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Strategies & Market Trends : The Financial Collapse of 2001 Unwinding -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: GPS Info who wrote (1700)1/11/2019 11:39:19 PM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13798
 
Low’s $12bn rape of Malaysia

In September 2009, a 27-year-old Wharton business school graduate stole $US700 million in one go from 1 Malaysia Development Berhad, a government investment fund where he held no formal position. By five years later, according to the US Department of Justice, Jho Low and his associates had gouged out $US4.5 billion.


PETER ALFORD


12:00AM JANUARY 12, 2019 5 COMMENTS

In September 2009, a 27-year-old Wharton business school graduate stole $US700 million in one go from 1 Malaysia Development Berhad, a government investment fund where he held no formal position. By five years later, according to the US Department of Justice, Jho Low and his associates had gouged out $US4.5 billion.

In terms of scale and depravity, the looting of 1MDB is one of the financial crimes of this or any other century. The potential cost to Malaysians of the fund’s collapse, only now being quantified after a unanticipated change of government, is north of $US12bn ($17bn).

Today Low scuttles with his diminished entourage to and from China (we assume), dodging Interpol red notices and his former US playgrounds, where the DoJ has seized some $US1bn of his assets and has laid criminal charges. Low denies everything and pays expensive international lawyers to defend his interests.

His one-time patrons, former prime minister Najib Razak and his wife Rosmah Mansor, are bailed in Kuala Lumpur on a growing mound of charges that should put them away for decades. They too deny everything.

Their colossal mess confronts a new government under 93-year-old Mahathir Mohamad, who led and shaped UMNO, Najib’s party, for two decades but, enraged by 1MDB, thundered out of retirement to lead the opposition’s conquest last May.

Former Goldman Sachs Southeast Asia chairman Tim Leissner, who connived with Low in raising $US6.5bn from 1MDB bond issues even though the young Malaysian was supposedly persona non grata at the bank, has pleaded guilty to bribery and subverting Goldman’s internal controls and forfeited $US43.7m.

The planet’s most powerful investment bank has, yet again, ugly questions to answer about a multibillion-dollar debacle.

Having demanded that Goldman disgorge the extraordinary $US600m fees received from 1MDB, Mahathir’s Finance Minister, Lim Guan Eng, is preparing a $US7.5bn reparations case against the firm.

International Petroleum Investment Company, an Abu Dhabi wealth fund that was a counter-party in the bond deals, is suing Goldman for unspecified damages.

IPIC is also suing its former chief executive Khadem al-Qubaisi and offsider Mohamed al-Husseiny, both Low accomplices, who are believed to be jailed in the emirate.

Yet, for all this contemporary account settling, 1MDB was effectively shuttered four years ago. And as far back as 2010, Low’s near-insane spending and Cristal champagne-soaked revels in the company of Paris Hilton, Leonardo DiCaprio and their fecklessly expensive ilk had attracted attention back in KL, where a tenacious opposition MP, Tony Pua, was probing 1MDB’s rackety finances.

By late 2014, dangerous questions were being asked about Low’s penthouse and hotel purchases in New York, exceeding $US300m, from resources he couldn’t plausibly explain.

From London, he’d snagged the attention of activist journalist Clare Rewcastle Brown.

She began tracking Low as a diversion from her mission to expose the commercial rape of Sarawak’s rainforests by the man she held most responsible, Taib Mahmud — the Borneo state’s dominant politician and a grasping multi-billionaire.

Rewcastle Brown first spotted Low in 2010 dealings with Taib. Next she noted him at The Wolf of Wall Street launch alongside DiCaprio, the star, and co-producer Riza Aziz, whom Low befriended during their England schooldays and who had clambered in three years from Hollywood nobody to financing a $US130m marquee movie.

So, on Boxing Day 2013, her Sarawak Report website speculatively drew together a skein of links between 1MDB, the unaccountably wealthy Low, Riza the arriviste filmmaker, his avaricious mother, Rosmah, and her second husband.

Najib, a blue blood of the ethnic Malay party, had just scraped through an election to extend 56 years of UMNO government, but already trailed a plume of suppressed scandals.

