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To: tejek who wrote (870931)7/7/2015 11:29:46 AM
From: RetiredNow  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 1576152
 
Germany is a great example, but not for what you think. They have definite capitalist tendencies, as exemplified by an economy that has performed better than most in the EU. However, their Socialist tendencies will be their undoing. Their debt is already at 70% of GDP and their giant health and welfare programs weigh on the economy as the population ages. It's no coincidence that Germand bunds are yielding negative rates. This is stimulus gone extreme due to overspending and debt overhang that drags on the economy, making the central planners feel like they have to intervene constantly, even as markets buy up all supply of anything that's perceived as safe. When social programs like Germany's are run as ponzi schemes, which almost all are across the world, because the next generation pays for the current generation, then it is inevitably unsustainable. I would have no problem with Obamacare and a giant Social Security program in the US, if Congress raised the taxes across the board to pay for it out of current revenues, instead of putting the debt and consequences on our children. That is the problem with Socialism. They want all these things, but they want the next generation of people to pay for them. It's always implemented as theft, instead of through a collective CURRENT desire to pay for the wellbeing of our neighbors. So please give me intellectual honesty. If you want something today, then you need to pay for it today. Don't steal from my children.



To: tejek who wrote (870931)7/7/2015 11:33:12 AM
From: RetiredNow  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1576152
 
JULY 6, 2015| Austrian Economics, Donald Boudreaux, Friedrich Hayek, John Keynes

Hayek for Everybodyby ALEX J. POLLOCK| 1 Comment


Donald Boudreaux has done us the favor of writing a popularized primer on the foundational thought of the great economist, Friedrich Hayek. His timing is good. For sadly, as Vaclav Klaus, the free-market president of the Czech Republic from 2003 to 2013, says in the book’s foreword: “State interventionism is back and growing.”

The once-vivid lessons of the failures and crimes of communist regimes are fading in the group memory, 25 years after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and its accompanying socialist ideology. Dirigiste government bureaucrats are busy giving orders, arrogantly convinced that they know what is economically best for you better than you do. Hayek, as presented by Boudreaux in readily accessible language, demonstrates yet once again that they not only do not, but cannot, know this.

F.A. Hayek was a brilliant thinker in economics, politics and philosophy. But he was not as good a rhetorician as his great intellectual competitor, John Maynard Keynes, who was a witty, appealing popularizer and journalistic writer, as well as a famous theorist, intent on producing government interventions by whatever arguments worked. In the 1930s, this led, Boudreaux relates, to “Keynes’ victory over Hayek [and] that victory was total.” However, in the hands of Keynes’ devoted macro-economic followers (and shortly after then-President Nixon purportedly announced that “We are all Keynesians now”), his victory led to the utterly disastrous great inflation of the 1970s and consequent financial collapse of the 1980s—the victory in time produced a memorable defeat. Hayek, his professional reputation redeemed, got the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1974. He used the occasion of his acceptance speech to skewer “the pretense of knowledge” displayed by macro-economists, and to suggest they needed a “lesson in humility.” Numerous such lessons have been provided them in the decades since 1974.

Hayek wrote about Keynes that those who met him “experienced the magnetism of the brilliant conversationalist,” with his “bewitching voice,” and knowledge of “artistic, literary and scientific matters,” who was “supremely confident in his powers of persuasion.” He certainly persuaded many subsequent economists. But Hayek thought that “Keynes was not a highly trained or a very sophisticated economic theorist,” whose General Theory was “too obviously another tract for the times [and] what he thought were the momentary needs of policy,” and which “was bound to lead to a revival of the more naïve inflationist fallacies.” As it did.

Keynes’ emergency proposals for government action in a depression, along with their winning rationales, got translated by his disciples into constant interventions of all kinds at all times by central banks and governments. In this dubious theory, the bureaucrats in charge play the part of Platonic Guardians of the economy because they know better than the people what should be done, just as Keynes was sure he knew better. Hayek is the healthy corrective to this fundamental mistake.

Unfortunately for the pretense of bureaucratic superiority, Hayek demonstrated that it is impossible for central authorities to have superior knowledge. Beginning with discussions of “How we make sense of an incredibly complex world” and “Knowledge and prices,” Boudreaux nicely explains Hayek’s insights into the essential role of necessarily dispersed knowledge. An extreme specialization of vastly different kinds of knowledge is required to create the amazing prosperity for ordinary people that free markets do. This knowledge can never be successfully centralized; moreover, enterprising actors are constantly expanding and changing it.

To envision of the interaction of dispersed knowledge, consider the book you are reading, Boudreaux suggests. “The people whose efforts, skills, and specialized knowledge, and the detailed information that went into producing the very ink and paper now before you, number in the millions.” The knowledge required to make this traditional object is boggling. Think of just the paper. “What kinds of trees are used to make it? Where are these trees found?” We can read the book without knowing this, but somebody has to know a lot about it. And somebody has to

know how to make the blades for chainsaws used to cut down the trees . . . explore for the oil used to make the fuel that powers those chainsaws . . . what chemicals and in just what proportions must be mixed with the wood pulp . . . how to arrange for insurance on the factory . . . how to operate the machines that package the paper.

