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Politics : Foreign Affairs Discussion Group -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Sun Tzu who wrote (281186)9/10/2014 4:24:31 PM
From: Sun Tzu  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
Saudi Funding of ISIS Lori Plotkin Boghardt

June 23, 2014

[ST Note: nicely ignores Obama's role in all this]

Significantly undermining ISIS's financial base would require rolling back the group's access to local Syrian and Iraqi income sources.

On June 13, U.S. Treasury Department officials stated that Saudi Arabia sees "eye to eye" with the United States on the importance of halting activities by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), the former al-Qaeda affiliate currently waging jihad in Iraq and Syria. Yet questions continue to arise about Saudi financial support to the group. Addressing these questions requires a better understanding of three issues: the scope of official Saudi government support to ISIS, if any; government allowance of private donations to the group; and the relative importance of Saudi donations compared to the group's other sources of income.

GOVERNMENT FUNDING?At present, there is no credible evidence that the Saudi government is financially supporting ISIS. Riyadh views the group as a terrorist organization that poses a direct threat to the kingdom's security. The Interior Ministry formally designated ISIS as a terrorist entity in March, along with Jabhat al-Nusra, the Muslim Brotherhood, Yemen's Houthi rebels, and Saudi Hezbollah. The designation outlawed various forms of support to the group by residents of the kingdom.

To be sure, many governments in the region and beyond sometimes fund inimical parties to help achieve particular policy objectives. Riyadh has taken pleasure in recent ISIS-led Sunni advances against Iraq's Shiite government, and in jihadist gains in Syria at Bashar al-Assad's expense. Nevertheless, official financing of the group may be precluded by Riyadh's perception that the ISIS terrorist threat is immediate and serious (though it would not be surprising to learn of limited, perhaps indirect contact, logistical coordination to further Sunni positions in Syria and beyond, or leaking of funds and materiel from Saudi-supported rebels to ISIS).

An Interior Ministry statement in early May underscored Saudi perceptions of the ISIS threat at home. In it, officials accused Saudi ISIS members in Syria of encouraging fellow citizens to assassinate leading religious figures and security officials inside the kingdom and plot attacks against government installations and foreign interests. Some of the individuals involved in these domestic plots allegedly had contacts with ISIS and the Yemen-based group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) -- the kingdom's most acute terrorist threat. At the time of the announcement, police had arrested fifty-nine Saudi citizens and three foreign nationals in the case and were still searching for forty-four additional suspects.

PRIVATE DONATIONSThere is a misconception that the kingdom does not get in the way of private Saudi financing of terrorist groups operating in Syria, including ISIS. Yet one of Riyadh's most observable counter-terrorism financing activities is its monitoring of the country's formal financial sector in order to block suspect donations. Indeed, social media fundraising campaigns highlight the challenges of sending such funds from Saudi Arabia to Syria. To ensure that their contributions actually reach Syria, Saudi donors are encouraged to send their money to Kuwait, long considered one of the most permissive terrorism financing environments in the Persian Gulf.

Riyadh's concern about blowback -- namely, the belief that allowing citizens to support terrorist groups hostile to the al-Saud monarchy will eventually spawn attacks on Saudi soil -- helps drive the kingdom's counterterrorism approach. In the mid-2000s, the country suffered a series of dramatic al-Qaeda attacks linked to Saudis returning home from the jihad in Afghanistan, and that experience was important in shaping the current mindset. As mentioned above, Riyadh formally outlawed private donations to ISIS and other groups when it designated them as terrorist organizations in March. That move may have been connected to increasing government concern about Saudi membership in foreign terrorist groups, and may have coincided with the investigation of the domestic ISIS-linked cell announced in May.

Today, Saudi citizens continue to represent a significant funding source for Sunni groups operating in Syria. Arab Gulf donors as a whole -- of which Saudis are believed to be the most charitable -- have funneled hundreds of millions of dollars to Syria in recent years, including to ISIS and other groups. There is support for ISIS in Saudi Arabia, and the group directly targets Saudis with fundraising campaigns, so Riyadh could do much more to limit private funding. U.S. officials have hinted that a combination of politics, logistics, and limited capabilities have impeded more effective Saudi efforts to counter terrorism financing. One particularly difficult problem is how to monitor cash transfers, a method common among Saudi donors.

RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF SAUDI FUNDINGAlthough Saudi donors and other private contributors were believed to be the most significant funding source for the original forerunner to ISIS, the importance of such donations has been marginalized by the group's independent sources of income. This income, which is now estimated to overwhelmingly exceed private donations, is generated by activities such as smuggling (of oil, weapons, antiquities), extortion (e.g., the group levies around $8 million per month in "taxes" on local businesses), and other crimes (e.g., robberies, counterfeiting). The group's June 11 seizure of Mosul's central bank alone netted tens of millions of dollars (though U.S. officials note that the $400 million figure often cited in connection with the heist is not accurate).

