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Strategies & Market Trends : The Financial Collapse of 2001 Unwinding -- Ignore unavailable to you. Want to Upgrade?


To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)7/21/2023 11:07:26 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13775
 
True, but the US and U consumer are not consuming like the past 15 years.

Second China does not want to produce. Export a lot. Get USD and then go buy US treasuries.

China is using USD to fund developing countries.

The relative resilience of LatAm and Caribbean (LAC) enabled the region to gain importance as a destination for Chinese investment. Prior to 2016, LAC represented less than 3% of China’s annual FDI outflows. Now, its share has likely grown to between 5% and 10%.

To put things in perspective, last year China invested $8.4 billion in the EU, $4.7 billion in the U.S. and $7-10 billion in LAC. The fact that LAC would attract a comparable amount of Chinese investment as did the EU and the U.S.—much larger economies—was unimaginable a decade ago.

By one estimate, Brazil alone absorbed $5.9 billion of FDI from China in 2021, making it the top recipient country of Chinese investment in the world.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)7/28/2023 12:13:06 PM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13775
 
China Has 10 Years Left, At Most' — 100 Million Population Drop Could Lead To Economic Disaster, According To Famed Analyst

Jeannine Mancini
Thu, July 27, 2023 at 6:33 PM GMT+3·3 min read



Renowned geopolitical analyst Peter Zeihan recently made a startling prediction during an interview with commentator Joe Rogan.

Zeihan believes that China's collapse is imminent, with only 10 years remaining before potential disaster. The crux of his prediction lies in his assertion that China has misrepresented its population numbers, leading him to estimate that the country's actual population is lower by 100 million than what the government has officially reported.

"This is their last decade," Zeihan said of China. When Rogan clarified by asking, So, you're saying that China has 10 years to go?" His response was, "At most."

Some argue that China's massive military, control over its people and economic power are safeguards against its demise, but others point to concerning signs that hint at potential challenges ahead.

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China's economy is showing signs of strain from various angles. Civil unrest erupted as a result of its strict zero-COVID policy, leading to lockdowns, reduced industrial output and restrained consumer spending.

Last year, economic growth experienced a significant decline, reaching one of its lowest levels in the past 50 years. The fourth quarter, in particular, was severely impacted by strict economic policies and political decisions that were deemed unwise.

With China's population aging rapidly, there are fewer working-age people to support retirees. The one-child policy, which lasted for more than three decades before ending in 2016, worsened the situation and threatens long-term economic prospects. While China has attempted to address this by allowing couples to have up to three children, the extent of its impact on the workforce remains uncertain.

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The Chinese real estate market has been grappling with a prolonged slump. In 2022, the country saw another major drop in home prices, marking the steepest annual drop since 2015. The downturn has reverberated through various sectors of the economy, including construction, steel and cement, causing a decline in demand and leading to job losses and an overall slowdown in economic growth.

The ongoing real estate slump has become a major cause for concern for the Chinese government. To counter the decline and stabilize the market, the government has implemented a range of measures, including tax breaks and subsidies for homebuyers. Despite these efforts, the decline in home prices has persisted, posing a significant challenge for policymakers seeking effective solutions.

The country's exports also saw a 9.9% drop from the previous year. Trade plays a significant role in China's economy, with exports accounting for around 20% of its gross domestic product in 2021. But this reliance on international trade makes China susceptible to global economic fluctuations and trade policy shifts, as demonstrated during the COVID-19 pandemic when demand for Chinese products declined.

China is now attempting to pivot toward domestic consumption to drive growth, with electric car manufacturers showing promise in leading the way. Nevertheless, a comprehensive shift will necessitate significant changes in China's economic structure and policies.

