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Strategies & Market Trends : 2026 TeoTwawKi ... 2032 Darkest Interregnum -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Maurice Winn who wrote (175876)8/6/2021 10:07:44 PM
From: TobagoJack  Respond to of 217631
 
Arguably cooperation merits consideration, at the very least, as opposed to thinking by slogans, but the realisation of so takes its own sweet time, cannot be rushed. Very difficult to make all people all happy all the time, especially when such people think the solar system is not big enough.

In the meantime I doubt CCP China China China shall make the same mistake Ming Dynasty China China China made back in 1421, and should such be the case, go go go, for the greater-good

As for China and Russia cozying up to each other to install an International Lunar Research Station, Logsdon suggests the U.S.’s reaction has thus far been inconsistent. “Half the time, we complain about [China’s and Russia’s] lack of transparency. But then when they make explicit their plans, we’re not happy either,”
“The solar system is such a big place. If we’re all duplicating everything individually, that is just stupid. So collaboration, cooperation, coordination—I think that’s absolutely the way to go,” Head concludes.

scientificamerican.com

Can the U.S. and China Cooperate in Space?

China’s meteoric rise in space science and exploration—along with its new partnership with Russia—is spurring U.S. experts to reconsider a long-standing prohibition on bilateral collaborations

Leonard David
August 2, 2021


International Space Station, seen here in 2018, exists because of a partnership between the U.S., Russia and other participating nations. China, however, has been excluded from the project because of U.S. opposition. Credit: NASA and RoscosmosWill collaboration or competition define international space science and exploration in the 21st century? The answer could come down to how two spaceflight superpowers, the U.S. and China, choose to engage with each other in the next few years.

The U.S. remains the global leader in space by most metrics, but China is methodically advancing its own ambitious space agenda at a quickening pace, blueprinting and carrying out a succession of robotic interplanetary forays to destinations such as the asteroid belt and Jupiter, as well as a sample-return mission to Mars. Layered into the mix is China’s five-year plan for moon exploration, which, in a recently announced partnership with Russia, would lead to both countries jointly building an International Lunar Research Station that would be tended by human crews.

In the meantime, nearer to Earth, China is rapidly constructing its “Heavenly Palace,” the multimodular Tiangong space station. A core segment of the station is already aloft and operational, housing a three-person crew. By late next year, a rapid-fire launch schedule of more astronauts, supply ships and add-on modules should bring assembly of China’s orbital outpost to its conclusion. The China Manned Space Agency has reportedly given provisional approval to stuff the station with more than 1,000 scientific experiments. And it is inviting foreign participation via the United Nations.

AdvertisementWhat impact China’s space schedule, along with the country’s joint ventures with Russia, may have on U.S. space exploration objectives remains to be seen. But some experts suggest it might be time for the U.S. to search for common ground in shaping a more inclusive multination space agenda.

For now, however, restrictive legislation makes this far more easily said than done. In 2011 Congress passed a law that included an add-on known as the Wolf Amendment. Named after its mastermind, then representative Frank Wolf of Virginia, the Wolf Amendment prohibits NASA from using federal funds to engage in direct, bilateral cooperation with the Chinese government. Ever since, a potential repeal of the amendment has been a political football, tossed between hawkish factions eager to paint China as an emerging adversary in space and less combative advocates wishing to leverage the country’s meteoric rise in that area to benefit the U.S.

Shifting Alliances“I think we’re going to see a mixture of cooperation and competition, probably between two blocs: one led by the U.S. and one led by China. And that’s not necessarily a bad thing,” says John Logsdon, a professor emeritus at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs and founder and former long-time director of the university’s Space Policy Institute. “After all, it was [U.S. versus Soviet] competition that got us to the moon. There is competition between the U.S. and China for global leadership.”