Unknown to any but the inner conspirators, 1MDB was by then crippled and 12 months later it was effectively a corpse, through which $US9.5bn in borrowings had been pumped.

The scandal remained containable until February 28, 2015, when Sarawak Report and The Sunday Times blew off the lid with simultaneous reports, informed by an electronic documents hoard Rewcastle Brown obtained from a disgruntled former PetroSaudi International executive. A $US2.5bn joint venture with PetroSaudi had been hailed in September 2009 as 1MDB’s first big undertaking under thrusting new PM Najib, as a “partnership to spearhead the flow of foreign direct investment from the Middle East”.

Perhaps Najib was sincerely deluded by Low’s crooked Emirati sovereign wealth contacts and his introduction to PetroSaudi co-founder, Prince Turki bin Abdullah al-Saud.

Seventh son of Saudi Arabia’s then monarch, Turki was just one of a swarm of royal drones trying to monetise their status. (Today he’s among a more select group of relatives, those still detained since the 2017 roundup by sinister Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman.)

Otherwise, PetroSaudi was a grab-bag of ­mediocre assets operated by a pair of slick go-getters, chief executive Tarek Obaid, a Riyadh-connected Saudi expat, and chief investment officer Patrick Mahoney.

Billion Dollar Whale: The Man Who Fooled Wall Street, Hollywood and the World, by Tom Wright and Bradley Hope.
Unknown to 1MDB’s directors ratifying the agreement, a $US700m loan had been fabricated, from PetroSaudi to the joint venture. Within two days, 1MDB had dispatched “repayment” to a purported PetroSaudi subsidiary, Good Star Ltd, whose single share was owned by Low.

A pattern was established in what the DoJ, meticulously unpicking the crimes, called the “Good Star phase”: four subsequent debt raisings were immediately pillaged; 1MDB executives who were Low’s accomplices misled or ignored directors; stolen funds were siphoned through a labyrinth of offshore bank accounts, tax-haven companies and lawyers’ client funds.

Also during the Good Star phase, $US20m was paid into an account of a person the DoJ called Malaysian Official 1: Najib Razak.

If the February 2015 exposure blew the lid off the cover-up, on July 2 Wall Street Journal reporters Tom Wright and Simon Clark reached inside to drop a bomb in Najib’s lap with a report headlined “Malaysia leader’s accounts probed”. Sarawak Report again published simultaneously, though this time the deadly material had leaked from the Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission.

The WSJ report lit a fire under the DoJ’s Kleptocracy Assets Recovery Initiative, where FBI investigators were sieving through Rewcastle Brown’s documents.

The reports revealed that in March 2013 — seven weeks before an election UMNO won, barely, by dint of colossal campaign spending — a Najib account received $US681m from Singapore. Rewcastle Brown claims more than $US1bn eventually found its way from 1MDB to Najib. The lacerating detail of the DoJ investigation, unveiled in mid-2016 by attorney-general Loretta Lynch, showed Riza’s Red Granite Pictures received $US238m and Rosmah was gifted jewellery costing $US28m.

1MDB is a technically difficult story. The crimes need complex explanation for lay readers, there is a profusion of actors across a decade and three continents, and exposure begins in earnest only in year seven.



The Sarawak Report, by Clare Rewcastle Brown
In two books on the scandal, Rewcastle Brown’s The Sarawak Report and Tom Wright and Bradley Hope’s Billion Dollar Whale,this necessitates frequent and confusing time shifts.

Also, the big consequences came in May last year, when presumably both books were with their editors.

Wright and Hope focus tightly on Low and his milieu, telling his story linearly: from son of a seedy Penang millionaire already exhibiting weird talents at school, through the 2009-15 roaring years, to jaded fugitive.

Their book is directed at an international audience that knows little of Malaysia and isn’t much interested, but might thrill to the escapades of a precocious criminal genius cavorting through Beverly Hills and Wall Street with a conga line of celebrities. The folk who brought you Crazy Rich Asians have the film rights.

