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To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:18:03 PM
From: TobagoJack1 Recommendation

Recommended By
Arran Yuan

  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218199
 
Hello Haim, did a modicum of search to support my earlier solid conjectures and vague premises with re to how Afrique should be careful before saying "no" to hospitals, roads, industrial parks, high-speed rails, large capacity ports, schools, power stations, etc etc etc

RE <<The day before yesterday was at one of the biggest Israeli law firms that sponsored a business gathering for investing in Ethiopia pop. 104 million 88% rural. External Debt to GDP below 32% GDP growth above 8% Cellphone users 20.5 million

They are fed up with the Chinese. Africa realizes the pure colonialistic tendencies of China. They bring money for infrastructure projects and a lot of the work is done by Chinese inmates.

Ethiopia wants to partner with smaller states>>

says to me to watch out for several telltales ...

- deep-state talking

- china-bashing per usual

- definition of pure colonialism - terrible colonials who bring money, undertake projects to benefit the locals, and making doubly sure by sending the necessary expertise along with the money, so that local bandwidth not stretched to breaking, and an opportunity of several hundred years is not squandered by local deep-state calling all the shots

- local deep-states and elites of Ethiopia wish to partner w/ smaller states, as would Nigeria and Uganda. Volunteers welcome. Even the USA and Russia and and and welcome. But who is coming?

so would treat the Israeli law firm's pitch along w/ its client's take with due care, and filter through the lens of the taxi driver of Addis Ababa and see what they see, and I deliberately select google-search stories only of Africa / Ethiopia origin as opposed to would-be-suspect China media. On casual search of "China Ethiopia>> the negative stories seem to be of western press, and so I am comforted that the Ethiopians are with good partner which can help them make big progress.

The west is peeved because it can no longer do what it has been doing for too long a time, am guessing, at the Neo con side of the equation.

And at the Neo liberal side, they wish to measure under developed Africa by measure of some theoretical benchmark, on the one hand, to essentially say "this is how Africa should be developed, starting w/ vegan diet", and mixed in a bit of entitlement unthinkable, "do the Ethiopians not warrant a local engineer to decide on how best to build a 200M (any major currency) project and do so by trial and error?"

Team China is essentially saying, "am interested to invest, fund, help with the design, build, and supply the parts we know best, our parts, and then buy the goods that better flow from whatever the project. do you want in, Ethiopia? and oh, can help gather tourist to spend the money you need to earn to help get everything started."

The trade is free, and the bargain is straightforward, and without much if any political strings. China cannot do what China does in Ethiopia without Ethiopian blessing at the decision-making level.

I did a google-search on "Ethiopia Brazil" and came up with effectively zilch.

I did a search on "Ethiopia America" and came up with a single item, tadias.com <<>> which sounds like attempt to sway local political process per interference protocol and colonial regime-change preparation, and given the state of USA media, would alert the Ethiopians to be very careful, especially as the initiative does not support job creation, increase export, improve local lives, and result in more foreign direct investment.

Did a search on "Italy Ethiopia" - amazing, nada, zilch, nought, zero - for the formal and genuine colonialist power in Ethiopia had left the place for dead.

Fact, with China's help, Ethiopia is on the mend after more than a century of western depravity.
pulse.ng
<<Ethiopian Airlines is reported to have provided 35% financing while EXIM Bank of China provided 65% of the project’s financing.
Ethiopian Airline, Africa most profitable airline is set to forever change Ethiopian skyline with a $65m Ethiopian Skylight Five Hotel later this month.
>>

exchange.co.tz
<<Ethiopia to intensify coffee exports to China>>

africandailyvoice.com
<<Chinese company signs road construction agreement with Ethiopian government>>

allafrica.com
<<Ethiopia: Embassy Promotes Ethiopia's Tourist Destinations in Shenyang, China>>

allafrica.com
<<Ethiopia: Chinese, French Firms Seal Turbine Supply Deal>>

fool.ca
<<China Is the Catalyst for Africa’s Growth>>

qz.com
<<Ethiopia is set to launch its first satellite into space—with China’s help>>



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:42:38 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218199
 
highlighting one of the referenced articles

minor states, especially busy war-fighting states with easily distractible attention / focus, and at beck & call of team USA sanction-this / punish-that routine, cannot possibly have the wherewithal (capability and capacity) to do for Ethiopia as team china have done, is doing, and intend to do.

https://www.fool.ca/2019/01/18/china-is-the-catalyst-for-africas-growth/



China Is the Catalyst for Africa’s Growth

Vishesh Raisinghani | January 18, 2019 More on: FAH.U

A few years ago, China realized that it would need to look beyond its borders to keep fueling its relentless pace of growth. The monumentally ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of the country’s growing interest in the rest of the world. Nowhere is this focus more apparent than in Africa. According to McKinsey, China has become Africa’s biggest trade partner in less than two decades. Taking into account trade, investment, infrastructure financing, and aid, China’s influence in the region is unparalleled.

The Asian giant is deploying capital to build infrastructure, sending government-backed companies to start factories in the region, and helping Chinese workers and entrepreneurs migrate to the continent in astounding numbers. This creates jobs and a return on capital for both.

China’s efforts are concentrated in the eight countries that contribute more than 80% of Africa’s gross domestic product (GDP): Angola, Côte d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zambia. This concentrated, infrastructure-focused approach has been co-opted by one of Canada’s most successful investors.

Prem Watsa, often called the Warren Buffett of Canada, created a special holding company in 2016 to invest directly in Africa’s growing economy. Fairfax Africa Holdings Corporation (TSX:FAH) is one of only a handful of Canadian listed stocks that provide a pure-play exposure to this underappreciated phenomenon.

One of Fairfax Africa’s biggest holdings include London-listed financial services group, Atlas Mara . The company generates over $420 million in annual revenue from its network of banks and financial services providers spread across nine African countries.

According to McKinsey, Africa’s retail banking sector grew 11% over the past five years and is likely to grow at a rate of 8.5% over the next five years. Banking the under-banked in this region is a key growth play.

