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To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/16/2019 12:16:48 AM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217840
 
hong kong is doomed again, until the entrepreneurial found salvation :0)

until the loophole is closed, Hong Kong would not have to find another loophole

per imperatives give rise to solutions, that simplistic pole climbers cannot begin to fathom, because to fathom requires digging as opposed to climbing

scmp.com

Trump’s trade war tariffs send firms to Hong Kong for a legal loophole
16 Jan 2019 - 9:21am
There were a few worried faces on the 23rd floor of a skyscraper in the business hub of Hong Kong’s Taikoo Place last Wednesday afternoon.

One of the most worried faces belonged to a supply chain manager for a Canadian technology company which manufactures the bulk of its products in China for export to North America.

A few years ago, in an effort to combat rising labour costs in the southern mainland province of Guangdong, his company shifted some of its production to Laos, only to find that the quality and support was nowhere near the level in South China.

“We wanted to move back to China,” he said. “Yes it is more expensive, but the support is much better.

“But then they started talking about tariffs.”

The company is now stuck with sub-par production facilities in Laos. However, since the trade war began last July, anything produced in its plants in China is subject to a 10 per cent tariff when exported to the US. In March, if there is no trade agreement, this is due to increase to 25 per cent.

The worried businessman – who spoke to the ?South China Morning Post on condition of anonymity – says his company is being whacked twice by Donald Trump’s tariffs.

“We can take 10 per cent, we divide the cost between our suppliers and pass some on to our customers. But if it goes up to 25 per cent, I don’t know what we will do. I may lose my job,” he said.

Why US-China dispute is about so much more than a trade imbalanceHe was one of about 20 people in the room, listening to presentations from PwC and Deloitte, about how companies in Hong Kong can avoid paying tariffs in China, but mainly in the US.

The secret lies in an arcane, decades-old customs rule that was codified into US law during the Ronald Reagan administration.

“I don’t usually come to these things,” said a director of a logistics company, who also wished not to be identified, but who said questions from clients had driven him to attend the event.

Cargo volumes at the port of Hong Kong are down by 5 per cent in 2018, and while it is difficult to quantify how much of that is directly related to the trade war – only 16 per cent of the total freight volume is directly related to the US – experts are expecting to see a further fall off once the effect of front-loading of export orders wears off.

China firms reconsider moving to Vietnam after trade truce“Hong Kong, from a shipping perspective, is 70 per cent transshipment. It is volume coming into Hong Kong and going out to China, volume coming into Hong Kong from China, going to other parts of the world,” said Peter Levesque, group managing director of Modern Terminals, the second largest container terminal operator in Hong Kong.

So whatever happens between the US and China, it definitely impacts on Hong Kong,” he said.

The mood in Hong Kong is as palpable as it is understandable.

Hong Kong financial secretary Paul Chan, speaking at the city’s 12th Asian Financial Forum this week, said he entered the new year full of “anxiety” over the decline of the rules-based trading system.

Wilson Chong, senior economist at the Hong Kong General Chamber of Commerce, confirmed the mood of general anxiety.

“Some chamber members have received fewer orders from their US clients due to the trade war,” Chong said.

“Some are worried that the situation might last longer and this uncertainty is hindering them from making important investment decisions.”

While many companies are considering moving their manufacturing out of China, that’s not always possible.

It can take years to relocate. And – as the experience of the Canadian technology company in Laos demonstrates – the quality, expertise and reliability in Southeast Asian countries can often fall well short of that in China.

Trade war drives manufacturers out of China, just not to the USFurthermore, few of these hubs have the infrastructure and capacity to absorb a mass exodus of manufacturing from China. The population of Vietnam, for example, is smaller than that of Guangdong province, while Cambodia in its entirety would fit neatly inside Hebei province, China’s 12th largest.

It is unsurprising, then, that companies are looking for technical workarounds to dodge tariffs.

The presentations from the accountancy firms were complex and high on jargon. But those who sat in the room at Taikoo were engaged, asking questions and scribbling notes.

Desperate times call for desperate measures and one such measure being considered is an arcane, mysterious, 30-year-old piece of trade legislation known as the “first sale rule”.

The first sale rules applies to goods bought and sold multiple times en route to their final buyer in the US, and works like this:

If you have a factory in China making smartphones, you sell that product first to your trading company in Hong Kong (or anywhere else). Your Hong Kong trading company sells it on to the US, but Trump’s tariffs are only payable on the first sale price – that is, what the trading company paid the factory.

There’s a catch: each of these transactions needs to be legitimate. Each party must make money and you have to prove this through reams of documentation, such as purchase orders that require transparency from your suppliers in China.

A major challenge is convincing Chinese suppliers to share details of their finances.

It can be “a pain in the a***” to implement, said Farouk Merzougui, chief financial officer of Native Union, a designer of luxury tech accessories, which is using the first sale rule to skirt tariffs.

It took five months to implement, but he’s now saving two-thirds of the duty slapped on his US exports.

When the trade war hit last summer, he was in the middle of inventory planning for the Christmas season. Merzougui’s firm looked at moving production to Cambodia or Vietnam, but had reservations about the manufacturing standards.

GoPro moving production out of China to avoid US trade war tariffsNative Union doesn’t own its facilities in South China but trusts its suppliers to deliver a quality product, according to Merzougui.

“We were looking for a bridge between a short term and long term supply chain solution, to Christmas basically. It’s not easy, it’s a very unknown rule. But based on our current organisation, it was likely to be the best short term fix,” he said.

“At [a tariff of] 10 per cent this is navigable, at 25 per cent, it’s survival,” Merzougui told the Post.

“It doesn’t protect you totally from the tariffs, it dilutes the burden. It’s not easy, a lot of preparation and documentation. But this trade war has become a competitive advantage.

“We’re a small organisation so we could move fast. Competitors were waiting to see, so we got a competitive advantage.”

The rule has been challenged numerous times but remains in place in the US, which is now the only major market in which first sale can be used, after the EU outlawed it in 2016.

For companies which have never dealt with trade tariffs before, the first sale rule offers a convenient solution.

“First sale is our baby,” said Sally Peng, Hong Kong-based Asia-Pacific practice group leader at Sandler, Travis & Rosenberg, a firm that specialises in trade and customs issues.

It was her firm that brought the litigation case that established the first sale rule in 1988.

In that case, tailored suits were being made to measure in Hong Kong, then shipped to Detroit, via a network of distributors and freight-forwarders, meaning that by the time they reached the final customer in Michigan, they had been sold numerous times.

Trade war has Hong Kong toymakers mulling relocating production from ChinaThose involved in the import trade thought duty should only be paid on the price of the first sale. The United States Court of Appeals agreed.

Three decades on, Peng said, the esoteric loophole now accounts for more than 50 per cent of her practice’s business.

Until recently, first sale was used mainly by the apparel, footwear and electronics industries, which have been subject to relatively high import duties in the US. But, since the trade war began, other firms are catching on.

“In the past, there needed to be two things happening at the same time for first sale to be used. One is that you need a really high volume of exports, as much as possible.

“The second is you want the duty to be high. For some garments, such as yoga clothes, the duty is over 30 per cent, so it was widely used,” Peng said.

Now businesses that have previously enjoyed low tariff access to the US market are getting in touch, even those which don’t have a high volume of exports.