As for China and Russia cozying up to each other to install an International Lunar Research Station, Logsdon suggests the U.S.’s reaction has thus far been inconsistent. “Half the time, we complain about [China’s and Russia’s] lack of transparency. But then when they make explicit their plans, we’re not happy either,” he says. In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s collapse, “Russia turned to the U.S. in 1993 [to help build the International Space Station] to save their space program. And now I think they are turning to China to do much the same.”

Is it time to work more closely with China, perhaps starting with a repeal of the Wolf Amendment? Logsdon thinks so, though he underscores that many of his peers disagree. “It’s a legitimate issue for policy debate,” he says, “and repeating the Wolf Amendment every year in legislation is a convenient way of avoiding that debate.” For now, Logsdon adds, the U.S. should use diplomatic and scientific channels to test the waters for future work with China, establishing whether any partnership could be mutual beneficial, let alone possible. “China may—or we may—decide [to say] no,” he says. “But right now we really can’t engage to make that decision.”

Fundamentally, however, Logsdon rejects the assertion that China and the U.S. are destined to engage in another space-based contest akin to the U.S.-Soviet rivalry during the cold war. “Sure there is competition, but it’s not a race,” he says.

Case-by-Case in SpaceBill Nelson, a former senator of Florida and now NASA’s 14th administrator, would be the first to disagree. The two nations are very much in a space race already, he says, and the U.S. must be wary.

“I think we have a very aggressive China and, I add, [a] thus far successful” China, he says. “They said they’d put up a space station, and they did. [They said they would] bring back lunar samples, and they’ve done so. They are the second nation to robotically land and rove on Mars. [And] they plan to put boots on the moon.”

“They put it out there..., and then they usually follow through,” Nelson says. “The Chinese civilian space program is, in reality, their military space program. That’s why I think we are going into a space race with China.”

Even before arriving at NASA, Nelson was familiar with China’s space ambitions. For six years, he chaired the space subcommittee in the U.S. House of Representatives, and he later served as ranking member of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation—both positions in which a thorough situational awareness of geopolitical space activities was essential.

On the prospect of working with China, Nelson muses about how things evolved with the former Soviet Union, once “our mortal enemy.” In part because of each nation’s huge nuclear arsenal and the associated threat of mutually assured destruction, the U.S. and the Soviet Union eventually reached a stalemate that extended into space, where cooperation rather than competition reigned. The jointly built ISS—circling Earth every 90 minutes and continuously crewed for more than two decades by astronauts and cosmonauts alike—is the shining example of what collaboration can achieve. “Things don’t go swimmingly on terra firma..., but in space they do,” he says.

That is the relationship Nelson wishes the U.S. had with China, too. But unfortunately, he says, for now, the latter nation’s penchant for secrecy stands in the way of any similar partnership. More openness is required. “Leadership in space is leadership in a transparent way for all nations to join you,” he says. If, however, the choice is made to pursue any work with China on its space program, “it calls for a certification from me that it does not affect our national security. So we’ll take it on a case-by-case basis.”

One case could be working with China to facilitate sharing some of the nation’s prized specimens from its recent and highly successful Chang’e-5 lunar-sample-return mission. Per the Wolf Amendment, Nelson says, as long as U.S. researchers do not utilize any NASA funds and keep NASA-funded university projects separate from any Chinese-related projects, there is no prohibition on American researchers asking for, and receiving, those lunar collectibles.

Similarly, China’s Martian-sample-return initiative is another future prospect. “Their Mars samples would be coming back about the same time that ours would, so that’d be a great opportunity,” Nelson suggests.

Harmony in the Heavens?There are, of course, ways that the newly announced space partnership between China and Russia can strengthen the U.S. even without meaningful cooperation. It could, for instance, compel the White House and Congress to open floodgates of money to pour into the U.S.’s civil and military space programs, says Marcia Smith, a veteran analyst who runs the Web site SpacePolicyOnline.com. But whether this would yield sufficient funding to meet the goals of NASA’s Artemis program—namely, landing astronauts back on the moon as early as 2024—is another question. The China-Russia lunar research base, Smith says, does not envision human lunar landings until 2036 or later, “so it’s not much of a race.”