Fairfax Africa originally bought bonds of Atlas Mara that were later converted to stock; it also purchased additional stock. The holding represents nearly one-third of shareholder’s equity. Atlas is a great example of Fairfax’s focus in the region – growing income, financial services, and infrastructure funding.

Other investments, like Consolidated Infrastructure Group and various corporate bonds, follow this basic thesis. Some, like AFGRI Holdings, targets a growing trend of consolidation, automation, and professionalization of the agricultural sector.

Most of Fairfax Africa’s investments are exposed to growth opportunities in South Africa and Nigeria, which represent more than half the region’s GDP at the moment.

This concentrated investment approach is similar to what Watsa has done with his holding companies in Canada and India. If his Canadian track record (book value has compounded by nearly 20% since 1985) is anything to go by, Fairfax’s African ventures should yield incredible results for long-term shareholders.

At the moment, the stock is down, which means it’s easier to become one of these long-term shareholders. Fairfax Africa’s book value was reported at $661 million, or $14.35 per share in the most recent quarter. That means the stock (currently priced at $8.69) is trading at 60.5% of book value per share.

When you buy heavily cyclical stocks at low prices… and then hold the shares until the cycle reaches its peak… you can make a very healthy profit.

Every investor knows that. But many struggle to identify the best opportunities.

Except The Motley Fool may have a plan to solve that problem! Our in-house analyst team has poured thousands of hours into their proprietary research – and this is the result.

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The last time this stock went from the low point of its cycle to the peak… shares shot from $12 to $40 inside of 4 years. That’s an 300%-plus return. And if you missed out on that ride, today might just be your second chance.

Fool contributor Vishesh Raisinghani has no position in any of the stocks mentioned.

More From The Motley Fool Canada




To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:44:40 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218199
 
Take McKinsey take, and sense why McKinsey itself is being tee-ed up for attack by western media

mckinsey.com

The closest look yet at Chinese economic engagement in AfricaField interviews with more than 1,000 Chinese companies provide new insights into Africa–China business relationships.

In two decades, China has become Africa’s most important economic partner. Across trade, investment, infrastructure financing, and aid, no other country has such depth and breadth of engagement in Africa. Chinese “dragons”—firms of all sizes and sectors—are bringing capital investment, management know-how, and entrepreneurial energy to every corner of the continent. In doing so they are helping to accelerate the progress of Africa’s economies.

Stay current on your favorite topics
Yet to date it has been challenging to understand the true extent of the Africa–China economic relationship due to a paucity of data. Our new report, Dance of the lions and dragons: How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve?, provides a comprehensive, fact-based picture of the Africa–China economic relationship based on a new large-scale data set. This includes on-site interviews with more than 100 senior African business and government leaders, as well as the owners or managers of more than 1,000 Chinese firms spread across eight African countries1 that together make up approximately two-thirds of sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP.

Africa’s largest economic partnerIn the past two decades, China has catapulted from being a relatively small investor in the continent to becoming Africa’s largest economic partner. And since the turn of the millennium, Africa–China trade has been growing at approximately 20 percent per year. Foreign direct investment has grown even faster over the past decade, with a breakneck annual growth rate of 40 percent.2 Yet even this number understates the true picture: we found that China’s financial flows to Africa are around 15 percent larger than official figures when nontraditional flows are included. China is also a large and fast-growing source of aid and the largest source of construction financing; these contributions have supported many of Africa’s most ambitious infrastructure developments in recent years.

We evaluated Africa’s economic partnerships with the rest of the world across five dimensions: trade, investment stock, investment growth, infrastructure financing, and aid. China is among the top four partners for Africa across all these dimensions (Exhibit 1). No other country matches this depth and breadth of engagement.


Chinese firms in AfricaBehind these macro numbers are thousands of previously uncounted Chinese firms operating across Africa. In the eight African countries on which we focused, the number of Chinese-owned firms we identified was between two and nine times the number registered by China’s Ministry of Commerce, until now the largest database of Chinese firms in Africa. Extrapolated across the continent, our findings suggest there are more than 10,000 Chinese-owned firms operating in Africa today (Exhibit 2).


Around 90 percent of these firms are privately owned—calling into question the notion of a monolithic, state-coordinated investment drive by “China, Inc.” Although state-owned enterprises tend to be bigger, particularly in specific sectors such as energy and infrastructure, the sheer number of private Chinese firms working toward their own profit motives suggests that Chinese investment in Africa is a more market-driven phenomenon than is commonly understood.

Chinese firms operate across many sectors of the African economy. Nearly a third are involved in manufacturing, a quarter in services, and around a fifth each in trade and in construction and real estate. In manufacturing, we estimate that 12 percent of Africa’s industrial production—valued at some $500 billion a year in total—is already handled by Chinese firms. In infrastructure, Chinese firms’ dominance is even more pronounced, and they claim nearly 50 percent of Africa’s internationally contracted construction market.

The Chinese firms we talked to are mostly profitable. Nearly one-third reported 2015 profit margins of more than 20 percent. They are also agile and quick to adapt to new opportunities. Except in a few countries such as Ethiopia, they are primarily focused on serving the needs of Africa’s fast-growing markets rather than on exports. An overwhelming 74 percent said they feel optimistic about the future. Reflecting this, most Chinese firms have made investments that represent a long-term commitment to Africa rather than trading or contracting activities.

Slideshow

Impact in African economiesAt the Chinese companies we talked to, 89 percent of employees were African, adding up to nearly 300,000 jobs for African workers. Scaled up across all 10,000 Chinese firms in Africa, this suggests that Chinese-owned business employ several million Africans. Moreover, nearly two-thirds of Chinese employers provided some kind of skills training. In companies engaged in construction and manufacturing, where skilled labor is a necessity, half offer apprenticeship training.

Half of Chinese firms had introduced a new product or service to the local market, and one-third had introduced a new technology. In some cases, Chinese firms had lowered prices for existing products and services by as much as 40 percent through improved technology and efficiencies of scale. African government officials overseeing infrastructure development for their countries cited Chinese firms’ efficient cost structures and speedy delivery as major value adds.

