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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 5:58:37 AM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218074
 
re <<An analysis in 2010 revealed that while the iPhone 4 cost $187.51 at the factory gate in China, Korea contributed $80.05 worth of components, the U.S. $22.88, Chinese Taipei $20.75 and Germany $16.08. China’s contribution in assembling the final product was just $6.50, or only about 3.5% of the total cost>>

2010 is relevant but ancient history in shenzhen

the trajectory is going as expected, especially for those who see history as a motion picture as opposed to a still photo

Apple? what's that and where?

we must try to be more considered in picking at facts to determine the truth.

worldstopexports.com
Cellphone Exports by CountryBelow are the 15 countries that exported the highest dollar value worth of cellphone during 2016:

China: US$116.1 billion (47.9% of total cellphone exports)

Vietnam: $31.1 billion (12.9%)
Hong Kong: $23.7 billion (9.8%)
Netherlands: $15.6 billion (6.4%)
United States: $9.9 billion (4.1%)
South Korea: $8.2 billion (3.4%)
Germany: $6.3 billion (2.6%)
Singapore: $5.2 billion (2.1%)
Austria: $4 billion (1.6%)
Slovakia: $3.5 billion (1.5%)
Czech Republic: $2.5 billion (1%)
Taiwan: $1.9 billion (0.8%)
Sweden: $1.8 billion (0.8%)
United Kingdom: $1.7 billion (0.7%)
France: $989 million (0.4%)

The listed 15 countries shipped 96% of global cellphone exports in 2016 by value.

Among the above countries, the fastest-growing cellphone exporters since 2012 were led by:

Vietnam (up 208.6%),
Hong Kong (up 115.5%),
China (up 42.6%) and
United States (up 34.8%).

Four countries posted declines in their exported sales:

Taiwan (down -69%),
France (down -47.8%),
South Korea (down -32.6%) and the
United Kingdom (down -17.5%).

Global Cellphone Making CompaniesThe following companies are among the top global companies that manufacture mobile phones.

Huawei (China)

Lenovo Group (Hong Kong)
Xiaomi Tech (China)
ZTE (China)
Panasonic (Japan)
Philips (Netherlands)
Samsung Electronics (South Korea)
Acer (Taiwan)
Apple (United States)
BLU Products (United States)
FT Group’s F-Mobile (Vietnam)
Bullitt Group (United Kingdom)
Microsoft Mobile (United States)
Google Nexus (United States)
Blackberry (Canada)

... and generally speaking, perhaps applies also to iphones as far as trajectory is concerned, even as iphones gets crowded out by huawei etc ... bloomberg.com

"The domestic value added of gross exports has risen to 71 percent in 2014 from 62 percent a decade earlier, according to the most recent data from the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development."



To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 6:00:29 AM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218074
 
re <<Apple>>

... and what about Porsche youredm.com ... oops, I meant Huawei

Porsche Partners With Huawei For $1,650 Phone Powered By A.I.

Matthew Meadow
October 16, 2017
It seems strange to think that a car brand would design a cell phone, but it’s not completely unheard of. Brands like Hummer, Mercedes, Aston Martin, and Ferrari have all put out their own cell phones at one point, and Porsche has actually done it quite a few times, with their Porsche Design branch.

Now, that same branch is teaming up with Chinese telecommunications company Huawei for the Mate 10 series of phones that aims to combine the aesthetic of Porsche with the technological innovation of Huawei.

One of the things that makes the Porsche Design Huawei Mate 10 very special is the use of a dedicated built-in AI. Yeah… artificial intelligence for your phone. It’s not enough to emulate Skynet, but according to High Snobiety, it still packs a pretty punch.

The device is spectacularly beautiful, encased entirely in glass in a “diamond black” shade that is perfect for your LA-producer aesthetic.

The phone also packs one of the industry’s leading batteries with 4000mAh. Combine this with Huawei’s SuperCharge technology and that means a 20-minute charge will last you all day.

All of this power, design and fashion however does translate to the price – the phone will retail for around $1,650 USD and will be available in early December. Watch the video below for more.








via High Snobiety



To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 2:10:27 PM
From: Elroy Jetson  Respond to of 218074
 
China is merely a final assembly station for tech devices, with an ever greater percentage of the work in the Taiwan-owned Foxconn factories being done by robots.

The bottom line is IP owners don't trust their proprietary chips and other tech to remain confidential in China so all of the chips and components which go into the final assembly are manufactured in the South Korea, Taiwan, the US and Germany and flown to Shenzhen, China for assembly.



