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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Snowshoe who wrote (147726)4/10/2019 10:58:30 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218787
 
in the mean time I wish the rebellion well ...

zerohedge.com

A Small Band Of Traders Is Taking Up Arms Against The Rise Of The MachinesBy many measures, overall market liquidity has dramatically improved since the 1980s: as shown in the chart below, several technological and regulatory developments in financial markets have helped reduce trading costs, with the most notable transformation in recent history taking place when US exchanges reduced the tick size for stocks in the 1990’s and decimalization (tick size of 1 cent) was implemented on the NYSE in January 2001.



And yet ask any trader today just how much of an improvement there has been in liquidity and you will likely get punched in the face. Starting with the May 2010 "flash crash" and continuing to this day, market depth has become a joke, or rather a mirage, as none other than Goldman's co-head of trading recently warned. Indeed, despite this "liquidity improvement" there were two “liquidity shocks” in 2018 (a "liquidity shock" is defined by detrending the illiquidity ratio versus its 3-year moving average given its strong autocorrelation). The 4Q 2018 liquidity shock, shown below, was the largest since 2011. Similarly, S&P 500 futures top-of-book depth reached its lowest level since 2008.



And, as we have discussed for much of the past decade, a big reason for this collapse in liquidity has been the transformation of the "market-making" topology, in which traditional providers of liquidity, those who actually took market-making, liquidity risk, were replaced with HFT algos who "add liquidity" but only if there is no stress in the marketplace; the moment a tremor, or worse a shock emerges, volatility vaporizes, leading to an increasingly unstable, fractured market which reprices violently and rapidly as Q4 2018 showed.

Amid this trader hellscape, in which any unexpected event can result in an instant flash crash, "a small band of humans is taking up arms against the rise of the machines" as Bloomberg puts it.

As Bloomberg reports, "fund managers who ride big sell-offs in stocks are relishing fresh Wall Street warnings that robots and the like are leaving the bull market more vulnerable to explosions in volatility and crashes in liquidity", warnings such as this one we made ten years ago today with " The Incredibly Shrinking Market Liquidity, Or The Upcoming Black Swan Of Black Swans."

It is this small group of rag-tag traders that are ready to pounce when, not if, the herd - from quants to passive money - is forced to unwind in a downturn just as the relative firepower of fundamental managers to buy the dip gets depleted.

According to Dominick Paoloni, the founder of IPS Strategic Capital, such a downturn is precisely what is coming: he believes that today’s equity rally is storing up all the ingredients for another flash crash. As a result, Paoloni started a fund three years ago to hedge price swings triggered by robotic programs going haywire (he is hardly alone in hedging for if not the end of the world, then at least the end of algo domination) and sees the current market calm prone to disruption.

Referring to a chart we have frequently shown, Paoloni said that "algorithmic trading strategies and other quantitative traders have caused exacerbated moves on both the up and downside in equity markets,” adding that "as AUM continues to flow out of actively-managed equity funds there are less participants available to bring markets back to equilibrium."

The chart, of course, is this one:



To be sure, there is nothing particularly new about the thesis: while nobody cares when stocks rice, computers have long been a favorite scapegoat when stocks are falling and volatility edges higher ( just ask Leon Cooperman). But the paranoia is in fact reserved in this case - as we explained a decade ago - and as last year’s sudden maelstrom and the ensuing melt-up demonstrated all too vividly.

Paoloni's siren call was picked up half a world away over in London, where Richard Haworth also argues that algo traders are a destabilizing force. Similar to Universa Investments, his 36 South Capital Advisors offers protection against tail risks through long-dated out-of-the-money options on multiple asset classes.

"There’s an illusion of liquidity because the algos are active," Haworth said in an interview in his Mayfair office, sounding suspiciously like this tinfoil conspiracy website. "But if they switch their machines off because they’re uncertain about some information that has come to light, that’s a lot less liquidity." Go ahead, Richard, tell them the full truth: when the machines are switched off, there is no liquidity, and an order as small as a few thousands dollars can move the tick in the Emini.

Haworth's paranoia was justified by a relatively recent JPMorgan research report that concluded index and ETF quants and options-related strategies dominate all but 10% of U.S. stock trading. The amount invested in large-cap equity funds tracking indexes recently eclipsed-cash in actively run funds of the same type, Bloomberg reported in February.