On balance, we believe that China’s growing involvement is strongly positive for Africa’s economies, governments, and workers. However, there are areas for significant improvement:

By value, only 47 percent of the Chinese firms’ sourcing was from local African firms, representing a lost opportunity for local firms to benefit from Chinese investment.Only 44 percent of local managers at the Chinese-owned companies we surveyed were African, though some Chinese firms have driven their local managerial employment above 80 percent (Exhibit 3). Other firms could follow suit.There have been instances of labor and environmental violations by Chinese-owned businesses. These range from inhumane working conditions to illegal extraction of natural resources including timber and fish.


Would you like to learn more about how we help clients in China?
Differences in country engagementAt a national level, we focused on eight large African economies, and identified the following four distinct archetypes of the Africa–China partnership:

Robust partners. Ethiopia and South Africa have a clear strategic posture toward China, along with a high degree of economic engagement in the form of investment, trade, loans, and aid. For example, both countries have translated their national economic-development strategies into specific initiatives related to China, and they have also developed important relationships with Chinese provinces and with Beijing. As a result, China sees these African countries as true partners: reliably engaged and strategic for China’s economic and political interests. These countries have also created a strong platform for continued Chinese engagement through prominent participation in such forums as the Belt and Road initiative (previously known as One Belt, One Road), and they can therefore expect to see ongoing rapid growth in Chinese investment.Solid partners. Kenya, Nigeria, and Tanzania do not yet have the same level of engagement with China as Ethiopia and South Africa, but government relations and Chinese business and investment activity are meaningful and growing. These three governments recognize China’s importance, but they have yet to translate this recognition into an explicit China strategy. Each has several hundred Chinese firms across a diverse set of sectors, but this presence has largely been the result of a passive posture relying on large markets or historical ties; much more is possible with true strategic engagement.Unbalanced partners. In the case of Angola and Zambia, the engagement with China has been quite narrowly focused. For Angola, the government has supplied oil to China in exchange for Chinese financing and construction of major infrastructure projects—but market-driven private investment by Chinese firms has been limited compared with other African countries; only 70 to 75 percent of the Chinese companies in Angola are private, compared with around 90 percent in other countries. Zambia’s case is the opposite: there has been major private-sector investment but not enough oversight from regulatory authorities to avoid labor and corruption scandals.Nascent partners. Côte d’Ivoire is at the very beginning of developing a partnership with China, and so the partnership model has yet to become clear. The country’s relatively small number of Chinese investors are focused on low-commitment industries such as trade.The next decadeWe interviewed more than 100 senior African business and government leaders, and nearly all of them said the Africa–China opportunity is larger than that presented by any other foreign partner—including Brazil, the European Union, India, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

But exactly how quickly will the Africa–China relationship grow in the decade ahead? We see two potential scenarios. In the first, the revenues of Chinese firms in Africa grow at a healthy clip to reach around $250 billion in 2025, from $180 billion today. This scenario would simply entail business as usual, with Chinese firms growing in line with the market, holding their current market shares steady as the African economy expands. Under this scenario, the same three industries that dominate Chinese business in Africa today—manufacturing, resources, and infrastructure—would dominate in 2025 as well.

We believe much more is possible: in a second scenario, Chinese firms in Africa could dramatically accelerate their growth. By expanding aggressively in both existing and new sectors, these firms could reach revenues of $440 billion in 2025. In this accelerated-growth scenario, not only do the three established industries of Chinese investment grow faster than the economy, but Chinese firms also make significant forays into five new sectors: agriculture, banking and insurance, housing, information communications technology and telecommunications, and transport and logistics. This expansion could start with Chinese firms moving into sectors related to the ones they currently dominate—for example, from construction into real estate and housing. Another part of this accelerated growth could come from Chinese firms more fully applying their formulas that have proved successful in China to markets in Africa, including business models in consumer technology, agriculture, and digital finance.

There is considerable upside for Africa if Chinese investment and business activity accelerate. At the macroeconomic level, African economies could gain greater capital investment to boost productivity, competitiveness, and technological readiness, and tens of millions more African workers could gain stable employment. At the microeconomic level, however, there will be winners and losers. Particularly in sectors such as manufacturing, where African firms are significantly lagging behind global productivity levels, African incumbents will need to dramatically improve their productivity and efficiency to compete—or partner effectively—with new Chinese companies on their turf.

With continued and likely growing Chinese investment, it will become ever more urgent to address the gaps in the Africa–China partnership, including by strengthening the role of African managers and partners in the growth of Chinese-owned businesses. Moreover, both Chinese and African actors will need to address three major pain points: corruption in some countries, concerns about personal safety, and language and cultural barriers. In five of the eight countries in which we conducted fieldwork, 60 to 87 percent of Chinese firms said they paid a “tip” or bribe to obtain a license. After corruption, the second-largest concern among Chinese firms is personal safety. For their part, our African interviewees described language and cultural barriers that lead to misunderstanding and ignorance of local regulations. If these problems are left unaddressed, the misunderstandings and potentially serious long-term social issues could weaken the overall sustainability of the Africa–China relationship.

Everyone—African or Chinese, government or private sector—has a role to play in realizing the promise of the Africa–China partnership. We suggest ten recommendations, consisting of actions to be taken by African and Chinese businesses and governments, to ensure the Africa–China relationship grows sustainably and delivers strong economic and social outcomes (Exhibit 4).


Download Dance of the lions and dragons: How are Africa and China engaging, and how will the partnership evolve? ,the full report on which this article is based—available in both English (PDF–3MB) and Chinese (PDF–5MB).

Stay current on your favorite topics
About the author(s) Kartik Jayaram is a senior partner in McKinsey’s Nairobi office, where Omid Kassiri is a partner; Irene Yuan Sun is a consultant in the Washington, DC, office.




To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:46:25 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218199
 
To make sense of it all, better to go w/ McKinsey than with some law firm, or the Economist

mckinsey.com

What’s driving Africa’s growthThe rate of return on foreign investment is higher in Africa than in any other developing region. Global executives and investors must pay heed.

Africa’s economic pulse has quickened, infusing the continent with a new commercial vibrancy. Real GDP rose by 4.9 percent a year from 2000 through 2008, more than twice its pace in the 1980s and ’90s. Telecommunications, banking, and retailing are flourishing. Construction is booming. Private-investment inflows are surging.

