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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (163688)10/14/2020 9:27:42 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217739
 
Re <<it is all about money>>

tragic truth.

very simple and complicated.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (163688)10/15/2020 5:36:36 AM
From: Haim R. Branisteanu  Respond to of 217739
 

dailysabah.com



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (163688)10/15/2020 11:34:26 PM
From: TobagoJack  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 217739
 
Following up to <<From my Azeri sources the real reason of the fighting between Armenia and Azerbaijan is purely economic>>

Looks like the Boyz are testing out measures and counter-measures, to better market for the next, and the next after the next dress-rehearsals to proxy conflicts

Some of the contents in the below report are wrong, but generally tells a cohesive story

By the looks of things, it would be surprising that the war lasts long as the casualty in people and material must be high and intense for both sides.

Team Israeli Harop en.wikipedia.org

Team Turkey deployed TB2


As Team America apparently wish to tee-up Taiwan as proxy by latest sale of rather expensive drones reuters.com , which is most likely unwise for Taiwan to partake, Team China is gearing up to export the latest and as the Zhuhai Airshow defenceweb.co.za is postponed, marketing by other means being tee-ed up scmp.com



I get the general impression that the battle fields likely much more complicated going forward than have been in even the recent past

The NBC article is very craftily worded "Cheap drones from China, Turkey and Israel are fueling conflicts like Armenia and Azerbaijan's"

... whereas I believe Team China has little to do w/ Armenia and Azerbaijan, essentially noting that the two sides should discuss to resolve differences scmp.com and in all cases far less so than either Team Russia or America, what with the pipe lines and such you noted. But I digress. There is little point in calling out NBC as it be simply another suspect MSM.

nbcnews.com

Cheap drones from China, Turkey and Israel are fueling conflicts like Armenia and Azerbaijan's


Oct. 14, 2020, 4:30 PM HKT

Armenia and Azerbaijan have been in a state of conflict for several decades over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region, but a deluge of grisly video released by the combatants in recent days shows that it's now being fought in a newer high-tech — and highly lethal — fashion.

The situation can only be worsened by the Trump administration’s push to deregulate armed drone sales in a bid to allow American manufacturers to compete in the export market.

One particularly startling video seems to show Armenian soldiers desperately firing into the sky as an ominous buzzing sound increases in pitch like a German World War II dive bomber. Seconds later, a drone plunges into the roof of a bus, its 50-pound warhead consuming the vehicle in a ball of fire.

It's just an example of how armed drones, or Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles — UCAVs — in military speak, are upping the casualties in long-simmering regional conflicts that until now have been low-level — limited in large part by smaller countries' inability to make precision strikes on forces at and beyond the front line.



When modern drone strikes made their confirmed debut with the Predator just a few weeks after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, they were wielded by powerful countries like the United States against insurgents and terrorists, such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

But that's changing as drone technology proliferates among smaller countries in conflict hot spots from Libya to the Caucasus Mountains. Unfortunately, as fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh suggests, using drones to make it easier to wage air wars is likely to lead to more such wars.

That this didn't happen sooner may be in part because the U.S. tightly restricted the export of its expensive Predator and Reaper UCAVs to close allies. But China, Israel and Turkey developed their own UCAVs, which they have widely exported (and, in the latter two cases, used extensively).

Just in 2020 alone, drones from these countries were used in three wars pitting state actors against each other, often with decisive impact.


A Turkish-made Bayraktar TB2 drone at Gecitkale air base near Famagusta, Northern Cyprus, on Dec. 16.Birol Bebek / AFP - Getty Images fileThe United Arab Emirates deployed Chinese-built Wing Loong drones last year to support the Libyan National Army faction inside Libya, where they gained infamy for deadly strikes using laser-guided Blue Arrow missiles. When Turkey intervened in behalf of the opposing side, it deployed a fleet of domestically built Bayraktar TB2 drones, which eventually overwhelmed and destroyed most of the Libyan National Army's Russian-built air defense systems, forcing the army to end its siege of Tripoli and withdraw from a key air base this May.