Put another way, there’s a vanishing cohort of human-powered funds with the conviction to snap up single-stock names in a falling market. They would act as a brake on losses.

Unless, of course, they too are swept away in the avalanche of selling which is sure to erupt should the Fed step away during the next market crash.

Back to Paoloni’s Absolute Return Strategy, it reminds us that a fat tail funds is a fat tail fund, the only difference is the timing - predictably, it focuses on the asset classes that have been most repressed by central bank micromanagement of markets, primarily equity-index options and VIX contracts. As one would expect, it’s had some of its best days when the S&P 500 plummeted by more than 4% in a single session. And while still a tiny speck compared to its behemoth passive peers, the $64 million fund is getting more inquiries of late from financial advisers wary of another 2009-style crash.

As one would also expect, the fund is eager to talk its book, and claims that the potential of a one-day decline of more than 5% has increased in recent years. This is absolutely true, however, it has also increased the odds of central bank intervention during every downtick, intervention which the following BofA chart confirms is precisely what has been taking place.



Of course, Paoloni's aggressive stance is a lone voice in the wilderness: defenders - the vast majority of today's traders who have never even seen a real bear market - of funds programmed to sell or buy on volatility triggers point out they are reducing spreads and day-to-day price swings in part thanks to their growing arsenal of assets. But the risk is that when volatility reawakens, they’ll exit the market on a dime and expose its fragility, says Paoloni.

"The illusion of a lot of liquidity dampens volatility. When that illusion is broken, volatility will be a lot higher than it otherwise would have been," Haworth said.

And while he is right, so far he has been early. Hopefully, he won't have long to wait for his thesis to come true.




To: Snowshoe who wrote (147726)4/11/2019 8:30:55 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 218787
 
<<patiently>> is extremely easy when there is absence of intention, at least as enunciated up to this point, and what enunciations were done w/r to Russia, in the main, originates from team America which seems to like keeping busy, productive or otherwise, appearing at times to be simply and just an action to mill time.

and w/r to busy, so much too do, productively, per imperatives give rise to solutions, some positive news, but per 'china china china' meme, perhaps the deep-state shall, in addition to the space force, the south china sea strutting around, tee-up the solar patrol, which, by the way, is difficult to do unless allowing trade deficit w/ team china to incline upward, from the lower left to the upper right, that which we can term alt-decline :0)

<<“The IEEFA has no doubt that China’s commitment to dominate the world in zero-emissions technologies and industries of the future is absolute.”>> in case the casual peruser in the cafe misses the trajectory per china 2025, silk this and belt that, and infrastructure infrastructure infrastructure

the days and nights of high speed rail running on grid-parity and soon god-parity essentially free electricity can do much for the economy economy economy and export export export, and if packaged w/ quantum-encryption enabled Huawei 5G tele system, oh whoa wee whiz bang gee (may have gotten the word order wrong).

ft.com

Chinese solar industry starts to hit grid parity
Breakthrough means photovoltaic sector can compete against coal without subsidies
April 5, 2019


Solar power will achieve grid parity with coal in 11 of China’s 31 provincial-level administrative units this year, according to Citigroup, potentially allowing the sector to continue its rapid expansion in spite of the slashing of government subsidies.

Beijing temporarily scrapped subsidies for most of China’s solar projects in June last year in a move aimed at curbing runaway growth in the photovoltaic industry, which had boomed under generous subsidies. The industry’s rapid expansion led to a $15bn-plus deficit in a fund set up to pay for higher tariffs for renewable energy.

The end of subsidies caused fears of a sudden slowdown in the roll-out of photovoltaic projects in the world’s largest polluter. China accounted for 29 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions last year, according to the International Energy Agency, with its emissions having risen 2.5 per cent year-on-year.

However, the earlier-than-expected transition to grid parity — allowing solar power to compete with coal-fired plants with no need of any subsidy — suggests the worries may be overdone.

A recent report from Unearthed, Greenpeace UK’s journalism project, noted: “There were fears that [solar PV] installation volumes would crash after [the] drastic cut to tariffs last summer, but they stayed strong, showing that solar is increasingly cost competitive against coal in China.”

It added: “Early this year, China announced the first unsubsidised wind and solar projects, marking a potential inflection point for the industry.”

