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To: Goose94 who wrote (15683)1/30/2016 8:59:09 AM
From: Goose94Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 203382
 
The Fed's Normalization and Gold

The Fed hike is not the end of the world. The U.S. economy experienced many tightening cycles. Actually, many analysts are citing past rate hike environments as a guide to the future. However, three things make this tightening cycle (if there are more hikes at all) unique. First, the U.S. central bank increased interest rates when the economy is actually decelerating and the manufacturing sector is in a recession. This makes new hikes less probable, while increasing the odds for the U.S. recession in the new year. Both effects are fundamentally positive for the gold market.

Second, the Fed has never hiked before from almost zero. Thus, to normalize its monetary stance and provide itself with the necessary ammunition to fight the next downturn, the Fed should hike to at least 3.5 percent (usually, the U.S. central banks cut the federal funds rate by 350 basis points in each easing cycle). Given the slow and gradual tightening cycle, the Fed will be generally unprepared for another recession. The U.S. central bank will then be forced to implement another round of quantitative easing, or perhaps even to implement helicopter money and negative interest rates.

Third, the Fed has never raised its interest rates with the interbank lending market practically dormant, massive excess reserves at commercial banks (worth around $2.4 trillion) and enormously expanded balance sheets. The U.S. central bank's balance sheet is now around $4.5 trillion, as opposed to the $800-900 billion range before the crisis (see the chart below).

Chart 1: The Fed's balance sheet (blue line, right scale, in trillions of $) and the bank's excessive reserves (green line, left scale, in trillions of $) from 2005 to 2015



In normal times, the U.S. central bank controlled the federal funds rate by changing the supply of reserves via open market operations. When the Fed wanted to raise rates, it would sell securities, which led to a reduction of reserves in the banking system. As the reserves become scarcer, the interest rate increased. However, because of the Fed's quantitative easing programs, the banks are now awash with reserves, so they do not need to borrow funds from each other as they used to before the financial crisis. It means that to raise interest rates by open market operations, the Fed would need to unwind all of its earlier purchases (around $3.6 trillion since 2008).

Therefore, the U.S. central bank will be using two other tools during the normalization process: interest on excess reserves (IOER) and reverse repurchase operations (RRP). The IOER is interest paid on funds held at the Fed in excess of what is required, and it would be the primary tool for raising the federal funds rate. According to the U.S. central bank, the IOER puts a "floor" on the main Fed rate, as no bank would want to lend money to other banks at lower rates than it may safely park cash at the Fed.

However, there is a notable problem with the IOER. It does not create a perfect floor since it is only available to depositary institutions (among other problems), which do not have accounts with the Fed, so they would lend money for less. This is when the reverse repurchase operations enter the scene. In the RRP, the Fed sells securities to the non-banks (such as money market funds) and agrees to buy it back the next day at a specified price. In essence, the U.S. central bank takes an overnight collateral loan, which also puts a floor under the federal funds rate, as no investor would lend money to commercial banks at a rate lower than what the Fed is willing to pay in the RRP. As one can see, the main difference between these two interest rates is different eligible entities. Since the investors who can participate in the RRP are the same ones who might undercut the IOER, the changes in both rates should push up the federal funds rate. Indeed, the Fed's strategy has worked so far.

Along with the federal funds rate, the U.S. central bank raised the IOER to 0.5 percent, while the overnight RPP rate rose to 0.25 percent (it also increased the discount rate to 1.00 percent. That is, the rate charged to depository institutions on loans they receive from the Fed's lending facility, which creates the "ceiling" on the federal funds rate, since no banks should want to borrow money from other banks at a higher rate than from the U.S. central bank. Consequently, the effective federal funds rate was traded on average at 0.375 percent after the Fed's hike (a level three times higher than 0.125 percent in 2015 before the hike!). The chart below shows the Fed's interest rates before and after the December hike. As one can see, the effective rate is actually formed between the ON RRP rate and IOER, which were set during December meeting at, respectively, the lower and upper bounds of the federal funds target.