Turkish drones also swooped down this year on Bashar al-Assad's forces in Syria's Idlib province, destroying over 100 armored vehicles — bringing Assad's initially successful assault on the rebel stronghold reeling to a halt.

And at some point Turkey transferred Bayraktar drones to Azerbaijan, which has been locked for over three decades in a conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh region. Late last month, Azerbaijan launched a broad ground and air offensive, using the drones to destroy at least a dozen Armenian air defense systems in the early hours of the conflict. Azerbaijan has since released videos of the drones destroying dozens of Armenian tanks and artillery systems, as well as resupply and reinforcement convoys.

But that's not the only armed drone at Azerbaijan's disposal. The Bayraktar supplements the Israeli-built Harop (Harpy) drone responsible for the bus attack, a "loitering munition" that combines the remote control and long endurance attributes of a drone with the deadly strike capabilities of a guided missile.


An Israeli UCAV IAI Harop drone at Paris-Le Bourget Airport at the International Paris Air Show in 2011.Pierre Verdy / AFP - Getty Images fileThese advanced capabilities are highly lethal, but they come at a relatively low cost for the governments involved.

A jet fighter costs tens of millions of dollars to procure and tens of thousands of dollars per flight hour to operate and maintain — and, most importantly, it has a highly trained, nonexpendable pilot on board. Risking the loss of a manned jet and its pilot is often seen as unacceptable materially and politically in anything short of an all-out high-intensity conflict. New combat drones from China and Turkey, by contrast, cost in the low millions of dollars, are significantly cheaper to fly per hour and — without pilots on board — are much more expendable.

To be sure, such drones are far from indestructible. In each of the war zones mentioned, significant numbers have been shot down by short-range air defenses. But that just highlights how drones can be used more aggressively, since a lost drone doesn't put the operator's life at risk.

And because UCAVs have less carrying capacity than manned jets, they use small but precise missiles, rather than crude, unguided bombs and rockets. That teaches new adopters of armed drones, like Azerbaijan, precision strike warfare methods formerly exclusive to wealthier militaries.

Furthermore, drones can prove deadly simply by acting as spotters to identify targets to strike with artillery fire. And even wealthy countries, let alone states like Armenia, are struggling to field effective defenses against swarms of small, expendable drones, giving attackers an advantage for the time being.

In short, drones are giving smaller countries affordable ways to project force with greater lethality at lower risk. And that is likely to tempt many countries to resort to force more often if the United States' rampant use of drones to assassinate "high-value targets" is anything to go by.

And there are other places beyond Nagorno-Karabakh where long-standing "frozen" conflicts might be reawakened if one side obtains what it perceives as game-changing drone capabilities. Countries with outstanding border conflicts like India, Pakistan, Serbia and Ukraine are all purchasing attack drones.

The situation can only be worsened by the Trump administration's push to deregulate armed drone sales in a bid to allow U.S. manufacturers to compete in an export market dominated by China, Israel and Turkey. Instead, Washington should sell potentially destabilizing offensive weapons only to trustworthy allies, such as Japan and Germany, that can be counted upon to use them in ways that advance U.S. interests and that are in keeping with American values.

Yes, that means that many clients will continue to buy armed drones from other countries and that drone proliferation will likely continue to increase the risks of military aggression between less wealthy countries. But we don't need to worsen the problem by making America's more capable unmanned killing machines more widely available, allowing pursuit of arms sales to contradict our broader national interest of a more stable and peaceful world.



To: Haim R. Branisteanu who wrote (163688)10/16/2020 3:45:07 AM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217739
 
your take is supported

the Boyz in that neighbourhood seems to play quite rough

zerohedge.com

NATO, Energy Geopolitics, And Conflict In Caucasus
Authored by Finian Cunningham via The Strategic Culture Foundation,

Rarely are geopolitical events innocently coincidental, as an old saying goes.



Let’s look at a few recent upheavals...

First we have the renewed pressure on Germany and Europe to abandon the Nord Stream-2 gas pipeline from Russia, which the strange Navalny affair and his alleged poison-assassination conveniently gives cover to what would otherwise be an unprecedented backsliding on strategic energy trade.