While the International Monetary Fund predicts China's economy will grow 5.2% (an increase from its previous 4.4% forecast), the economic headwinds and demographic challenges facing the nation could have significant implications on a global scale. Any slowdown in the Chinese economy may trigger price pressures in the U.S. and impact the demand for American products.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)8/8/2023 2:06:31 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13775
 
China reports double-digit plunge in July exports and imports, missing expectations
PUBLISHED MON, AUG 7 202311:14 PM EDTUPDATED 2 HOURS AGO

Evelyn Cheng @CHENGEVELYN

KEY POINTS
  • China reported trade data for July that showed a worse-than-expected drop in imports and exports.The drop pointed to falling demand overseas and in China.
  • Among the few higher-value export categories that saw a significant increase in the first seven months of the year were cars and suitcases.
  • China’s exports to the U.S. plunged by 23.1% year-on-year in July
  • Those to the European Union fell by 20.6%
  • Exports to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations fell by 21.4%, according to the data
BEIJING — China said Tuesday that exports fell by 14.5% in July from a year ago, while imports dropped by 12.4% in U.S. dollar terms.

That’s worse than what analysts had expected.

A Reuters poll predicted a 12.5% decline in exports in July from a year ago, in U.S. dollar terms. Imports were expected to have dropped by 5% during that time, according to the poll.

China’s exports to the U.S. plunged by 23.1% year-on-year in July, while those to the European Union fell by 20.6%, CNBC analysis of customs data showed.
Exports to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations fell by 21.4%, according to the data.

China’s imports from Russia fell by 8.1% in July from a year ago, the data showed.

A slowdown in U.S. and other major economies’ growth has dragged down Chinese exports this year. Meanwhile, China’s domestic demand has remained lackluster.

Chinese imports of crude oil dropped by 20.8% in July from a year ago, while imports of integrated circuits fell by nearly 17%.

July’s decline in trade adds to recent weakness in China’s exports and imports.

On a year-to-date basis, China’s exports for the first seven months of the year fell by 5% from a year ago, while imports dropped by 7.6% during that time.

Among the few higher-value export categories that saw a significant increase in the first seven months of the year were cars, refined oil and bags, suitcases and similar receptacles.

For imports, paper pulp, coal products and edible vegetable oil were among the categories seeing significant growth in the January to July period from a year ago.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)8/13/2023 6:55:57 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13775
 
China is hostage of the economic model that China grew with: The fat cats that grew fat will grab ANYTHING FROM THE TABLE.

"...the weight of vested interests (state enterprises, as well as local governments thriving on construction contracts and state bank loans fuelling those projects), and the powerlessness of social groups who stand to benefit from such rebalancing policy (workers, peasants and middle-class households), meant that reformism did not take root."





Zombie Economy
HO-FUNG HUNG
04 AUGUST 2023 ECONOMICS

In the early 2010s, the economist Justin Lin Yifu, a former World Bank chief official with ties to the Chinese government, predicted that China’s economy would have at least two more decades of growth above 8%. He reckoned that since the country’s per capita income at that time was about the same level as Japan’s in the 1950s and South Korea’s and Taiwan’s in the 1970s, there was no reason China could not replicate the erstwhile successes of these other East Asian states. Lin’s optimism was echoed by the Western commentariat. The Economist projected that China would become the world’s biggest economy by 2018, surpassing the United States. Others fantasized that the Communist Party would embark on an ambitious programme of political liberalization. The New York Times’s Nicholas Kristof wrote in 2013 that Xi would ‘spearhead a resurgence of economic reform, and probably some political easing as well. Mao’s body will be hauled out of Tiananmen Square on his watch. Liu Xiaobo, the Nobel Peace Prize-winning writer, will be released from prison’. The political scientist Edward Steinfeld likewise argued in 2010 that China’s embrace of globalization would kickstart a process of ‘self-obsolescing authoritarianism’ resembling that of Taiwan in the 1980s and 90s.

Ten years later, the naivety of these forecasts is apparent. Even before the onset of Covid-19, the Chinese economy had slowed down and entered a domestic debt crisis, visible in the collapse of major real estate developers like Evergrande. After Beijing lifted all pandemic restrictions in late 2022, a widely anticipated economic rebound failed to materialize. Youth unemployment spiked at above 20%, surpassing that of every other G-7 nation (another estimate put it at above 45%). Data on trade, price, manufacturing and GDP growth all point to deteriorating conditions – a trend that fiscal and monetary stimulus has failed to reverse. The Economist now claims that China might never catch up with the US, and it is universally acknowledged that Xi is no liberal, having redoubled state intervention in the private sector and foreign enterprises while silencing dissenting voices (including those that had previously been tolerated by the Party).

