To: Andrew H who wrote (14443 ) 2/8/1998 7:11:00 AM From: Henry Niman Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 32384
Here's what the FT had to say about pharmas and Biotechs: Merger: Drugs hit gene gridlock SATURDAY FEBRUARY 7 1998 Driving brains not profit, is the task facing Glaxo and SmithKline, says Daniel Green There can be nothing more frustrating for a Ferrari driver than getting stuck in atraffic jam. That is what has happened to the drugs industry, and the proposed œ100bn merger between Glaxo Wellcome and SmithKline Beecham is an attempt to get the traffic moving. It is a risky strategy because it involves people rather than mere money. Glaxo and SmithKline are prepared to take that risk even though, by the standards of any other industry, they are enormously rich. The combination would be a behemoth with annual sales of œ17bn, employing more than 100,000 people and, if City analysts are to be believed, making œ5bn a year in pre-tax profits early next decade. Why should the rich take risks? Because they have a problem that could seriously damage their wealth if their rivals solve it first. The problem is that their gridlocked Ferraris - the glittering research centres and sales forces packed with PhDs - cost billions of pounds a year. If only there was a way they could go faster . . . Start with sales. Drugs are tested through clinical trials that should give an objective evaluation of how good they are. They do not. Patients are different (do you prefer aspirin or paracetamol?) and trials are different (should you measure how quickly your headache goes or how long before the next one starts?). The bottom line is that doctors and patients are eminently persuadable about medicines. The more sales people there are on the road, the more drugs are sold. And anyone who has watched US television in the past three years will have noticed that drug companies have discovered television advertising. The Glaxo SmithKline combination would be the biggest drugs company in the world, able to afford a huge sales force, negotiate for the best advertising slots, and sell more. The R&D jam is not harder to understand, but the description takes a little longer. Seventy years ago, new medicines were discovered with what scientists call "bucket chemistry". Plants and soil gathered outside the factory or on a seaside holiday would be tested on animals and people in the hope that some medical effect would turn up. If something looked promising, chemists would try to make a similar compound to see if it worked better, or hurt less. It was a slow process, but aspirin and penicillin were high spots. After the second world war, the doctors moved in. They wanted to understand how a disease worked before looking for a drug to treat it. The great pioneer was ICI's James Black, who studied how adrenalin affected the heart in the 1950s. He found chemical "receptors" for adrenalin and suggested that a drug might occupy the receptors and keep the adrenalin out. Knowing roughly what to put in his bucket, and what to test it on, led to a group of best-selling drugs to treat high blood pressure. These beta-blockers helped bring Black a knighthood and a Nobel Prize. The Black model is still how drugs companies work. The difference is that understanding how diseases work is largely about studying genes, and finding the key to fit the genetic lock involves computers, miniature robots and finding people who understand how to apply them in molecular medicine. In the past five years, SmithKline has built a Ferrari of genetics research. It has identified thousands of pieces of DNA, the chemical that holds genetic material, and probably has more genetic information than any other company in the world. The trouble is that knowing chemical structure is just the start. A gene is not a medicine. A gene is something that makes a protein in the body. A disease may start when a gene misbehaves. But how, where, when and why the gene does what it should not remain to be answered. There are so many possibilities that SmithKline has offered some data to other drugs companies in the hope they get somewhere. Glaxo has a solution. It is one of the top companies in the computerisation of bucket chemistry which goes by the more high falutin' name of combinatorial chemistry. It is a way to put together pieces of molecules in different ways very quickly. Specialist combichem companies in the US claim to be able to make a million different compounds a week, and Glaxo is probably not too far off that number. But Glaxo's Ferrari is also stuck in a jam. How do you test so many potential drugs before the next million come through the door? Glaxo - and about every other drugs company - have part of the solution: banks of robot arms working day and night testing molecules against targets like James Black's adrenalin receptors. What Glaxo needs is many more targets, and that is what SmithKline's genetics research is producing. It sounds such a sensible merger, then. Not according to some, such as Merck in the US and the UK's Zeneca. They may yet change their minds but for the moment can point to lots of problems. First, the available evidence suggests that people are more productive in small laboratories. There are more than 2,000 biotechnology companies, and Jan Leschly, SmithKline's chief executive, once said: "Biotech companies can turn geniuses into millionnaires. We can't." Second, there may be more efficient ways to clear the traffic jam. How about learning more about what the genes and molecules do before doing millions of potentially useless screens? Third, and most importantly, is the damage big mergers can cause. Michael Standing, a vice-president with management consultancy Gemini, points out that Glaxo has a market valuation of œ60bn. Its annual accounts show its assets are worth less than œ2bn Much of the difference lies in the value of people's ideas, techniques and skills. Standing says that both companies could get the financial side of their merger perfect, but if they mess up the human side, they risk destroying most of their value. We are likely to hear a lot over the next few weeks about the finances of this proposed merger. The figures will sound convincing. But investors considering the prospects of these companies and the alternatives should remember that the numbers are a small part of the story. People who buy cars for their theoretical top speed sometimes find that a people-mover would have been a better idea.