The vivid, cinematic writing fleshes out interesting common characteristics among the conspirators. Obaid, Mahoney, al-Qubaisi, al-Husseiny, Leissner, and Low’s lieutenant Seet Li Lin are, like him, from privileged upbringings, internationally educated, youngish, insatiably greedy and ethically void. These are globalisation’s spawn.

Malaysia in Billion Dollar Whale, however, becomes merely one backdrop for Low’s escapades and not even the most picturesque, what with his supermodels and superyachts. With such a man, this treatment implies, 1MDB could happen anywhere.

Even Najib, his patron, without whose implied authority Low could not have moved, is rendered as a bluff fool. Until suddenly, following the July 2 revelation, the PM bares his fangs at sullen colleagues and savagely regathers political control.

Rewcastle Brown’s Najib isn’t the sharpest arrow in the quiver either but through her ­immersion in environmental issues and her Malaysian political and civil society contacts she conveys how the entwined roots of business and political corruption and the baleful sway of UMNO incumbency enabled an admittedly phenomenal thief.

In contact throughout with the opposition, including its moral leader Anwar Ibrahim as well as Mahathir, and having herself been hounded by the vengeful Najib, she explains the scandal’s political dynamics, which Whale barely acknowledges.

The Sarawak Report is undeniably a tougher read for anyone not closely interested in the 1MDB affair or journalistic hot pursuit.

It is more voluminous and more dense, and the lack of an index is more noticeable than in the case of the airier Billion Dollar Whale.

We are reminded by the constant first person that here is “the inside story of the 1MDB expose” — her expose. In mitigation, Rewcastle Brown is primarily responsible for exposing the worst larceny in East Asia in decades: this is a monument to public-interest journalism.

Without her, third-term prime minister Najib might now be patting the back of his shovel over the deep-buried 1MDB scandal.

Peter Alford was a foreign correspondent in East Asia for 16 years.



To: GPS Info who wrote (1700)1/12/2019 1:08:30 AM
From: Elroy Jetson  Respond to of 13798
 
Kiwis are notoriously cheap. If you're a New Zealand resident who gets seriously ill, if you have any sense, you move to Australia because New Zealand covers so few treatments.



To: GPS Info who wrote (1700)1/15/2019 12:49:20 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13798
 
Even the Chinese entrepreneurs support the US trade war !

Just about every complaint US trade negotiators raised in Beijing last week – not to mention their doubts about the sincerity of China's concessions – are shared by Chinese entrepreneurs, who feel as under-appreciated and unwelcome as their foreign counterparts. Their common enemy: the Chinese industrial state, an animus summed up in China by the lament "guo jin, min tui" – the state advances, the private sector retreats.

In his trade war with China, Donald Trump has secret allies

By Andrew Browne15 January 2019 — 12:39am

In his tariff war with China, US President Donald Trump has some hidden allies. Just about every complaint US trade negotiators raised in Beijing last week – not to mention their doubts about the sincerity of China's concessions – are shared by Chinese entrepreneurs, who feel as under-appreciated and unwelcome as their foreign counterparts. Their common enemy: the Chinese industrial state, an animus summed up in China by the lament "guo jin, min tui" – the state advances, the private sector retreats.

This reality underscores how tough it will be for the Trump administration to roll back a set of statist industrial policies that are rooted more in politics and ideology than economics. At the same time, it presents Trump with an opportunity – to leverage internal Chinese pressure to open doors both for international investors and a domestic Chinese constituency with a vital stake in playing by global trading rules.

In his efforts to ensure Communist Party control over every facet of Chinese life, Chinese President Xi Jinping has smothered the animal spirits of the country's private businessmen, who account for more than 60 per cent of economic output and 80 per cent of employment. Even though the party welcomed capitalists to join in 2001, they've long had an uneasy relationship with state authority. Many have been caught up in Xi's anti-corruption campaign, paying the price for a pervasive rent-seeking culture in which bribing officials was necessary to secure business deals, land and bank loans.

Some wealthy entrepreneurs are moving their money offshore because they fear their tainted earnings will be confiscated. Others are putting off hiring and investing as the economy slows. Fred Hu, the founder of Primavera Capital Group, compares their current mood to the years immediately following the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown, which were marked by "tremendous uncertainty, concerns and worries" about the future.