It would be wrong to think that external factors have radically altered China’s prospects. Rather, the country’s gradual decline started more than a decade ago. Those who closely analysed the data, beyond the buzzing business districts and flashy building developments, detected this economic malaise as early as 2008. Back then, I wrote that China was entering a typical overaccumulation crisis. Its booming export sector had raked in a huge amount of foreign reserves since the mid-1990s. In its closed financial system, exporters must surrender their foreign earnings to the central bank, which creates equivalent RMB to mop up the foreign currencies. This led to the rapid expansion of RMB liquidity in the economy, mostly in the form of bank loans. Because the banking system is tightly controlled by the party-state – with state-owned or state-connected enterprises serving as the fiefdoms and cash cows of elite families – the state sector enjoyed privileged access to state bank loans, which were used to fuel an investment spree. The result was rising employment, a temporary and localized economic boom, and a windfall for the elite. But this dynamic also left behind redundant and unprofitable construction projects: empty apartments, underused airports, excessive coal plants and steel mills. That, in turn, resulted in falling profits, slowing growth and worsening indebtedness across the main sectors of the economy.

Throughout the 2010s, the party-state periodically undertook new lending in an attempt to arrest the slowdown. But many enterprises simply took advantage of easy bank loans to refinance their existing debt without adding new spending or investment to the economy. These companies eventually became loan addicts; and as with any addiction, increasing doses were needed to generate diminishing effects. Over time, the economy lost its dynamism as zombie enterprises were kept alive through debt alone: a classic case of the ‘balance-sheet recession’ that roiled Japan after its boom ended in the early 1990s. Yet just as these woes became increasingly clear to insiders in the early 2010s, they were censored in official media, which amplified Lin’s upbeat assessment. Meanwhile in the Western world, a web of Wall Street bankers and corporate executives had reason to suppress more sceptical analyses, as they continued to profit off luring investors into China. The illusion of limitless high-speed growth thus ruled the day at the very moment when the economy entered its most serious crisis since the outset of the market reform era.

Beijing has long known what must be done to alleviate this crisis. An obvious step would be to initiate redistributive reform to boost household income and hence household consumption – which, as a share of GDP, has been among the lowest in the world. Since the late 90s, there have been calls to rebalance the Chinese economy in favour of a more sustainable growth model, by reducing its reliance on exports and fixed asset investment like infrastructure construction. This led to some reformist, redistributive policies under the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao government of 2003–13, such as the New Labour Contract Law, the abolition of agriculture tax, and the redirection of government investment to inland rural regions. But the weight of vested interests (state enterprises, as well as local governments thriving on construction contracts and state bank loans fuelling those projects), and the powerlessness of social groups who stand to benefit from such rebalancing policy (workers, peasants and middle-class households), meant that reformism did not take root. The minimal gains in inequality reduction in the Hu–Wen period were duly reversed after the mid-2010s. More recently, Xi has made clear that his ‘common prosperity programme’ is not a return to the egalitarianism of the Mao era, nor even a restoration of welfarism. It is, rather, an assertion of the state’s paternalistic role vis-à-vis capital: increasing its presence in the tech and real estate sectors, and aligning private entrepreneurship with the broader interests of the nation.

The party-state has been bracing itself for the social and political repercussions of this dire situation. In official policy speeches, ‘security’ has become the most frequently uttered word, eclipsing ‘economy’. The current leadership believes that it can survive an economic downturn by tightening its control over society, eradicating autonomous elite factions, and adopting a more assertive posture on the international stage amid rising geopolitical tension – even if such measures serve to aggravate its developmental problems. This helps to explain the abolition of the presidential term limits in 2018, the centralization of power within Xi’s hands, the relentless campaign to root out Party factions in the name of anti-corruption, the construction of a growing surveillance state, and the shifting basis of state legitimation: away from the delivery of economic growth and towards nationalist fervour. The current weakening of the economy and hardening of authoritarianism are not easily reversible trends. They are, in fact, the logical outcome of China’s uneven development and capital accumulation over the last four decades. This means they are here to stay.

