realistic military option when Russia made its move on Crimea. However if China were to try to take the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea, it would meet a stiff response from Japan, and probably the US. The US has no alliance with Ukraine – but it does with Japan, South Korea and the Philippines.

Yet in the eyes of many of its neighbours, China has for a number of years been conducting mini land-grabs in the region’s seas, an incremental strategy to assume greater control sometimes called “salami-slicing”. In 2012, Chinese ships in effect assumed control of Scarborough Shoal, a chain of reefs and rocks in the South China Sea, after a confrontation with the Philippines. In recent weeks, Chinese ships have also been trying to edge the Philippines out of another area called Second Thomas Shoal.

In both Asia and Europe the US faces the same dilemma: the fact that it ultimately cares less about the outcome than either Russia or China, for whom the stakes are higher. Reclaiming “lost” territory is a highly effective national rallying cry: defending international norms is not.

With all this in mind, there are several broad lessons from Ukraine for the US in Asia. The first is to stay the course in the region. With some justice, critics have accused the administration of enabling Mr Putin by neglecting Europe. But the Ukraine crisis actually makes the case for the Asia “pivot” – the idea that deterrence can best be achieved by maintaining a strong military presence, boosting alliances and deepening economic links with Asia, while also trying to engage China. Repairing a mistake in one important region is not a reason to make the same error in another.

Yet the Crimea crisis also shows the importance of picking the right battles. It is one thing to defend traditional allies. But just as the west should not have been so surprised that Russia was terrified of losing influence in Ukraine, the US will need to tread carefully as it boosts ties with countries like Vietnam if it wants to avoid provoking China.

Ultimately, the crisis has been a wake-up call for the harsher new realities of international politics. John Kerry, the US secretary of state, is fond of slamming Russia’s “19th-century behaviour” in Ukraine. Yet in a world of aspiring great powers like China and frustrated “regional powers”, as Barack Obama refers to Russia, economic ties and international law may not be enough to prevent destabilising revisionism. Globalisation has not restrained Russia.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (105687)4/20/2014 7:56:08 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217616
 
scmp.com

Japanese have duty to visit war shrine, says minister Keiji FuruyaA Japanese cabinet minister yesterday visited a Tokyo shrine that honours the dead, including war criminals, in what has repeatedly caused friction with Japan's neighbours.

Keiji Furuya, who chairs the National Public Safety Commission, said he paid respects yesterday morning at the Yasukuni shrine ahead of a festival that starts today.

"I believe that to honour those dead who gave up their lives for our country is the right thing for a Japanese to do," he said.

Furuya said he regularly visited Yasukuni at spring and autumn festivals, and on August 15 - the day Japan surrendered in 1945. He chose to go at the weekend because he had duties to attend to during the week.

Officials' visits to Yasukuni have infuriated China and both Koreas. The 2.5 million Japanese war dead enshrined there include 14 class-A war criminals from the second world war - national leaders who were either executed, died in prison or during their trials.

This year's April 21-23 spring festival at Yasukuni partially overlaps with US President Barack Obama's trip to Japan, part of an Asian tour that also includes South Korea, the Philippines and Malaysia.

Obama late last month helped to bring together Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and South Korean President Park Geun-hye for the first time since they took office more than a year ago.