To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 5:29:54 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218074
 
good news, the world economy is growing well ... the dial is materially moving
and somewhere in between 2026 teotwawki and 2032 darkest interregnum, we should be able to measure by all ways instead of just 'most measures'
the journey is good for the world, am sure you would concur

bloomberg.com

Who Has the World's No. 1 Economy? Not the U.S.By the most measures, China has passed the U.S. and is pulling away.
More stories by Noah SmithOctober 18, 2017, 6:30 PM GMT+8



The wear and tear doesn't help.

Photographer: kurt Wittman/UIG via Getty Images
What’s the most powerful country in the world? There’s a good case to be made that it’s China.

There are many kinds of power -- diplomatic, cultural, military and economic. So an easier question to ask is: What’s the world’s largest economy? That’s almost certainly China.

Many might protest when hearing this. After all, the U.S. still produces the most when measured at market exchange rates:



Looks Might Be DeceivingGross domestic product at market exchange rates, 2016

Source: World Bank

But this comparison is misleading, because things cost different amounts in different countries. Gross domestic product is supposed to measure the amount of real stuff -- cars, phones, financial services, back massages, etc. -- that a country produces. If the same phone costs $400 in the U.S. but only $200 in China, China’s GDP is getting undercounted by 50 percent when we measure at market exchange rates. In general, less developed countries have lower prices, which means their GDP gets systematically undercounted.

Economists try to correct for this with an adjustment called purchasing power parity (PPP), which controls for relative prices. It’s not perfect, since it has to account for things like product quality, which can be hard to measure. But it probably gives a more accurate picture of how much a country really produces. And here, China has already surpassed the U.S.:



A Better Way to Size Things UpGross domestic product at purchasing power parity, 2016

Source: World Bank

If you don’t trust the murky PPP adjustments, a simple alternative is just to look at the price of a Big Mac. The same burger costs 1.8 times more in the U.S. than in China. Adjusting the market-exchange-rate GDP numbers by that ratio would put China even farther ahead.

In some dimensions, China’s lead is even larger. The country’s manufacturing output overtook that of the U.S. almost a decade ago. Its exports are more than a third larger as well.

American commentators may be slow to recognize China’s economic supremacy, but the rest of the world is starting to wake up to the fact:



Appearances MatterSurvey of perception of economic power in developed nations

Source: Pew Research Center

This doesn’t mean China's population is the world’s richest -- far from it. The countries with the highest income per person, in order, are Qatar, Luxembourg, Singapore, Brunei and the United Arab Emirates. But few would argue that Qatar or Luxembourg is the world’s leading economy -- while per-capita numbers are important for the well-being of a nation’s people, they don’t translate into comprehensive national power unless a country also has a large population.

China’s modest per-person income simply means that the country has plenty of room to grow. Whereas developed countries can only get richer by inventing new things or making their economies more efficient, poor countries can cheaply copy foreign technology or imitate foreign organizational practices. That doesn’t always happen, of course -- many poor countries find themselves trapped by dysfunctional institutions, lack of human capital or other barriers to development.

But there’s good reason to think that China will overcome at least some of these obstacles. Economists Randall Morck and Bernard Yeung have a new paper comparing the histories of Japan and South Korea -- both of which climbed out of poverty to achieve rich-country status -- with the recent rise of China. They find that China’s institutions are, broadly speaking, developing along the same path followed by its successful neighbors.

In other words, not only is China already the world’s largest economy, the gap between it and the U.S. can be expected to grow even wider. This continues to be borne out in the growth statistics -- though China has slowed in recent years, its economy continues to expand at a rate of more than 6 percent, while the U.S. is at just over 2 percent. If that disparity persists, China’s economy will be double that of the U.S. in less than two decades.

So economically, China has surpassed the U.S., and is on track to zoom far ahead in the near future. But what about military power? Here, it still looks like the U.S. reigns supreme. It spends more money on its military than China, has a larger nuclear arsenal, and -- thanks to its recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq -- has a more seasoned fighting force as well.

But that doesn’t mean that the U.S. would win a war, if the two countries fought. A full nuclear exchange, of course, would have no winners. But in a protracted conventional struggle, there’s a good chance that China’s weight of numbers and manufacturing prowess would win out. As an analogy, consider the U.S. and Japan in World War II. At the beginning of the war, Japan’s aircraft carrier force outnumbered that of the U.S., and its navy was far more seasoned (due to Japan’s war in China). But when the war began, the U.S. greatly outproduced its opponent:



Economic Size Made all the DifferenceAircraft-carrier production

Source: Combinedfleet.com

The U.S. also had a 2-to-1 manpower advantage. When two countries of similar technology levels fight, numbers tend to tell. China has a larger GDP, more manufacturing output and four times the population. And as its recent advances in stealth technology, directed energy weapons, hypersonic missiles and other areas demonstrate, its military technology isn’t that far behind the U.S. In a drawn-out war, once the mighty Chinese steamroller got moving, it would be unstoppable.