Read on: Nathan Sperber, ‘Party and State in China’, NLR 142.



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)11/14/2023 4:13:44 AM
From: elmatador  Respond to of 13775
 
Cogito disappeared...



To: Cogito Ergo Sum who wrote (11410)6/29/2025 10:14:20 AM
From: elmatador  Read Replies (1) | Respond to of 13775
 
Canada’s Trump-Fueled Brain Gain
The University of Toronto has attracted several U.S. professors amid turmoil between American higher-education institutions and the Trump administration.




Brian Rathbun and Nina Srinivasan Rathbun are international relations professors at the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. Before moving to Toronto last year, they worked at the University of Southern California.Credit...Ian Willms for The New York Times


By Matina Stevis-Gridneff

Reporting from Toronto

June 28, 2025

A year ago, when Timothy Snyder and his wife, Marci Shore, both prominent Yale historians, moved to Canada after being recruited to the University of Toronto, they thought it would be a fun adventure.

“I was trying to have a positive midlife crisis,” Professor Snyder said in an interview.

By the time they had settled into their new home, the mood in the progressive academic circles that feted them back in New Haven, Conn., was rapidly darkening after the election of Donald J. Trump in November.

The Trump administration has put U.S. colleges in its cross hairs, accusing some of cradling haters of America. It has launched policies that threaten to expel international students and jeopardize funding and academic freedoms.

Professors Snyder and Shore, along with Jason Stanley, a Yale philosophy professor who also moved to Toronto, have in recent months become outspoken about the Trump administration.

They published a widely shared New York Times video opinion piece titled, “We Study Fascism, and We’re Leaving the U.S.”

At the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, they joined Brian Rathbun and Nina Srinivasan Rathbun, international relations professors who made a similar move last year from the University of Southern California.

These hirings offer early signs that at least some academic talent is moving away from American schools, with Canada emerging as a notable destination.

“In this last year, several scholars from the States have joined us because they are deeply concerned about the assault on universities, the threat to academic freedom and the attack on rights more generally,” said Janice Stein, the founding director of the Munk School and the force behind the recruitment of U.S. academics.

“At the Munk School, we are totally committed to freedom of inquiry, to the independent pursuit of scholarship and to academic freedom,” she added. “For some coming from the United States now, those core values are of paramount importance.”

Students, too, could follow. This past week, the University of Toronto agreed to take in Harvard graduate students who are unable to complete their studies in the United States because of visa restrictions threatened by the Trump administration on foreigners.

Professor Snyder's departure is probably the most high profile, given his fame outside of academia as a best-selling author and sought-after speaker. A celebrated 20th-century Eastern Europe historian, he specializes in the study of Nazism and Stalinism and is an authority on Ukraine.

He predicted a continuing exodus of academics from the United States.

“If you let a horrible authoritarian who destroys institutions come to power, people are going to leave,” he said.

Image



Prof. Timothy Snyder, a prominent Yale historian, moved to Canada after being recruited by the University of Toronto.Credit...Ian Willms for The New York Times

But, he added, his move to Canada was not only about U.S. politics; it was also about Toronto.

“I came to Toronto a year ago because of the city and because of the university, because I wanted to teach more students,” he said, sitting on the stage of the University of Toronto’s Convocation Hall, a grand, 1,700-person-capacity auditorium.

That is where he will teach his signature first-year history course starting in January, titled, “Hitler and Stalin Today.”

It will be his, and the university’s, largest class to date. More than 1,000 students have signed up for the course. The formal venue, normally reserved for major events like graduations, is the only place on campus that can accommodate the demand.

The University of Toronto is one of the largest higher-education institutions in North America, with more than 100,000 students — more than five times the size of Yale’s student population.

International students make up a third of the University of Toronto’s student body, while Canada and Toronto itself are heavily diverse: About half of Torontonians were born outside Canada.

The university is also affordable for many Canadians, with fees about 6,200 Canadian dollars ($4,500) per year for domestic students. By comparison, tuition at Yale for American students is nearly 15 times that amount.