To be sure, many of Africa’s 50-plus individual economies face serious challenges, including poverty, disease, and high infant mortality. Yet Africa’s collective GDP, at $1.6 trillion in 2008, is now roughly equal to Brazil’s or Russia’s, and the continent is among the world’s most rapidly growing economic regions. This acceleration is a sign of hard-earned progress and promise.

While Africa’s increased economic momentum is widely recognized, its sources and likely staying power are less understood. Soaring prices for oil, minerals, and other commodities have helped lift GDP since 2000. Research from the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI) shows that resources accounted for only about a third of the newfound growth.1 The rest resulted from internal structural changes that have spurred the broader domestic economy. Wars, natural disasters, or poor government policies could halt or even reverse these gains in any individual country. But in the long term, internal and external trends indicate that Africa’s economic prospects are strong.

Each African country will follow its own growth path. We have developed a framework for understanding how the opportunities and challenges differ by classifying countries according to levels of economic diversification and exports per capita. This approach can help guide executives as they devise business strategies and may also provide new insights for policy makers.

More than a resource boomTo be sure, Africa has benefited from the surge in commodity prices over the past decade. Oil rose from less than $20 a barrel in 1999 to more than $145 in 2008. Prices for minerals, grain, and other raw materials also soared on rising global demand.

Yet the commodity boom explains only part of Africa’s broader growth story. Natural resources, and the related government spending they financed, generated just 32 percent of Africa’s GDP growth from 2000 through 2008.2 The remaining two-thirds came from other sectors, including wholesale and retail, transportation, telecommunications, and manufacturing (Exhibit 1). Economic growth accelerated across the continent, in 27 of its 30 largest economies. Indeed, countries with and without significant resource exports had similar GDP growth rates.

Widespread growth
Africa’s growth was widespread across sectors from 2002 to 2007.


The key reasons behind this growth surge included government action to end armed conflicts, improve macroeconomic conditions, and undertake microeconomic reforms to create a better business climate. To start, several African countries halted their deadly hostilities, creating the political stability necessary to restart economic growth. Next, Africa’s economies grew healthier as governments reduced the average inflation rate from 22 percent in the 1990s to 8 percent after 2000. They trimmed their foreign debt by one-quarter and shrunk their budget deficits by two-thirds.

Finally, African governments increasingly adopted policies to energize markets. They privatized state-owned enterprises, increased the openness of trade, lowered corporate taxes, strengthened regulatory and legal systems, and provided critical physical and social infrastructure. Nigeria privatized more than 116 enterprises between 1999 and 2006, for example, and Morocco and Egypt struck free-trade agreements with major export partners. Although the policies of many governments have a long way to go, these important first steps enabled a private business sector to emerge.

Together, such structural changes helped fuel an African productivity revolution by helping companies to achieve greater economies of scale, increase investment, and become more competitive. After declining through the 1980s and 1990s, the continent’s productivity started growing again in 2000, averaging 2.7 percent since that year. These productivity gains occurred across countries and sectors.

This growth acceleration has started to improve conditions for Africa’s people by reducing the poverty rate. But several measures of health and education have not improved as fast. To lift living standards more broadly, the continent must sustain or increase its recent pace of economic growth.

Promising long-term growth prospectsA critical question is whether Africa’s surge represents a one-time event or an economic take-off. The continent’s growth also picked up during the oil boom of the 1970s but slowed sharply when oil and other commodity prices collapsed during the subsequent two decades. Today, individual African economies could suffer many disappointments and setbacks. While short-term risks remain, our analysis suggests that Africa has strong long-term growth prospects, propelled both by external trends in the global economy and internal changes in the continent’s societies and economies.

Global economic tiesAlthough Africa is more than a story about resources, it will continue to profit from rising global demand for oil, natural gas, minerals, food, arable land, and the like. MGI research finds that over the next decade, the world’s liquid-fuel consumption will increase by 25 percent—twice the pace of the 1990s. Projections of demand for many hard minerals show similar growth. Meanwhile, Africa boasts an abundance of riches: 10 percent of the world’s reserves of oil, 40 percent of its gold, and 80 to 90 percent of the chromium and the platinum metal group. Those are just the known reserves; no doubt more lies undiscovered.

Demand for commodities is growing fastest in the world’s emerging economies, particularly in Asia and the Middle East. Despite longstanding commercial ties with Europe, Africa now conducts half its trade with developing economic regions (“South–South” exchanges). From 1990 through 2008, Asia’s share of African trade doubled, to 28 percent, while Western Europe’s portion shrank, to 28 percent, from 51 percent.

This geographic shift has given rise to new forms of economic relationships, in which governments strike multiple long-term deals at once. China, for example, has bid for access to ten million tons of copper and two million tons of cobalt in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in exchange for a $6 billion package of infrastructure investments,3 including mine improvements, roads, rail, hospitals, and schools. India, Brazil, and Middle East economies are also forging new broad-based investment partnerships in Africa.

The global race for commodities also gives African governments more bargaining power, so they are negotiating better deals that capture more value from their resources. Buyers are now willing to make up-front payments (in addition to resource extraction royalties) and to share management skills and technology.

At the same time, Africa is gaining increased access to international capital. The annual flow of foreign direct investment into Africa increased from $9 billion in 2000 to $62 billion in 2008—relative to GDP, almost as large as the flow into China. While Africa’s resource sectors have drawn the most new foreign capital, it has also flowed into tourism, textiles, construction, banking, and telecommunications, as well as a broad range of countries.

The rise of the African urban consumerAfrica’s long-term growth will increasingly reflect interrelated social and demographic changes creating new domestic engines of growth. Key among these will be urbanization, an expanding labor force, and the rise of the middle-class African consumer.

In 1980, just 28 percent of Africans lived in cities. Today, 40 percent of the continent’s one billion people do—a proportion roughly comparable to China’s and larger than India’s (Exhibit 2). By 2030, that share is projected to rise to 50 percent, and Africa’s top 18 cities will have a combined spending power of $1.3 trillion.

Urban Africa
Africa is nearly as urbanized as China is and has as many cities of one million people as Europe does.