In other words, China is now in a position similar to that of the U.S. at about the turn of the 20th century -- a formidable superpower that just hasn’t yet felt any reason to exercise its dominance. Once the U.S. woke up to the need to throw its weight around, no one doubted its primacy.

China may never make the same decision. It may choose to remain restrained on the international stage, with a modest nuclear arsenal and a light footprint in global institutions. If so, its dominance will remain a lurking, looming potentiality instead of a real and present fact of life.

But I wouldn't count on that happening.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Noah Smith at nsmith150@bloomberg.net

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
James Greiff at jgreiff@bloomberg.net




To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 9:46:15 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218074
 
soon to reach a shop near you

finance.yahoo.com

Volvo's Polestar to go electric: Performance car brand gets boost


Volvo unveils Polestar model in China, looks to rival Tesla 3

By Adam Jourdan

SHANGHAI (Reuters) - Volvo Cars and its Chinese parent have unveiled their first Polestar high performance electric car and pledged to invest 5 billion yuan ($760 million) in the brand, gearing up for intense competition to sell greener cars in the world's biggest auto market.

The Swedish car maker took the wraps off the "Polestar 1", a luxury four-seater hybrid coupe in a ceremony in Shanghai - its first salvo as it positions the brand as a competitor to Tesla Inc <TSLA.O> and Mercedes's <DAIGn.DE> AMG division.

China has said it wants electric and plug-in hybrid cars to make up at least a fifth of Chinese auto sales by 2025, spurring a raft of investment plans from global automakers in electric vehicles, particularly new joint ventures with Chinese firms.

The Polestar 1 - with a nominal pricetag of 130,000 euros to 150,000 euros ($153,000-$176,000) - will go into production in the western Chinese city of Chengdu in mid-2019. Close behind will be the smaller, fully electric Polestar 2, that would compete more directly with the Tesla 3, and an SUV Polestar 3.

Volvo, owned by Zhejiang Geely Holding [GEELY.UL], bought Polestar in 2015 and relaunched the brand as a stand-alone electric car business in June this year.

Volvo's chief executive Hakan Samuelsson said there was huge demand for premium electric cars in China, but added a lot of others players were moving into the market, raising competition.

"In electric high-performance cars there are a lot of companies now in this start-up arena, so we will have company," he said in Shanghai.

The Polestar 1 will be produced in "lower volume", but the subsequent models will be "mass produced" and all will be sold online via a subscription model involving monthly payments.

China has set strict quotas for electric and hybrid vehicles that carmakers need to hit by 2019 and has begun looking at an eventual ban on the production and sale of cars using fossil fuels.

Samuelsson said China's aggressive push towards electric vehicles was positive, though he disagreed with the prescriptive nature of the quota system. He added the government would need to work cooperatively with carmakers to make the shift work.

"You cannot do this alone. We cannot build up (for example) the charging infrastructure in China; developing the tech, the politicians can't do either," he said.

Volvo has said that all its car models launched after 2019 will be electric or hybrids, making it the first major traditional carmaker to set a date for phasing out vehicles powered solely by the internal combustion engine.

($1 = 6.6013 Chinese yuan)

($1 = 0.8519 euros)

(Reporting by Adam Jourdan; Editing by Edwina Gibbs, Greg Mahlich)



To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/18/2017 10:06:42 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 218074
 
according to maxey, more usa exports to help maintain peace and stability
and/or to dilute china alt-import, or whatever, and if so, peace & stability costs less by team china's way

"But while China is becoming a true competitor of the U.S. in the provision of key weapons systems such as drones, it is also replacing Russia as the cheaper and less restricted alternative supplier. For example, a Chinese CH-4 drone costs a mere $4 million on the global market, while the MQ-1 Predator and ground station costs a reported $20 million."

thecipherbrief.com

Will China Start Selling the ‘AK-47’ of Drones?

October 15, 2017 | Levi Maxey

The Newsletter



From the time of the first kinetic strike by an unmanned aircraft in October of 2001, the United States has relied heavily on remote-controlled drone technology for its relatively inexpensive loitering capabilities and the geographic reach it enables in the global war on terror.