Peng says she is hearing from manufacturers of everything from tables, through car parts, to phone covers and air conditioning units which are produced in Chinese factories and exported to the US.

“The companies that may not have that high a volume [of exports] will consider doing first sale, because they need every little bit of help that they can get,” Peng said.

The common denominator is that each product is on the list of goods subject to US tariffs under Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, the legislation underpinning the US trade war.

The Post spoke to more than a dozen exporters, academics, lawyers, customs experts and consultants about the first sale rule. Some were fully familiar with it, others loosely, while about half had never even heard of it.

Deloitte and PwC said they were fielding more enquiries from Hong Kong companies looking for workarounds before the trade war “truce” expires on March 1.

“Half a year ago we started getting enquiries. That’s when people started to feel that the trade war is going to continue, even though in the beginning a lot of people were hoping that it would end pretty quickly,” Derek Lee, a partner specialising in trade at PwC, said.

Trade lawyers in the US said the rule was legitimate and usable, but warned that the US Customs and Border Protection agency (CBP) would be watching like a hawk for discrepancies.

“Establishing that the necessary conditions will be met for use of ‘first sale’ value is complex and requires careful evaluation,” said Craig Lewis, a trade partner at law firm Hogan Lovells’ Washington practice.

“CBP continues to recognise the validity of this valuation methodology in its practices and rulings, including a ruling recently issued in 2018,” Lewis said.

“Therefore, absent new legislation amending the valuation statute, first sale valuation should continue to be acceptable to use first sale value where the required factual conditions are met.”

Back in Taikoo, the reaction was a mixture of excitement and suspicion.

“Even if true, I wouldn’t recommend it to any of our customers as it doesn’t follow the spirit of the law,” said the logistics provider.

The supply chain manager who fears for his job was more enthused. “That was the first time I heard that we could transfer the cost of the tariff,” he said on the phone days later.

“This is something I am very excited about.”



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/16/2019 1:37:18 AM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217840
 
bad data makes for worse understanding, leading on to terrible policies, result in horrible consequences

but let us not even bother to try to interrupt the awareness process by wasting time w/ pole climbers and such same

bloomberg.com

Is China Really Cheating?The evidence of Chinese malfeasance on trade, technology and intellectual property is a lot thinner than most people assume.
Stephen Roach16 January 2019, 06:00 GMT+8



Estimates of the cost of Chinese IP theft are dubious.
Photographer: Brent Lewin/Bloomberg

Stephen Roach, a faculty member at Yale University and former chairman of Morgan Stanley Asia, is the author of "Unbalanced: The Codependency of America and China."
Read more opinion

Repetition breeds reality. Such is the case with allegations the U.S. has leveled at China in their budding economic Cold War. Across the American political spectrum, it’s now taken for granted that China forces U.S. companies to transfer critical technology in order to do business on the mainland, engages in rampant hacking and theft of intellectual property, and massively and unfairly subsidizes its high-tech industries — all of which contributes to fears that the country poses an existential threat to America’s prosperity.

Like many longtime observers of China, I’ve been getting more than my fair share of airtime over the past several months. Typically, the interview starts with a false premise followed by a loaded question: “Everyone knows that China is stealing hundreds of billions of dollars a year in U.S. intellectual property. Isn’t it high time for America to stand up to its greatest economic threat?”

But, what exactly does “everybody” really know? This assertion is drawn from the findings of the “ IP Commission Report” co-chaired by two renowned public servants, former Director of National Intelligence Adm. Dennis Blair and former Utah governor Jon Huntsman Jr., now ambassador to Russia. In 2017, the commission estimated that intellectual-property theft cost the U.S. economy somewhere between $225 billion and $600 billion annually, an exceptionally broad range. Stolen trade secrets are thought to account for 80-90 percent of the total, the remainder being counterfeit and pirated hardware and software.

When it comes to stolen trade secrets, though, there’s a problem. There’s no hard data to support the estimates. The IP Commission rests its case on a 2014 study by PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and the Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade, which itself relies on dubious “proxy modeling” — in essence, coming up with statistical guesstimates using available data on nefarious activities such as narcotics trafficking, corruption, occupational fraud and illicit financial flows. While these are problematic features of any nation, it takes a rather large leap of faith to convert this information into the 1-3 percent of GDP that the IP Commission claims is lost to theft of intellectual property.

The commission’s estimates of how much of this loss to attribute to China are even more dubious. They come from the U.S. Customs and Border Patrol (CBP), which reported $1.35 billion in seizures of counterfeit and pirated goods in 2015. Another model — this one constructed by researchers at the OECD — was used to convert this to a U.S. total. Then 87 percent of that was attributed to China — 52 percent from the mainland and 35 percent from Hong Kong. With no direct tally available for pirated software, once again a “model” (from the Business Software Alliance) was used to impute 61 percent of that total to Asia Pacific.

Meanwhile, no attempt was made to quantify the Chinese share of stolen trade secrets, which, as noted above, accounts for the bulk of the overall estimate of America’s IP losses. The bottom line: The only thing “everybody knows” about China’s alleged IP theft from the U.S. comes from flimsy evidence derived from highly dubious models.

Unfortunately, an equally suspicious approach was used to support the case leveled by the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) in the so-called Section 301 report published last March and used to justify America’s tariff war against China. The heart of the USTR’s case is that companies are forced to transfer technology when they enter into mainland joint ventures.

Within the JV structure, a voluntary contract between two parties, it’s hardly shocking that U.S. and Chinese partners share talent, strategies, operating systems, process designs and, yes, production technologies in their collective efforts to build a new business.

But, even the USTR confesses it has no hard evidence to prove that this sharing is forced — the essence of the allegation. Buried on page 19 of the 182-page USTR report is the admission that “transfer policies and practices have become more implicit, often carried out through oral instructions and ‘behind closed doors.’” Here, following the highly questionable precedent of the IP Commission, the USTR also rests its case on proxy surveys conducted by the U.S.-China Business Council, in which 19 percent of respondents claim they’ve been forced to transfer technology to their Chinese partners. Curiously, in the council’s latest survey (conducted in 2018), 99 percent of respondents saw no deterioration in IP protection over the past year.

Bias even creeps into the evidence on cyber-attacks presented by the USTR. While there have been reports of very recent cyber incursions by state-sponsored Chinese hackers, most of the allegations documented by the USTR predate a September 2015 cyber accord signed by Presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping.

Finally, while state-sponsored industrial policies (such as “Made in China 2025”) are alleged to be a unique and unfair effort by China to dominate leading-edge industries such as artificial intelligence, little mention is made of similar industrial policies long supported by Japan, Germany, and even the U.S. through its Pentagon-centric R&D program. Nor is there any effort to provide serious economic analysis of the outsize U.S.-China bilateral trade imbalance — the political lightning rod in the trade battle — as but one piece of America’s multilateral deficits with 102 nations that have long afflicted a savings-short U.S. economy.

China is far from perfect and must be held accountable for verifiable economic transgressions. But America’s case against China is based on anecdotes and shaky evidence that don’t stand up to serious scrutiny. As a trade war now morphs into a cold war, the current U.S. administration would be wise to stop relying on such “alternative facts” to wage its battles.

This column does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.