The socioeconomic makeup of the university and the city were also singled out by Professor Rathbun, who holds the Munk Chair in Global Affairs, as key draws.

“Over the last 30 years in the United States, we have built these bubbles for ourselves that are socioeconomic and now also highly tied to our political leanings,” he said. “And Toronto doesn’t feel like that.”

To be sure, Ivy League schools hold unique prestige and score higher in rankings than the University of Toronto, which is the world’s 21st-best institution for higher education, according to the widely cited Times Higher Education ranking. McGill University in Quebec is another top Canadian institution.

U.S. colleges, especially private ones, often have more resources because they charge much higher fees than their Canadian counterparts, that heavily depend on provincial funding.

Toronto, too, has its own share of big-city problems — an affordability crisis and slow public transport, among others. And the University of Toronto, like other Canadian schools, has not been immune to the controversies and clashes that have roiled campuses across Western countries over the Israel-Gaza war.

Image



Janice Stein, the founding director of the Munk School, on Thursday in Toronto.Credit...Ian Willms for The New York Times

But the American professors who have recently arrived in the city say they believe that it offers the conditions for academic excellence.

“There’s an opportunity to build the public study of democracy or authoritarianism, which would be simpler here than in the U.S., because, I’m sad to say, even very elite universities in the U.S. are thinking twice about having seminars on democracy and things like that in the U.S.,” Professor Snyder said.

The Trump administration’s attacks on higher-education institutions as part of what Mr. Trump has said is an effort to make them more patriotic and less left-wing, along with his deportation push, have had cascading effects on Professor Snyder’s colleagues, he said.

“In a cafe in New Haven, when colleagues sit down to converse, the conversation could be, ‘I just lost that Turkish grad student,’” he said. “Or, you know, ‘What’s the federal government about to do to us?’”

Canada has long played something of a special role in the minds of progressive Americans, stretching back to the Vietnam War, when people dodging draft notices fled north.

But Professor Snyder said that viewing Canada just as an expatriate base for American Trump resisters would not do justice to the country’s own unique role.

“We have to first respect the Canadians, because Canada itself has done much more to resist Trump than anything in the United States thus far,” he said.

Since Mr. Trump’s re-election and his menacing of America’s northern neighbor and ally through tariffs and sovereignty threats, Canadians have rallied around their flag.

In a crucial federal election in April, voters shifted 30 percentage points in just weeks to elect a new prime minister, Mark Carney, the leader of the Liberal Party and a political neophyte. It was a remarkable electoral U-turn interpreted as a rejection of the Conservative candidate for being too close to Mr. Trump.

Professor Srinivasan Rathbun, who, like her husband taught international relations at U.S.C. before moving to Toronto, said there was a clear drive at the Munk School to keep young Canadians at home for college and to lure Canadian academics back from the United States.

She sees this as part of a bigger movement to boost Canadian achievements at a time when the country seeks to redefine and assert its identity.

Professor Srinivasan Rathbun has been put in charge of undergraduate programs at the Munk School, as well as a new scholarship for top undergraduates.

“It is centered on trying to help Canadian students see that their futures can be here,” she said. “That goes along with all the effort to keep tech entrepreneurs in Canada and to create a framework where the best minds of Canada don’t have to go to the United States.”

“There’s so much commitment to building the Canadian future; it is so incredibly optimistic here,” she added, “and I didn’t feel a lot of that in the United States.”

A correction was made on
June 28, 2025
: An earlier version of this article referred incorrectly to the relative size of the University of Toronto, as ranked by student population. It is one of the largest higher-education institutions in North America, not the largest.

When we learn of a mistake, we acknowledge it with a correction. If you spot an error, please let us know at nytnews@nytimes.com. Learn more

Matina Stevis-Gridneff is the Canada bureau chief for The Times, leading coverage of the country.

A version of this article appears in print on June 29, 2025, Section A, Page 6 of the New York edition with the headline: Some Professors Leave U.S., Seeing Canada as More Congenial. Order Reprints | Today’s Paper | Subscribe
See more on: Timothy Snyder, University of Toronto, Donald Trump, Liberal Party (Canada), Ivy League, Harvard University