Russia’s first principle in waging war with Ukraine: Destroy the Ukraine army. Acquiring and holding territory is secondary. However, Russia assumed that its public understood this principle, and failed to explain the military rationale for pulling out of Kharkiv and Izyum. That led to a firestorm of criticism and looks to have forced the timing of the referenda in the “liberated” areas and the partial mobilization.

In the ensuing uproar, I lost sight of this first principle. Hence, I initially missed the significance of General Surovikin’s remarks in his press conference yesterday about the possibility of Ukraine flooding Kherson city by blowing up the dam at the Kakhovskaya hydroelectric power station and causing as many as 50,000 deaths. Kherson had a population of less than 300,000 before the fighting started and it has to be markedly lower now.

I don’t take seriously the idea that Ukraine military could take the city by force. They failed in their last Kherson offensive, over the same terrain, and took massive losses. They are in no better shape now when by contrast Russia has been able to resupply and has started moving more men in too.

However. Ukraine may finally get those 300km range HIMARS missiles. And it likely can shell the outskirts of Kherson now, and could do more with only incremental advances. Surovikin depicted the city as in borderline crisis now, with food and water supplies erratic.

I had deemed abandoning Kherson to be politically unacceptable. Surovikin appears to have persuaded the Russian public that the destruction of the Ukraine army and preserving Russian lives as top priority.

And in particular, if Ukraine does flood the city, the military will want maximum flexibility in how to respond. Taking Nickolaev and Odessa, for example.