To contact the author of this story:
Stephen Roach at stephen.roach@yale.edu

To contact the editor responsible for this story:
Nisid Hajari at nhajari@bloomberg.net




To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/19/2019 5:37:52 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217840
 
btw, re chip ban to be applied to chia by team America

the last round did not quite work out, maybe this time would be different

but pole-climbers, due to simplicity of thought process, have difficulty grasp reality

https://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/04/10/us_intel_china_ban/



US govt bans Intel from selling chips to China's supercomputer boffins
Xeon, Xeon Phi processors slapped on trade block list

By Iain Thomson in San Francisco 10 Apr 2015 at 18:08

The US government has blocked Intel from shipping high-end Xeon processors to China's supercomputer builders – and other American chip giants are banned, too.

Intel confirmed to The Register last night it was refused permission to sell the chips to the Middle Kingdom's defense labs and other parts of its supercomputing industry.

"Intel was informed in August by the US Department of Commerce that an export license was required for the shipment of Xeon and Xeon Phi parts for use in specific previously disclosed supercomputer projects with Chinese customer INSPUR," a spokesperson for the Santa Clara-based biz said, adding:

Intel complied with the notification and applied for the license which was denied. We are in compliance with the US law.Those Xeon chips are vital to high-performance computing needed for scientific research and similar work: they will be used to power the 50,000-node, 180-petaFLOPS Aurora supercomputer Intel and Cray are building for the US Department of Energy, due to go live in 2018. China's Tianhe-2 computer, today the world's fastest publicly known supercomputer, uses 3.1 million Intel Xeon E5 cores to hit 54 petaFLOPS in peak performance.

The decision to deny China's boffins access to the powerful processors emerged this week – but was formalized on February 18 in rules [PDF] set by the End-User Review Committee (ERC) in the Bureau of Industry & Security (BIS) at the US Department of Commerce.

The ERC is a joint operation run by the Departments of Commerce, State, Defense, and Energy, and occasionally the Treasury, to decide the organizations American companies can and can't sell to.

The committee has added the National Supercomputing Center Changsha in Changsha City, the National Supercomputing Center Guangzhou at Sun Yat-Sen University in Guangzhou, the National Supercomputing Center Tianjin in Tianjin, and the National University of Defense Technology in Changsha City to its blockade.

The ERC did not respond to our requests for information as to why the four centers were placed on the blacklist. The rule update says entities are blockaded if they pose "a significant risk of being or becoming involved in activities that are contrary to the national security or foreign policy interests of the United States."

Other chip manufacturers, including AMD, contacted by El Reg had no comment on the matter at time of going to press. It appears the US government has decided that China's supercomputing industry will have to do without American processors for the time being.

Blowback timeIf the ERC honestly thinks that the ban will put a significant dent in China's supercomputing plans, it is either very foolish or dangerously misinformed.

In the short-term, the ban may slow the development of China's supercomputers slightly, although it wouldn't be hard for a shell company to buy the high-end Xeon processors on the open market, and ship them off to the Middle Kingdom.

At the same time, the US has put Intel in a very sticky position. The company has invested heavily in its presence in the supercomputing market – and in wooing the Chinese – and the ERC decision has just made Chipzilla's life more difficult.

In addition, China is developing processors using the IBM Power architecture, which Big Blue has opened up to more than one Chinese partner. It's not clear how the ERC decision can interfere with this. (Power is definitely a goer in the supercomputer world: a Power9-powered 300-petaFLOPS machine dubbed Summit is being built for the US government by IBM, Nvidia and Mellanox. It is due to arrive in 2017.)

The embargo will add impetus to China's home-grown processor industry, which its government has been investing heavily in developing. Cutting off supplies now is likely to lead the government to open its checkbooks and spend more time and resources building up a processor business to rival the US firms that dominate the market for high-end server chips.

"The governments in China want fast, efficient machines but they don’t want to use chips and systems controlled by vendors outside of China for the same reason the US government gets nervous about deploying machines from Huawei Technologies," Timothy Prickett Morgan, co-editor of our sister site The Platform, noted in March regarding IBM's OpenPower movement.

"Everybody is worried about backdoors that they don’t control, even if they might not exist. This is one reason why Chinese startups are taking a shining to OpenPower."

The CIA term for this kind of cockup is "blowback" – the unintended, harmful consequences of actions. It has become a defining feature of American policy and only last week the former head of the NSA warned about just this kind of processor embargo.

Ex-NSA boss Michael Hayden, writing in the Washington Post this month, said that in the past the US had restricted the sale of high-end chips capable of millions of theoretical operations per second (MTOPS). But when he took over the NSA, Hayden says, he argued against the policy.

"We still wanted an MTOPS advantage, of course, but we were fast realizing that our preferred limits were undermining the global competitiveness of the U.S. computer industry — the very industry on which we relied for our success," he wrote.

"It was becoming clear that the overall health of that industry was more important than any MTOPS advantage against a specific target country. We still insisted on limits with regard to places such as Cuba and North Korea, but we became far more forgiving elsewhere."

He also pointed out that such actions can be used to justify economic and political sanctions against the US by overseas companies and governments. Unilateral action of this type is counterproductive both economically and from a security perspective, he argued. ®



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/19/2019 5:50:41 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217840
 
watch & brief

on parts of the true divide

sciencebusiness.net

China gets ahead in supercomputer raceAccording to the latest Top500 data on supercomputing capabilities, the share of installations based in China continues to increase, with the country now hosting 227 systems, or 45 per cent of the total number of installations world-wide.

However, while China has the most systems, the US still dominates in terms of performance. Two systems at the US Department of Energy (DOE) rank first and second in the world: the Summit supercomputer at Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and Sierra at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

The number of US-based supercomputers continues to decline, reaching in November 2018 an all-time low of 109, 22 per cent of the total.

The EU has 92 supercomputer installations in the top 500. The UK leads with 20 supercomputers, France 18, Germany 17 and Ireland 12. Germany has the best-performing EU supercomputer installation on the list, ranked 7 worldwide, based at the Leibniz Rechenzentrum in Garching near Munich.

Top500 is a closely watched list of global supercomputer capacity maintained by three researchers: Erich Strohmaier and Horst Simon of Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Jack Dongarra of the University of Tennessee and Martin Meuer of ISC Group, Germany.

Number and world share of supercomputer installations, by country



Source: European Commission, www.top500.org




To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/19/2019 5:59:49 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217840
 
it is telling, that rags such as the usually suspect economic magazine has to hedge so much on what it intones, because such pole-climber favourites intuitively know that what they understand is just the surface layer of CNN-esque sloganeering, bearing little resemblance to not only facts on the streets but truth at the core

bullish

that the world shall have two chromo-DNA path to technology, such that one might work out, two might win, or far less likely, both would fail

economist.com

Print edition | Science and technology
Jan 12th 2019


TO LAND ON the Moon, as China’s Chang’e -4 spacecraft did on January 3rd, is not quite the pinnacle of achievement it once was. Both the Indian government and a well-backed Israeli team of enthusiasts will attempt landings there this year; in 2020 various American companies intend to light out for the lunar provinces, too. But all these non-Chinese efforts will land on the Moon’s Earth-facing near side, and thus within the solicitous sight of Earthbound controllers—just as all previous lunar landings, whether American, Soviet or, since 2013, Chinese, have been.