Over the years the U.S. has slowly lost its monopoly on the use of military drones, with adversaries such as China now developing their own remotely controlled weapons and surveillance platforms, both for their own military and to export to countries that align with its national interests.

In response, the Trump Administration is reportedly nearing a decision to make it easier to sell U.S.-made military drones such as the MQ-1 Predator and MQ-9 Reaper overseas as part of the “Buy American” campaign. The campaign seeks to overhaul U.S. arms export protocols in an effort to compete against fast-growing global rivals such as China, while countries such as Russia, Israel, Turkey, and South Korea are close behind.

The changes in U.S. export regulations are reportedly based on a desire to renegotiate the 1987 Missile Technology Control Regime – an accord signed by the U.S. and 34 other countries that set the rules for the sale and purchase of missiles. The focus of the renegotiations would allegedly be an alternative interpretation of what is defined as a missile – the accord currently defines drones with a flight range over 185 miles and payload above 1,100 pounds as cruise missiles that require tight export controls.

A new definition that excludes certain drones as missiles would loosen the sale of unarmed intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance systems equipped with high-resolution remote aerial monitoring and laser-guided targeting systems to aid missiles fired from other air, land, and sea assets.

Countries that will likely be given fast-track sales to American drones are close NATO allies and partners in the “Five Eyes” intelligence alliance: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. But other strategic allies, such as India and certain governments in the Middle East, are also likely to become eligible to purchase sophisticated U.S. drones.

China, which is not a signatory to the 1987 accord, has seemingly taken advantage the American void in exporting drone technology to certain countries and quickly advanced to develop and export its own arsenal of unmanned aerial systems.

What are the geopolitical implications of China becoming the primary alternative supplier of drones to countries both hostile and friendly to the United States? How does this proliferation differ from China simply incorporating its drone technology into its own military doctrine? Will China’s drones become the AK-47s of tomorrow?

Since joining the military drone scene, China has grown into a world leader in the technology’s development, which could have strategic implications for the U.S. foreign policy in flashpoint regions such as the South China Sea, and even around the globe.

First, what is China’s broader military doctrine? Unlike how drones fit into American military doctrine, which has largely surrounded monitoring and lethally striking non-state actors in countries outside of its immediate sphere of influence, Chinese military doctrine is much more confined to their region – more specifically the Chinese mainland and disputed territories in the South China Sea. What’s more, their primary goal is to pursue anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) against a near-peer, if not conventionally superior, adversary – the United States – not dispersed networks of non-state actors.

To meet this specific Chinese military challenge, Beijing has developed an arsenal of unmanned aerial systems ranging from stealthy combat drones to networked-drone swarms. While the U.S. military still remains superior in technology and in number of drones – with the U.S. military reportedly operating some 7,000 and Chinese military operating at least 1,300 – China is quickly gaining traction.

China’s CH-3 and Ch-4 are broadly modeled off variations of the U.S. Predator and Reaper drones. The next iteration, the CH-5, with a 4400-mile flight range over 60 hours – soon to be 12,000 miles over 120 hours – and payload of over one ton of weapons and sensors, including modules designed for electronic warfare and early warning radar to detect enemy aircraft, is the country’s most advanced drone to date. It can even communicate with other combat drones such as earlier CH-3 and CH-4 models to conduct joint missions. Similarly, the smaller CH-805 Stealth Target Drone, which can fly at near supersonic speeds to mimic Chinese fighters on air defense systems, would likely be used operationally as a wingman for manned aircraft.

Notably, however, China must tailor its military doctrine to engage a conventionally superior foe in the United States, who has prioritized expensive and highly advanced drone hardware such as the Global Hawk. For this reason China has sought to foster drones that will enable it an asymmetric capability – an inexpensive attack force operating together and capable of quick – though not decisive – attacks. For this reason, Beijing has sought swarms of small, low-tech, possibly 3-D printable drones linked together through high-tech artificial intelligence to create a cognitive hive mind, or swarm.

For example, China’s SW-6 is a small “marsupial” drone with folding wings that can be dropped en mass from cargo chutes or helicopters to conduct persistent surveillance, jam enemy communications, or even relay friendly communications in contested airspace. While the drone is unarmed, it could network with other SW-6s to hunt, swarm, and even dive-bomb enemy targets. This would allow Beijing to project power within its sphere of influence with a lower probability of outright military confrontation – the presence of unarmed drones do not trigger escalation in the same way that fighter jets or aircraft carriers do.