To be sure, urbanization can breed misery if it creates slums. But in many African countries, urbanization is boosting productivity (which rises as workers move from agricultural work into urban jobs), demand, and investment. Companies achieve greater economies of scale by spreading their fixed costs over a larger customer base. And urbanization is spurring the construction of more roads, buildings, water systems, and similar projects. Since 2000, Africa’s annual private infrastructure investments have tripled, averaging $19 billion from 2006 to 2008. Nevertheless, more investment is required if Africa’s new megacities are to provide a reasonable quality of life for the continent’s increasingly large urban classes.

Meanwhile, Africa’s labor force is expanding, in contrast to what’s happening in much of the rest of the world. The continent has more than 500 million people of working age. By 2040, their number is projected to exceed 1.1 billion—more than in China or India—lifting GDP growth. Over the last 20 years, three-quarters of the continent’s increase in GDP per capita came from an expanding workforce, the rest from higher labor productivity. If Africa can provide its young people with the education and skills they need, this large workforce could become a significant source of rising global consumption and production. Education is a major challenge, so educating Africa’s young has to be one of the highest priorities for public policy across the continent.

Finally, many Africans are joining the ranks of the world’s consumers. In 2000, roughly 59 million households on the continent had $5,000 or more4 in income—above which they start spending roughly half of it on nonfood items. By 2014, the number of such households could reach 106 million. Africa already has more middle-class households (defined as those with incomes of $20,000 or above) than India. Africa’s rising consumption will create more demand for local products, sparking a cycle of increasing domestic growth.

Africa’s diverse growth pathsWhile Africa’s collective long-term prospects are strong, the growth trajectories of its individual countries will differ. Economists have traditionally grouped them by region, language, or income level. We take another approach, classifying 26 of the continent’s largest countries5 according to their levels of economic diversification and exports per capita. This approach highlights progress toward two related objectives:

Diversifying the economy. In the shift from agrarian to urban economies, multiple sectors contribute to growth. The share of GDP contributed by agriculture and natural resources shrinks with the expansion of the manufacturing and service sectors, which create jobs and lift incomes, raising domestic demand. On average, each 15 percent increase in manufacturing and services as a portion of GDP is associated with a doubling of income per capita.

Boosting exports to finance investment. Emerging markets require large investments to build a modern economy’s infrastructure. Exports are the primary means to earn the hard currency for imported capital goods, which in Africa amount to roughly half of all investment. This is not to say that African countries must follow an Asian model of export-led growth and trade surpluses, but they do need exports to finance the investments required to diversify.

History shows that as countries develop, they move closer to achieving both of these objectives. Most African countries today fall into one of four broad clusters: diversified economies, oil exporters, transition economies, or pretransition economies (Exhibit 3). Although the countries within each segment differ in many ways, their economic structures share broad similarities. Our framework is useful for understanding how growth opportunities and challenges vary across a heterogeneous continent. Although imperfect, this framework can guide business leaders and investors as they develop strategies for Africa and can provide new perspectives for its policy makers.

Four development paths
Segmenting African countries by exports per capita and by economic diversification reveals how growth opportunities and challenges vary across the continent.


Diversified economies: Africa’s growth enginesThe continent’s four most advanced economies—Egypt, Morocco, South Africa, and Tunisia—are already broadly diversified. Manufacturing and services together total 83 percent of their combined GDP. Domestic services, such as construction, banking, telecom, and retailing, have accounted for more than 70 percent of their growth since 2000. They are among the continent’s richest economies and have the least volatile GDP growth. With all the necessary ingredients for further expansion, they stand to benefit greatly from increasing ties to the global economy.

Domestic consumption is the largest contributor to growth in these countries. Their cities added more than ten million people in the last decade, real consumer spending has grown by 3 to 5 percent annually since 2000, and 90 percent of all house-holds have some discretionary income. As a result, consumer-facing sectors such as retailing, banking, and telecom have grown rapidly. Urbanization has also prompted a construction boom that created 20 to 40 percent of all jobs over the past decade.

Looking ahead, these diversified economies face the challenge of continuing to expand exports while building a dynamic domestic economy. Apart from Egypt, their exports have grown much more slowly than those of other emerging markets, in part because they have unit labor costs (wages divided by output per worker) two to four times higher than those in China and India. Like other middle-income countries, such as Brazil, Malaysia, and Mexico, these African states must move toward producing higher-value goods. They have started to do so—witness South Africa’s and Morocco’s automotive exports—and should continue to build on their comparative advantages, which include proximity to Europe and facility with European languages.

Along with other countries seeking to make this jump, Africa’s diversified economies need to improve their education systems. Broadly speaking, they already have the continent’s highest rates of literacy and school enrollment; the next step will be to increase secondary and tertiary enrollments and improve the overall quality of their education systems.

Another priority for the diversified economies is to continue building their internal service sectors, which will be important sources of future employment. (MGI research finds that internal services account for virtually all net job creation in high-income countries and for 85 percent of net new jobs in middle-income ones.) The diversified economies can also expand manufacturing, particularly in food processing and construction materials, for local and regional markets. This move could increase exports and reduce the need for imports, easing these countries’ current-account deficits.

Oil exporters: Enhancing growth through diversificationAfrica’s oil and gas exporters have the continent’s highest GDP per capita but also the least diversified economies. This group—Algeria, Angola, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Libya, and Nigeria—comprises both countries that have exported oil for many years and some relative newcomers. Rising oil prices have lifted their export revenues significantly; the three largest producers (Algeria, Angola, Nigeria) earned $1 trillion from petroleum exports from 2000 through 2008, compared with just $300 billion in the 1990s. For the most part, Africa’s oil and gas exporters used this revenue well, to reduce budget deficits, fund investments, and build foreign-exchange reserves.

Economic growth in these countries remains closely linked to oil and gas prices. Manufacturing and services account for just one-third of GDP—less than half their share in the diversified economies. The experience of emerging-market oil exporters outside Africa illustrates the potential for greater diversification. In Indonesia, manufacturing and services account for 70 percent of GDP, compared with less than 45 percent in Algeria and Nigeria—even though all three countries have produced similar quantities of oil since 1970.

