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Politics : Formerly About Advanced Micro Devices -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Bill who wrote (1284714)12/23/2020 10:17:11 AM
From: Jamie153  Respond to of 1574720
 
Once his beliefs were proven to be untrue a decent man retreats with his tail between his legs.

Let's face it, nothing mattered to republicans when Reagan was lying about balancing the budget, Gingrich was lying about Whitewater, Nixon was lying about Watergate, and Trump lied about everything.

Republicans have this vision of themselves that isn't true.



To: Bill who wrote (1284714)12/23/2020 12:19:07 PM
From: rzborusa  Respond to of 1574720
 
Bush asked Rumsfeld to develop a plan for an invasion in late September 2001. CIA and Intelligence Community officers walked into a highly-charged policy atmosphere—hardly a first for intelligence—when they were asked to assess the relationship between Saddam Hussein and al Qa‘ida and for specifics of WMD stockpiling and production.

At the same time, Baker regurgitates the worn line suggesting there was something insidious about high-level White House interaction with the CIA about intelligence on Iraq’s WMD and its relationship with Al Qa‘ida. After noting investigations found no evidence that Cheney had applied pressure during his many visits to CIA headquarters for Iraq briefings, Baker goes on to quote an unnamed CIA officer saying, “analysts felt more politicized and pushed than any of them could remember.” The author would have been better off sticking with insights from Deputy Director John McLaughlin and Associate Deputy Director for Operations Michael Sulick, which suggested the White House had encouraged, intentionally or not, confirmation bias in CIA officers and that analysts were instructed to give firmer, more sweeping judgments, possibly in response to not connecting the dots prior to 9/11.

https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-58-no-2/days-of-fire-bush-and-cheney-in-the-white-house.html