The fact is that the world needs Chinese private enterprises to succeed if China is to remain a driver of global growth. And, conveniently enough, their demands mirror those of multinationals: better access to services markets that are currently dominated by state monopolies in energy, finance, telecommunications and transport; better protection for their intellectual property; a reduction in the subsidies, cheap financing and other advantages enjoyed by the state sector; and a desire to be left alone by meddling bureaucrats.

No less than foreigners, local players would love to get rid of the party cells implanted in their companies. What's more, a policy shift away from state enterprises, which dominate old-line industries, towards private businesses, which excel at innovative services, would help boost Chinese domestic consumption and reduce the household savings glut that shows up in external imbalances. It is these distortions that have destabilised the global trading order and sparked a protectionist backlash in much of the West.

Xi will never willingly dismantle the state-led industrial structure he sees as key to the survival of the Party. Privatisation of state enterprises is not on the table, even though they suck up 50 per cent of all credit despite accounting for just 20 per cent of GDP – a colossal misallocation of financial resources.

Still, there are two reasons to think that Xi may be ready to make genuine concessions. First, as the sombre headlines in Chinese newspapers make plain, the economic slowdown, exacerbated by trade tensions with the US, has stunned the Chinese leadership. Until a few months ago, the People's Daily was bombarding readers with stories lauding "Made in China 2025," a blueprint for Chinese high-tech supremacy, and boasting of a "China Solution" to global challenges. Movie-goers were treated to a documentary called Amazing China that extolled Xi's accomplishments in science, technology and poverty reduction. Today, China's industrial ambitions get scant mention in the media and cultural tsars have pulled the propaganda film from cinemas. If nothing else, Trump has got Beijing's attention.

Second, cracking open Chinese markets wider to both domestic and foreign competition would be the surest way for Xi to revive China's flagging growth. Private enterprises produce three times the return on assets compared to state companies and, as the providers of almost all new jobs, they're critical to boosting consumption and weaning the economy off its reliance on credit-fuelled investment. The International Monetary Fund calculates that while China's per capita GDP, measured in terms of purchasing-power, is similar to Brazil's, its consumption per capita is comparable only to Nigeria's. If Chinese consumed like Brazilians, their spending would double.


The government understands the need to appease the private sector. Since the middle of last year, it's been trying to encourage banks to lend more to private companies. Its efforts have made scant progress, though, in large part because the traditional banking system simply isn't set up to issue such loans. Meanwhile, the government, trying to head off a potential financial crisis, has been cracking down on the shadow banks where small firms used to seek financing.

The good news is that a comprehensive blueprint for economic reforms that would energise the private sector already exists. Five years ago, when Xi ascended to power, he unveiled a 60-point plan that pledged "to let the market play a decisive role in the allocation of resources." Unfortunately, the document has been gathering dust ever since. Resurrecting those abandoned pledges in the name of rescuing private Chinese enterprises would give Xi the political cover to accede to some of Trump's demands. A two-for-one bargain is available: China would be wise to take it.

Andrew Browne is the editorial director of the Bloomberg New Economy Forum. Prior to joining Bloomberg, he was China editor, senior correspondent and columnist for the Wall Street Journal.



To: GPS Info who wrote (1700)1/19/2019 4:52:10 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13798
 
The end of the Japanese era in the late 80s, created the Southeast Asian miracle in the 90s which was followed by the Asian Meltdown and lead to the China era.

The Japanese era ended when automation, mechanization and introduction of numerical control machines allowed a bigger flexibility in localization of factories.

High tech products no longer needed to be produced in highly developed countries, where the necessary qualified manpower was available.

One of the remarkable opportunities which new technology provides to companies in the field of training is that, generally speaking, the ability to operate computer controlled equipment can be learned very quickly —in a matter of days— with no previous experience or special apti­tudes.” Aho, C. Michael & Levinson, M., After Reagan, Confronting the Changed World Economy, New York: Council of Foreign Relations, Inc., 1988.