“Should a U.S. warship all of sudden get swarmed by hundreds if not a thousand small unarmed drones, it could have disruptive and distracting effects – impacting electronics and target acquisition for U.S. weapons systems by blinding them,” says Doug Wise, former Deputy Director of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. “By having the nonlethal drone military capability, it also gives the Chinese a non-kinetic way to conduct military operations in the prosecution of the sovereign Chinese seas – expedite control of a disputed island or interdict maritime traffic to control the waters.”

Part of the reason the Chinese military has likely kept its drones near the mainland could be a lack of space-based communications for over-the-horizon flight control where there is not a direct line of sight between the Chinese-based ground control and the drone. But China has already displayed an ability to do conduct such operations in a limited fashion, and as Beijing’s constellation of satellites grows, so will its ability to conduct remote operations in far off places where it has national interests, such as Africa and the Middle East, where drones could be launched from its new military base strategically positioned in Djibouti.

While drones might play a narrow asymmetric roll in Chinese military doctrine at the moment, the prominence of Chinese drone technology in defense trade shows suggests Beijing is also seeking to incorporate the technology into its broader foreign policy. Besides the United States, who has sold armed drones to the British and Italian militaries, China is the only other current exporter of lethal drones, providing them to governments with questionable human rights records, such as Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and possibly even the Somali military. China is even building factories for its drones outside of its borders, in places like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Myanmar, essentially bypassing plausible export restrictions all together.

But while China is becoming a true competitor of the U.S. in the provision of key weapons systems such as drones, it is also replacing Russia as the cheaper and less restricted alternative supplier. For example, a Chinese CH-4 drone costs a mere $4 million on the global market, while the MQ-1 Predator and ground station costs a reported $20 million.

“There are definite issues going on with restrictions on who we can and can’t sell to, but they are never the sole cause,” says Peter W. Singer, a Strategist and Senior Fellow at New America. “And sometimes those restrictions are pointed to as if somehow if they could get this law changed, or the interpretation of it changed, all would be good – no. Essentially what is going on here is that China is offering itself up not just an alternative seller, but also an alternative seller of products that are comparable and cheaper. “

The implications of Chinese sales of drones go far beyond the lost of profit U.S. defense firms might lose out on should they be restricted or outbid by Chinese competitors – and there is little evidence to show that loosening the export controls on U.S. systems will even make them more competitive on the global market. The true implications are that, unlike U.S. use of drones in the far corner so the globe that rings of American imperialism, China is able to sidestep political backlash by turning to proxy nations to conduct its fights remotely through drone proliferation.

“When you are thinking about Chinese systems – be it unmanned aerial systems or armed robotic tanks or warships – you have to think about it in a framework that is not just about China,” says Singer. “It is akin to how the U.S. military had to think about the implications of the spread of big fighter jets to surface-to-air missiles to AK-47s – not just in the Red Army’s hand, but how they would be present in battlefields that the Russian weren’t serving in. And that is the same thing today when we look at the proliferation of these technologies.”

Levi Maxey is a cyber and technology analyst at The Cipher Brief. Follow him on Twitter @lemax13.



To: elmatador who wrote (136134)10/19/2017 8:14:28 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218074
 
good news still 8-hrs warm, served by the sort of suspect magazine you apparently indulge in

imagine for a moment what 30-years of same same might facilitate, enable, or otherwise give rise to ... say 36% of global gdp for example, etc etc

whether by enlarged pie or by compression of the cake might be a question

i am guessing enlarged pie even as some players might be compressed by way of 2026 teotwawki and 2032 darkest interregnum

economist.com

China’s audacious and inventive new generation of entrepreneurs


Industries and consumers around the world will soon feel their impact
8 hours ago



“NEW era, new revolution. I am a MAKER, for the hearts of the dream.” So goes a rallying cry carved in giant letters on the wall of a warehouse in Shekou, a seaside enclave near Hong Kong. Many of China’s most promising entrepreneurs flocked there recently for a conference organised by TechCrunch, a technology publisher from Silicon Valley. Yet Baidu, Alibaba and Tencent—established Chinese internet giants collectively known as the BAT—were overshadowed by upstarts such as Didi Chuxing, a ride-hailing firm that chased America’s Uber away from China, and Ofo, a bike-sharing startup that is going global.



They are part of a new wave of inventive young firms emerging from China. A few years ago, Chinese innovation meant copycats and counterfeits. The driving force is now an audacious, talented and globally minded generation of entrepreneurs. Investors are placing big bets on them. Around $77bn of venture-capital (VC) investment poured into Chinese firms from 2014 to 2016, up from $12bn between 2011 and 2013. Last year China led the world in financial-technology investments and is closing on America, the global pacesetter, in other sectors (see chart 1).