In December, a 500MW solar PV plant in Golmud, a city in Qinghai province on the Tibetan Plateau, was connected to the grid selling power for Rmb0.316 per kWh, below the Rmb0.325 benchmark price for electricity generated from coal-fired plants, according to the official Xinhua news agency, which said the tariff was “unprecedented nationwide for solar power”.

China’s National Development and Reform Commission said in January, “Some regions with good natural resources and firm demand have already achieved subsidy-free, or grid price parity, conditions.”

François Perrin, a Hong Kong-based portfolio manager at investment house East Capital, said, “The development of the photovoltaic industry over the last 20 years has been driven all the way by generous subsidies — 2019 will effectively be remembered as the year China reached grid parity in the PV industry.”

The temporary freezing of the subsidy regime may, in itself, be a major factor behind some Chinese provinces potentially reaching grid parity this year, four years ahead of an official target of 2023.

Prices for polysilicon, wafers and solar cells have been in long-term decline, but have fallen more sharply still since the end of May 2018 as the elimination of subsidies led to expectations of weaker global demand, given China’s outsized role in the solar industry, even as production continued to rise rapidly.

Since May 31, prices for all three components have fallen by between 35 per cent and 41 per cent, according to figures from Citi and PVinsights, a data provider, as the chart illustrates.


“Solar panels are now reaching price levels enabling photovoltaic power plants to be competitive versus conventional coal power plants in more than 10 provinces in China,” said Mr Perrin.

“When I started to run money in China in 2009 the cost of the solar panel was around $4/W. Now the cost has fallen to 25c and at the same time the efficiency of the panel has been increasing.”

Eleven Chinese provinces — Qinghai, Sichuan, Gansu and Chongqing on the central plateau; Hebei, Beijing, Tianjin and Shandong on the east coast; Jilin and Heilongjiang in the north-east; and the island of Hainan in the South China Sea — will reach grid parity with coal this year, according to Citi. Another five are judged as being within 5 per cent of doing so, as the map indicates.

Scott Chui, China solar analyst at Citi, forecast that 2.5GW of solar PV capacity will be installed at grid parity this year, out of an estimated total of 42GW, after the subsidy freeze was relaxed in January.


Mr Chui believed a further three provinces — Liaoning in the north-east, central Shaanxi and Guangdong in the south — would reach grid parity by the end of next year.

Mr Perrin said provinces on the Tibetan plateau were particularly suited to solar power because of their high altitude, which meant there was less pollution to block out sunlight, improving efficiency. Being relatively sparsely populated also means land is both cheaper and more readily available in large parcels, allowing economies of scale.

In contrast, some of the most polluted urban areas are furthest away from grid parity, while the comparison is also influenced by coal prices varying from province to province.

However, Tim Buckley, director of energy finance studies at the Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis, a think-tank, argued that the lack of widespread reverse auctions for new power generation suggested unsubsidised solar was not yet competitive with coal, although this tipping point was not far off.

“They will be at grid parity within two years. That is how fast the market is changing and how fast prices are coming down,” he said.

Amid falling component prices, Mr Buckley saw new installation reaching 45GW across China this year, only a little below last year’s 50GW, despite the reinstated feed-in tariff rate being Rmb0.45/kWh, 30 per cent less than a year ago.

“China is driving the cost of solar down and is likely to achieve grid parity by the end of 2020/21, ahead of the official target of 2023,” he said. “And it won’t stop there: wind is set to reach grid parity in China in 2020.

“The IEEFA has no doubt that China’s commitment to dominate the world in zero-emissions technologies and industries of the future is absolute.”

Mr Perrin said “the jury was out” on whether tumbling costs will lead to an acceleration in the already rapid rate of solar roll-out in China, a development for which there would appear to be ample scope.

Although power generation from solar PV rose 50 per cent last year in China, and wind power generation by 20 per cent (taking their combined share to 8 per cent) these sharp increases still only covered 30 per cent of the country’s incremental power demand, according to Unearthed.

Mr Perrin was optimistic for the medium term, however. “Coal still represents close to 60 per cent of the energy mix. We see coal going down to 30 per cent by 2030,” he said. “They will have to revise their targets, but they haven’t done so yet.”

He was also upbeat that tumbling equipment prices and rising efficiency would spur growth in India, the world’s other population giant.

“The one that should come next is India. Solar remains a tiny portion of the market but up to 2022 I would expect India to offer much better growth,” Mr Perrin said.