Get our daily newsletterUpgrade your inbox and get our Daily Dispatch and Editor's Picks.

Chang’e-4’s landing site in Von Kármán crater, though, is on the far side of the Moon, where the spacecraft can no more easily be reached by radio than it can be seen through a telescope. Landing there and getting data back afterwards is possible only with the help of a cunningly pre-positioned relay satellite. Other countries have considered such missions, but none has ever mounted one. China has been carefully building up the capacity to go where they have not; now it has done so.

China is keen on such signals of pre-eminence, and willing to put in the work they require. It wants the world, and its own people, to know that it is a global power—that it boasts not just a titanic economy, but the geopolitical sway and military might to match, soft power of all sorts, a storied past and a glorious future. Science is a big part of this. It is seen in China, as elsewhere, as an ennobling pursuit and a necessary foundation for technological advance. China’s leaders see such advances as crucial not just to their economy, but also to expanded military prowess and social progress. They want the sort of science that will help China project its power and respond to its people’s particular problems. They want new clean-energy sources and freedom from resource constraints. And the country’s ever greater scientific proficiency makes such ambitions look realisable. It is a long way from landing on the Moon to mining it. But it is not uncommon to hear speculation about such things. As one Weibo user put it after Chang’e-4’s landing, “China has made history! Half of the Moon will be ours.”

The huge hopes China has for science have prompted huge expenditure. Chinese spending on R&D grew tenfold between 2000 and 2016 (see chart 1). This open chequebook has bought a lot of glitzy kit. Somewhere in the Haidian district of Beijing, which houses the Ministry of Science and Technology as well as Tsinghua and Peking Universities, it seems there is a civil servant quietly ticking things off a list of scientific status symbols. Human space flight? Tick. Vast genome-sequencing facilities? Tick. Fleet of research vessels? Tick. World’s largest radio telescope? Tick. Climate researchers drilling cores deep into the Antarctic icecap? Tick. World’s most powerful supercomputer? Tick (erased when America regained its lead, but watch this space). Underground neutrino and dark-matter detectors? Tick and tick. World’s largest particle accelerator? The pencil is hovering.


The spree is tellingly reminiscent of the golden years of “big science” in post-war America. Between the International Geophysical Year of 1957 and the cancellation of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) in 1993, America’s government unfailingly invested ever more of the resources of an ever more powerful economy into the things which the leaders of its scientific community most wanted. From the creation of quarks to the cloning of genes to the netting of Nobel prizes, American science came to dominate the world.

Over those 40 years America—and, to a lesser extent, Europe—were doing things that had never been done before. They opened up whole new fields of knowledge such as high-energy astrophysics and molecular biology. Benefiting from the biggest and best-educated native generations ever produced, they also welcomed in the brightest from around the world. And they did so in a culture dedicated to free inquiry, one keenly differentiated from the communist culture of the Soviet bloc.

Measured against that boom—one of the most impressive periods of scientific achievement in human history—China’s new hardware, grand as it often is, falls a bit short. It has been catching up, not forging ahead. It has not been a beacon for scientists elsewhere. And far from benefiting from a culture of free inquiry, Chinese science takes place under the beady eye of a Communist Party and government which want the fruits of science but are not always comfortable about the untrammelled flow of information and the spirit of doubt and critical scepticism from which they normally grow.

America’s science boom had a firm institutional and ideological foundation. It grew out of the great research universities that came into their own in the first half of the 20th century, and whose intellectual freedom had attracted extraordinary talents threatened by regimes elsewhere, including Albert Einstein, Enrico Fermi and indeed Theodore von Kármán, the Hungarian-born aeronautical engineer in whose honour Chang’e-4’s new home is named. China has imported ideas and approaches more than people and ideals. The resultant set-up has the ricketiness often seen in structures ordained from the top down rather than built from the bottom up.


Top-down ambition can mean running before you walk. Take FAST, the Five-hundred-metre Aperture Spherical Telescope, which opened in 2016. Built in a natural basin in Guizhou province, it is more than twice the size of the world’s next-largest radio telescope, in America. But FAST does not have a director. Having leapt from nowhere to the top of the tree in terms of hardware, the country finds itself in the embarrassing position of having no radio-astronomer to hand who combines the scientific and administrative skills needed to run the thing. Nor, so far, has it been able to recruit a qualified foreigner willing to live in the telescope’s remote location.

Self-defeating shortcuts, symbolic and otherwise, are not only the preserve of the government; Chinese scientists are prey to such temptations, too. China is not only recapitulating American science’s cold-war national-prestige boom. It is doing so in the context of the subsequent high-technology era in which no American university feels complete without a symbiotic microbiome of venture capitalists pullulating across its skin. The economic benefits of research have increasingly come to be seen as a possible boon to the researcher, as well as to society at large.

For a particularly egregious example, consider the most notable Chinese scientific first of 2018. He Jiankui looked like the model of a modern Chinese scientist. He was educated at the University of Science and Technology of China (USTC) in Hefei. He went on to equally prestigious American universities, Rice and Stanford. He was brought back by the government’s “Thousand Talents” programme to a new position at the Southern University of Science and Technology in Shenzhen. Once established there, he took unpaid leave to start an entrepreneurial project.

That project was editing the DNA of embryos that would then grow up into human beings. Its result was two baby girls. They do not, as yet, appear unhealthy. Nor, though, have they been provided with the questionable advantages Dr He says he was trying to provide through his tinkering—tinkering which was unsanctioned, illegal and which, since he went public, has seen opprobrium heaped upon him.

You can’t clone successThe He affair could have taken place in many places, and it is hardly representative of the broad swathe of China’s researchers; 122 of them signed an open letter denouncing his actions. At the same time it is not at all surprising that the He affair took place in China. It was a perversion of what Chinese scientists are trying to achieve as they seek to establish themselves and their country in the world of elite science. But it was also an illustration of it.


The staggering growth in the number of scientific papers by Chinese researchers needs to be seen in this context. In terms of pure numbers, China overtook America in 2016 (see chart 2). But the quality of some of these papers is very low. In April 2018 Han Xueying and Richard Appelbaum of the University of California, Santa Barbara, reported opinions gathered in a survey of 731 researchers at top-tier Chinese universities. As one from Fudan University put it: “People fabricate or plagiarise papers so that they can pass their annual performance evaluations.”

The Chinese government is aware of the risks of a reputation for poor and even fraudulent research. It is one of the reasons that it is orchestrating the development of a scientific establishment. One of its pillars is a core group of elite universities known as the C9. Fudan is one of them, as are Tsinghua and Peking Universities and Dr He’s alma mater, USTC. The other is the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), an official agency that runs laboratories of its own, which will adhere to prevailing international standards. The government is clamping down on shoddy journals, especially those in which researchers pay to be published. Raising standards in this way will not just improve science; it will also attract the best scientists.

After Deng Xiaoping came to power in 1978 the top tier of Chinese students was encouraged to go abroad for their graduate studies. Many returned, as had been intended, filled with knowledge unavailable at home. Without them the current scientific boom would not have happened, however much the government had spent. But the best often chose to stay abroad. In 2008 the country started the Thousand Talents programme to draw these exiles back with promises of lucre and lab space.