China’s 89 unicorns (startups valued at $1bn or more) are worth over $350bn, by one recent estimate, approaching the combined valuation of America’s (see chart 2). And to victors go great spoils. There are 609 billionaires in China compared with 552 in America.



“Innovation moves faster here,” insists Kai-Fu Lee, a former head of Google’s Chinese operations who now runs Sinovation Ventures, a VC fund and accelerator in Beijing. Gone are the “C2C” (copy to China) and “JGE” (just good enough) strategies of their parochial predecessors. China’s nimble new innovators are using world-class technologies from supercomputing to gene editing. Having established themselves in the cut-throat mainland market, many are heading abroad.

There are three main reasons why China’s determined entrepreneurs can expand their businesses rapidly. First, the economy, the world’s second largest, is big enough to let firms attain huge scale just by succeeding at home. It helps that language and culture are more homogeneous than in Europe and physical infrastructure (such as roads and wireless broadband) is new and excellent, unlike in America.

Second, Chinese shoppers are voracious and venturesome, an advantage to innovators with clever products but unfamiliar brands. They are also unusually eager to embrace technology. China’s penetration rates for mobile phones and broadband internet are high, making it easy for startups to reach a vast market cheaply. And China is rapidly becoming cashless. The volume of mobile payments shot up almost fourfold last year, to $8.6trn, compared with just $112bn in America. This is why China breeds financial-technology startups so quickly and is home to many of the world’s most valuable fintech firms. Ant Financial, spun out of Alibaba, may be worth more than $60bn.

Third, state-dominated industries ranging from telecommunications and banking to health care are woefully inefficient and even hostile to consumers. This allows agile newcomers, with business models that put the customer first and deploy the latest technologies, to jump ahead of incumbents more easily in China than their counterparts in developed markets.

Moving at China speed

The government’s inability to run industries well is counterbalanced by a willingness to support new ventures, which in turn hastens innovation in areas such as transport. David Frey of KPMG, a consultancy, believes that it has played a useful role as a “market-maker”, one reason why China is far ahead of America in both electric-vehicle (EV) registrations and the number of charging facilities. A recent announcement of an eventual ban on petrol engines (probably after 2030) could help to secure a long-term lead in the global EV market. But the most useful change was a decision to allow venture-backed startups without previous carmaking experience to enter a field previously dominated by inept firms cranking out subpar EVs.

Consider Nio, a three-year-old automotive company. Its headquarters and research centre are tucked away in a huge complex of low-rise buildings in Shanghai’s Jiading district, a cluster that aspires to become the Detroit of China. It is the brainchild of Li Bin, one of China’s most formidable serial entrepreneurs. He made a fortune through BitAuto, a pioneering online platform for buying and selling cars. He also conceived and launched Mobike, Ofo’s main rival in the booming bike-sharing market, and is still its chairman. Nio, backed by the country’s most astute early-stage investors, including China’s Hillhouse Capital and America’s Sequoia Capital, is valued at around $3bn.

Leaping to a whiteboard, Mr Li calculates that the impact China’s cars have had on the planet over the past decade equals that of all cars in the previous 100 years. “From 2000 to 2017,” he adds, sketching a declining curve, “there was diminishing happiness from owning a car.” Traffic, pollution and accidents were to blame. So too, he adds, is a car industry locked into “a 100-year-old way of doing business”.

Driven by innovation

His solution has three pillars. The first is to combine cloud computing, artificial intelligence and sensing technologies to advance autonomous driving. This will not end traffic jams, he reckons, but it can bestow on erstwhile drivers the gift of free time in their cars. Nio has unveiled Eve, a concept vehicle that is in effect an AI-powered living room on wheels. The second pillar is to speed up electrification. To augment the roll-out of conventional chargers, he will offer rapid battery swapping in big cities. The third, and one in which he thinks startups have the edge, is to design cars specifically for the digital era.

The firm has developed much of its technology in-house. It employs people from 40 countries, some poached from established carmakers including Ford and Volkswagen. Last November, Nio presented its first vehicle at a glitzy event at the Saatchi Gallery in London. The EP9, which holds the world speed record for EVs, is designed to wow critics and show off technological prowess, not for mass-market sales. That will come in time, says Mr Li.

Over the next decade, he sees sales rising to the millions, half outside China. Nio has an affiliate in Silicon Valley headed by Padmasree Warrior, a former chief technology officer of Cisco, which plans to raise funds as an independent entity this year. “We consider ourselves a global startup because we want to solve global problems,” Mr Li reflects. As for rivals, he is confident that “Nio can do much better than Tesla.”

