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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (148094)	4/28/2019 2:43:23 PM
From: Elroy Jetson	1 Recommendation Recommended By elmatador Respond to of 219648

Engineers are "too blame" for every trade-off they make. Boeing engineers "were to blame" for making the 717 "too powerful" so they sold only 180 or so. But now that they're out of production these more powerful, less fuel efficient 717s sell for more than they did when they were new because they can fly routes no other aircraft can without going to a much larger aircraft. Likewise Boeing engineers could have been to blame for doubling the cost of the 737-max by making the landing gear too high, making the aircraft doubly undesirable, when a simply flight envelope limiter would eliminate the problem. American and United fly a 737-max fleet with more experienced pilots. There's always complaints and they always get retrofitted as a result, but not crashes. Ethiopia Air and Lion Air are to blame for hiring very inexperienced pilots to fly the 737-max. Boeing and Airbus sales reps are to blame to the extent they gave these airlines the impression that very inexperienced pilots are OK because their aircraft are highly automated. These aircraft are highly automated until they're not because something like an AOA or an AIDRU fails. Then you quickly find out how goof your pilots are. Passengers "are to blame" when they buy cheap tickets on strange little foreign airlines which employ unqualified pilots.

To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (148094)	4/28/2019 3:05:38 PM
From: Elroy Jetson	1 Recommendation Recommended By elmatador Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 219648

One of the problems with the Air France 447 is all of the A330 flight controls are limited by "the flight envelope", what you can do with the plane with it's current weight, altitude, speed and temperature. Yaw too far too fast and under "Flight Law" and the A330 responds with a slow mild move nothing like the spastic gesture you've just made with the hand control side-stick. But if the flight computers disengage or reboot, "Alternate Flight Law" goes into effect just as you prefer. . The quick hand movement you're accustomed to making to bank the plane will now send the aircraft into a steep roll and dive as co-pilot Pierre-Cedric Bonin discovered. Every little movement you make is put into instant effect without any muscular effort even though it can cause the plane to crash or breakup in midair. Under "Normal Flight Law" Bonin could not have stalled the jet for 15 minutes until it hit the ocean. Flight Law aka Flght Envelope Control is "one of those bad things" like MCAS. But once the series of faults left him with "Alternate Flight Law" he was free to stall the aircraft onto the ocean just as his hand control pitched at 35 to 40 degrees made the aircraft pitch the exactly the same. The recorded called out "Stall Stall" 72 times before the crash. This is the list of mistakes the investigators laid at the pilot's feet. The pilots had not applied the unreliable-airspeed procedure. The pilot-in-control pulled back on the stick, thus increasing the angle of attack and causing the aircraft to climb rapidly. The pilots apparently did not notice that the aircraft had reached its maximum permissible altitude. The pilots did not read out the available data (vertical velocity, altitude, etc.). The stall warning sounded continuously for 54 seconds. The pilots did not comment on the stall warnings and apparently did not realize that the aircraft was stalled. There was some buffeting associated with the stall. The stall warning deactivates by design when the angle of attack measurements are considered invalid, and this is the case when the airspeed drops below a certain limit. In consequence, the stall warning came on whenever the pilot pushed forward on the stick and then stopped when he pulled back; this happened several times during the stall and this may have confused the pilots. Despite the fact that they were aware that altitude was declining rapidly, the pilots were unable to determine which instruments to trust: it may have appeared to them that all values were incoherent. But you could say Airbus engineers were to blame for making Bonin accustomed to the flight computers implementing different action than what he called for with his side stick and throttle.