In theory, the programme is open to any top-notch researcher working in an overseas laboratory, regardless of nationality. In practice, few non-Chinese have availed themselves of it. But many Chinese have. Such returners are known as haigui, the Chinese for “sea turtle”, since they are thought of as having come back to their natal beach, as turtles do, to lay their eggs.

Talent that has not been abroad is not, however, neglected. A coeval programme, Changjiang Scholars, is aimed at identifying potential top-flight researchers who are languishing in thousands of provincial institutions. Once identified, they, too, are brought into the charmed circle.

Taikonauts back controlThis is yielding results at all but the very highest levels. Chinese scientists working in China have as yet earned only one Nobel prize. Other than that work—the discovery of artemisinin, a novel antimalarial drug, by Tu Youyou—there has not yet been any Chinese scientific advance that a fair-minded person would be likely to think Nobel-worthy. No fundamental particle has been discovered there, nor any new class of astronomical object. Chinese scientists have not yet done anything to compare with, say, the development of CRISPR-Cas9 gene editing (America) or the creation of pluripotent stem cells (Japan) or the invention of DNA sequencing itself (Britain).


But a great deal of Chinese science is now very good indeed, particularly in relatively new fields with practical implications. The country has a very large and ever growing workforce (see chart 3) that is both enjoined and keen to tackle juicy topics. A study published by Elsevier, a scientific publisher, and Nikkei, a Japanese news business, on January 6th found that China published more high-impact research papers than America did in 23 out of 30 hot research fields with clear technological applications. Chinese science is a nimble giant, capable of piling in on any new field of promise with enormous, often centrally encouraged, force.

Developments in fields such as double-layer capacitors and biochar, two of those 23, may be important but are unlikely to be much noticed, either by Nobel committees, the public or foreigners who need impressing. For visible signals of its national prowess, China is following the well-trodden path of big science in America, Europe and Japan: building large physics experiments and putting things—especially people—into space.

The China National Space Administration has sent several “taikonauts” into orbit and provided them with some small space labs to hang around in while they are there. Its plans include, in the near term, a bigger space station, assembled in orbit from modules launched separately, and in the longer term crewed missions to the Moon enabled by a new booster more powerful than any of today’s, the Long March 9.

The National Space Science Centre, part of CAS, is busy putting up scientific satellites; in April 2018 it announced six new ones that should be launched by 2020 or soon after. Most of China’s launches, though, are not scientific; they are for communications, Earth observation—and military intelligence. China’s space programme began in the bosom of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and though it is no longer directly run by the armed forces, they are still keenly involved with the development of the country’s orbital abilities. In 2007 China tested an anti-satellite weapon; its “Strategic Support Force” is thought to co-ordinate its military space-, electronic- and cyber-warfare capabilities. All China’s taikonauts are PLA officers. Other physics facilities have obvious military applications, too, such as wind tunnels designed for research into forms of hypersonic flight that are really relevant only to the armed forces.

Beyond rocketry, China’s most ambitious big-science plan is to build the largest particle accelerator ever. Since their development in the 1930s, circular particle accelerators have grown from the size of a room to the size of the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), which occupies a 27km loop of tunnel beneath the Franco-Swiss border at CERN, Europe’s particle-physics laboratory. The bigger the accelerator, the more energy it can pump into its particles. The LHC packs its protons with more than a million times more energy than the original machines did in 1930s Berkeley.

Sharpening the gene shearsThe Chinese plan foresees a loop of tunnel as much as 100km long. Even China will not be able to foot the bill for such a beast alone. In the 2000s the LHC cost CERN over SFr4bn ($5bn); contributions to its experiments from other countries, including China and America, significantly increased the total. Making use of it has cost billions more. Nor would China be able to supply all the physicists needed to make use of such a facility. Like the LHC, the next accelerator will be a single lab for the world, wherever it is: these toys are one-per-planet affairs. But the Chinese seem more serious than anyone else about hosting and building the thing. Just as it meant something beyond the world of particle physics when America cancelled its proposed giant SSC and CERN’s LHC became the biggest game in town, so it would mean something if China took CERN’s crown.

Particle physics enjoys a particular prestige in part because of its early (and now dissolved) association with the development of nuclear weapons, in part because of the conceptual depths it plumbs, in part because of the sheer size and expense of its tools. But there are other parts of physics with more of the cutting edge about them. These include applications of the more abstruse aspects of quantum mechanics to computation and cryptography, an area where China is a world leader: it was the first country to send a quantum-encrypted message via a satellite. In computer science, too, it has few peers. Though it does not yet have a semiconductor industry that quite matches those elsewhere, it is world class in many applications, especially in artificial intelligence.


The same applies in trendy bits of biology. Dr He was not the first person to edit the DNA of a human embryo. That honour belongs to Huang Junjiu, a researcher at Sun Yat-sen University, in Guangzhou, whose research was blameless and above-board. Like Dr He, Dr Huang was making use of the capabilities of CRISPR-Cas9. Since 2012 this form of gene editing has become one of the hottest fields in biology, and China is very well represented in it (see chart 4); according to the study by Elsevier and Nikkei, it is publishing 22.6% of the world’s most highly cited papers in gene editing, slightly more than half the amount that comes from America, and far more than from any other country.

Dr Huang wants to apply CRISPR-Cas9 to the treatment of beta thalassemia, a hereditary blood disease. To this end, in 2015 he successfully edited the DNA of several fertilised human eggs left over from IVF treatment. He had no intention of implanting the results in anybody’s womb; he used embryos which, due to other abnormalities, were not able to develop. What he learned about gene editing in those experiments will, if all goes well, be used to edit stem-cells extracted from the bone marrow of people suffering from the disease, allowing them to make better red blood cells.


Stem-cell research is another hot topic to which China is adding its heft. Zuo Wei of Tongji University in Shanghai is trying to use stem cells to repair lungs damaged by emphysema, a big problem in China, where smoking is still common and the air often dense with smog. Last year he conducted a trial in which four patients had some lung tissue removed. The most healthy-looking stem cells in that tissue were isolated and encouraged to multiply, and the revved-up results then sprayed back into the lung. The procedure apparently repaired the lungs of two of the patients; the other two showed neither benefits nor harm. Dr Zuo has since organised a second trial of 100 patients. He is working on a similar approach to kidney disease, but so far only in mice.

Let 100,000 genomes bloomDr Zuo’s work demonstrates another feature of Chinese bioscience: keeping its application clearly in mind. In the West there has been an increasing concern over the past couple of decades that basic biology led by independent academic researchers has drifted too far from potential medical application. In America, in particular, biomedical-research prowess and the health of the population are increasingly poorly correlated.

This concern has led to a new emphasis on building up “translational-medicine” research capacities to bridge the gap—an idea the Chinese are already integrating into their work. The government has opened a translational-medicine centre in Shanghai, where laboratory researchers, clinicians and patients will all be under the same roof and biotech companies encouraged to set up shop next door. Others may follow in Beijing, Chengdu and Xi’an.

Genetic research is a field where China has both made big investments and sees a big future. In the BGI, as what was once the Beijing Genomics Institute is now known, China has by some measures the largest genome-sequencing centre in the world. Once an arm of CAS, it declared independence as a “citizen-managed, non-profit research institution” and has now become a semi-commercial chimera, with one of its divisions listed as a company on the Shenzhen stock exchange.