Alternatively, because the Wolf Amendment does allow NASA to work with China under certain, very restrictive circumstances, perhaps more robust collaboration is still in the cards.

“If NASA can convince Congress that [any] proposed cooperation does not create the possibility for technology transfer or involve officials determined by the U.S. to have direct involvement in violating human rights, it can get approval,” Smith says. “And it only restricts bilateral, not multilateral, cooperation.” Even so, she adds, at present, there is very little NASA-China space cooperation to speak of and no indication that this will change anytime soon.

Meanwhile the U.S. still shares responsibility with Russia in maintaining and building upon the decades-long multinational human space exploration program that led to the creation of the ISS. NASA, Smith says, hopes Russia will not only remain a partner on the ISS but will also help build a planned lunar Gateway space station for the agency’s Artemis program.

“Perhaps Russia will choose to work with China, as well as with the U.S.-led multinational effort. But getting all three working in harmony to explore the heavens? Not without dramatic geopolitical changes that are nowhere to be seen in my crystal ball,” Smith concludes.

Deep-Space Power DynamicsJust how much space cooperation two authoritarian systems can actually achieve is unclear, says Dean Cheng, a senior research fellow on Chinese political and security affairs at the Heritage Foundation’s Asian Studies Center in Washington, D.C. “Announcements are easy. Actual cooperation is hard,” he says.

“Russia seems to be the weaker of the partners in any Russia-China space relationship,” Cheng adds. “And Russia doesn’t handle being the weaker partner well, whether it is with the West after the collapse of the former Soviet Union or, in all likelihood, with China.”

The U.S., he notes, does well when cooperating with other states that demonstrate transparency, as well as respect for intellectual property and the rule of law with regard to human rights and national sovereignty—all areas where tensions with China have flared. This history of conflict and its probably continuation in the future makes Cheng skeptical of any near-term hopes for cooperation between the two nations in space.

Brown University planetary scientist Jim Head, a leading expert on space exploration, works multilaterally with both Russian and Chinese space scientists, as well as his European colleagues, on analyzing landing sites for future interplanetary missions. Whether in conflict or collaboration, he says, the one constant to China’s space aspirations is that they will not stop.

“China is on the ‘silk road’ to space,” Head quips. “They are doing it; there’s no question about that. Their space program is important to them, and it establishes national pride and prestige. It is not just good for science but for everything [the nation does]. If we sit and bury our heads in the sand and don’t do anything ourselves, they are still going. They are not waiting for us.”

China is already nearing a leadership position in lunar science, Head says, because it has demonstrated that it can send sample-return spacecraft to both the moon’s near and far sides, and it “can basically pump them out like sausages.”

Rather than await a heavy lift from the White House to change the Wolf Amendment, Head suggests it could be more fruitful for scientists to petition Congress for an exception so that they can work bilaterally with their Chinese peers on space projects. A way forward could be through the Inter-Agency Consultative Group for Space Science, an informal collective of researchers from major space agencies that executes interagency coordination on select missions.

Having China become a signatory of the Artemis Accords might be a productive pathway, too, Head adds. Led by the U.S. Department of State and NASA, these accords describe a shared vision for principles, grounded in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, to create a safe and transparent environment that facilitates exploration, science and commercial activities on the moon. As of this writing, a dozen countries have embraced the Artemis Accords: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand, South Korea, Ukraine, the United Arab Emirates, the U.K. and the U.S.

“The solar system is such a big place. If we’re all duplicating everything individually, that is just stupid. So collaboration, cooperation, coordination—I think that’s absolutely the way to go,” Head concludes.



