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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?

To: TobagoJack who wrote (172049)	5/21/2021 4:22:09 AM
From: sense	Read Replies (1) \| Respond to of 219512

Certainly one way to see it is that "tranistory" is an ill-defined measure of time, not a measure of magnitude. So, there are two questions, both of which the article addresses... if in open ended fashion. The question of magnitudes is addressed in relation to inputs and capacities: At least a trillion to go (in what has been tabled thus far)... and struggling now, with insufficient capacity to handle the magnatude we have now... So, the new Reverse Repo problem is "the solution to the lack of capacity"... leaving unaddressed what the real world consequences of that as a solution are... or what the costs and functional limiits are of sustaining that "solution". Prior history... the trial run in Greece... included impositions of limitations on the ability to use cash in banks... withdrawal limits at ATMs, etc. Negative rates "worked" (work ?) in Europe... but, of course, they wouldn't have worked (won't work) without the dollar backstopping them... just as the argument "it works for Japan" when Japan is backstopped by the dollar, doesn't mean the U.S. can mimic Japan and have it work. Not surprising, though, that there is no public mention of probable failure modes... or the likelihood of those occurring... or what thresholds are likely to induce them, timing of that relative to expectations, etc. The question of timing is addressed by the chart showing a comparision of Goldman's opinion versus others... which, if you think about it, is rather an odd way to present that. Makes me curiuos about the context in which that graph was developed to address the timing question. What they most obviously leave out is... "and then what"... ? But, on the face of it, I'd say "the plan" appears to be... igniting a rip roaring inflation from now untl the middle of 2023... after which... "something else"... I suspect the "great reset"... will prove to be not all that great. Rumblings that "it won't succeed"... But, of course, no one is really saying much about what that part of the plan is... or what alternatives exist. But every element of "the plan" appears to be... very high risk... "never been tried before" at least in the sense of not knowing whether or not the institutional structures can actually sustain the stresses thus created... wiithout imploding at some point... It seems ilkely to me that another "great financial crisis" is likely to result at some point... Or, of course, perhaps an event like March 2020 as a "sink" for the relief of stresses... Will mull it some more...