The BGI’s corporate arm is also taking an interest in beta thalassemia; it has developed a DNA blood test for it, one of an increasing range it is making available across China. The tests use DNA-sequencing machines the BGI developed with technology which it acquired when it bought Complete Genomics, an American firm, in 2013.

That battalion of machines has a lot of other work to do. Non-commercial bits of the BGI use them for pure research. The outfit is also home to the China National GeneBank, the intended repository for several hundred million samples taken from living creatures of all sorts, human and non-human. It already holds the genomes of 140,000 Chinese people, part of a wider desire by the government to be at the forefront of the field of precision medicine, in which diagnoses, and eventually treatments, are personalised with particular emphasis on understanding a patient’s genetic make-up.

The BGI is one example of China’s ability to bring big-science approaches to new areas of research. For another you should look inside a low building in Zhuanghe, Liaoning province, where the world’s largest battery is taking shape. It is to have six times the storage capacity of the system supplied by Elon Musk, an American entrepreneur, to South Australia in 2017, which lashed together thousands of lithium-ion battery cells to make the world’s then-largest battery. It can do so because it uses a completely different approach based on a flow of vanadium-salt solutions.

China’s near-insatiable demand for energy has led to investments in wind and solar power that dwarf those in other parts of the world, and is now leading to research into better ways of handling the energy they produce. Vanadium-flow batteries are of interest because, unlike most batteries, in which a single electrolyte is built into the cell, a flow battery has two electrolytes and an open cell through which they pass. This means its storage capacity is governed solely by the size of the tanks that store the electrolytes. That makes it possible, in theory, to build batteries big enough to store energy on a scale useful to large grids. The theory has been developed by Zhang Huamin, a researcher at the Dalian Institute of Chemical Physics, a local arm of CAS. The factory in Zhuanghe, owned by Dalian Rongke Power, a local electricity company, is trying to turn theory into practice. If it works, it could revolutionise grid-scale electricity storage.

The Dalian Institute’s researchers are also looking into perovskites, materials with applications both in batteries and in solar cells. Their aim—also being pursued elsewhere in China and abroad—is to apply perovskite solutions to everyday solar cells so that the resultant layers will absorb wavelengths of light that the normal cells cannot absorb. This could produce much more efficient solar panels for relatively little extra cost. To the extent that academic publications are a good measure of technologies quite close to the market, perovskites are an area where China has a substantial lead over America, with 41.4% of the highest impact publications, compared with 21.5% from America.

Taking things on trustChina’s energy research also extends to areas that the rest of the world is avoiding. China is building 13 new nuclear reactors to add to its fleet of 45; it has 43 more planned. If they are all built China will become the world’s biggest generator of nuclear electricity. Those reactors are of similar design to the plants already in operation around the world. But China is also exploring new reactor technologies—or rather, technologies abandoned elsewhere. These include reactors in which the core is filled not with fuel rods but with little ceramic pebbles—or, in the case of thorium reactors, with molten metal.

The lack of progress such reactors have enjoyed in the West reflects a lack of appetite for new sorts of nuclear power much more than a lack of scientific plausibility. If China’s appetite is sharp and its researchers imaginative, progress may come swiftly. The development of mass-produced, compact, cheap and safe nuclear reactors would be a Chinese first that a world in the throes of climate change would have real cause to celelebrate—and start importing.


That possibility, though, brings to the fore a shadow over the future of Chinese science. Making novel nuclear reactors extremely safe requires critical thinking and obstinate truth-telling; so does convincing others that you have done so. A culture that provides the results the boss wants, or does not investigate inconvenient anomalies, or withholds data from nosy outsiders is not good enough.

Those requirements are very like the norms that are seen as basic to doing good science in the West. Testing hypotheses, finding the flaws in the work on which your teacher’s reputation rests, questioning your own assumptions, following the data wherever they lead, sharing data openly with your rivals-sorry-colleagues: this is how science is meant to work, even if in real life the ideal can be a bit tarnished. In some labs and institutions in China things doubtless do work that way. But the authoritarian system in which they are embedded makes it hard for Chinese science to speak truth to power, or escape challenges to its integrity. This gnaws at the scientific body politic, and saps resources, both financial and moral.

In their survey of Chinese researchers Dr Han and Dr Appelbaum heard many complaints about excessive government interference. A respondent from Sun Yat-sen University told them “There is still not enough academic freedom in higher education. If the central government makes one statement, even if it is not fair, all of the universities have to follow suit.”

In matters of promotion, job interviews and grant-giving, the question of who you know seems much more important in China than in the West (and even there, it is not negligible). For the past decade the National Natural Science Foundation of China (NNSFC), one of the country’s main funding bodies, has been running a campaign against such misconduct. Wei Yang, until recently the NNSFC’s boss, describes a situation in which, to stop interference from outside, the composition of interview panels is kept secret until the last minute. Panellists are not told in advance who candidates are, and both panellists and candidates have their mobile phones confiscated in order to avoid anyone being nobbled—which used to happen even while interviews were being conducted.


Some Chinese scientists fear that the corruptions and silences endemic in authoritarian states will hold them back from the breakthrough-making Nobel-winning heights. Others may doubt this. China has been playing in science’s premier league for only a decade or so. Its investments are not at an end. China’s R&D was 2.07% of GDP in 2015, up from 0.89% in 2000 (see chart 5). That is higher than the average for European states, but lower than France, Germany or America. It is much lower than in the Asian catch-up states that might be the most natural comparators, Japan and South Korea. A China spending as much of its GDP on research as South Korea does would have an R&D budget twice today’s. With resources on that scale and a scientific workforce in the many millions, the hobbling effect of corrupt institutions might be overcome by brute force.

Others might argue that big breakthroughs are not the only measure of good science. Incremental work that solves practical problems is not to be sniffed at. Scientific research directed from the top down can serve national goals, and a one-party system may give particularly consistent support to such programmes. China’s lunar programme has built up its capabilities steadily in a way no Western space-science programme has since Apollo, the achievements of which it may yet match.

This is the sort of methodical science that typically appeals to engineers oriented towards results—and from Jiang Zemin onwards all China’s presidents, as well as almost all its other leading politicians, have had engineering degrees. Xi Jinping, today’s president, studied chemical engineering at Tsinghua.

But the idea that you can get either truly reliable science or truly great science in a political system that depends on a culture of unappealable authority is, as yet, unproven. Perhaps you can. Perhaps you cannot. And perhaps, in trying to do so, you will discover new ways of thinking as well as fruitful knowledge.

This article appeared in the Science and technology section of the print edition under the headline "The great experiment"




To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/24/2019 7:42:45 AM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 217840
 
Bullish, if one has faith w/r to imperatives leads to solutions, once-in-800 years super cycles, rural land reform giving rise to collateral-good money, etc etc

Just in in-tray

Latest from Stephen Roach:

China's Economic Challenges in 2019

Over the past 40 years, challenge has been synonymous with opportunity for the Chinese economy. With another significant slowdown now at hand, that is very much the case in 2019.

Modern China has a rich experience to draw on as it contemplates its current risks. In the late 1970s, China faced enormous challenges in the aftermath of two decades of political, social, and economic instability — challenges that ultimately provided historic opportunities for the reforms and opening up that were to follow. In the late 1990s, China faced the challenges of a wrenching Asian financial crisis, which subsequently turned into a pivotal opportunity for China to emerge as a leader of pan-regional economic growth.

