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Strategies & Market Trends : The Financial Collapse of 2001 Unwinding -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (8399)1/14/2022 10:06:34 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13783
 
I try gauging by two trusted persons.

I have my old friend who worked with me in Africa, a returnee from Huawei projects abroad.

Another is a Singaporean who follows China very closely. He is neither TJ, nor is he a China basher.

He is very realist on his evaluation.

All that apart from what I read.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (8399)1/17/2022 5:51:06 AM
From: elmatador3 Recommendations

Recommended By
Cogito Ergo Sum
gg cox
pak73

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Prices will start becoming a story.

Canadian friend on Facebook
Shocked at the CAD5 price for a handful of grapes.

Portions shrinking but price kept the same becoming postings in social media.

This kind of memes appearing




To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (8399)1/18/2022 1:47:26 AM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 13783
 
The $28trn global reach of Asian finance

The scale of Asia’s foreign holdings has only grown since 2005, as the region has become richer and older

Like Elmat says: Look to Demographics.


As private savings have built up in East and South-East Asia, the region’s financiers now wield heft in far-flung asset markets
Source The Economist

THE COUNTRIES of East and South-East Asia are renowned, even envied, for reshaping global supply chains. Less well appreciated is the extent to which they have redrawn the map of global capital flows. After a buying spree over the past decade or so, the region’s ten biggest economies now hold nearly $28trn in foreign financial assets, more than three times the amount in 2005 and equivalent to a fifth of global assets held by foreigners.

Once-staid institutions that are little-known in the West—from obscure Japanese banks and Taiwanese insurers to South Korean pension funds—now wield heft in markets for assets ranging from collateralised-loan obligations (CLOs) in America to high-speed rail lines in Britain.

The Economis thas looked at figures for the gross foreign financial assets for ten East and South-East Asian economies. We define these as total gross foreign assets excluding foreign direct investment by multinationals; our measure captures investment portfolios and bank lending, among other things. The combined foreign financial assets of our ten countries rose from around $8trn in 2005 to nearly $28trn in 2020, increasing the region’s share in global foreign-held financial assets by five percentage points (see chart 1). headtopics.com

The composition of Asia’s savings hoard has also changed, strikingly so in some places. When Mr Bernanke conducted his analysis foreign-exchange reserves held by governments and central banks in our set of ten economies accounted for about half of a country’s foreign financial assets, on average.

These had been stockpiled after the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 as a bulwark against future currency collapse, and were held in safe, liquid assets. The average share of reserves has now fallen to nearer a third. Meanwhile, two-thirds of the stockpile now reflects an explosion in portfolio and other financial flows, as institutional investors in the region have hunted for yield (see chart 2).

The shift is drawing the attention of financial watchdogs. In December the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), a club of central banks, concluded that Asian institutional investors had contributed to dollar funding stress in March 2020, as covid-19 first began to spread and markets panicked. Yet much about these financial interlinkages, and the risks associated with them, is still poorly understood.

Our sample of countries can be split into three camps.
The wealthiest handful—Hong Kong, Japan and Singapore—hold significant foreign-exchange reserves, but their hoards of other financial assets are between five and eight times larger. Their holdings are now mature, and slower-growing by regional standards.

A bigger shift has taken place in South Korea and Taiwan. In 2005 almost half of Taiwan’s foreign financial assets, and two-thirds of South Korea’s, took the form of reserves.
Although reserve holdings have since more than doubled for both countries, portfolio and other assets have expanded at a far more rapid clip.

South Korea and Taiwan now own $1.5trn and $2.1trn in foreign financial assets, respectively, less than a third of which is held in reserves.

In Malaysia, too, non-reserve financial assets now outweigh reserves two-to-one. By contrast, for a third set of countries, which includes China, Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand, reserves still retain a large share. headtopics.com

A year on, has Trump benefited from a Twitter ban?
The growth in foreign financial holdings has gone hand-in-hand with the transformation of conservative institutional investors into big players in distant corners of financial markets.

A prime example is Norinchukin Bank, an agricultural co-operative based in Japan. It holds some ¥4.8trn ($42bn) in CLOs, securities made up of a portfolio of loans, most of which are denominated in dollars. Before it slowed purchases in 2019, it was widely considered the largest buyer of CLOs in America.

Taiwan’s insurers, such as Cathay Life Insurance and Fubon Life Insurance, have become influential institutions in a number of international markets. Their total assets have nearly tripled over the past decade. And more of them are now held overseas. By the end of 2020 almost 60% of their assets comprised foreign investments, up from 30% in 2010.