While cheap coal means solar power is not at yet grid parity in India, he believed cheaper financing options for solar infrastructure could help narrow the gap.

Mr Buckley agreed, noting that funding costs had already fallen from 12-16 per cent in India to 9 per cent and “there is plenty of scope for that to come down further”.

In particular, with global pension money moving into the industry, solar plants are regarded less as “equity” investments and more as “infrastructure”, an asset class where investors are typically targeting annual returns of 7-8 per cent, rather than 10 per cent or so for equities.

“India is looking to quadruple the installation rate over the next two years and they will be doing it at less than half the cost,” Mr Buckley said.



To: Snowshoe who wrote (147726)4/12/2019 11:21:45 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218787
 
looking like the deep-state teeing up self to pitch victory parade

foreignpolicy.com

A Win-Win U.S.-China Trade Deal Is Possible

Selling more goods is not enough. Trump’s trade agreement with Beijing must include real structural reforms.
Stephen J. HadleyApril 11, 2019, 6:45 PM

U.S. President Donald Trump, right, and Chinese Vice Premier Liu He talk to reporters at the White House on April 4. (Chip Somodevilla/Getty Images)

U.S.-China relations are entering a new era.

On the U.S. side, the optimistic belief that engaging and including China in the international system would produce a responsible stakeholder and potential partner has been largely discredited. On the Chinese side, increased confidence in the country’s economic strength and political system has made Beijing more assertive in global affairs and more skeptical of U.S. competence and leadership. Many Chinese experts see the United States as seeking to contain China, constrain its economic growth, limit its global influence, and undermine its political system. Many U.S. experts see China as an economic predator, a military threat, a geopolitical rival, and an ideological competitor.

Trending Articles

Selling more goods is not enough. Trump’s trade agreement with Beijing must include real structural reforms.

This new era will see much more direct competition between the two countries. But if competition becomes the sum total of the relationship, the result will be a lose-lose proposition for both Washington and Beijing. If heightened competition leads to sustained confrontation, it will destroy the current global economic system that has fostered so much prosperity and progress. It will increase the risk of an outright armed conflict—which would have potentially staggering consequences. And it will prevent cooperation between the two countries in meeting global challenges such as environmental degradation, terrorist extremism, pandemic diseases, water and resource scarcity, and disruptive technological change. These are challenges that neither country can solve alone but that both countries must see solved if either is to realize its goals.

The problem is that China—with its increasing diplomatic, economic, and military might—is a strategic competitor like no other the United States has faced since it emerged as a world power after the end of World War II. The Soviet Union represented a formidable military challenge but without a strong, competitive economic foundation or an effective, adaptive political system. China, by contrast, potentially has all three.

All that being said, however, strategic competitors need not become strategic adversaries. To avoid this outcome, the two countries must work together to develop a framework that will bound their competition, prevent it from driving them into confrontation or conflict, and allow some scope for cooperation. China and the United States must be strategic competitors and strategic cooperators at the same time. This will be very difficult, with few historical precedents. And to reach this outcome, the United States must be prepared to compete successfully in those areas critical to its national security and economic future—and China must understand that the United States will do so.

There are two areas in which competition most threatens this model of U.S.-China relations. The first is critical 21st-century technologies—such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyberweapons, and autonomous machines—which could lie at the center of a technological cold war between the two countries. The second is the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s international development strategy, which could establish Chinese domination of critical global infrastructure. Yet even in these areas, strategic competition need not extinguish strategic cooperation.

For example, the world desperately needs more infrastructure (such as roads, railways, highways, airports, and power plants). For projects that are not critical to U.S. national security or economic interests, the United States and U.S. companies should cooperate with China so long as it follows international best practices of transparency, intellectual property protection, resilience to corruption, sustainability, and fiscal, environmental, and social responsibility. By contrast, from a national security perspective, it is just too risky to let China dominate the global digital infrastructure. It would be too tempting for China to use that platform for espionage, data theft, and disruption of global communications in the event of an international crisis or conflict. And China will come to dominate digital infrastructure if the United States does not get in the game and develop its own capabilities to compete successfully—mobilizing private industry and private capital, incentivizing innovation and technology development, and re-energizing cooperation among industry, academia, and government.