Nigeria provides an example of an African oil exporter that has begun the transition to a more diversified economy. Natural resources accounted for just 35 percent of Nigeria’s growth since 2000, and manufacturing and services are growing rapidly. Banking and telecom, in particular, are expanding thanks to a series of economic reforms. Since 2000, the number of Nigeria’s telecom subscribers increased from almost zero to 63 million, while banking assets grew fivefold.

The oil exporters generally have strong growth prospects if they can use petroleum wealth to finance the broader development of their economies. The experience of other developing countries shows it will be essential to make continued investments in infrastructure and education and to undertake further economic reforms that would spur a dynamic business sector. But like petroleum-rich countries in general, those in Africa face acute challenges in maintaining political momentum for reforms, resisting the temptation to overinvest (particularly in the resource sector), and maintaining political stability—in short, avoiding the “oil curse” that has afflicted other oil exporters around the world.

Transition economies: Building on current gainsAfrica’s transition economies—Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia—have lower GDP per capita than the countries in the first two groups but have begun the process of diversifying their sources of growth. These countries are diverse: some depend heavily on one commodity, such as copper in Zambia or aluminum in Mozambique. Others, like Kenya and Uganda, are already more diversified.

The agriculture and resource sectors together account for as much as 35 percent of GDP in the transition countries and for two-thirds of their exports. But they increasingly export manufactured goods, particularly to other African countries. Successful products include processed fuels, processed food, chemicals, apparel, and cosmetics. As these countries diversified, their annual real GDP growth accelerated from 3.6 percent a year in the 1990s to 5.5 percent after 2000.

Expanding intra-African trade will be one key to the future growth of the transition economies, because they are small individually, but their prospects improve as regional integration creates larger markets. If these countries improved their infrastructure and regulatory systems, they could also compete globally with other low-cost emerging economies. One study found that factories in the transition countries are as productive as those in China and India but that the Africans’ overall costs are higher because of poor infrastructure and regulation—problems that the right policy reforms could fix.6 The local service sectors (such as telecommunications, banking, and retailing) in the transition economies also have potential. While they are expanding rapidly, their penetration rates remain far lower than those in the diversified countries, creating an opportunity for businesses to satisfy the unmet demand.

Pretransition economies: Strengthening the basicsThe economies in the pretransition segment—the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Mali, and Sierra Leone—are still very poor, with GDP per capita of just $353—one-tenth that of the diversified countries. Some, such as Ethiopia and Mali, have meager commodity endowments and large rural populations. Others, devastated by wars in the 1990s, started growing again after the conflicts ended. But many pretransition economies are now growing very fast. The three largest (the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, and Mali) grew, on average, by 7 percent a year since 2000, after not expanding at all in the 1990s. Even so, their growth has been erratic at times and could falter again.

Although the individual circumstances of the pre-transition economies differ greatly, their common problem is a lack of the basics, such as strong, stable governments and other public institutions, good macroeconomic conditions, and sustainable agricultural development. The key challenges for this group will include maintaining the peace, upholding the rule of law, getting the economic fundamentals right, and creating a more predictable business environment. These countries can also hasten their progress with support from international agencies and new private philanthropic organizations that are developing novel ways to tackle poverty and other social issues.

In a more stable political and economic environment, some of these countries could tap their natural resources to finance economic growth. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, for example, controls half of the world’s cobalt reserves and a quarter of the world’s diamond reserves. Sierra Leone has about 5 percent of the world’s diamond reserves. Ethiopia and Mali have 22 million and 19 million hectares of arable land, respectively. If these countries could attract businesses to help develop their resources, they could push their economies upward on the path of steadier growth.

If recent trends continue, Africa will play an increasingly important role in the global economy. By 2040, it will be home to one in five of the planet’s young people, and the size of its labor force will top China’s. Africa has almost 60 percent of the world’s uncultivated arable land and a large share of the natural resources. Its consumer-facing sectors are growing two to three times faster than those in the OECD7 countries. And the rate of return on foreign investment is higher in Africa than in any other developing region. Global executives and investors cannot afford to ignore this. A strategy for Africa must be part of their long-term planning.

The time for businesses to act on those plans is now. Companies already operating in Africa should consider expanding. For others still on the sidelines, early entry into emerging economies provides opportunities to create markets, establish brands, shape industry structures, influence customer preferences, and establish longterm relationships. Business can help build the Africa of the future. And working together, business, governments, and civil society can confront the continent’s many challenges and lift the living standards of its people.

About the author(s)Acha Leke is a principal in McKinsey’s Lagos office, Susan Lund is director of research at the McKinsey Global Institute, Charles Roxburgh is a London-based director of MGI, and Arend van Wamelen is a principal in the Johannesburg office.

The authors wish to acknowledge the contributions of the following colleagues to this article: Martijn Allessie, Charles Atkins, Mutsa Chironga, Norbert Dörr, Reinaldo Fiorini, Michael Kloss, Corrado Ruffini, Sven Smit, Amine Tazi-Riffi, Till Zeino-Mahmalat, and Nadia Terfous.




To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:48:26 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218199
 
... and so McKinsey comes under predictable attack

newyorker.com

McKinsey’s Work for Saudi Arabia Highlights its History of Unsavory Entanglements
Sheelah Kolhatkar
For most of McKinsey & Company’s nearly hundred-year history consulting for companies and governments around the world, the firm has enjoyed a reputation for discretion and professionalism in its work. Its name evokes a certain mystique: hiring McKinsey telegraphs to employees and competitors that a company is serious about tackling a particular problem—whether it involves reorganizing its business, cutting costs, or launching a new line of products—and that the company is willing to spend millions of dollars for the most sophisticated advice. At the same time, part of what makes McKinsey different from other firms is its insistence that it not be acknowledged for its work; a client often agrees not to publicly disclose the fact that it has hired McKinsey. Part of what the firm is selling is credit for its ideas, in addition to the ideas themselves. “If McKinsey has a great idea and you follow their advice and everything works out, you never see McKinsey running around saying, ‘That was our idea,’ ” Duff McDonald, the author of “ The Firm: The Story of McKinsey and Its Secret Influence on American Business,” told me. “But at the same time, part of the sale is that they take no responsibility for the result. They are saying to the client, ‘You can have all the credit you want, but you cannot push a bad outcome on us.’ ”