To: Maurice Winn who wrote (175876)8/6/2021 10:15:24 PM
From: TobagoJack1 Recommendation

Recommended By
Snowshoe

  Respond to of 217631
 
Something topical, in preparation for the 'next' time, which should be after 'this' time, am reasonably guessing

economist.com

Scientists’ pandemic response could be even faster next time

New research suggests mass vaccination can be scaled up more quickly

Aug 5th 2021
AS THE DELTA variant of covid-19 continues to spread across large parts of the world, the shame is that vaccines are still in such short supply. Worse, they are being hogged by rich countries even though the need elsewhere is so great. For that, blame politics. The triumph, however, is that vaccines exist at all. And for that, praise science.

The sequence of the virus’s genome was made public on January 11th 2020, just one month after a new respiratory illness was first reported in Wuhan, in China. Days later, on January 15th, Moderna, working with America’s National Institutes of Health, had completed the design of the prototype molecule that would comprise its vaccine. Sixty-two days after that, on March 16th, human trials began. Maggie Keenan, a 91-year-old Briton, received the first clinical Pfizer vaccine on December 8th. By comparison, the vaccine against polio in America took 20 years to make the journey from trials to licence.

And yet scientists could do even better. By the beginning of 2021, according to our statistical model of excess deaths, the pandemic had claimed between 4m and 8m lives. If mass vaccination had got under way even a bit sooner and scaled up just a little more quickly, hundreds of thousands of people could have been saved. That is a goal worth striving for in the next pandemic—and, recent research suggests, it is entirely possible.

The foundation for this is decades of scientific and medical research. Katalin Karikó, one of the pioneers of the mRNA technology that underpins the two most successful vaccines, made by Pfizer and Moderna, spent 30 years studying how mRNA can help fight disease. Her research was often too radical to attract government grants or institutional support. But it is part of a body of work that vastly enlarges the scope to cope with infectious diseases, including those that are new.

As we explain this week, the pandemic has seen a new set of biochemical and computational tools come to the fore in predicting the evolution of viruses. One approach is called “deep mutational scanning”, which observes random changes in a pathogen’s crucial proteins under laboratory conditions. Using machine learning, scientists can form predictions about which combinations of these mutations will, for instance, make the disease spread faster and hence come to dominate a pandemic in much the way that Delta is dominating covid-19.

Armed with these predictions, manufacturers could prepare stockpiles of vaccines and therapies before pathogens have mutated and spread. One day, people could even be vaccinated pre-emptively. Such a degree of preparedness, and the rapid deployment of doses that it will make possible, could save many lives.

The same faster-is-better logic also applies to other areas of pandemic response. Testing and contact-tracing ought to be available as soon as the first signs emerge that a pathogen is going global. The pandemic has shown that large centralised testing facilities, while they are quick to get up and running from scratch, have slower turnaround times than smaller, more local facilities which can process samples on site.

Such facilities ought to be ready for the next pandemic, relying on rapid, purpose-built genetic testing that has only just started to come online in airports around the world. By the time the next pathogen arrives, the same technology which allows the covid-19 testing centre in Berlin’s new Brandenburg airport to turn around a sample in less than an hour should be widely available.

Regulators must also play their part. Health authorities are already grappling with the modular nature of the new vaccine-production systems, streamlining their approval processes so that shots may be updated to confer protection against the coronavirus variants. The new vaccine “platforms” can churn out one vaccine as easily as another, with only minor changes. The authorities should start thinking about how to ensure the safety of platform-produced vaccines against entirely new pathogens without having to start the approval process from scratch each time.

There is no knowing when the next pandemic will come. New pathogens are emerging from complex, unpredictable environments all the time, often far from scrutiny or regulatory control. A fresh disease could be about to take off right now, as a freak bacterium escapes from an antibiotic-abusing factory farm, say, or a mutated virus sweeps out of a laboratory or a forest, as a bat passes it on to a new host which can infect humans. You cannot stop all pandemics, but you can prepare for them better. ¦

Dig deeper

All our stories relating to the pandemic and the vaccines can be found on our coronavirus hub. You can also find trackers showing the global roll-out of vaccines, excess deaths by country and the virus’s spread across Europe and America.

This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Vaxelerando"