Such institutional investment is now so widespread that Formosa bonds, foreign-currency bonds issued in Taiwan by a range of global firms and governments, have exploded since the securities were designated as domestic rather than foreign debt, allowing insurers to skirt regulatory limits on foreign-security ownership. By the end of 2021 the outstanding value of dollar Formosa bonds alone was $195bn, compared with $84bn six years earlier.

South Korea’s National Pension Service has also sought more overseas exposure, announcing a flurry of global ventures. Foreign assets made up 37% of the pension fund last year, nearly double the share in 2013, and the firm aims to increase that to 50% by 2024.

The strategy is to chase returns not only abroad but also in less-liquid asset classes, before the fund’s benefit payouts start to increase in the early 2040s and its revenue surplus turns to a deficit. headtopics.com

Malaysia’s Employees Provident Fund (EPF), which manages mandatory pension investments for the country’s private-sector employees, provides another illustration of Asian institutions’ foreign reach.

Last year it launched what it called the world’s largest sharia private-equity fund, with BlackRock, HarbourVest Partners and Partners Group each managing a third of the allotted $600m. The EPF’s foreign assets have also climbed from 29% of the total in mid-2017 to 37% in mid-2021.

The result of all this activity is that Asian institutional investors have become enormous swing buyers in certain markets.

“They’re disproportionately large in Australia,” says Martin Whetton of Commonwealth Bank of Australia. The country, he says, is the third-largest location of assets for Japanese life insurers, and tends to make up about 10-15% of their portfolios.

Mr Whetton points out that purchases of Australian dollar assets in North Asia are large enough to shift the country’s cross-currency basis (the premium traders pay to temporarily exchange currencies).

Some institutions have made promises of guaranteed payouts to clients and, as interest rates have sunk to rock-bottom levels, have had little option but to hunt for yield in less highly rated or more illiquid asset classes.

Industry insiders note that insurers in the region have moved increasingly into emerging-market debt and higher-yielding Asian bonds.

Private, illiquid assets have also become more popular. Asian investors have long been drawn to private equity and property, says Anish Butani of bfinance, an investment consultancy. Now “we’re really seeing a surge of activity in infrastructure and private debt”.

To observers such as the BIS and the IMF, all this signifies greater financial risks than when more holdings took the form of safe, highly liquid reserve assets.

Cross-border financial flows can be volatile and flighty, transmitting stress from one part of the world to another, and posing risks both to the buyers and the markets in which they participate.

Although many institutions must pay clients in their domestic currencies, few appear to hedge their entire foreign-currency exposure.

Private assets are harder to sell quickly at reliable prices, potentially posing liquidity problems should investors need to pull out. Precise, coherent figures on the composition, riskiness and liquidity of holdings are still hard to get hold of, making it difficult to gauge the overall picture.

But understanding what’s going on could become more important, if China follows the path of East Asian economies. Its reserves of more than $3trn dwarf its other financial holdings.

A shifting composition of foreign assets is not a matter of destiny, and would require some loosening of China’s capital controls. But even a marginal move towards more portfolio investment could produce huge flows of capital.

“Chinese insurers have a lot of interest in investing overseas,” says Rick Wei of JPMorgan Asset Management. “They want to diversify their holdings, increase returns and match their liabilities with longer-term assets.” Even after more than a decade of rampant growth in Asia’s private foreign assets, more may be yet to come.

Read more: The Economist »



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (8399)1/21/2022 8:20:09 AM
From: elmatador1 Recommendation

Recommended By
Cogito Ergo Sum

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The Lords of Easy Money — where the Fed went wrong

Christopher Leonard’s compelling account of central-bank decision-making — and why the 2008 financial crash never really ended Thomas Hoenig, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City

It’s tough to turn the nuances of monetary policy into personality-driven narrative. But Christopher Leonard has succeeded in doing just that with The Lords of Easy Money.

In it, he follows Thomas Hoenig, the plain-spoken Kansas City banker who was, back in 2010, the single dissenting vote on the policy-setting Federal Open Market Committee to stand against the US central bank’s quantitative easing programme. He turns the unassuming economist into the protagonist of a compelling tale about how the Federal Reserve changed the entire nature of the American economy.

Hoenig was in many ways born to be a central banker. A thoughtful, quiet, easy-tempered man who rose over years at the Fed to head its Kansas City branch, he’s a Midwesterner to his core: prudent, balanced and the opposite of attention-seeking.

But after the financial crisis, he broke out of the traditional Fed consensus and risked public fury (not to mention massive criticism from his peers) to sound the alarm about how a radical experiment in monetary policy, which involved pumping unprecedented amounts of money into the US economy, would increase inequality and encourage ever more risky behaviour on Wall Street.

What kind of sensible investing is possible in a world in which teenagers talk about ‘buying the dip’ and pension funds desperate for yield pour money into cryptocurrencies?