And, of course, during the 2007-09 period, China faced the twin challenges of global financial crisis and worldwide recession. While these developments came as a shock to most, for China they proved to be an opportunity to draw on a structural rebalancing strategy that was already under active consideration. Indeed, ahead of that crisis there was growing recognition by the Chinese leadership of the need to shift the sources of economic support from the seemingly systemic risks of excess reliance on external demand in a crisis-prone world to a new self-sufficiency from internal demand, especially private consumption. The 12th and 13th Five-Year Plans framed a new round of reforms that were most effective in addressing the strategic challenges of a decade ago,

The key to China’s successful reform strategy was bridging the gap between rhetoric and implementation. From the rural reforms of the 1980s that sparked growth in entrepreneurial-driven Township and Village Enterprises to the first round of State-Owned Enterprise reforms of the late 1990s to the sharp tariff reductions ahead of China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in late 2001, the reform agenda became China’s greatest strength in implementing its longer-term development strategies.

The biggest question for 2019 is whether China, now facing increasingly stiff headwinds, continues to draw on reforms in meeting its challenges head on. On the surface, there is good reason for concern. While the official data point to only a relatively modest slowdown in real economic activity in the final quarter of 2018, the deceleration in GDP growth was concentrated in tertiary activity. In conjunction with deteriorating December comparisons for several key components of discretionary consumption (i.e., retail sales of autos and mobile phones), the relatively rapid compression of services activity, in the face of a more resilient manufacturing sector, hints at the emergence of a worrisome imbalance between aggregate supply and demand.

Two sets of forces appear to be at work— the structural headwinds of deleveraging after ten tears of increasingly debt-intensive growth and the cyclical pressures of yet another softening of the global economy, exacerbated by a worrisome conflict with China’s largest trading partner, the United States. While the lagged impacts of recent policy stimulus should kick in and stabilize the economy by midyear, downside pressures could intensify in the months immediately ahead.

To be sure, the broad consensus of western observers believes that the Chinese economy will be much weaker — hit very hard by this tough combination of cyclical and structural headwinds. Growth is feared to fall well short of the 6.6 percent pace of 2018, which, in and of itself, already represents a sharp slowdown from the 10 percent average gains from 1980 to 2012. While these concerns can hardly be dismissed out of hand, they have a striking sense of déjà vu. Time and again – but especially in the depths of the Asian Financial crisis of the late 1990s and again in the midst of the Global Financial Crisis a decade later — there was a crescendo of despair claiming that China would be next to fall. And yet, time and again, China has defied this pessimistic prognosis.

Will that be the case again? Surely, there is good reason to take current concerns seriously. Could it already be too late for China to avoid a Japanese-style debt crisis? As cyclical pressures on the real economy intensify, Chinese policymakers may well be tempted to revert to yet another round of debt-fueled growth as they did in the depth of the global recession of 2008-09. This would be a serious mistake. China’s overall debt-to-GDP ratio is more than 100 percentage points higher today than it was back then — having moved up from 138% in late 2008 to 253% in mid-2018, according to BIS statistics. The leeway to act is far more limited as a result.

Moreover, many of China’s last round of major reforms — the so-called Third Plenum Reforms of November 2013 — have yet to be implemented. This is particularly the case with seemingly inconsistent state-owned enterprise reforms. The focus on “mixed ownership reforms” — exemplified by the August 2017 capital injection of $12 billion into China Unicom, with nearly half that amount coming from other SOEs — underscores an unfortunate hybrid approach that emphasizes steadfast Party control over SOEs while paying only lip-service to the promise made five years ago to allow for the decisive role of markets in shaping resource allocation. Such an approach is reminiscent of the cross shareholdings of Japanese keiretsus that played a key role in the first of Japan’s “lost decades” during the 1990s.

The optimistic case for China, which I continue to embrace, invariably requires a leap of faith when circumstances seem especially challenging. Such is the case in framing the outlook for 2019 and the years beyond. Like comparable circumstances in the past, reforms are the only way out. That is not only true of ongoing efforts at deleveraging required to avoid a Japanese-like endgame but also for more meaningful excess-capacity shedding, market-oriented SOE reforms. It is also true of China’s need to push ahead on market opening reforms by eliminating foreign ownership caps (and joint ventures) in order to improve China’s competitive climate and ameliorate the mounting conflict with the United States. China without reforms points to an opportunity squandered rather than to a challenge that begets a new opportunity. With the outlook darkening, China has no choice but to seize this moment.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)1/25/2019 5:23:44 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217840
 
let us hope that events do not reach its logical destination and that the politicians hesitate before jumping off the edge

but given that the Neo-con / Neo-liberal bases of core supporters may not understand the full consequences of trade war carried to its logical end, we may end up where it is not so nice, a bifurcated world, that on average should do okay, but which side of the average may matter to many

- consequences to valuations
- market size
- market growth
- market flavour
- etc etc etc
- asymmetric nature of understanding scientific research as consequence of language divide
- arms & legs vs brains & internal competition

do not expect pole climbers to understand, never mind appreciate Message 31992829

so, in the mean time, encourage companies to come home or at least re-domcile to HK Message 31992773

try best to carry on systemic reform, and hitting corruption is a pre-requisite, and

go outward bound, OBOR, space, whatever

to set the scene to energise rural land reform and monetisation, that which should result in USD 250 trillion of collateral-good printing over 30-50 years

re land reform
- 2003 subject tee-ed up, Message 29283719

- 2017 refresh Message 31376080

- 2017 explanation Message 31414366

all interesting to view but hard to play, per de-in-screw-flation, anguish and pain, etc etc Message 31996007

unless comrade trump doubles down on bring down the house, so to speak and Powell shies away from dropping interest rate

should trump fail to keep office and vacate for pence, or Powell raises rate, maybe even more easy to play

should the neo-democrats take over, all bets are off until the market clears

let see, watch & brief

zerohedge.com

China Threatens To Pull Money From Silicon Valley: "Trade War Will Become A Tech War"

In the span of a day, China has gone from threatening to crash US markets if President Trump doesn't agree to a trade deal to helping the US rebut reports that trade talks weren't going as smoothly as President Trump and the Wall Street Journal had let on. During a press conference on Thursday, Ministry of Commerce Spokesman Gao Feng denied reports that a meeting involving high-level trade officials in Washington had been cancelled (the FT had cited US frustrations with China's reluctance to cave on demands relating to curbing IP theft and certain structural reforms) - backing up Larry Kudlow, who sparked a brief rally just before the close on Wednesday when he appeared on CNBC to deny these reports.

Kudlow said yesterday that the most important meeting, between a Chinese delegation led by Vice Premier Liu He, the country's top economic official, was still slated to take place in Washington next week.

But in the latest sign that the simmering tensions over the US's dispute with Huawei continue to spill over into trade talks, RT reported on Thursday that Beijing might cut off all Chinese funding to Silicon Valley after the US slapped an export ban on a Huawei subsidiary based in Silicon Valley.

The comments were made by Former PBOC Deputy Governor Zhu Min, who sat for an interview with CNBC.