Then we have the resurgence in armed conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the disputed enclave territory of Nagorno-Karabakh.

A key factor in all this too is NATO’s long-term plans to expand membership of the U.S.-led military alliance in the Caucasus and Central Asia along Russia’s southern periphery.

Political analyst Rick Rozoff comments that the flare up in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is fully consistent with Turkey’s years-long agenda of bringing Azerbaijan into NATO membership. He says that Ankara is trying to force a resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute in favor of Azerbaijan whereby the latter reclaims its historic territory from Armenian separatists.

For NATO to move forward with absorbing Azerbaijan into the alliance there must be a settlement to the long-running frozen conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. The two sides last went to war during 1988-1994 and have had cross-border skirmishes ever since. At the end of last month, the conflict blew up again on account of a recent surge in rhetoric from Azeri leaders and their Turkish patrons about recovering sovereign lands.

Rozoff says there is an analogy here to other post-Soviet frozen conflicts in South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. For NATO to incorporate Georgia and Moldova, as it intends to do, there is a requirement of Georgia and Moldova to gain control over their respective breakaway regions. The brief war in 2008 between Georgia and South Ossetia – when the former attacked the latter only to be repelled by a Russian intervention – was triggered by NATO’s ambition to recruit Georgia.

The analogy with Azerbaijan today is that the country is trying to settle its Nagorno-Karabakh question at the prompting of NATO member Turkey in order to make the nation an acceptable entrant for the alliance. Turkey has long endorsed Azerbaijan as the “next NATO member”. Ankara’s greatly increased military supplies to Azerbaijan is also part of the process of bringing the candidate country up to NATO’s standards.

But NATO’s expansionism is not merely about militarism for militarism sake. Yes, to be sure, having American missiles stationed further around Russia’s underbelly is to be desired in the game of “great power rivalry”.

However, there is a more specific and equally enormous strategic aim, and that is the supplanting of Russian (and Iranian) energy supplies to Europe with an alternative route from the south. The Caspian oil and gas riches have long been sought after. It was a driving goal for Hitler’s Wehrmacht to reach as it battled across the Russian space.

The Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline is proposing to supply natural gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan through the crucial Azerbaijani hub of Baku and on to Turkey from where it can join existing pipeline networks into central Europe.



With a projected annual supply of 30 billion cubic meters of gas the Caspian pipeline could well go a long way towards substituting for the Nord Stream-2 project (55 billion cubic meters). The alleged poisoning of Russian blogger Alexei Navalny and his valorization by assorted European leaders appears to be paving the way for axing the Nord Stream-2 project.

Washington and transatlantic allies in Europe would surely welcome the completion of the Trans-Caspian Gas Pipeline as a means to undermine Russia’s importance as gas supplier to Europe.

To guarantee the security and political alignment of that alternative route, it would be imperative for NATO to consolidate its relations with the key countries of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. For this reason, NATO has been busy courting these nations as prospective members.

What Turkey gets out of this is increased geopolitical influence in the Caucasus and beyond as the presumed linchpin between Europe and Asia. As well as a lot of transit fees for facilitating the fueling of continental Europe. Ankara already enjoys such a position with regard to linking Russian gas to Europe through the Turk Stream corridor. But for Erdogan, the Machiavellian Turkish leader, hitting Russia’s Nord Stream-2 means more profits for Ankara from boosting the aggregate capacity of the Southern Energy Corridor.




Turkey is unlikely to want to see a full-blown war in the Caucasus, especially one that would drag in Russia. Hence Russia’s recent efforts at mediating a peace deal between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh have received the nominal backing of Ankara.

Nevertheless, the bigger strategic picture of pushing NATO expansion further into the Caucasus and Central Asia and the objective of replacing Russian energy to Europe with a Caspian alternative, all that means that the resurgence in conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could be a prolonged proxy, low-intensity war.

Indeed, Rick Rozoff, the political analyst, predicts that the present war will feed into renewed conflict in Georgia and South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria. There too the geopolitics of NATO seeking to gain advantage over Russia and cornering strategic energy trade with Europe are the same and loom large.

Countries should beware though of being pawns for NATO. It comes with a heavy price.