I had earlier pointed out what should be pointed out, that
<< Message 31927066
"opportunity" ...
you are right, that the SEC is jumping on wagon per Pence all-government approach, but is actually doing Xi Jinping's bidding.
(3) Re <<At this time I do not see China saying "no". The cost of a positive response is small. The cost of a negative response is greater and greater mistrust, and that is the face China wants to and needs to change, to prosper.>>
You might appreciate China / Xi Jinping keeping quiet for a very good reason, that being china wants those listings to be pressured in USA so that the companies would migrate to Shanghai. The companies are understandably less enthusiastic about Shanghai, and so looking at Hong Kong.
At the moment Hong Kong real estate is hiccupping, but really limited to residential and retail, as opposed to office and industrial, because the companies moving in for tax-home is increasing. Folks prefer Hong Kong to Shanghai, for the freedom, and to NYC for the less-hassle.>>
Here be the follow-up, indicating one should wait for many shoes to fall and then pick up what positions earlier investors choose to de-camp, cheap, and weather the storm for the inevitable inexorable rejuvenation, de-risked.
I can just see it now. Congressional hearings on “who lost China, part 2”
wsj.com
Will China Cheat American Investors?Beijing wants to bring home its big tech firms. U.S. shareholders may face undervalued buyouts.
By
Jesse M. Fried and
Matthew Schoenfeld
Dec. 13, 2018 6:45 p.m. ET
While Washington and Beijing battle over trade, a worrisome cross-border financial link has escaped scrutiny: Americans now collectively own most of the public equity of China’s biggest tech companies, including Alibaba, Baidu and Weibo. This relationship is strange (imagine if the Chinese owned most of Amazon, Facebookand Google). It’s also extremely risky, at least for American investors.
China’s tech darlings began tapping U.S. investors in the early 2000s, when mainland capital markets were unsophisticated and strict profitability requirements shut out most fast-growing tech firms. Dozens of Chinese unicorns and near-unicorns went to New York to raise capital from Americans eager for exposure to China’s explosive growth.
Such investment was technically proscribed by China’s tough laws restricting foreign investment in the internet sector. But Beijing turned a blind eye because funding this critical industry domestically was fraught with risks. Unlike in the U.S., China’s stock market is dominated by retail investors. Cash-burning startups in hypergrowth mode are harder to value—even for sophisticated, institutional investors—than mature ones. They are therefore more vulnerable to violent price swings. Instability is dangerous for autocrats, especially in a country without a sturdy social safety net.
The relationship seemed like a win-win: U.S. investors got to own fast-growing companies, while China avoided destabilizing manias and panics. But the symbiosis began to break down as these hypergrowth companies matured. American investors became dispensable, and thus vulnerable to expropriation.
It started around 2014 with a wave of confiscatory “take private” transactions led by Chinese controlling shareholders. The objective was to delist U.S. shares at low buyout prices and later relist them in China at a much higher valuation.
Consider the July 2016 take-private of Qihoo 360, an internet security firm. The founders squeezed out U.S. shareholders at $77 a share, reflecting a value of $9.3 billion. In February 2018, they relisted Qihoo on the Shanghai Stock Exchange at a valuation north of $60 billion. That’s a 550% return. Qihoo’s chairman personally made $12 billion upon relisting, more than he claimed the entire company was worth 18 months earlier.
Public investors in a firm with a controlling shareholder always face the risk of an unfair take-private. But investors in U.S.-listed Chinese companies are particularly vulnerable. Most incorporate in the Cayman Islands. This jurisdiction affords investors much less protection than Delaware, home to most U.S. companies. Neither U.S. nor Cayman court judgments can be enforced in China, where insiders and assets are based. Chinese controllers can thus squeeze out the minority on terms that would make American controllers blush. More than 60 U.S.-listed Chinese companies have been taken private since 2013.
Investors in large-caps like Alibaba and Baidu have felt safe from this type of expropriation because the companies seemed too big to be taken private. But China’s regulatory apparatus started taking an ax to the tech behemoths this year, sending their share prices into free-fall.
Alibaba’s burgeoning e-payment business has been stifled by a series of curbs. NetEase, an e-gaming company, has been subject to a freeze on government approval of new games. Search giant Baidu has been probed unrelentingly over “subversive” content. All told, the four largest U.S.-listed Chinese tech firms—these three plus JD.com —have lost more than $125 billion in market capitalization, about 20% of their value, since March 30.
It’s unlikely regulators would be as aggressive if Chinese retail investors, rather than Americans, were holding the bag. Beijing may be deliberately tanking these companies’ shares to pave the way for Chinese investors to acquire interests at lower prices.
It’s no secret that Beijing remains focused on bringing its largest crown jewels home. In March the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission unveiled a pilot plan to encourage overseas-listed Chinese companies valued at more than 200 billion yuan ($31.9 billion) to float shares in China while remaining listed overseas.
The Big Four qualify. But to date none has participated in the pilot program. Beijing may be waiting for their stock prices to fall further to ensure that the retail investors who buy newly floated shares are protected from further losses. Once local investors have bought into Alibaba and its peers on the cheap, Beijing may relieve the regulatory pressure.
Despite the warning signs, American investors continue lining up for Chinese initial public offerings. In fact, Chinese companies have raised more than $8.5 billion in U.S. markets this year, the most since 2014. This week, Tencent Music Entertainment went public in the U.S., raising about $1 billion at a valuation exceeding $20 billion. Let’s hope investors price in the risk.
Mr. Fried is a professor at Harvard Law School. Mr. Schoenfeld is a portfolio manager at Burford Capital.
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