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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: TideGlider who wrote (930298)4/13/2016 3:45:13 PM
From: FJB1 Recommendation

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“Ferguson effect” documented in Chicago
POWERLINE

Rob Arthur and Jeff Asher at FiveThrityEight show that arrests have declined and gun violence has spiked since the release of the video showing Laquan McDonald being shot and killed by the police. This is evidence of the “Ferguson effect.”

Arthur and Asher explain:
After some cities saw a rise in crime last year, police chiefs and even the head of the FBI suggested that the United States was experiencing a “Ferguson effect”: Police officers sensitive to public scrutiny in the wake of protests over the 2014 police killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri, were pulling back on police work, the theory went, and emboldened criminals were seizing their chance.
Some dismissed this theory or expressed lots of skepticism given the volatility of crime statistics. According, to Arthur and Asher, however:
The spike in gun violence in Chicago since the end of November. . .is too sharp to be explained by seasonal fluctuations or chance. There have been 175 homicides and approximately 675 nonfatal shooting incidents from Dec. 1 through March 31, according to our analysis of city data.

The 69 percent drop in the nonfatal shooting arrest rate and the 48 percent drop in the homicide arrest rate since the video’s release also cannot be explained by temperature or bad luck. Even though crime statistics can see a good amount of variation from year to year and from month to month, this spike in gun violence is statistically significant, and the falling arrest numbers suggest real changes in the process of policing in Chicago since the video’s release.
(Emphasis added)
The Ferguson effect isn’t unique to Chicago:
A similar decline in police activity and increase in violence occurred in Baltimore after protests over the death of Freddie Gray, who died in police custody. Likewise, police activity in New York City slowed down dramatically after police killed Eric Garner. In the case of the New York Police Department, some news outlets suggested that the slowdown was a large-scale, organized protest against interference by the mayor.
Arthur and Asher find little evidence of an organized police slowdown in Chicago. However, “in both public statements and private conversations, former and current Chicago police officers, crime analysts and journalists have described a climate of low morale and hesitation among officers that has led to fewer arrests.”

The authors quote Roseanna Ander, an executive director at the University of Chicago Crime Lab. She finds that “proactive” policing, including street stops, that is designed to prevent crime has diminished, as officers seek to cut down on their discretionary interactions with civilians. “Certainly they’ll respond to 911 calls … but if you have a group of guys on the corner and you think you have probable cause to stop them and see if one of them has a gun, you’re probably not going to do that,” Ander says.

The diminution of proactive policing dates back to the release of the McDonald video. A police department spokesman attributes it to a new form that must be filled out after some interactions with members of the public. This requirement is the result of the city’s August 2015 settlement with the American Civil Liberties Union over the department’s “stop and frisk” program.

It’s logical to suppose that the paperwork requirement might reduce interaction with the public. However, Arthur and Asher point out that the requirement was implemented 38 days after the release of the Laquan McDonald video. By that time, the overall arrest rate had fallen from 26 percent to 19 percent. Since then, the overall arrest rate has risen slightly.

Reducing police interaction with the public will reduce the number of cases in which the police acts abusively. But the evidence is that, not surprisingly, reduced interaction will lead to an increase in violent crime, including gun violence.

Given the rarity of unjustified police shootings, it is obvious that policies and attitudes that discourage proactive policing will result in a very bad trade-off. And the trade-off will be worst for residence of low income and minority-centric neighborhoods where violent crime and gun violence are the most intense.






To: TideGlider who wrote (930298)4/13/2016 5:11:52 PM
From: FJB4 Recommendations

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The Next President Is Going to Be Hated

BY VICTOR DAVIS HANSON
APRIL 11, 2016
pjmedia.com

Everyone hates the sourpuss who says the party is over. The next president will have to tell the American people that a reckoning is on the horizon—and that it is not going to be pretty.


President Obama has created lots of mythoi about the landscape he inherited in January 2009: the Iraq war was lost and al Qaeda ascendant; the September 2008 meltdown had wrecked the economy; the immigration system “was” in shambles; and Obama would have to restore fiscal sobriety after George W. Bush (all “by his lonesome” with a “credit card from the Bank of China”) in “unpatriotic” fashion had alone piled up U.S. record debt.

In reality, the 2007-8 surge had all but ended al-Qaeda in Iraq; and the American fatality rate in the Iraqi theater of operations had plunged to fewer than the military’s monthly losses to accidents and illness. To be sure, the economy was still shaky, but the recession that had started in December 2007 was all but over, ending in a natural fashion about five months after Obama took office. The so-called bailouts and TARP rescue measures were already in place to stop the panic of four months prior. Bush’s nearly $5 trillion profligate increase in the national debt would be doubled by Obama, despite an increase in income taxes, a fortuitous fracking bonanza, and near-constant zero interest rates. Obama shattered the old Clinton-Gingrich formula of balancing the budget by raising income tax rates and curbing spending. The bipartisan Simpson-Bowles committee recommendations to address the debt were ignored. There is no need to compare the status of health care in 2008 to the present mess.

