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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: combjelly who wrote (924784)3/6/2016 5:25:59 PM
From: Broken_Clock  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 1577083
 
He sure moves the left when he writes.

Show where, in 2001, he warned against a housing bubble.

I've given you 8 direct quotes where he literally pleaded with the Fed to blow one up.

Krugman is a two faced wall st. shill for the elite.

++++++

"In 2002, economist Paul Krugman, who would go on to win a Nobel Prize in 2008, advised that the Fed "create a housing bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble." In his view, this would allow "soaring household spending to offset moribund business investment." (Krugman began warning that the housing bubble was dangerous in 2005.)"
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/19/paul-krugman_0_n_3118069.html



To: combjelly who wrote (924784)3/6/2016 5:31:53 PM
From: Broken_Clock  Respond to of 1577083
 
http://tomwoods.com/blog/paul-krugman-the-fed-didnt-create-the-housing-bubble/

On that count, from my book, Ron Paul vs. Paul Krugman (http://www.amazon.com/Ron-Paul-vs-Krugman-Keynesian/dp/1470070723)

Krugman again argued in the New York Review of Books in September 2010 that the Fed had had no
choice but to lower interest rates following the collapse of the dot-com
bubble. “It’s hard to see,” he wrote, “even in retrospect, how the Fed could have justified not keeping rates low for
an extended period.” However, now his argument was that “it would be wrong to
attribute the real estate bubble wholly, or even in large part, to misguided
monetary policy.”

Yet how could
Krugman reconcile his argument here that the Fed was
not “wholly, or even in large part” responsible for creating the housing bubble
with his earlier arguments that the Fed should lower interest rates to spur
investment in housing? How could he reconcile this argument with his earlier
statement that “Millions of Americans have decided that low interest rates offer
a good opportunity to refinance their homes or buy new ones” (May 2, 2001)? Or
with his observation that “those 11 interest rate cuts in 2001 fueled a boom
both in housing purchases and in mortgage refinancing” (October 1, 2002)?
Or with his acknowledgment that it had been “the Fed’s dramatic interest rate
cuts” that had “helped keep housing strong” (December 28, 2001)? Or his
statement, “Repeated interest rate cuts encouraged families to buy new houses
and refinance their mortgages” (December 22, 2002)? Or his remark that “Mortgage rates
did indeed fall briefly to historic lows, extending the home-buying and
refinancing boom that has helped keep the economy’s head above water” (July 25,
2003)? Or, “Low interest rates … have been crucial to America’s housing boom”
(May 20, 2005)? Or, “interest rate cuts led to soaring home prices, which led
in turn not just to a construction boom but to high consumer spending, because
homeowners used mortgage refinancing to go deeper into debt”(May 25,
2005)? Or, “A snarky but accurate description of monetary policy over the past
five years is that the Federal Reserve successfully replaced the technology bubble
with a housing bubble” (August 7, 2006)? Or, “Back in 2002 and
2003, low interest rates made
buying a house look like a very good deal. As people piled into housing,
however, prices rose—and people began assuming that they would keep on rising.
So the boom fed on itself” (July 27, 2007)?

What can explain
Krugman’s self-contradictions? When he thought the
housing bubble was a good thing, the road to recovery, he was all for it,
lavishing the Fed with
praise for single-handedly rescuing the economy from the much more painful
recession that
otherwise would have occurred without it. Once the devastating consequences of
the housing bubble became
clear, however, he changed his story, denying that he had ever called for a
bubble and even denying that the Fed was
responsible for having created it.