A good example is 5G wireless networks: China wants to wall off its domestic 5G market as a privileged sanctuary for its own national champions (think ZTE and especially Huawei). Using the scale of this domestic market and, in some cases, government subsidies, these national champions can then underprice their non-Chinese competitors and dominate if not monopolize the global market. The United States is pressuring countries around the globe to avoid Huawei products and technology, with only mixed success. The problem is that there are currently no real alternatives to Huawei as an end-to-end 5G provider. The United States should share technology and otherwise seek to develop such alternatives—working with U.S. companies but also companies of major U.S. allies (companies like Samsung, Nokia, and Ericsson)—so that countries seeking 5G have choices. The United States should also seek to develop 5G network capability that would remain secure even if deployed over equipment that is potentially compromised (because it contains Huawei hardware or otherwise). This would both hedge against the risk of failure of the U.S. campaign against the adoption of Huawei 5G technology and help mitigate the competition between the United States and China—and Huawei and other companies—in the 5G area. The United States should also insist that China open up its own digital infrastructure market to non-Chinese companies, creating a global market and level playing field open to all comers. This result would not only produce economic benefits for both economies but would further bound the competition between the United States and China, reducing the risk of confrontation and conflict.

The resolution of the current trade crisis should similarly seek to bound and mitigate competitive risks. And, as the Chinese would say, there is a win-win solution available if the parties can seize it. As many Chinese experts will acknowledge, China’s economy needs further market-oriented reforms and further opening up to both the Chinese private sector and foreign companies.

China’s economy needs further market-oriented reforms and further opening up to both the Chinese private sector and foreign companies.Such reform and opening up is the only way to produce the increased competition, innovation, and efficiency that the Chinese economy needs if it is to produce the economic growth that the Chinese Communist regime has promised its people. A new round of reform and opening up would also address the complaints of the Trump administration and the U.S. business community about the lack of access to the Chinese market, China’s failure to protect intellectual property, and industrial policies that favor Chinese state-owned enterprises at the expense of virtually everyone else.

In order to achieve this win-win outcome, the trade agreement currently under negotiation between the two countries must involve more than just dramatically increased purchases by China of U.S. goods (such as natural gas, soybeans, and other agricultural products). It must also involve China’s commitment to make structural reforms that will open its economy to greater foreign participation, reduce government subsidies and regulatory protections to Chinese state-owned entities and other national champions, create a level playing field for both Chinese and non-Chinese competitors, and provide for truly reciprocal trade and investment. There is strong support for this agenda of structural reform across the U.S. political spectrum, among Republicans and Democrats, and no trade agreement that fails to provide such relief will be sustainable politically.

There appears to be a struggle within the administration for the mind of U.S. President Donald Trump on this issue—with many (including U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer) arguing strongly that the trade agreement must not only involve structural reform but also contain a real enforcement mechanism to ensure that China complies with its commitments. Indeed, some argue that current U.S. tariffs on Chinese goods should not be loosened until there is not only a trade agreement but actual evidence of Chinese compliance with it.

Only with real structural reforms will the Chinese economy be able to continue to contribute to global economic growth and will the two nations be able to resolve the trade issues that now hold hostage the future of U.S.-China relations. The threat of increased tariffs and a weakening Chinese economy has presented the Trump administration with a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to make progress on these structural issues. It must not let that opportunity slip away.

But much will depend on the Chinese side. Economic reform is in tension with the political agenda of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who has championed increased Communist Party control over almost all aspects of Chinese life. The question is whether Xi can be convinced to embrace economic reform and opening up that is broad enough, deep enough, and soon enough both to meet the needs of the Chinese economy for future growth and to satisfy the demands of Trump and the U.S. business community. To win this argument, Xi must be persuaded that political repression as an instrument for greater political control will ultimately be self-defeating because it threatens future economic growth. For it is sustained economic growth on which the regime’s political legitimacy, public support, and ultimate political future depend. In this context, increased political repression risks threatening the very political control that Xi seeks to achieve. He needs to change course.

Stephen J. Hadley is a principal of RiceHadleyGates. He served as the national security advisor to President George W. Bush from 2005 to 2009. From 2001 to 2005, he served as deputy national security advisor.