The limitations of this model came into sharp focus recently, with the revelation that McKinsey may have inadvertently played a role in Saudi Arabia’s mistreatment of critics. On October 20th, the Times reported that the government of the Saudi crown prince, Mohammed bin Salman, had employed operatives to harass dissidents, including the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, who was allegedly murdered inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, on October 2nd. The article included the revelation that McKinsey had prepared a nine-page report measuring the public perception of certain Saudi economic policies, and cited three individuals who were driving much of the largely negative coverage on Twitter: a Saudi Arabia-based writer named Khalid al-Alkami, a dissident living in Canada named Omar Abdulaziz, and an anonymous writer. After the report was created, Al-Alkami was arrested, and Abdulaziz’s brothers living in Saudi Arabia were put in prison. The anonymous Twitter channel was shut down.

The condemnation of McKinsey’s decision to do work for Saudi Arabia’s autocratic leadership was swift. (Disclosure: The New Yorker has worked with McKinsey in the past.) In a statement posted on Twitter in response to criticism, the company said that the Saudi state had not commissioned it to create a report that identified critics. “In our work with governments, McKinsey has not and never would engage in any work that seeks to target individuals based on their views,” the firm said. “The document in question was a brief overview of publicly available information looking at social media usage,” and “its intended primary audience was internal.” The firm said that it was “horrified” by the possibility that its work could have been misused, and that it was investigating how the report could have got into the hands of people who were not supposed to have it.

There is still much to learn about McKinsey’s role in the episode, and it may well turn out to be less nefarious than it first appeared. But in the last few years, the firm, which likes to stay out of the news, has become embroiled in several unsavory engagements. Taken together, the incidents highlight the fact that McKinsey’s commitment to working with almost anyone who will pay its lavish fees, from China to dozens of departments in the U.S. government, while disavowing any responsibility for what clients do with the information that it supplies, can lead to unacceptable levels of moral compromise. “I think, by the very nature of the business, they are mercenaries—they will work for anyone,” McDonald said. “I don’t mean they’ll work for a murderer. But they’re for hire.” Referring to McKinsey’s tradition of recruiting students right out of business school, he noted, “The M.B.A. is a corporate soldier willing to work for the highest bidder. . . . And if you pledge loyalty to no one in particular, and insist on your right to work with everyone, then ultimately it could become a leadership nightmare.”

The most disturbing of these recent cases involves McKinsey’s controversial entanglement in South Africa. In 2015, according to reporting in the Times, the firm signed a contract worth up to seven hundred million dollars to provide consulting services to Eskom, the state-owned power company. It soon became clear that McKinsey had partnered on the project with a firm linked to Ajay, Atul, and Rajesh Gupta, three brothers whose business dealings were at the center of a far-reaching corruption scandal—they are alleged to have used their personal connections to former President Jacob Zuma to manipulate the government for personal gain. (Zuma resigned early this year, partly as a result.) Facing international criticism, McKinsey denied any legal wrongdoing, but acknowledged that it had made misjudgments. The firm replaced the management of its South African office and pledged to repay the seventy-four million dollars that it had received from the government. “This isn’t who we are,” Dominic Barton, the firm’s managing director, told the Times. “It isn’t what we do.”

This summer, in the midst of protests over the Trump Administration’s immigration policies, it came to light that McKinsey was working with the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency. The firm said that its contract was for a “long-term program” at the agency, and that it was not involved in implementing immigration policy. When the firm’s engagement with ICE became public, it reportedly prompted heated discussion among current and former McKinsey employees. This corporate dynamic seems to have become more common recently; earlier this year, Google employees protested the fact that their employer had agreed to provide artificial-intelligence services to the Pentagon, prompting the company to withdraw from the deal. (Last week, Microsoft quietly announced that it had agreed to provide A.I. to the military.) In July, McKinsey’s contract with ICE, which began in 2016, ended as scheduled. The firm would not “under any circumstances, engage in any work, anywhere in the world, that advances or assists policies that are at odds with our values,” the firm’s managing partner wrote in a note to McKinsey employees. McKinsey has had several subsequent moments of notoriety. This fall, for example, the Times reported that the firm was advising Puerto Rico on managing a hundred and twenty-three billion dollars’ worth of debt, while also investing in some of that debt—an arrangement that posed a possible conflict of interest. McKinsey had received fifty million dollars in fees for the assignment as of September. (A spokesperson at the time said that McKinsey had met all legal requirements, “including those regarding potential conflicts.”) After each episode, there was public scrutiny—in some cases, an apology—and then business continued largely as usual.

These kinds of problems have arisen, in part, because McKinsey is so successful. It has greater access and influence than most other management-consulting firms, and this puts it in a position to see its work misused. There is little external oversight of a company like McKinsey, from either review boards or federal regulators. At a time when accountability is declining in both the U.S. government and corporate America, we are left asking the people at the firm to impose it on themselves. “Who do they answer to?” McDonald asked. “They work for the F.B.I., the D.O.J., for ICE, for Puerto Rico. They work for all the big banks. They work for everyone. It’s transnational.” He went on, “So something like South Africa happens. Who punishes a firm of their size and influence over something like that? McKinsey is so connected and so influential all over the planet, it’s kind of interesting to think about. Who’s the entity that says, ‘What are you doing?’ Apparently no one.”

A previous version of this article inaccurately summarized reporting by the New York Times.




To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/18/2019 3:50:34 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218199
 
I note that McKinsey doing studies that must have semblance of conviction is materially different than Goldman helping Malaysian politicians to steal

bloomberg.com

McKinsey Says It’s ‘Horrified’ Saudi Arabia Report May Have Been Misused
Jordyn Holman22 October 2018, 05:50 GMT+8

business

By 21 October 2018, 22:04 GMT+8

Consulting firm says report not intended to target dissidents

McKinsey says it was studying social-media use in kingdom



McKinsey 'Horrified' Saudis May Have Used Memo to Silence Dissidents

McKinsey & Co. says one of their reports was misused by the Saudi’s. Bloomberg’s Jason Kelly reports.