An adult president is going to have to tell the American people that a mandated equality-of-result economy is fossilized, entitlements are insolvent, the debt is unsustainable, interest rates are going up, the medical system is pure chaos, and people have to get over expecting to live off government, not because it is unethical, but because it is untenable.

Then we come to the world abroad.

In a recent interview in The Atlantic, Obama seemed to voice pride in his overseas recessional, even including his Syrian faux red lines that eroded American “credibility”—which to Obama is a mere construct of the Washington foreign policy establishment. Is there any legacy that Obama diplomats now cite as historic—the special friendship with Turkey, the Iran deal, the pullout from Iraq, the dismissal of ISIS as amateurs, the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, the red lines in Syria, the reset with Russia, the disaster in Libya, the ostracism of the Gulf states, the distance from Israel?

A great power’s deterrence—acquired with difficulty over years—can be easily lost in months. And it is often only restored through danger commensurate to what was paid during its original acquisition. When Ronald Reagan inherited a wrecked foreign policy in January 1981—invasions of Afghanistan and Vietnam, communist insurrections in Latin America, Iran in chaos, American hostages in Tehran, an ascendant Soviet Union—it took him three years to reestablish U.S. credibility.

Reagan was roundly despised for his supposedly cowboy manner in reinstating deterrence. In November 1983, Hollywood gave us The Day After—a melodramatic account of what life in the heartland would be like after a nuclear strike. The message was for America to brace for a nuclear winter that Reagan would earn in his absurd effort to “win” the Cold War.

Prepare for the same hysteria in 2017. The Pentagon, to remain the world’s most powerful and respected military and to help to keep the world order relatively calm, quietly accepts that it will have to demonstrate soon to America’s enemies that it is quite a dangerous thing for any nation to shoot a missile near a 5,000-person, $5-billion American Nimitz-class carrier; or to hijack an American naval craft, humiliate the crew to the point of tears, and then video the embarrassment; or to attack a U.S. consulate. Yet it will not be so easy for our military to reestablish credibility in 2017. And over the next 10 months we may see some scary things not witnessed since the annus horribilis of 1980.

Trying to persuade Putin that NATO has commitments to the territorial integrity of the Baltic states, and deterring him from further expansionism will be one of the most dangerous gambits of 2017— and one that will be widely caricatured.

The effort will be somewhat akin to what would have happened had Neville Chamberlain said “no” at Munich, instead of waving a worthless scrap of paper to the adoration of huge British crowds. Assembling a British-led coalition in 1938 of the Poles, Czechs, French, Dutch, and Belgians, while ensuring the Soviet Union was neutral, would have checked Hitler’s rather still weak Wehrmacht, but in the short term earned Chamberlain the slur of war-monger rather than for about a year canonization as a League of Nations humanitarian.

There are 4,000 troops now in Iraq. To stop ISIS and prevent a Syrian redux, more may be sent—a task far more costly than it needed to have been, and far more unpopular.

The Obama "special relationship" with Recep Erdogan’s Turkey is in shambles; it green-lighted the Islamicization of Turkey and the destruction of democracy. The next president must deal with a key NATO member, whose behavior and values are becoming entirely antithetical to the premises of NATO, and whose provocative bullying under no circumstances should earn the alliance’s military solidarity.

The Iran deal would be laughable if it were not so tragic.
What Obama calls the Iranian violation of the “spirit” of the agreement— from shooting missiles near carriers and hijacking and humiliating Navy seamen, to unleashing cyber war on the U.S. and issuing daily promises of war against the U.S. and Israel—is a precursor of more to come in the next 10 months. If Iran is not to become a nuclear power, the next president will have to re-impose sanctions and reassemble a coalition to prevent its nuclearization. That effort too will be difficult, and it will outrage many and be caricatured as saber-rattling.

China has established the precedent that it can create an artificial island in the midst of key sea lanes and then expand upon that fantasy island concept by claiming additional sovereign air and sea space around it. To prevent a Chinese veto over all commercial traffic to our Asian allies, President 45 is going to have to persuade the Chinese of the foolishness of their overreach and convince them to end the general precedent of island creation. That, too, will be no fun.

History in the short term adores appeasers. They pontificate and pose as sober and judicious humanitarians who will do anything to avoid confrontation on their watch, even as they light the fuse of Armageddon for their successors. The restorers of deterrence are always smeared as war-mongers—and only praised as Churchillian largely when they are dead. So it will be for the next president if he or she chooses to stop the decline and restore the American-led postwar order.