Here is the grand Hayekian, indubitable conclusion:

No single person more than a tiny fraction of all that there is to know about how to make the ink and paper . . . No single person—indeed, not even a committee of geniuses—could possible know more than a tiny fraction of all the details that must be known to produce the ink and paper.

(Or, if you prefer, to produce electronic representations.) Try to imagine—you can’t—the essentially infinite specialized knowledge which is functioning in an advanced market economy. How can it possibly work at all? How can it work as brilliantly as it manifestly does?

“The answer,” as Boudreaux relates, “is voluntary exchange, or markets that are based on private property rights and freedom of contract” and on “the prices of some options relative to the prices of others.” Then “millions [actually billions] of producers all across the globe . . . act in ways that mesh productively with each other,” and “do so at costs that are as low as possible.” This Hayek called “the extended order.” No central direction can know enough to achieve this.

Boudreaux asks us to imagine the “astonishingly complex web of human cooperation” as a jigsaw puzzle with one billion pieces, with “each of these billion puzzle pieces having a mind of its own, as well as the ability to move itself.” No one could put the puzzle together from the top down, but using prices as signals and voluntary exchange, the puzzle puts itself together into a market order. This order “is intended by no one.” It is planned by no one. It is directed by no one. No one knows how it will turn out. “It is spontaneous.” This is the central Hayekian idea of the order which results from human action but not from human design, which “encourages millions [billions] of people to interact peacefully with each other in ways that are mutually beneficial.”

What can mess all this up? Unwise interventions and manipulations by government and central bank bureaucrats who represent the political bias in favor of command and compulsion, believe in spite of experience that they have superior knowledge, and, in economic particular, push the “political bias in favor of inflation.” This is demonstrated in today’s central banking fashion, as the Federal Reserve and every major central bank has committed itself to perpetual inflation. But: “a people are wisely advised never to allow their government to exercise discretion over the supply of money.”

Can we ever correct the current institutionalization of endless government interventions and monetary manipulations? Can we ever correct “the very dishonesty and duplicity that is so common in the pronouncements of all governments, today and in the past”? Can we move toward the maximum realization of “a society of free and responsible individuals”?

Boudreaux’s appeal is to the power of ideas in the long run. He believes that “No economist in the twentieth century has done as much to get the ideas right as did F. A. Hayek.” Those of us who admire these profound and complex ideas are glad to have them published in popularized, compact, introductory form. May they flourish.



To: tejek who wrote (870931)7/7/2015 11:36:06 AM
From: jlallen1 Recommendation

Recommended By
locogringo

  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1576152
 
Some good news today....

newsmax.com



To: tejek who wrote (870931)7/8/2015 4:07:57 AM
From: Road Walker  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1576152
 
Germans Forget Postwar History Lesson on Debt Relief in Greece Crisis
Photo

In 1953, Hermann Josef Abs, center, signed an agreement that effectively cut West Germany's post-World War II debt in half. Credit Associated Press
As negotiations between Greece and its creditors stumbled toward breakdown, culminating in a sound rejection on Sunday by Greek voters of the conditions demanded in exchange for a financial lifeline, a vintage photo resurfaced on the Internet.

It shows Hermann Josef Abs, head of the Federal Republic of Germany’s delegation in London on Feb. 27, 1953, signing the agreement that effectively cut the country’s debts to its foreign creditors in half.

It is an image that still resonates today. To critics of Germany’s insistence that Athens must agree to more painful austerity before any sort of debt relief can be put on the table, it serves as a blunt retort: The main creditor demanding that Greeks be made to pay for past profligacy benefited not so long ago from more lenient terms than it is now prepared to offer.

But beyond serving as a reminder of German hypocrisy, the image offers a more important lesson: These sorts of things have been dealt with successfully before.

The 20th century offers a rich road map of policy failure and success addressing sovereign debt crises.

The good news is that by now economists generally understand the contours of a successful approach. The bad news is that too many policy makers still take too long to heed their advice — insisting on repeating failed policies first.

“I’ve seen this movie so many times before,” said Carmen M. Reinhart, a professor at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard who is perhaps the world’s foremost expert on sovereign debt crises.

“It is very easy to get hung up on the idiosyncrasies of each individual situation and miss the recurring pattern.”

The recurring, historical pattern? Major debt overhangs are only solved after deep write-downs of the debt’s face value. The longer it takes for the debt to be cut, the bigger the necessary write-down will turn out to be.

Nobody should understand this better than the Germans. It’s not just that they benefited from the deal in 1953, which underpinned Germany’s postwar economic miracle. Twenty years earlier, Germany defaulted on its debts from World War I, after undergoing a bout of hyperinflation and economic depression that helped usher Hitler to power.