His message was clear: The US's push to drive Huawei out of Western markets would have a negative impact on the trade negotiations. In addition to his former role at the PBOC, Zhu is also a former official at the IMF.

“I can tell you, after the Huawei events, all the Chinese money into Silicon Valley stops. And no US money will want to invest into China either,” Zhu Min told CNBC on the sidelines of the World Economic Forum (WEF) on Tuesday. He did not elaborate on what should happen to bring about such an outcome.

Min's comments followed remarks from Huawei Chairman Liang Hua, who told world leaders gathered in Davos that his company could shift away from Western countries if it continues to face restrictions.

Asked if it was possible for China to abruptly pull money from Silicon Valley, John Zhao, founder and chief executive of Hony Capital, said "by numbers, that seems to be the case."

"But it really suggests something that is much deeper than the number has started to show. First of all, it shows the interdependency that the world has built with each other...But it also suggests that while there are some short-term pains to be resolved, we need to have a long-term view," Zhao said, while speaking to CNBC’s Nancy Hungerford in Davos on Wednesday.



And just like that, Silicon Valley has once again found itself at the center of the trade war.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (145484)2/7/2019 6:58:22 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217840
 
folks on your side of the pond is looking for the seeds ofd collapse on my side, and this on my side are looking for the seeds of calamity on your side

I am not sure, maybe the seeds are everywhere or nowhere or somewhere else like ion Europe

we shall find out

scmp.com

LOOK TO US, NOT CHINA FOR THE 2019 FINANCIAL CRISIS. HERE’S WHY

There’s a lingering feeling that the global economy is due for another downturn, as one tends to come along every five to seven yearsBut while the West points to China, it’s the US that has most reason to worry. Something eerily similar to its subprime disaster is afoot
BY TOM HOLLAND

14 JAN 2019
2787 SHARE



After a panicked end to 2018 in the financial markets, and a jittery start to the new year, an increasing number of investors, analysts and economists are beginning to warn about “the crisis of 2019”, as often as not to be followed by “the recession of 2020”.

Part of the reason is simply the feeling that the world is overdue for another downturn. A look at the economic history of recent decades shows that major financial crashes tend to come along every five to seven years.

So, for example, there were the oil crises of the 1970s, the Latin American debt crisis of 1982, the Black Monday stock market crash of 1987, the Tequila Crisis of 1994, the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98, the dotcom bust of 2000 and the worldwide recession that followed, the credit crunch and global financial crisis of 2007-08, and the European debt crisis that peaked in 2012.

Seven years on from that episode, and more than 10 years after the implosion of Lehman Brothers, financial markets have accumulated a whole new batch of excesses that are ripe for correction, as well as some old ones that previous crunches failed to correct.

Don’t count on China to toss the global economy a stimulus lifeline in 2019But although many in the financial world fear a new crisis is looming, there is little agreement about what will trigger the shake-up, or where it will start.

Lots of observers in the West point to China. They note how in just 10 years debt levels have soared from 150 per cent of gross domestic product to more than 250 per cent, even as economic growth has slowed, eroding borrowers’ ability to service their debt.

Others cast a wary eye towards Europe, where it is likely Germany and Italy are already in a new recession, and where the “doom loop” between rising Italian government bond yields and weakening Italian bank capital is stronger than ever, threatening a whole new crisis of confidence in the euro zone’s single currency.

But although these concerns are real, the probability that the next financial crisis will originate in either China or Europe is relatively low. That’s because crises are not usually triggered by insolvency – when liabilities exceed assets – but because of illiquidity, when institutions run out of ready cash.

More than 10 years after the implosion of Lehman Brothers, financial markets have accumulated a whole new batch of excesses that are ripe for correction. Photo: AFP

In China, where the state owns and controls the banking system, officials have their hands on all the levers necessary to ensure plentiful supplies of liquidity in case of an emergency. And in the euro zone, the 2012 pledge by European Central Bank president Mario Draghi to do “whatever it takes” to preserve the single currency still stands.

Faced with a new crisis, the ECB can once again open the funding taps to avert disaster. That will not solve the euro’s deep-seated underlying problems, but it will postpone a day of reckoning for the currency that many believe will be inevitable without far-reaching structural reforms of Europe’s economic governance.

Instead, it is more likely that the world’s next big financial crash will originate in the United States. And while there will be differences from the 2008 crisis, there will also be telling similarities; history doesn’t repeat, but it does rhyme.

In the years before 2008, a protracted period of low interest rates encouraged banks to ramp up lending to risky borrowers, and to repackage their loans and sell them on to yield-hungry investors. Back then, the risky borrowers were “subprime” homebuyers. This time around they are American companies. With benchmark interest rates close to zero for most of this decade, US companies have binged on debt.

Many have borrowed ever-greater sums, not to invest in productive assets like new factories, but to buy back their own shares, so juicing up their stock prices and generating ever bigger bonus packages for their executives. As a result, over the last 10 years, the value of US corporate bonds outstanding has tripled from about US$2.5 trillion to US$7.5 trillion. And of that amount, roughly 45 per cent is rated “BBB” – just one grade above junk.

That’s not all. Since the 2008 crisis there has also been a boom in so-called leveraged loans – loans to high-risk corporate borrowers – with the market doubling in size from US$550 billion to around US$1.1 trillion. And most of these loans have been repackaged and sold on to investors as “collateralised debt obligations” – just as subprime mortgages were repackaged and sold on in the 2000s.

But it is in the corporate bond market that there is the greatest cause for anxiety. That’s because even as the amount of debt outstanding has ballooned, new regulations introduced after the 2008 crisis have discouraged banks and brokers from trading the bonds on their own account.

As a result, few Wall Street finance houses either hold inventories of corporate bonds or are prepared to quote firm prices to investors come what may.

With benchmark interest rates close to zero for most of this decade, US companies have binged on debt. Photo: Reuters

In short, the market has grown in size, even as its reservoir of trading liquidity has dried up.

That is likely to be a problem. Much of the US corporate debt market is owned by exchange-traded funds (ETFs) and foreign institutional investors, many of which are prohibited from holding junk bonds, and all of which expect to be able to sell their holdings without difficulty should they want or need to.

It is not hard to imagine that as the US economy slows after its long cycle of expansion and US companies face tightening margins, an increasing number are likely to face difficulties servicing the debts they ran up to fund share buy-backs.

Sooner or later, some BBB-rated borrowers will get downgraded to junk status. When that happens, ETFs and institutional investors will attempt to sell the bonds they hold – only to find few dealers willing to quote them reasonable prices.

As investors take fright, US corporate bond prices will collapse. ETFs will rush to liquidate their holdings to meet redemptions, worsening the price slump. Leveraged investors such as hedge funds will face margin calls they will not be able to meet, which in turn will cast doubt on the financial integrity of the investment banks that extended them the leverage. Other banks will stop dealing with the investment banks, liquidity in the financial system will dry up, and suddenly the world will find itself facing a repeat of the September 2008 death spiral that led to the implosion of Lehman Brothers.

All this, of course, is speculation. It may never happen. But on the other hand, it is a plausible scenario, and one that is making investors increasingly uneasy. All we can say for sure is that sooner or later the next financial crisis will strike, and that it could unfold more or less as described here. Let’s hope it doesn’t. ¦

Tom Holland is a former SCMP staffer who has been writing about Asian affairs for more than 25 years