Venturesome consumers also play a role in fostering innovation. The Chinese are keen to try new products and are more forgiving than Westerners if they are not perfect. Deprived of consumer goods and luxuries for many years, they are eager to experiment. Wealthy Chinese are younger (typical Audi buyers in Germany are in their 50s; in China they are in their 30s), and hence more familiar with technology. Because the car is not a cherished cultural icon as it is in America, locals are not addicted to driving and are open to alternative forms of mobility such as ride-sharing.

That has been a boon to Didi. With a reported valuation of $50bn, it is the world’s most valuable startup after Uber. This is thanks to an injection earlier this year of $5.5bn, the biggest-ever funding round for a young tech firm, by a group led by Japan’s SoftBank. Didi’s other investors include all the BAT companies, as well as Apple. Didi is far more than a smartphone app for hailing cars, explains Connie Chan of Andreessen Horowitz, an American VC firm. The willingness of local consumers to experiment has helped shape its business model.

Didi runs car pools, minibuses and buses in addition to taxis and luxury cars. It has services for the elderly and can send a driver to take you home in your own car. The firm provides about 20m rides a day in China, several times the number managed by Uber worldwide. Didi hopes to use AI to predict a customer’s transport needs, be that for cars, public transport or bicycles. Its platform offers 200,000 EVs, a figure set to rise to 1m within a few years, and it plans to promote autonomous cars heavily.

“We’re definitely going global,” declares Jean Liu, Didi’s president. Her firm owns stakes in ride-hailing services worldwide, from India’s Ola and South-East Asia’s Grab to Brazil’s 99 and America’s Lyft. In July Didi and SoftBank ploughed $2bn into Grab. In August the Chinese upstart invested in two Uber clones, Estonia’s Taxify, which serves Europe and Africa, and Dubai’s Careem, which operates in the Middle East. It does not lack ambition: “In the next five years, Didi will grow beyond a mobility service to become the world’s leading automotive network operator and a leader in new transportation technologies,” the firm claims.

Didi’s success shows how local companies can cause global disruptions with sharing-economy services road-tested in China. The country’s urbanites already use smartphones to rent umbrellas, mobile-phone chargers, basketballs and other necessities for a small fee. The firms behind such services are pioneering the use of micropayments and credit verification using analysis of social media.

Accelerating the business cycle

The battle of the bikes is the most closely fought of China’s sharing-economy wars. Ofo and Mobike, rival bike-sharing unicorns worth about $3bn each, have redesigned the humble two-wheeler to be an intelligent, cloud-connected device. China’s big cities are awash with brightly coloured bikes from a rainbow of competitors. Because tracking technology removes the need for dedicated docks, they can be picked up and dropped off anywhere. This convenience creates new problems to solve. Ofo is pioneering a credit-scoring system that rewards well-behaved users and punishes naughty ones, such as those who park in the middle of roads.

Dai Wei, Ofo’s boss, explains that his firm’s rapid rise builds on the explosive growth in smartphones, mobile payments and the internet of things in China. Just three years ago, Ofo’s founders were poor students in Beijing, frustrated that their bikes were often stolen. They now control 8m bikes and provide over 25m rides a day in America, Singapore and Britain as well as China, and expect to operate in 200 cities in 20 countries by the end of the year.

Ofo is moving at China speed but the trail ahead could be bumpy. The mainland has dozens of bike-sharing startups. All are investing furiously. Almost all will be crushed. The chance of failing in China is far higher than in Silicon Valley, explains Xiang Bing, dean of Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business in Beijing. But because so many well-funded firms are chasing so many novel ideas so quickly, he predicts that the battle-hardened winners will become world-beaters.

The inefficiency of China’s state-dominated economy is another powerful force boosting entrepreneurs. Young firms are using new technologies and novel business models to push aside state-run laggards. China’s health industry, for instance, is antiquated and dysfunctional. Long queues are common at state hospitals and access to drugs is complicated by an opaque system of dispensation. AliHealth, an arm of Alibaba, is now a leading online pill-peddler. WeDoctor helps patients book medical appointments using smartphones. Venus Medtech has invented a retrievable heart valve intended for patients with high calcification in their arteries.

The best example of a local health-care disrupter with global potential, however, is iCarbonX, a health-data analytics firm from Shenzhen, a metropolis near Hong Kong. It is the brainchild of Wang Jun, who is a picture of the active health he wants to encourage with his startup. He formerly ran BGI, one of the world’s leading genomics-research firms. The Chinese company was involved in the global race to decode the first human genome and at one time owned half the world’s gene-sequencing equipment.