It is a general lesson about the nature of debt. Yet from the World War I defaults of more than a dozen countries in the 1930s to the Brady write-downs of the early 1990s, which ended a decade of high debt and no growth in Latin America and other developing countries, it is a lesson that has to be relearned again and again.

Both of these episodes were preceded by a decade or more of negotiations and rescheduling plans that — not unlike Greece’s first bailout programs — extended the maturity of debts and lowered their interest rate. But crises ended and economies improved only after the debt was cut.

Continue reading the main storyMultimedia FeatureGreece’s Debt Crisis ExplainedThe weak link in the 19-nation eurozone is struggling to tame its debt. On Sunday, Greeks decisively rejected in a referendum the terms of an international bailout.


OPEN Multimedia Feature

In a recent study, Professor Reinhart and Christoph Trebesch of the University of Munich found sharp economic rebounds after the 1934 defaults — which cut debtors’ foreign indebtedness by at least 43 percent, on average — and the Brady plan, which sliced debtors’ burdens by an average of 36 percent.

“The crisis exit in both episodes came only after deep face-value debt write-offs had been implemented,” they concluded. “Softer forms of debt relief, such as maturity extensions and interest rate reductions, are not generally followed by higher economic growth or improved credit ratings.”

Policy makers have yet to get this.

This is true even at the International Monetary Fund, which was created after World War II to deal precisely with such situations. Its approach to the European debt crisis, five years ago, started with the blanket assertion that default in advanced nations was “ unnecessary, undesirable and unlikely.” To justify this, it put together an analysis of the Greek economic potential that verged on fantasy.

Even as late as March 2014, the I.M.F. held that the government in Athens could take out 3 percent of the Greek economy this year, as a primary budget surplus, and 4.5 percent next year, and still enjoy an economic growth surge to a 4 percent pace.

How could it achieve this feat? Piece of cake. Greek total factor productivity growth only had to surge from the bottom to the top of the list of countries using the euro. Its labor supply had to jump to the top of the table and its employment rate had to reach German levels.

The assumptions come in shocking contrast to the day-to-day reality of Greece, where more than a quarter of the work force is unemployed, some three-quarters of bank loans are nonperforming, tax payments are routinely postponed or avoided and the government finances itself by not paying its bills.

Photo


European ministers, including Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras of Greece, second from left. Credit Olivier Hoslet/European Pressphoto Agency Peter Doyle, a former senior economist at the I.M.F. who left in disgust over its approach to the world’s financial crises, wrote: “If ‘optimism’ results in serial diagnostic underestimation of a serious problem, it is no virtue: At best, it badly prolongs the ailment; at worst, it is fatal.”

Creditors, of course, do not generally like debtors to write down their debt. But that’s not how Germany and its allies justify their approach. They rely instead on a “moral hazard” argument: If Greece were offered an easy way to get out of debt, what would prevent it from living the high life on other people’s money again? What kind of lesson would this send to, say, Portugal?

But the Greek economy has shrunk by a quarter. Its pensioners have been impoverished. Its banks are closed. That counts as suffering consequences. No sane government would emulate the Greek path.

Germany, in fact, understands moral hazard backward. The standard definition refers to lenders; covering their losses will encourage them to make bad loans again. And that is, let us not forget, exactly what Europe’s creditors have done. Their financial assistance to Greece was deployed to pay back German, French and other foreign banks and investors that held Greek debt. It did Greece little if any good.

Greece has done little to address its endemic economic mismanagement. But it has few incentives to do so if the fruits of economic improvements will flow to its creditors.

A charitable explanation of the strategy of Greece’s creditors is that they feared Europe’s financial system was too fragile in 2010, when Greece’s insolvency first became apparent, to survive a write-down of Greek debts. Greece, moreover, was not an outlier but one of several troubled European countries that might have followed the same path.

But Adam S. Posen, who heads the Peterson Institute for International Economics, says he thinks it has more to do with political cowardice. Greece’s creditors were not prepared to take a hit from a Greek debt write-down and then explicitly bail out their own banking system. So they resorted to what Mr. Posen calls “extend and pretend.”

“There’s an incredibly strong incentive not to recognize losses,” Mr. Posen told me. Governments “will do things that are more costly as long as they don’t appear as a line-item on the budget.”

There is a slim case for optimism. Today, the risk of contagion from Greece is low, Professor Reinhart says. Other peripheral European countries are in better shape. And even the I.M.F.’s economists recognize that there may be no way around a Greek write-down. The cost to Europe’s creditors would be minuscule.

Yet Germany has not come around. It took a decade or more from the onset of the Latin American debt crisis to the Brady deal. Brazil alone had six debt restructurings. Similarly, the generalized defaults of 1934 followed more than a decade of failed half-measures. Does Greece have to wait that long, too?

Correction: July 7, 2015
An earlier version of this column described incorrectly the period of time in which Brazil had six debt restructurings. It was the 1980s and 1990s, not the 1990s.