More from Foreign Policy

By Taboola




To: Snowshoe who wrote (147726)4/13/2019 6:22:36 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 218787
 
the Boyz should be able to play well together, or so the below piece notes, as it begins to dawn on the Neo-con / Neo-lib that that which is inevitable, by definition, could be inexorable, and before judging others, best to take look in the mirror ala whether china is good or bad only time shall tell

but as team china gains wherewithal, suspect the world becomes a better place with fewer wars and more construction, as has been the trajectory since bottom-ing process tapered off and rejuvenation began, per once in 800-years protocol, even as others at beginning of descent

scmp.com

Chemistry between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump can smooth the way for China-US ties, Michael Pillsbury says

There will be trouble ahead for the world’s two biggest economies but it needn’t be all bad news, White House adviser saysUS president views China as both a challenge and an opportunity, and his idea that there is “a good China and a bad China” is reflected in the ongoing trade talks, Pillsbury says



Wendy Wu

Published: 11:00pm, 13 Apr, 2019



China and the United States will face more conflict and confrontation in the future but the “chemistry” between their leaders will provide something of a buffer, according to a White House adviser.

“Trust has been going down in the past 10 years,” Michael Pillsbury, a senior fellow and director for Chinese strategy at the Hudson Institute, a conservative think tank based in Washington, told the South China Morning Post.

“Confrontation will go up between the two economic systems, but don’t forget what’s new: the personal relationship between President Xi Jinping and President Donald Trump. Do they have some level of trust? I would say yes,” he said.

On the future of relations between the two countries Pillsbury, who is described by Trump as a leading authority on China, said: “It is going to be a mixture of cooperation and competition.”



This year marks the 40th anniversary of the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between China and the US, but their rivalry – on everything from technology and the military to geopolitics – has been on the rise in recent years. Since July they have been locked in an unprecedented tariff war, which officials are currently working hard to resolve.

Trump’s administration has labelled China a strategic competitor and accused it of being a “revisionist power” that seeks to displace US leadership in Asia and expand the reach of its “state-driven” economic model. Cold war-style rhetoric has been increasingly common in Washington, but Pillsbury said many of Trump’s critics “misunderstood his China policy”.

The US president has long viewed China as both a challenge and an opportunity, and his idea that there is “a good China and a bad China” is reflected in the ongoing trade talks, he said.

The current thinking is that a “good America is facing a bad China … [but] this relationship can be improved, so we have a good America and a good China”, he said.

Negotiators are moving towards a comprehensive deal to end the trade war that tackles the long-term concerns of US companies, such as ending forced technology transfers, improving intellectual property protection and reducing industrial subsidies for state companies.

“This is the desire to have a good China”, Pillsbury said.

One of the stickiest issues in the negotiations has been the
enforcement mechanism
. The US insists that any deal must be enforceable and allow the US to verify China’s actions and punish any violations. China, on the other hand, wants it to more balanced.

To that end, US Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin said on Thursday that the two sides had agreed to set up “enforcement offices” to monitor progress on trade reforms.

According to Pillsbury, the deal may incorporate a series of targets and time frames for China to deliver on its commitments.

“We [will] have a new kind of a court of appeal led by Vice-Premier Liu He and US Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer to manage the disputes,” he said.

If an agreement could be reached and implemented, “we [will] have stability in trade relations for 10 years”, he said.

Pillsbury cited a report titled: “China 2030: Building a Modern, Harmonious, and Creative High-Income Society” – published in 2012 by the World Bank and China’s national policy research agency, the Development Research Institute of the State Council – as evidence of “a good China”.

The study proposed six priorities for economic reform, including strengthening the foundations for a market-based economy by redefining the role of the government, reforming state owned enterprises, and creating an open innovation system.

“If China really succeeds in its reforms, and if it reduces the role of the party and really reforms its economy, society and government, that would be a good China,” he said.

“If it is a good China, it is not a bad thing that China surpasses the US. [In that case] China is like us and resembles the transition when we surpassed the UK.

“But we have economic, military and technological supremacy. We can’t give China free rein on technology, like an idiot.”



Pillsbury, who spoke in both English and Mandarin during the interview, said he did not advocate a cold war, but said the US had to “be smart”.

On the issue of Beijing’s increasingly aggressive stance in the South China Sea, Pillsbury said another element of “a good China” would be for it not to militarise features in the disputed waterway.

He acknowledged, however, that tensions between Washington and Beijing were rising on the South China Sea issue, as well as on Taiwan, technological rivalry, cyber governance and data control.