Healthy competition

Asked why he left, Mr Wang confesses that he grew frustrated by the limits of academic research, even at privately run BGI. A breakthrough in genomics typically does not carry real-world implications. A better approach, he reckoned, would be to marry genomics with data on lifestyle, diet, gut bacteria, blood and so on to find stronger correlations and better treatments. This required entrepreneurship, he reasoned, because “commercial firms are designed for efficiency.”

At iCarbonX he aims to build a predictive digital avatar of each of its customers. The company will start with the goal of 1m punters within a few years, he says, but expects to grow in time to 10m or 100m or beyond as its AI algorithms, supercomputing expertise and analytical methods improve. Within six months of its founding in 2015, Mr Wang had secured enough funding from Tencent and others to become a unicorn—making iCarbonX the fastest firm in the world to do so.

To mine a deep seam of health data, iCarbonX has invested $400m in building a global coalition of medical startups. SomaLogic will supply expertise in analysing human proteins. PatientsLikeMe, which curates an online network of some 500,000 people with chronic diseases, will share patient experiences. AOBiome will contribute its knowledge on the interaction of bacteria and human health.

Fast-mover advantage

Western rivals like IBM and Google have similar goals but Mr Wang is undaunted. “We’ll collect more and better data, and we’ll do it more quickly,” he insists. He just might. With Tencent as a partner, he can expect access to data collected by WeChat, its messaging-and-payments app with about 1bn users. It helps that Chinese consumers are more relaxed than Westerners about sharing personal data. The Chinese government’s supportive stance on ???precision medicine” is useful, too.

Other inefficient state-dominated industries are being upended. China’s logistics sector was roughly equal to 15% of GDP in 2016, costlier even than in Brazil or India. Many of the lorries owned by individuals miss out on jobs because they lack information about potential new loads. This is changing fast. “Our target market is ten times as big as Didi’s,” calculates Richard Zhang, the finance chief of Huochebang, a logistics-technology unicorn. He estimates that the empty-load rate in China is 40%, well above the American level. Huochebang’s online marketplace matches drivers with loads at no charge (though he expects this service to become the main earner once the firm starts levying fees). It also offers lorry sales and leasing, insurance and financial services. Mr Zhang vows to go global in the future.

Older firms often stuck with the familiar home market, but the best new ones are born global and have the world in their sights. Many have founders educated abroad; others are backed by foreign venture capitalists. Edward Tse, an expert on Chinese innovation, argues that local startups have world-class people and technology at their disposal: “They know much more about what is going on in Silicon Valley or Israel than do Europeans.”

Mr Lee reckons the country’s vast and growing market, its urban hyper-density and its legions of tech-hungry and free-spending young people provide a better proving ground for aspiring global entrepreneurs than do the stagnant markets of the developed world. He is convinced that China has the most industrious entrepreneurs and the boldest venture capitalists anywhere. As a result, he insists, China’s winners “will inherit a decent portion of the world market.”



China’s new entrepreneurs are clearly on the ascendancy but there are plenty of ways in which they could yet stumble. Outside factors such as a sharp recession or banking crisis could lead to a panicky venture-capital bust. The rule of law in China remains uncertain. Many new firms, such as those in online finance and the sharing economy, operate in grey areas that are vulnerable to regulatory whim. Even the popular bike-sharing firms could one day find their business models undermined by arbitrary new rules.

The high-octane nature of innovation in China may also make for a bumpy ride. The spectacular rise of some firms could be mirrored by the precipitous fall of others. Even so, there are good reasons to think that the best of the bunch will overcome such obstacles and in time enhance competition and provide better goods and services everywhere. A Chinese startup might even give the world that most elusive of inventions, the flying car.

Kuang-Chi Science already makes money by floating helium-filled blimps, chock-full of sensors and communications equipment, high above cities. Liu Ruopeng, its chairman, explains that this is an inexpensive “satellite for smart cities” that can monitor traffic and pollution while serving as a hub for the internet of things. It is perfecting advanced balloon technologies that it hopes will bring tourists and cargo to near-space at a fraction of the cost of rockets within a few years, and owns a majority stake in Martin Jetpack, a New Zealand firm that makes one-man flying machines. “Every individual should be able to fly cheaply, easily and safely!” insists Mr Liu. China’s new wave of entrepreneurs has already taken flight.

This article appeared in the Briefing section of the print edition under the headline "The next wave"