U.S. POLICY IMPLICATIONSRecent ISIS gains in Iraq present an opportunity for Washington to tighten counter-terrorism financing cooperation with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, whose concerns about ISIS terrorist threats on their soil are deepening. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew's visit last week to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates -- the closest U.S. partners on this issue in the Gulf -- is a positive step. Another constructive move would be to gauge the potential for altering Washington's contentious dynamics with Kuwait and Qatar regarding terrorism financing. There are signs that ISIS "successes" may fuel higher levels of private Saudi and other Gulf support to a variety of Sunni extremist groups operating in Iraq and Syria, which would be important to counter.

At the same time, the current reality -- that of ISIS acquiring major independent sources of income -- demands a counter-terrorism financing approach that shifts away from focusing on private donations made by residents of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries. Significantly undermining ISIS's financial base would now require rolling back the group's access to local Syrian and Iraqi income sources.

Lori Plotkin Boghardt is a fellow in Gulf politics at The Washington Institute.



To: Sun Tzu who wrote (281186)9/11/2014 7:11:49 PM
From: sense  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 281500
 
You have correctly identified EXACTLY what the problem is.

However, you have erred in identifying the sources of the problem. Every administration from Reagan, to Bush, Clinton, Bush and Obama have contributed continuously to the problem... and, of course, the problem is deeply rooted in Congress and legislated into being.

The situation that exists is precisely the most telling instance in which the mantra of independents and libertarians claiming "there is no meaningful difference between the parties" is most accurate.

The ICT revolution is profoundly deflationary. The impact, however, is not linear with Moore's law, as there is clearly a parallel impact that exists in enhanced productivity creating more wealth, not only more operations.

The deflationary impacts of ICT are broadly felt, across the economy... however, in a free market, the impact of unfettered innovation and competition (and not the Microsoft euphemisms for those offered in apology for monopoly) in the ICT industry itself would gut corporate profits... at a rate which might exceed Moore's law, with each increment proving discontinuous in relation to legacy technology... and business profits. To prevent that result, it is necessary to obstruct the operation of the market... and that the ICT industry does as a matter of routine...

However, it is not the impact of monopoly behavior apparent in the ICT industry that is the source of the problems, rather than the parallel that exists to the ICT industry's obstructions of the market... in the world of finance.

The source of ALL of the problems in the market today... are apparent in the Wall Street banks responses, and those of their lapdog regulators, to the IPO of Spring Street Brewing.

The technology, today, requires that we no longer have a need for investment banks... just as shopping on the internet obviates the need for intermediaries in many other businesses.

The primary purpose of our markets, of course, is to enable raising capital that funds innovators in innovating, and allows new businesses to enter markets, compete, and succeed. The market does not exist in order to help raise rents that enhance the profitability of banks, or to enable stock portfolio trading, or derivative based speculation, etc... instead of REAL investment.

Because of ICT, every company, today, is easily capable of raising capital directly... without using a bank. And, every trader is capable of executing trades directly, without using a broker as an intermediary. The need for Glass-Steagall, which used to work by isolating bank deposits from the risk taking of the investment bankers, is able to be eliminated... because we no longer have any apparent utility in or need for the investment bankers... who run the banks.

However, that would be inconvenient in relation to sustaining banks profitability, even though their profits are far more about management of other functions in the market than about raising capital, and enabling new businesses to succeed. But, enabling ICT based market efficiencies, would ALSO eliminate most of their utility in other roles across the market, including eliminating a need for their controlling authority over the conduct of the economy...

Instead of adopting the greater efficiencies possible in capital markets, which would allow any company to directly raise capital on the internet without needing a bank... the bankers have instead regulated to prevent that ICT based efficiency from occurring... instead, they have more sharply limited market access, and RAISED the tolls charged to gain access to the financial interstate. The value being added by them, is now essentially zero, in market terms (although grossly negative in policy terms)... while they're reducing access and charging more... a vastly larger percentage in equity... than ever in prior history.

As a result, our capital markets... no longer resembling free markets... have failed.

And the banks (and regulators) response to the failure of the markets... rather than allowing the failure to be recognized, and rather than enabling the introduction of market efficiencies (and regulations) that would re-enable free market functions... is that we have instead enabled the banks in sustaining their failed institutions and excess rents... by allowing them to directly attach the flow of tax revenue... and exert even greater control over the economy.