He was right, of course. We’re all speculators now, a point that Leonard drives home throughout the book by following not only the politics and macroeconomics that drove Fed decision-making, but also its real-world fallout.

More than a decade on from the Fed’s fateful decision to turn the liquidity spigots on full-blast, ultimately increasing its balance sheet from $2.3tn in 2010 to a whopping $7tn by 2020, most investors and even plenty of average people are aware that the central bank has, in some profound way, manipulated the market. What kind of sensible investing is possible in a world in which teenagers talk about “buying the dip”, retail traders on the popular Robinhood app push meme stocks into the stratosphere, and pension funds desperate for yield pour money into cryptocurrencies?


It’s all part of what Leonard calls “the age of ZIRP”, referring to the “zero-interest-rate policy” that has made price discovery in US markets in particular next to impossible. He unpacks all the obscure trader terminology and its meaning, weaving this into a 40-year history of the central bank and its main actors, frequently coming back to Hoenig and his warnings as a touchstone to tie it all together.

Weaving together narrative non-fiction with big ideas can be difficult. One of the best things about this book is that through Hoenig, Leonard, a business journalist, is able to tell the whole, complicated half-century story of how we got to where we are now in a way that isn’t at all wonky. There are real people here, making real decisions about the real world. What’s more, this isn’t just about 10 years of easy money. It’s about a culture in which the Fed has over the past several decades taken over from government as the key economic actor in the country.

The central bank has always held a crucial but fraught position in the US political system. Americans need the Fed, but don’t like it being too powerful. It’s both a government agency but also a private bank. “It was controlled in Washington, DC, but also decentralized. It was given total control over the money supply, but didn’t replace the private banking system,” writes Leonard. “It was insulated from voters, but broadly accountable to politicians.”

That strange middle ground enabled bankers like Alan Greenspan, Fed chair from 1987-2006, to exert ever more power relative to politicians, who were all too happy to hand over the decision-making baton to someone else. With low rates and other monetary tools, America’s central bankers created a kind of saccharine growth on Wall Street that was potent and yet divorced from the real story on the ground.

The Fed-led “irrational exuberance” — to deploy Greenspan’s memorable phrase — was behind the dotcom bubble; the crash of 2008; the past few years’ troubles in the vital repo market that underpins billions of dollars in financial transactions; and to a large extent the outperformance of equities, even the most speculative ones, amid a global pandemic (we don’t get too much about that, since the narrative stops around 2020).

Part of the root problem was that Greenspan and most of his successors worried more about price inflation than asset inflation, which was, after all, good for the investing class. That was convenient, given that Greenspan himself was quite invested in being a part of that class, as detailed in The Man Who Knew by Sebastian Mallaby. The more he did to keep markets propped up, the better it was for the business elite, and the less politicians had to do, creating a dysfunctional dance in which the fortunes of asset owners versus everyone else moved further and further apart.

But Hoenig always cared more about Main Street. And he could see, over the past decade in particular, that while inflation (usually the bugaboo of those who worry about loose monetary policy) wasn’t rising, asset prices were, in ways that encouraged everything from our record corporate debt bubble to energy speculation to a wildly overleveraged commercial real estate market.

Indeed, there’s now academic evidence to show that the Fed has for decades stretched out recovery cycles in artificial ways that have papered over big economic problems, creating bigger and more damaging bubbles.

Many of us have worried for some time now about when this latest one will pop. Given the recent volatility following Fed chair Jay Powell’s admission that today’s inflation is no longer “transitory” and that both interest rates and balance sheets need to be normalised, it’s likely we’ll see some pain this year. What will happen when central bankers, “the only game in town” (to quote another Cassandra of easy money, Mohamed El-Erian), finally, by choice or by force, pull the plug?

Nothing good. We’ve built “an entire economic system” around a “zero rate. Not only in the US but globally. It’s massive,” says Hoenig.
“Now, think of the adjustment process to a new equilibrium at a higher rate.
Do you think it’s costless?
Do you think that no one will suffer?
Do you think there won’t be winners and losers? No way.”
Or, as Leonard himself puts it, the financial crash of 2008 never really ended. It just morphed into another crisis, the bills for which have yet to be paid.

The Lords of Easy Money: How the Federal Reserve Broke the American Economy by Christopher Leonard Simon & Schuster, $30, 362 pages

Rana Foroohar is the FT’s global business columnist



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (8399)1/30/2022 11:59:13 PM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 13783
 
Mother of all sanctions: Cripple the Russian economy using bank sanctions.

In the event of an invasion, Menendez said the Kremlin would face “the mother of all sanctions” targeting Russian banks to cripple the country’s economy.

At the same time, US would step up supplying Ukraine with lethal aid.

”These are sanctions beyond any that we have ever levied before?,” Menendez said.?

nypost.com