McKinsey & Co. said it’s “horrified” that a report it prepared to measure public perception of Saudi Arabia’s policies may have been used by the kingdom to silence dissidents.

The consulting firm responded on Twitter to a New York Times article that detailed a report in which it identified several people driving conversations on Twitter. Those people were later arrested or had their social-media accounts shut down.

In a nine-page report, the consulting firm said responses to the country’s economic policies received twice as much coverage on Twitter than in the country’s traditional news media, and that negative sentiment was more common than positive statements on social media. The document was a brief overview of social-media usage and meant for internal use, McKinsey said.

The New York-based firm said it wasn’t working in tandem with the Saudi government, and that when it does work with governments, the company “has not and never would engage in any work that seeks to target individuals based on their views,” according to a statement released on Saturday night.

“We are horrified by the possibility, however remote, that it could have been misused in any way,” the statement said. “At this point, we have seen no evidence to suggest that it was misused, but we are urgently investigating how and with whom the document was shared.”

McKinsey’s media relations office didn’t immediately respond to a message left on Sunday.

South AfricaSaudi Arabia has faced intense international criticism since the disappearance earlier this month of Jamal Khashoggi, a critic of the Saudi government who was a contributing writer for the Washington Post.

The kingdom confirmed Saturday that he was killed inside the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, where he’d gone to obtain a document he needed to marry his Turkish fiancee. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman initially said that the journalist left unscathed. King Salman, the prince’s father, eventually ordered an internal investigation.

This isn’t the first time McKinsey has dealt with ethical fallout from government-related consulting work. In July, the consultancy apologized to South Africa over how business was handled with the state-owned power company Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. The firm admitted to overcharging the utility and said it had been slow to admit wrongdoing.

McKinsey reached a settlement in July to repay almost 1 billion rand ($74 million) in fees to Eskom. It said it had failed to follow its own procedures when it worked alongside Trillian Capital Partners Pty Ltd., a business linked to the Gupta family, which had close ties to former President Jacob Zuma.

Consultants’ InfluenceNotwithstanding its statement that the report on Saudi Arabia was meant for internal use only, McKinsey and other consultants must be aware of how their work may affect every stakeholder involved, said Susan Harmeling, associate professor of entrepreneurship at the USC Marshall School of Business and an expert in business ethics.

This is especially true with government work, where large consulting agencies are in position to influence key leaders, she said.

“Any action you take, any information you produce, anytime you put something in writing, you need to know this could get into a lot of different hands,” Harmeling said. “That’s then out there or potentially out there and you have to think about ‘Could this hurt somebody? Could this get to the wrong place?’"

While McKinsey still holds the reputation of being the “gold standard of management consulting companies,” it could face reputational damage, she said.

Some U.S. businesses have opted to back away from their connections with Saudi Arabia. Lobbying firms Glover Park Group and The Harbour Group ended their relationships with the kingdom as the fallout continued. The BGR Group and the law firm Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP wrote in filings with the Justice Department that they would no longer represent the kingdom.

Business leaders including those at BlackRock Inc., Blackstone Group LP, JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Deutsche Bank have withdrawn from Saudi Arabia’s Future Investment Initiative conference, dubbed “Davos of the Desert,” which is scheduled to start Tuesday in Riyadh.

— With assistance by Ben Brody

(Updates with business ethics expert interview starting in 12th paragraph.)

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To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (145540)1/19/2019 3:01:03 AM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218199
 
Hello Haim, the below story is sad and happy.

you may appreciate the backstory ... the singer / song your recommended to me earlier, Dimash, led me to search and listen to all his of his singing and searched on below back story to one of the Chinese language songs ...

Dimash, it turns out, is ultra popular in China and was made so through good office of Hunan Provincial TV show "I am a Singer" contest where Dimash did 12 rounds as a foreign participant. The contestants are all professionals, and as a group 'adopted' Dimash as a favoured more-than-guest.

that Dimash sang a Mandarin Chinese language song titled "Daybreak" at the "I am a Singer" TV contest show (episode 8) whilst suffering from a throat issue, and refrained from going his characteristic ultra sonic


... and later after recovery did live at some live concert at Bastau - and did ultra sonic ...


the backstory, a true story ... a singer ms Han Hong en.wikipedia.org adopted a child (the original song by original artist)


lyricstranslate.com
This song tells a story of an orphan:
A cable car at a scenic spot in Guizhou Province crashed in 1999, at that moment a couple used their hands hold up their two and a half years old child, so he was saved, but his parents died. Later, Hanhong adopted that child. The great parental love has shocked her who also longed for love in her childhood, as she experienced a painful childhood. Her father was a crosstalk comedian who died on the way to show when she was six years old. Her mother was also a famous singer at that time. So she was very busy every day. Years later, her mother married another man and left her with her grandmother.
So this song is about this orphan, and from the story of the orphan, Han also see her own childhood in his.



ms hang hong and the orphan today (was 2.5 at time of cable car accident where 35 folks died, including the child's parents)



Dimash has since engaged w/ Ms Han Hong as godmother


Ms Han Hong met Dimash on the singing contest show.

Commonly felt that Dimash changes but adds to original songs, rather than simply change for changes sake.

Day Breaks

Versions: #1 #2

That's an autumn, the breezes were so sentimental
That reminded me of their helpless eyes
Just at that place with the beautiful scenery
I heard a loud noise echo in the valley
That was the autumn I couldn't see the face of my dad again
He used his both shoulders hold up the starting point of my rebirth
Tears cover my eyes in the night
Don't you go away, don't hurt yourself
I saw mom and dad walk away, just like that
Leave me alone in this strange world
I wondered whether any dangers in my future
I wanted to hold tight at his hands
Mom told me that we still had hope
I saw the sun rise and mom smile. The day breaks.



This is a night, a starry night
I saw my mom in the dream
I need to be strong being alone in this world
Don't you go away, don't hurt yourself
I saw mom and dad walk away, just like that
Leave me alone in this strange world
I wanted to build a beautiful garden for him
I wanted to hold tight at his hands
Mom told me that we still had hope
I saw the sun rise and they smile. The day breaks.