In recent months, several US universities have cut research ties with Chinese telecoms giant Huawei, citing national security concerns, and Washington is pressing its allies to restrict the firm’s access to their 5G markets.

The US was also “very suspicious” about China’s flagship “
Belt and Road Initiative
”, Pillsbury said, citing allegations that major infrastructure projects developed under it created debt traps for host countries and ultimately undermined their sovereignty.

“But this is something for future negotiations,” he said.

Beijing will host the second Belt and Road Forum later this month. While the US sent a semi-ministerial delegation – led by Matthew Pottinger, senior director of Asian affairs at the National Security Council, who also delivered a short speech – to the inaugural event in 2017, Washington said it would not be sending any representatives this time around.

Pillsbury is the author of three books on China, but is best known for his 2015 work, The Hundred-Year Marathon: China’s Secret Strategy To Replace America As The Global Superpower, which found an audience as the current US administration adopted a hawkish stance on China.

The book was translated into Chinese and published for “internal reference” only by the PLA National Defence University with forewords by Liu Yazhou, a former air force general of the People’s Liberation Army, and Dai Xu, a former PLA colonel, both of whom are China hawks.

Pillsbury, who also served under the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations, said he was currently working on a new book exploring the relationship between the US and China over the past 40 years.



To: Snowshoe who wrote (147726)10/24/2022 6:46:10 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (2) | Respond to of 218787
 
Re <<China waits patiently to catch the ripe Siberian plum when it falls from the tree>>

Why bother with grabbing? so confrontational. Just free-trade is enough, and much easier.

Good news, CPC China China China to the rescue, to fight inflation, fill shortfall, albeit at the cost of EU bloomberg.com and with the help of Putin :0)))))))

Funnier still, perhaps the raw material of the gasoline is from the SPR stock sold by USA to PRC. Be interesting to know the margins applied at each stage, starting from ripe plum of Alaska :0)))))))

Perhaps Ms Pelosi would like to pay another visit to the Republic of China, cause it to be blockaded by the People's Republic of China, and airlift PRC gasoline from USA back to Greater China :0)))))))

Sanction Russian energy, and secondary-sanction China energy, and ... sanction consumers

zerohedge.com

US Gasoline Prices Go Haywire As Stockpiles Crater... But Here Comes China To The Rescue

Last week we shared a lengthy discussion on the creeping distillate inventory crisis, which has sent diesel prices sharply higher as the administration has been narrowly focus on gas prices (which have also moved sharply higher since their summer lows), threatening to cripple freight transit just as the economy slides into a recession. But amid the ongoing scramble for refineries, it is now gasoline that is also seeing abnormal (read deeply concerning) price moves as there is just not enough processing capacity to convert all that oil into required amount of both gasoline and diesel.

Let's start with simple RBOB (i.e., wholesale gasoline) whose November/December spread has blown out to the widest level since data began in 2018...

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... as backwardation reached 22.44c/gallon in intraday trading on Monday.

Furthermore, the prompt month spread has also widened to its most bullish since August and around three times what it was this time last year.

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The wider spread signals prompt tightness evident in the physical market: sure enough, spot RBOB in New York is pegged at 10.75c/gallon over futures.

What's behind the haywire prices? Why shortages of course: and as the next chart shows, New York Harbor regional stockpiles are at their lowest in a decade.

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It's not just the Atlantic region: US West Coast gasoline inventories are at their lowest seasonally on record going back to 1993...

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... as imports from Europe have slowed amid ongoing maintenance and refinery strikes.

So what's a formerly energy independent nation (whose energy policy is currently in the hands of radicalized 'progressive' lunatics) to do, to offset these growing gasoline shortages? Why import from China, of course.

According to Bloomberg, Chinese gasoline is making its way to the US for the first time since September 2019 as the country hikes exports at a time when global markets are scrambling for fuel.

The Torm Singapore is carrying around 300k bbl of gasoline components from Huizhou, China, with an estimated arrival in Los Angeles around Nov. 10, according to Kpler and Bloomberg vessel tracking.

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[/url][url=]Source: [/url] VesselFinder

According to US customers, Chinese gasoline most recently made its way to the US in September 2019, so there's that. And since Chinese gasoline is made in no small part thanks to Russian oil imports, it is safe to say that US gasoline shortages are about to be plugged - at least in part - by China, thanks to Russian oil.