Chart 2: The Fed's interest rates (discount rate - red line; green line - IOER; blue line - effective federal funds rate; purple line - ON RPP rate) before and after December hike (between December 1, 2015 and January 6, 2015)



Therefore, it seems that the Fed, by using new tools, retained control over its main interest rates. However, there may be some unintended consequences of using them. First, paying banks for holding reserves at the Fed provides banks with easy money and discourages them from participating in the interbank market and from more intense restructuring (not to mention the ethical and political issues related to the fact that the U.S. central bank pays tens of billions of dollars to the banks not to use the trillions it paid them before). Second, the use of RPP would expand the Fed's intermediation in short-term funding markets, which could crowd out private financing (the U.S. central bank is already the largest lender in the tri-party repo market), magnifying flight-to-quality flows and their repercussions during crises - as the investors will likely to seek the safety of the Fed (the ultimate 'risk-free' counterparty) instead of lending to private institutions - and promote 'shadow banking' (by transacting with non-banks) that are largely beyond the Fed's regulatory scrutiny.

The bottom line is that the Fed raised the federal funds rate in December. After the end of quantitative easing, the hike was the next step toward the normalization of monetary policy. There is still a long way to return to normal monetary policy, as the Fed should raise interest rates significantly above zero and unwind its balance sheet. Therefore, the Fed stance will remain accommodative for a long time, as the U.S. central bank will not start selling its assets until the normalization of the federal funds rate is well under way. This is very good news for the gold market, since the quick normalization of the Fed's balance sheet would boost the real interest rates, which are negatively correlated with the price of bullion. Another piece of positive news for the gold bulls is also that the tightening cycle would be slow and gradual, and based on the use of relatively new tools, such as IOER and RRP. As the Fed is entering unchartered waters, the use of these interest rates could alter financial markets in unpredictable ways and further impair the functioning of free markets and risk loss of the Fed's credibility in case of losing the control over the federal funds rate in case of some negative shocks.

Thank you.

Arkadiusz Sieron



To: Goose94 who wrote (15683)2/4/2016 11:57:57 AM
From: Goose94Respond to of 203382
 
Is An LBMA Silver Benchmark Overhaul Coming After Price Discrepancy?

In response to a divergence in the London Bullion Market Association’s silver benchmark price to the actual spot price last week, CME Group and Thomson Reuters alongside the independent LBMA Silver Price Oversight Committee have announced that they are working to ensure that this won’t happen again.

In a statement released Thursday, the organizations said that they will “further develop” the benchmark in order to prevent any future inconsistencies or compromise its integrity.

"We are committed to maintaining the integrity of the LBMA Silver Price,” said Neil Stocks, chairman of the Oversight Committee, in the release. “We are introducing enhancements and are consulting on further developments with the many users who rely on this important benchmark.”

The statement was put out following a discrepancy in the auction system late last week, when the benchmark price, which is used by producers and traders to settle silver products and derivatives contracts, was set at $13.58 an ounce, off by 84 cents from the actual silver price on that day. A CME representative told Kitco News at the time that it took up to 29 rounds before a settlement price was reached.

Two “extraordinary” meetings have been held since Jan. 28 in order to address concerns over the benchmark, and one of the main changes includes an intervention protocol that wasn’t there before. Since Jan. 29, the Oversight Committee gave CME and Thomson Reuters the green light to intervene and “suspend an auction if they believe the integrity of the auction or participants is threatened,” the press release said.

Although no precise date is mentioned, the three organizations intend to present details of new measures – including potentially introducing centralized clearing of all auction trades – to be discussed at the “earliest opportunity.”

Other potential changes, the statement continued, include: “a blind auction, where only prices and not volumes are disclosed to participants until after the auction has closed; increasing the settlement tolerance where necessary to maintain the integrity of the auction; change the structure for sharing the differential to encourage full participation; and a package of measures to increase participation in the benchmark process and to encourage non-banks’ participation.”

The LBMA Silver Price is calculated daily on a transparent electronic auction platform operated by the CME Group, and Thomson Reuters is responsible for administration. HSBC, JPMorgan Chase Bank, The Bank of Nova Scotia, Toronto Dominion Bank and UBS are the banks involved with the daily silver price fixing mechanism. Media reports released in October suggested that China Construction Bank would also join the benchmark, however, CME refused to comment on the matter.

By Sarah Benali